Lonergan's *Insight*: Foundations of Theology

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Robert M. Doran, S.J.
Regis College, Toronto
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Thoroughly understand what it is to understand,
and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood
but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern,
opening upon all further developments of understanding.

Bernard Lonergan
Insight: A Study of Human Understanding

Notes by Jim Englert

[Page references to *Insight* are to the 1957 Philosophical Library edition.]

<u>19 September 1985</u>

The "early" and the "later" Lonergan.

'Locating' *Insight* [*I*] in relation to *Method in Theology* [*MT*]:

We will read chapters 1-13 as a unit – though Lonergan divides the book after chapter 10. This is because chapters 1-13 contain the three basic "positions" (i.e., on subject, reality, objectivity) which ground the remainder of the work.

Note that use of the term "basic" here links with the later concern (e.g., *MT*) with "foundations."

The "basis" provided in *Insight* contributes to the foundations for doing theology.

Therefore *MT* includes – but vastly expands – the "basis" of *I*.

For the "later" Lonergan, theology unfolds in two phases:

1. Indirect discourse: 'stating what others have said.'

   This phase mediates *from the past into the present* – the central elements are interpretation and history:



Research

2. Direct discourse: the theologian stands on his/her own two feet – 'I say this.'

This phase mediates *from the present into the future*. It is constitutive of the MEANINGS which inform the life of the community.

This is true of all significant figures in the tradition of the community.

Thus: theologians contribute to the community's meanings (e.g., doctrines).

Foundations
Doctrines
Systematics
Communications

Foundations: gives an account which provides the basis for whatever else follows – an objectification of the self.

Doctrines: expression of what I state to be true.

Systematics: understanding of the interrelations of doctrines.

Communications: mediating these understandings to the multiple expressions of common sense and to other disciplines.

Lonergan's all-consuming drive/desire/vocation was working out a *method* for contemporary theology in the context of modern science/philosophy/historical-scholarship.

I was a general study of methods preparing for method in theology.

Insight (especially chapters 1-13) serves as a contribution to foundations, insofar as it seeks to articulate the ongoing process of CONVERSION (five-fold):

- *Religious*: reception of the gift of God's love and having one's horizon transformed by this.
- *Moral*: shift in the criterion of decision from satisfaction to value.
- *Intellectual*: the focus of *I* (though the term 'intellectual conversion' is not used there); the self-appropriation of a process that goes on whenever I know; a conversion is involved because I spontaneously tend to understand knowing other than it is (i.e., analogy of knowing with looking);
- *Psychic*: (cf. chapter 6 of *I*) Freud had spoken of the 'censor' which controls what I allow to surface from the psychological depths. (It can be 'constructive,' filtering out the irrelevant, or it can be 'repressive,' filtering out the images needed for insight.) This conversion is of the censor from being repressive to being constructive.
- *Affective*: a three-fold love permeating consciousness: love in the family, in the community, and love of God. Conversion is the transformation of my affectivity so that this three-fold love forms the basis of my operations.

Psychic and affective conversions are mentioned only in post-*MT* writings (especially *A Third Collection*).

Insight is primarily concerned with *self-appropriation of the process of knowing*; but these five conversions are not separate.

Lonergan later said he always preferred to discuss intellectual conversion first, not because it is basic or because it happens first, but because it provides a basis for talking about the others.

Note this key distinction: performance / concept
consciousness / self-knowledge
praxis / theory

At the level of performance, religious and moral and intellectual living is going on before it bets conceptualized; thus, conceptualization articulates something that has been going on all the time; self-knowledge articulates ongoing consciousness.

Intellectual conversion provides basic structures at the level of conceptualization for talking about the other conversions.

Appropriation of the process of knowing reveals that consciousness unfolds on three levels of operations:



Intellectual conversion (in its formal sense) is grasping that process, making it my own – which gives me a structure for talking about the other conversions.

E.g., moral conversion: add the fourth level of consciousness (decision) and relate it to the others.

E.g., religious conversion: add the fifth level of being in love.

E.g., psychic conversion: consider what happens between unconscious and experience.

E.g., affective conversion: pervades the entire process.

Thus, *I* begins with focus on Experience/Understanding/Judging, and derives an irreversible basic position which can then be expanded into 'higher viewpoints.'

The basic structure comes to completion at the end of chapter thirteen.

Foundations in theology has another task besides the objectification/articulation of conversion, namely, the derivation of the "categories" to be used in doctrines/systematics/communications.

E.g., when asked what I mean by "sin," I revert back to articulation of conversion.

CATEGORIES are of two kinds:

special: those categories special to theology (other disciplines may use them, but they are borrowed from theology); proper to theology. E.g., sin, grace, Christ, church, heaven, hell, etc.

general: categories shared with other disciplines – borrowed from other disciplines but transformed.

Both kinds of categories are derived from foundations.

This has always been the case: e.g., Nicea uses the 'general' category of *homoousion*.

To communicate with other, I must use general categories.

But there has always been a conflict in theology as to the importance of general categories (e.g., Barth would object to their use).

This dispute depends on what I think theology is; if my notion of theology is a *mediation of religion in a culture*, then general categories are essential: theology will thus be an ongoing process since the categories develop.

Lonergan insists that the categories of modern science must be used by the theologian intelligently, if the faith is to be mediated.

E.g., for Tillich, Tracy, Gilkey, Lonergan, *et al*., theology is mediating.

Note the first sentence of *MT*: "A theology mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of a religion in that matrix."

Mediation can be conceived as a matter of "correlation" (e.g., Tillich) or of synthesis (Doran's term for Lonergan's distinct motion of mediation).

"A synthesis of the realities known by other disciplines and the realities known in faith."

The danger of correlation is reduction of the realities of faith to the realities known by other disciplines.

Insight is significant especially for the derivation of general categories (though the final chapters deal with special categories). Throughout the book there is a focus on how to approach other disciplines.

One reaches "mastery" in any given field when s/he can reverse him-/herself and return to the beginning point and see it from the other side. Thus, mastery is a circle.

E.g., arithmetic: addition and subtraction.



Lonergan's field is human consciousness: the whole of his early development is the "WAY UP" – the way of intelligence, creativity. Only in later years did he turn to the "WAY DOWN" – the way of love, healing.

Cf. John Dunne's image of climbing the mountain to find God, and once arriving at the summit finding that God has gone down into the valley (*The Way of All the Earth*).

Our focus will be on the way up – but in relation to the later focus.

Reading Lonergan: Lonergan intends a "heightening of consciousness;" thus, the best mood is "abiding" at the level of the presence of oneself to oneself, not a mood of "striving."

It's largely a matter of "waiting for insight," which can't be forced (Cf. John Dunne's essay, "Insight and Waiting on God," in *Creativity and Method: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Matthew L. Lamb, 3-9. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1981.)

Lonergan is largely moving in the realm of the *preconceptual* – he uses concepts to invite the reader to attend to his/her own preconceptual self.

The act of insight (the focus/center of the book) is a preconceptual act; it is a grasp of the intelligibility (possible intelligibility) in the data that is expressed in concepts and stands in need of verification.

The concepts are grounded in the insight, and not *vice versa*. One of Lonergan's major opponents is 'conceptualism' (e.g., Duns Scotus): an epistemological position in which concepts precede understanding, and understanding is a matter of grasping the relationships between concepts.

Scotus explains the derivation of concepts as a matter of 'metaphysical mechanics.'

For Lonergan, the key is insight into experience, and concepts express that grasp.

In Aquinas, *intelligere* is essential, and this is missed in most all Thomistic interpretation (cf. chapters 1 and 2 of *Verbum*).

In reading *I*, it is important to try to get back into the preconceptual ("let go!").

Lonergan wrote chapters 607, 10-11 first; but in order to have anyone in the modern scene pay attention, he had to start with chapters 1-5. (This was acknowledged by Lonergan in a conversation with Doran in 1984).

Pick up what you can in chapters 1-5 and move on; you can come back as often as you want.

Theological purpose: it was conceived as a step on the way to writing a method for modern theology.

<u>26 September 1985</u>

CONTEXT in which Lonergan is writing: existential and historical.

The "*dramatic* context" is the "communal FLIGHT FROM UNDERSTANDING embedded in the texture of our civilization."

- accelerating cultural social decline;
- the only intelligibility able to be found in the world is a balance of destructive powers.

In this context, Lonergan seeks to contribute to the elaboration of a common ground on which persons of intelligence can meet to attack these problems.

Chapters 6 & 7 of *I* represent a major concern of Lonergan's since the 1930s when he worked out a theory of history; his early academic emphasis was philosophy (especially epistemology).

- In a 1935 letter (just before ordination) to his provincial, he asked to study the philosophy of history because he had developed a scheme to address problems involved in this; thus, this is an essential concern.
- His Jesuit superiors decided he would do the doctorate in theology.

These two concerns are related: he addresses the problem of history precisely by developing an epistemology: What are the PRACTICAL implications of a theory of knowledge?

A key notion is that of the DUALITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

Consciousness is "*self-presence*:" my presence to myself.

Thus, unconscious states are those in which I am not present to myself.

Consciousness is not knowledge: 'grasping that is what separates the men from the boys" (BL).

The tension of inquiry (involving ignorance) is an element of consciousness; though knowing is also consciousness.

Consciousness is a PROCESS of inquiry that occasionally comes to rest when I arrive at (different kinds of) answers.

"Insight" is not any act of advertence/memory/apprehension/etc., but a supervening *act of understanding* that organizes what one adverted to, remembered, apprehended, etc. (cf. *I*, p. ix).

Accordingly, there are two levels of consciousness:

1. adverting, remembering, apprehending, etc.; and
2. understanding.

E.g., when I enter a new situation, I am anxious and uncertain in experiencing it until I (2) understand the situation after which I come to be at home.

Human beings are restless when living at level (1), wanting 'more' (2): organization/understanding.

The supervening act of understanding that organizes experience is the focus of *Insight*.

The empirical level of consciousness is the FLOW of:

- Sensations
- Memories
- Images
- Emotions
- Conations (strivings)
- Bodily movements
- Spontaneous intersubjective responses (added by Doran)

The activity of understanding is not like the prior activity of the "presentation of data;" insight ADDS to this level a grasp of possible intelligibility in the data.

The scholastic tradition refers to grasping the "formal cause."

The intelligibility is "possible" because "insights are a dime a dozen. . . . most of them are wrong!" (BL)

There is a fuller self-presence in understanding beyond that to be found in experience.

Doran contends that there is a notable difference of "feeling" in the experience of self-presence at these two levels.

I.e., a human being cannot feel content at pure experience without organization of the data through acts of understanding.

The DIALECTIC of CONSCIOUSNESS: Consciousness *can be* a process of inquiry that occasionally comes to rest; consciousness can also be a flight from understanding (i.e., there can be insights that one does not want).

In *I*, Lonergan speaks of "genuineness," whereas later he will speak of "authenticity."

So: consciousness can be genuine – seeking understanding; but consciousness can also be disturbed by "alien concerns."

Cf. the later treatment of bias:

- Dramatic
- Individual
- Group
- General

Thus, there is a concern in *I* to catch the dynamics, not only of consciousness seeking understanding, but also of the flight from understanding.

What leads us to flee understanding/authenticity?

(In this it may be possible to see influences from the Ignatian exercises.)

In *Understanding and Being*, he refers to the "existential problem," insofar as the book brings me close to my "self" and leads to the need for self-understanding, self-judgment, and decision.

The practical purpose of the book is to help me realize when one or the other of these tendencies is operative in ME.

Cf. his *Lectures in the Philosophy of Education*: one of the major differences between the 'natural' and the 'human' sciences is what happens in how the two handle revolutions within the sciences.

- In natural science, there is first resistance, but it eventually dies out because the new is successful in explaining data.

  Aristotle. . . . Galileo. . . . Newton. . . . Einstein. . . .

- In the human sciences, the initial resistance is similar – but it doesn't die out!

  Lonergan contends that in Greek philosophy there were counterparts to our realists/idealists/nihilists.

  The reason for this is that any developments in the human sciences involve my understanding of my-self: the orientation of the subject.

  Lonergan will later say that we cannot truly understand in the human sciences without facing the question of authenticity/conversion.

The process of inquiry unfolds in different *patterns*: intellectual
dramatic
aesthetic

Lonergan starts with the intellectual pattern, not because it is the only one, but because in it the process is clearest.

The flight from understanding also unfolds in these patterns.

The two levels of consciousness are related to two forms of KNOWING (cf. *I*, p. xvii).

The question for cognitional theory is" 'What are the two forms of knowledge and what is the relationship between them?' (This question arises from the basic question:" What am I doing when I am knowing?)

Cf. *I*, p. xxii for reference to the "psychological problem;" each person must discover the two forms of knowing in him-/herself.

Augustine: from "body" to "real"

Modern science: recognition that the objects of inquiry need not be *imaginable* entities moving in an imaginable space-time through imaginable processes.

The image gives rise to the insight, but the insight cannot be grasped in the image.

$E=mc^2$ cannot be translated into a picture, yet there is intelligibility that has been verified as probably true.

There are realities that can be known only by transcending the realm of images in which we start.

For Augustine, it was the reality of God which enabled him to posit "reality" beyond "body" (which Tertullian, e.g., had not been able to do).

Modern science posits the intelligibility of realities that cannot be sensed/imagined.

In his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Education*, Lonergan draws on Piaget's analysis of the development of cognitive skills.

Lonergan distinguishes two *worlds*:

1. The world of IMMEDIACY:
    - Prior to the attainment of linguistic skills;
    - World of sense;
    - The 'world of the nursery.'
2. The world MEDIATED BY MEANING:
    - Introduced by language;
    - Meaning relates us to:
        - the distant;
        - the absent;
        - the past.

There are *different criteria for what is REAL* in these two worlds, and we have an amazing tendency to maintain the criteria from world (1) [what I can see/touch/hear/taste/smell] when we move into world (2).

In the world mediated by meaning, the criteria of the real moves beyond that simply of sense.

In later works, Lonergan will speak of the connection between this and "intellectual conversion."

Different philosophies can be distinguished in terms of these two worlds:

- NAÏVE REALISM refers to people who live in the world mediated by meaning, believe in that world, but tend to use criteria from the world of immediacy as their criteria of the real.

  When they talk cognitional theory, they tend to use language indicating that the real is the already-out-there-now to be known by 'taking a good look.'

  It is hard for such people to develop an epistemology which does justice to their belief in the existence of realities that transcend sense.

  In the world mediated by meaning, the criterion of reality must become the "verification of grasped intelligibility."

  When Augustine moved beyond "body" to "real," the word he used to refer to God was *veritas*.

  The Confessions: the truth is not known by looking outward or by looking inward; it is known by participation in the "light" that is immutable and eternal.

  He is trying to express the effort to get beyond the criterion of sense.

  Piaget analyzes the intersection of schemes of sensory-motor development; Lonergan contends that at that time the notion of "the real as that which satisfies the skills of sense" develops.

  Thus, the already-out-there-now comprises the "real" and the "imaginary."

- EMPIRICISM is an example of a philosophy which denies the existence of realities which transcend the world of immediacy.

  Empiricists contend, therefore, that empirical science does not know 'reality;' all science gives us are helpful clues in how to deal practically with sensed objects.

- IDEALISM maintains the same criterion for reality, but maintains that we live in a world mediated by meaning, but the meanings are simply subjective constructions and not knowledge of the real.

- CRITICAL REALISM: We live in the world mediated by meaning, and it is real, and it is known by criteria other than the criteria of sense knowledge.

<u>3 October 1985</u>

Clarifications concerning the "duality of knowing" (cf. *I*, pp. xxii-xxiii):

Husserl speaks of the "natural attitude" (naïve, undifferentiated coexistence of two forms of knowing); philosophy's task is to criticize this natural attitude and move us beyond it.

Beginning to differentiate these two forms of knowledge gives rise to problems of philosophy:

a. Empiricism restricts objective knowledge to the level of sense experience (positing further intellectual acts as purely subjective).

    Knowledge at the level of *experience*.

b. Idealism allows that knowing includes understanding, but what is known is not 'the real' – rather, I know 'the ideal;' what I know is 'in me' and I have no way of verifying that what is known has any reality independent of me.

    Knowledge at the level of *understanding*, but understanding is not of the real; it is a purely human construct.

c. In critical realism, knowing includes understanding, and understanding can be of the real.

    Some of the constructs created by human activity know "the real" in *judgment* (i.e., positing understanding as knowing what-is).

Cf. *I*, p. xxviii: There is an "incoherent realism" which poses half way between empiricism and idealism – it knows the world of understanding, but thinks it does so on the criteria of experience.

This is the "natural attitude" where most of us are at home.

"Intelligent/reasonable realism" accepts what the idealist posits regarding the creative capacities of the human mind but goes beyond it.

There is a "startling strangeness" consequent to realizing that some of the constructions of my mind grasp what-is.

The maintenance of this attitude is always precarious; I tend to continually fall back into the "natural attitude" of incoherent realism.

Conversion is ever a matter of withdrawal from Inauthenticity.

Lonergan frequently characterizes naïve realism as a matter of "looking" (spatial imagery); Doran (following Richardson) finds a more sophisticated version of the problem in Heidegger's constriction of being to "time."

Doran sees three levels to the "aim" of *Insight* as expressed in the "preface" and "introduction:"

1. "insight into insight"
    - P. x: grasping insight in its conditions/working/result.
    - Grasping the terms and relations in cognitional process, which can bring a startling unity to the whole of human knowledge.
2. "Self appropriation:" verified/posited insight into oneself.
    - The aim is to bring the reader to be a different subject (with a new differentiation of consciousness.
        - "Interiorly differentiated consciousness" (MT) grasps the terms and relations in human interiority.

- What goes on in “the little black box” that mediates between stimulus and response?

- Augustine expresses a tremendous knowledge of interiority, but it is a ‘descriptive’ account – as in Newman’s *Apologia*.

  - Lonergan wants to move beyond description to explanation that reaches invariant, recurrent structures of consciousness.

3. Explicit positions in philosophy with regard to knowing and what-is-known.

   - He thus seeks an epistemology and metaphysics that can unify/integrate the various sciences.

   - “Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding.” (*I*, p. xviii)

In *Understanding and Being*, Lonergan tries to come to grips with Hegel’s objection; Hegel had held that no explicit ideal of knowledge is ultimately valid.

There are “ideals of knowledge” (*U&B*, p. 4ff):

- Pythagoras: numbers
- Aristotle: certain knowledge of things through causes
- Galileo: mathematicization through geometry
- Newton: movement to system in mechanics (motion)
- Einstein: movement beyond Euclidean geometry
- Quantum: movement away from system to states/probabilities

Without the explicit ideal, these accomplishments would not have been possible.

This is also clear in philosophy:

- E.g., C. Wolff’s Scotist transference of the Euclidean ideal into philosophy: deduction from self-evident principles.

- Kant destroyed this ideal (“pure reason”).

Hegel (cf. *U&B*, pp. 11f) rejected the validity of such “ideals” because they leave dimensions implicit and thus abstract; the exclusion of those dimensions is alienating; when that alienation is recognized, a mediation between implicit and explicit allows reconciliation. Such reconciliation is then explicitly expressed, leaving some dimensions implicit, etc. . .

Lonergan posits an invariant structure in human consciousness: *oneself* as attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible – and that forms the ground/source of the particular ideals of knowledge, and of the movement beyond one ideal to another.

Lonergan thus seeks to reach beyond the relativism occasioned by the Hegelian objection.

This touches the whole contemporary issue of FOUNDTAIONS.

E.g., Jacques Derrida offers a post-Nietzschean interpretation of Hegel, ‘deconstructing’ foundations.

The question of foundations pushes beyond dialectic, because we may (in dialogue) arrive at irreconcilable differences at which point I have to make a choice. The question here is whether there are foundations in myself as subject on the basis of which to authentically make that choice.

(This forms the basis of Doran's criticism of David Tracy's *The Analogical Imagination*, in which he seeks reconciliation of dialectics which Doran sees as irreconcilably opposed -- e.g., Derrida and Voegelin.)

CHAPTER ONE:

Lonergan's descriptive account of insight (Archimedes) helps to see what goes on in every instance of coming to understand.

Cf. the five characteristics of insight (*I*, pp. 3-4):

1. Presupposing the question/tension is the antecedent desire to know (Aristotle: "wonder").

   This parallels Thomas's notion of "agent intellect."

   This desire is highly evident in children.

   It is the link between "experience" and "understanding."

   It is curiosity arising with regard to our experience that moves us beyond experience.

2. Insight is a leap, not a 'logical' deduction.

   There are no methodological/logical "rules" that will guarantee understanding.

3. Sensation is a function of outer circumstances; insight is a function of "inner."

4. Insight is always into the concrete, but also always possesses a significance/relevance that is wider than its concrete origins.

5. Coming to understand is like crossing a divide – I don't have to make that particular crossing again.

   This is also the basis of collaboration.

There are insights within common sense (e.g., the Athenians's recognition of wise men in Plato's Socratic dialogues); but there is an exigence which raises a new question which demands insights within theory (e.g., Socrates: "What is wisdom'?").

The movement is from insight in particular cases, toward universal definition.

Example of insight: Doran recalls the insight that there is such a thing as "psychic conversion," yet it took ten years to come to what he regards as adequate statement/definition.

If in description (section 1) I am becoming "familiar" with it (insight), in explanation (section 2) I am moving toward a grasp of terms and relations in the process.

Clue/suggestion: consider hub/spokes as 'lines' and 'points' – with the important thing being movement beyond imagination.

Question: Why is it round? (limit/focus the question)

Empirical presentation: cartwheel.

From the beginning he wants to emphasize the difference between understanding and looking/imagination.

What is understood – though not imaginable – is REAL.

Conception creates objects that cannot even be imagined. . . . concepts are constituted by the activity of supposing, etc.

Concepts occur in conjunction with an act of insight, not at random.

10 October 1985

Recall: if description refers to a relationship to myself, explanation regards an account of the relationship of thing/elements to other things/elements.

Thus, an explanatory account of cognitional process seeks to give an account of the elements of that process in the interrelationships among themselves.

ELEMENTS (cf. *I*, chapter 1, section 2):



The image gives rise to the question which occasions the clue, but the clue refers back to the image.

Insight is into image, grasping the intelligibility in the image.

Insight is conditioned by the elements which precede it: image and question.

The image makes possible the insight, but also restrains it.



"Conceptualization" (in section 2) regards such things as "point," "line," "necessity," and "impossibility."

The concepts are constructions of the mind, but they result from a grasp of the intelligibility in the image.

The IMAGE (section 2.3) is necessary for the insight; imagination is necessary for (human) understanding.

Aquinas: the natural light of human intellect is being in *material* things, from which we extrapolate.

Note that points/lines, impossibility/necessity cannot be imagined, but also that they cannot be grasped without the prior operation of imagination.

Note, e.g., Voegelin's contention that the dead-end character of contemporary philosophical controversy results from "doctrine versus doctrine" (e.g., Marxism vs. liberalism). Voegelin contends that it is necessary to go beneath the doctrines to their

grounding experiences (and Lonergan would add, subsequent images, questions, insights) if we are ever able to mediate or transcend the conflicting doctrines.

And as John Dunne insists, it is much easier to understand emotions if we have appropriate images.

In education, a good teacher is one who provides fruitful images and puts them into appropriate configurations so that the students can have the insights.

The QUESTION (section 2.4) regards "the pure question," the "desire to know;" cf. 2.5, "I" am the standard set for determination of truth.

Note that Plato was vexed by the question as to how I can recognize the truth, which led in one formulation to his theory of *anamnesis*.

This dissatisfaction is what leads to further questions.

Clarifications from *Understanding and Being*:

Insight ADDS something; with it the object of knowing changes.

Concerning the circle – insight adds "necessity" and "impossibility;" thus, the object-of-knowing is *constructed*, not purely given.

The grasp of, e.g., necessity and impossibility is preconceptual, even though the expression is in concept.

Clarifications from *Verbum* concerning the relationship of insight to conceptualization to formulation.

V, chapter 1: words are spoken or written 'formulations.'

Lonergan finds a distinction in Aquinas between these "outer words" and the "inner word" that is said ("*dicere*") within; it is at the level of the "*inner* word" that insight arises.

E.g., if an English-speaking and a Chinese-speaking physicist both understand the theory of relativity, they share an "inner word" of understanding, even though their "outer word" expressions vary.

"Inner words" cause "outer words," and "outer words" immediately mean "inner words."

Immediately, outer words mean acts of understanding, which mean reality. Thus, there is not a direct like between the outer word and reality; *the inner word is the medium of knowing the real*.

Insight always occurs in conjunction with conceptualization, but *it is the insight which grounds conceptualization*, and not *vice versa*.

The inner word emerges simultaneously with understanding, but is distinct from understanding and is a product/effect of understanding. (cf. *V*, pp. 9-10)

Nominal and Explanatory Definition (I, section 2.6): cf., e.g., Socrates's questions.

Nominal definitions tell one how to use words; they express insights into the proper use of language.

Explanatory definitions express insights into the reality to which words refer.

2.7 gets back to the PRECONCEPTUAL character of insight.

Lonergan posits a vicious circle in a problem of logical terms; he contends that insight "fixes the terms."

This relates to Gödel's theorem which states that within any formal system questions arise which cannot be answered within the system.

Thus, logic expresses the insights. It this plays a significant role between the levels of understanding and judgment.

Insight is not a product of logic! Lonergan was convinced that his philosophy teachers were giving far too much importance to the syllogism.

2.8 – A line can be mathematically states as: $ax + by + c = 0$ (in which x and y are points)

This is an *implicit definition* which is characterized by "complete generality."

Lonergan seeks to state cognitional process in terms of a purely relational structure (in which each term is implicitly defined in terms of its relations to other terms); what he asks of the reader is to 'fill in' the structure with his/her own experience (data) and engage subsequently in existential self-appropriation.

Also, the notion of "dialectic" is a purely relational structure for Lonergan which he then applies to the subject, culture, and community.

"Higher viewpoints" (section 3) involves an analysis of development.

DEVELOPMENT occurs in two fashions: homogeneous expansion
higher viewpoints

Common to the two forms of development is that insights accumulate in a *process of learning tending toward mastery*.

Homogeneous expansion introduces no new understanding of previous notions.

Higher viewpoints involve modification of previous notions in terms of the later development.

In 3.4, Lonergan emphasizes that what he is about in 3.2 and 3.3 is the experience of needing a higher viewpoint.

E.g., it is not essential here to know why the rules for dealing with negative numbers work; what is essential is recognizing that when I came across negative numbers, the old rules learned in arithmetic *aren't adequate* to the new task/question.

He takes his clue from "group theory," which holds that a complex set of mathematical operations are organized by a controlling image; a new set of operations involve a new image.

- doing calculus
- doing algebra
- doing arithmetic

Cf. sections 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7

In *Understanding and Being*, Lonergan approaches this issue from the notion of system: "the expression of a cluster of insights" (cf. pp. 60-62).

Mathematical formalism seeks to "prove everything" in terms of the *system*. But Gödel insisted that questions would emerge in any system which cannot be answered in terms of the system.

This relates to the notion of "casual in sight."

E.g., Freud (according to Ricoeur) sought to account for everything in terms of biological system. But the data cannot be explained within the bounds of that system. There was need, as Jung posited, for higher viewpoint.

Cf. the notion of "reductionism."

Thomas Kuhn is talking about the emergence of higher viewpoints in scientific revolutions.

The emergence of higher viewpoints is fairly common, arising whenever data is encountered that cannot be accounted for in terms of the prior framework.

The emphasis on the significance of "apt" symbolism is important; this is generalizable beyond mathematical examples.

E.g., it is terribly important to have "apt" images for our feelings. The more I cut myself off from the fundamental source of lived images, I develop a "second reality" (Voegelin) in terms of which I try to interpret my life, and proceed to 'get more and more screwed up.'

Also, the Ignatian exercises are a matter of getting insight into God and self through biblical images.

A considerable amount of self-discovery is a matter of shifting imagery.

Note the relationship of Marx's notion of "false consciousness:" e.g., to the extent that a woman accepts the images/definitions given by a patriarchal society, thus cutting herself off from the pulsing flow of her own psyche.

<u>INVERSE INSIGHT (section 4) and EMPIRICAL RESIDUE (section 5)</u> are instances of "empirical data without corresponding intelligibility."

In inverse insight, intelligibility is expected; in empirical residue, no intelligibility is expected.

A question that Lonergan doesn't really deal with concerns where the expectation of intelligibility in inverse insight comes from.

An example of inverse insight could be: *where* is God? (Augustine)

Empirical Residue: Content of primitive experience which gives rise to no direct insight. This will relate to the subsequent notions of statistics and probability.

<u>17 October 1985</u>

Lonergan frequently quotes Herbert Butterfield (*The Origins of Modern Science*, p. 7): Toward the close of the seventeenth century there emerged a new scientific context. For centuries there had been insights calling into question the Aristotelian world view; in the late seventeenth century a new context emerged to provide the beginnings of a new world view: "It outshines everything since the beginnings

of Christianity" and reduces the Reformation/Renaissance to mere episodes in medieval Christendom (in comparison to the origin of modern science).

That new world view is the context of contemporary science.

The world view of "mechanist *determinism*" prevailed from the late 1600s to the late 1800s; it was in opposition to many tenets of Christian belief.

Cf. "Theology in its New Context" (Lonergan's first statement of "conversion" as foundational to theology); Lonergan notes that in the face of this mechanist world view, theology simply opted out, and did not attempt to enter into the questions of modern science. Theologians developed vocabulary without concern for scientific developments, and science thus developed without any dialogue with theology. There came to be a growing chasm between general and special categories in theology.

In the twentieth century, the world-view of mechanist determinism has broken down.

In I, Lonergan is trying to demonstrate his own grasp of modern science in order to assume 'theological responsibility.' He contends that all serious theology must be done *at the level of its time*. If we don't have some real grasp of what is going on in the scientific community, theology will be without impact.

There are many levels on which chapters two and three can be read; our attempt here is to disengage those notions most significant for reading the rest of the book.

It is becoming more and more clear that Kant took Newton seriously for the sake of faith. L Kant considered our knowledge of (Newtonian) objects insofar as that knowledge is possible *a priori*: what does the mind contribute to knowledge of scientific objects? Lonergan's consideration of the *heuristic structures of empirical method* is similar; he insists that we are not simply 'passive receptors.'

Thus, his notion of heuristic structure is his attempt to deal with the question of what our mind contributes.

Lonergan insists that knowing is a *structured*, *dynamic process*; the structure is "heuristic" – i.e., the structure *anticipates* the goal. (The structure is not blind; it is not a mechanistic process.) The process anticipates the goal so that it is recognized when I arrive at it. The structure is operative even if it is not formulated. (Einstein: don't ask scientists to tell you what they do; watch them!)

<u>Mathematical and scientific insights</u>:

Similarities:

- ✓ What is wanted is intelligibility *immanent* in the data.
- ✓ Insight begins with a *clue*; (e.g., Galileo begins with the supposition that some correlation was to be found between measurable aspects of the data).
- ✓ There is some *transcendence of imagination* (even though images are essential for the insight).

Differences:

- ✓ Insight in modern empirical science depends on *field work* and *experimentation* even for the images which it needs.
- ✓ The data in scientific inquiry are *discontinuous*. The scientist's mind presumes the 'continuity', e.g., in drawing a smooth curve on a graph.

- ✓ Scientific knowledge is knowledge of what is *possible*, not necessary; the more it is verified, the more "probable" it becomes. This is vastly different from Aristotelian science, in which knowledge was held to be of 'certain' causes!

    Kant presumed that science was a grasp of necessity and universality, and asked where this came from.

        Cf. Giovanni Sala, "The *a priori* in Human Knowledge: Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and Lonergan's *Insight*," *The Thomist* 40 (1976): 179-221.

    Modern science leads to probable hypotheses, but is not knowledge of what is necessarily true.

    Scientific procedure is this:

    - Hypotheses: if A, then B.
    - If B does not occur, the hypothesis is falsified.
    - If B does occur, A *may* be true.

- ✓ The data in empirical science remain always "refractory to more than approximate measurements – whereas in math the data can be carefully controlled since they are products of imagination.

- ✓ In modern science, the operations involve external experimentation on data independent of the mind.

The question Lonergan is dealing with here is stated on page 44: "How can means be ordered to an end when the end is knowledge and the knowledge is not yet acquired?" His answer to that question is the notion of "heuristic structure."

Lonergan differentiates two kinds of heuristic structure here: classical and statistical. (He will also refer to genetic and dialectic structures.)

Classical heuristic structure (e.g., physics from Newton through Einstein):

It anticipates abstract and systematic laws by seeking correlations and functions in measurable data, whereas statistical heuristic structure anticipates "states." Statistical heuristic structure holds that by anticipating ideal frequencies of events (probabilities), it can be found that actual frequency will diverge from ideal frequency in a random/nonsystematic fashion.

    Lonergan argues the validity of each structure, and in fact for the complementarity of the heuristic structures of empirical method.

In Classical heuristic structure, the initial *clue* is the supposition of a "correlation between measurements of the data."

The beginning step is to *name the unknown* (x, the nature of. . .) which is supposed to be a correlation among measurable aspects of the data (which involves a fundamental break from Aristotle).

Steps in development of classical heuristic structure:

1. A basic theorem is that *similars are to be similarly understood*.
2. It is possible to consider "similarity:" (a) in terms of sensible qualities (in relation to me); or (b) in terms of *the relations of things to one another*.

Galileo shifted science from (a) to (b), and this shift is at the basis of the shift from Aristotelian science.

Modern science begins with description, but it moves to explanation (i.e., correlation of measurable aspects of the data). Aristotle's categories had been descriptive.

In modern science, insights are expressed in formulations of equations which grasp correlations of measurable aspects of the data.

3. In discovering the calculus, mathematicians discovered that it is helpful for understanding the physical continuum and they constructed *differential equations* (some of which are used in physics to understand the relations of things to one another). The physicist presumes that the correlation of things to one another will be the solution of a differential equation.

4. One expects that eh correlation will be invariant, regardless of spatial-temporal transformations: *presumption of invariance*.

In *U&B*, Lonergan uses the "from below" and "from above" imagery; these images parallel the notions of *a posteriori* and *a priori*.

- ↑ "From below:" experimentation, measurement, charting, curve-fitting – all heading toward mathematical formulae.
- ↓ "From above:" guiding anticipations; cf. 1, 2, 3, & 4 above. Mind contributes "intelligence guiding investigation."

Q: What would we know if all the classical laws were known? (ch. 2, sec. 3)
A: We would know the systematic component in the data.

Laplace's goal had been the point where we know all the laws so that any future event/situation could be deduced/predicted from any given situation.

Lonergan insists that in addition to knowledge of laws, there would be needed insight into one concrete situation; that one situation might be systematic, but it might be non-systematic If it is systematic, my understanding of it will be expressed in one unified set of insights; it if is non-systematic, my understanding of it will be expressed in multiple sets of insights that do not have any ultimate unity.

Thus, the planetary system is systematic, and therefore accurate predictions can be made about future situations from insight into a present situation.

Lonergan asserts that what presently appears to be the case is that all world process is not systematic – though he makes no dogmatic claim here.

The question is: can universal world-process be grasped by one unified set of insights?

Lonergan proposes the inability to predict weather as one could an eclipse, as possibly indicative of non-systematic elements.

Whether that will remain permanently the case in science remains to be seen.

Lonergan posits the emergence of the planetary system as the emergence of the systematic out of the non-systematic.

Emergent probability is the emergence of schemes of recurrence out of the non-systematic with probabilities of emergence and probabilities of survival.

If process involves non-systematic elements, then there is room for statistical knowledge as scientific knowledge of what-is.

If there is a non-systematic component (left over in classical science), is it intelligible? Is there an intelligibility of "events"?

Statistical intelligibility (probability) is the intelligibility of the non-systematic.

Statistical science tries to understand the probability of events where there is no unit probability ("1", as in classical science).

Lonergan considers two meanings of "probable":

He distinguishes sharply between saying (1) that something is probably true, and (2) that something will probably occur.

Statements of *f-probability* (frequency) are on the second level of consciousness and stand in need of verification.

E.g., the statement – "The probability of rain today is 90%" – can remain true even if it does not, in fact, rain today.

<u>24 October 1985</u>

Concerning chapters four and five: ""Emergent probability" is the intelligibility of the universe (ch. 4); space-time (ch. 5) is the "potency' of emergent probability (which is the 'form').

Thus, section two is the essential part of chapter four.

Heuristic structure refers to the structured anticipation of understanding. It is the *a priori* in knowing; this *a priori* develops over history, as the movement from-below achieves greater success. Thus, the concrete form of the *a priori* is not given once-for-all (as in Plato/Kant).

E.g., 'differential equations' are now part of the *a priori* heuristic structure of science; it obviously was not always so.

Thomas's notion of "agent intellect" is related to Lonergan's assertion that intelligence anticipates insight.

Review of 'Classical heuristic structure:'

→ It aims at understanding the nature of data, with the assumption that similars will be similarly understood; this relates to the notion of 'abstraction.'

→ Science is interested in the relations of things to one another. (This is an example of historical development of the a priori – in Galileo.) This forms the basis of collaboration and scientific generalization.

→ Relations will be expressed in differential equations.

→ There is an expectation of 'invariance' (under transformations in space and time – thus Einstein).

> In his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Education*, there is an example of how NASA establishes one set of axes guiding a missile relative to earth, and then a second set relative to the solar system, and then a third beyond the solar system. The trajectory of the missile is invariant *under* the transformation equation of one set to the others.

Section three is key to chapter two.

> "Coincidental aggregate" is a key notion: at the level of the physical, there are elements in the data which are purely coincidental but which can be understood at the level of chemistry.



> "Coincidental aggregate:" a set of events whose members have some unity in space and time, but *no corresponding unity in intelligibility*.

> Lonergan contends that the universe is a matter of both systematic and non-systematic process, and that the systematic emerges out of the non-systematic; its survival does not have the unit probability of "1".

> There is an intelligibility in non-systematic process (probability) and that is known by abstracting from the random an ideal frequency from which the actual frequency diverges non-systematically.

Statistical Heuristic Structure (cf. I, pp. 63ff.) compared with Classical:

1. Where the classical scientist is after the "nature of. . .," the statistical scientist is after the "state of. . ."
2. The 'state' can be described pre-scientifically (descriptively): common sense notions of "ordinary" and "exceptional."

3. Formation of a theorem: "A notable regularity is compatible with random differences of runs of events" (p. 63).
4. Whereas for classical science, explanation is in terms of functional relationships, in statistical science runs of events are explained in terms of sets of probabilities.
5. The classical scientist measures similarities; statistical science counts and tabulates events.
6. Corresponding to mathematical functions known by calculus, there is being developed a 'calculus of probabilities.'
7. Corresponding to curve-fitting among measurements, the statistical scientist does a similar type of curve-fitting which gives the image for the insight.
8. Corresponding to differential equations in classical science, there are 'operator equations' in statistical science.
9. In both there is the leap of intelligence: in classical to functional relations; in statistical to probability.
10. In both, the leap is a hypothetical possibility and needs to be verified.

Two meanings of "probable" (cf. I, p. 67): probably occurring
probably true

Probably occurring = f-probability (frequency)

E.g., weatherman: "There is a 40% chance of rain today."

Probably true = v-probability (verification)

Repeated confirmation of cases continue to verify a statement. E.g., relativity theory is probably true.

These two meanings must be clearly distinguished. Behind the distinction lies the possibility of recognizing the efforts of relativism, which fails to make the distinction.

<u>Canons of Empirical Method</u>: [Canons are the process of 'filling out' the heuristic structure.]

Statistical Residues (ch 3., sec. 6):

There are cases of ordered sequence to which abstract classical system can be applied (e.g., the planetary system); but it is very doubtful that the functioning scheme of the planetary system brought about its own existence and that it can assure its own survival.

There seems to be no universal scheme that embraces the totality of particular cases in our universe.

Classical method knows only the 'abstract' component; the concrete is 'left over' and must be known in another way.

"It would seem, then, that an understanding of the concrete unfolding of the world process will not be based exclusively on classical laws, however exactly and completely known, but in a fundamental manner will appeal to statistical laws." (*I*, pp 91-92)

Concrete historical unfolding has both a classical and a statistical component.

"Abstraction" is enriching; it adds something (intelligibility) that is not given in sensible data; it involves grasping what is significant/essential ("form").

Lonergan identifies what Aristotle/Thomas meant by "form" with modern science means by classical law.

The only negative moment in abstraction is leaving out what is insignificant; but even that leaves open the possibility of finding a regularity in what is otherwise insignificant.

The abstraction involved in classical science will move toward systematic unification of laws; but even when we have that systematic unification of laws, that is a conceptual object and that does not mean that the concrete data will be so related. (I.e., the data will still be related non-systematically and stand in need of statistical procedure.)

We will not arrive at a "picture" in which everything is related.

A comprehensive grasp of the universe will not involve an imaginative synthesis.

- Selection: law must involve observable or producible sensible consequences.

Science is not a matter of merely passive receptivity; even in everyday living, most experience occurs within 'patterns' of interest – science operate within the intellectual pattern.

- Operations: Scientific hypothesis leads to activity on data which makes possible new data which require a new hypothesis. . . .
- Relevance: Sought is the intelligibility immanent in the data of sense.
- Parsimony: The empirical scientist cannot affirm what s/he does not know *as* scientist (i.e., that which is verified).

An implication of this, e.g., is that the mechanist-determinist image of the universe has never been verified and, therefore, should never have been affirmed.

E.g., moving from using structuralist method to understand particular phenomena to developing an entire world-view violates the canon of parsimony.

Formulations/hypotheses can be verified, as can the formulations of common sense (from the standpoint of common sense). I.e., both statements of (a) relations of things to us, and (b) relations of things to each other can be verified.

Lonergan speaks of "*experiential* conjugates" and "*pure* conjugates."

"Experiential conjugates" are verified in ordinary-experience-as-such; "pure conjugates" are verified in empirically established equations (which involves a removal from experience).

There are two types of pure conjugates:

1. Relations among contents of knowing: empirical science.
2. Relations among acts of knowing: cognitional theory, intentionality analysis.

GENERALIZED EMPIRICAL METHOD: Lonergan insists that what he is doing in *I* is as scientific as physics.

Statistical laws can be verified – in "events."

Verification involves *questions for reflection*, *following upon questions for intelligence*.

An answer to a question for intelligence enunciates a hypothesis; an answer to a question for reflection terminates in judgment.

'Events' stand to 'conjugates' as 'questions for reflection' stand to 'questions for intelligence.'

There is no such thing as a pure event – there is always '*some*-thing' that happens; that '*some*-thing' is known by classical law and abstraction; 'event' is the actual occurrence of the '*some*-thing' which is known by statistical science.

Complete explanation: Explanation is moving from experiential to pure conjugates.

All Hallow's Eve, 1985

Reading *MT*'s treatment of "general theological categories" seems to make it clear that chapter four of I is concerned with such theological realities as: creation, cosmology, Providence, miracles, resurrection, etc.

Two central notions of chapter four are:

1. Schemes of recurrence; and
2. Conditioned series of schemes of recurrence.

Schemes of Recurrence: a sequence of events of determinate types coiling around in a circle, so that the occurrence of one conditions the occurrence of the others.



"Eating breakfast" is an *event* (i.e., it occurs – actually as a 'series' of events); it probably occurred this morning in a relatively 'automatic' fashion (i.e., I didn't have to go out and slaughter a hog, pick oranges, bake bread, etc.); it is an event which *recurs* because it is part of a *scheme that recurs*.

This event can occur because of other events (e.g., the production and exchange of goods, the division of labor, the maintenance of capital); but the very occurrence of the breakfast-event furthers the occurrence of the other events (e.g., it strengthens me to be part of the economic system and consumes goods such that demand for production will be affected).

The scheme has a *probability of survival*; there are no iron laws of economics (the "Depression" broke through the assumption that there were such laws) – not only do events have probability, schemes have a probability of survival: i.e., the non-occurrence of events that would break the scheme.

That probability may be low or high, in part depending on whether there are *defensive circles* set up to prevent interferences.

E.g., some/many civil laws are established to prevent events which would interfere with the problems of survival of the existent economic scheme.

This relates to what Lonergan will later call the "good of order," which is not an absolute good (or "terminal value") – in terms of such real values, any given order is to be criticized. But order nonetheless remains a good.

In the universe there are analogous schemes which have probabilities of survival.

In addition to probabilities of survival, any scheme has a *probability of emergence*. E.g., the economic system under which we live did not always exist; it *emerged* out of prior systems/schemes. The probability of emergence takes effect when all the *conditions* for the scheme are *fulfilled*.

Other schemes "could have emerged;" this one did/does because of the fulfillment of concrete conditions.

In no way was the emergence of 'this' scheme determined.

Major emergences (leaps) in the emergence of the universe in its present state:

physical events □□□ chemical events
chemical events □□□ botanical events
botanical events □□□ zoological events
zoological events □□□ psychological events
psychological events □□□ intelligence

In each instance there is a probability of emergence that went into effect when all the conditions were met. (E.g., as far as we know, the conditions for emergence-of-life were not met on other planets in our solar system.)

Lonergan asserts that the probability of emergence of schemes equals the sum of the probabilities of the individual events; this has been called into question in a recent thesis.

The probability for emergence of life in the beginning was extremely low, because of the needed conditions. When life emerged, there is a probability of survival (i.e., the probability of non-

interference of events that would threaten the conditions for life – threats such as we are poignantly aware of in our time!)

Only in this century have scientists gone a long way toward understanding the "nature of" the conditions of life (e.g., DNA research).

The concrete conditions can be determined only in the individual sciences.

Conditioned *series* of schemes of recurrence:

Breakfast/lunch/dinner as a scheme is a function of the interaction of vital and social schemes:

social ——— order

vital ——— food

Social order sets up the probability of distribution of vital goods.

Later schemes can emerge if the earlier ones (on which the later ones are dependent) are functioning. It is because – and only because – the social order functions in such fashion as to provide me with breakfast/lunch/dinner that I am able to be here to partake in cultural (higher level) values.

Functioning of the social schemes is a condition for the functioning of the cultural schemes (e.g., education).

If there is an effectively functioning cultural scheme, there is the emergence of persons: the personal does not function if the vital/social/cultural are not functioning.

personal
cultural
social
vital

The functioning of the earlier schemes sets up the conditions for the emergence/functioning of the latter.

In the universe, physical schemes are setting up the conditions for the emergence of chemical schemes; chemical schemes for the emergence of botanical schemes; botanical schemes for the emergence of zoological schemes; zoological schemes for the emergence of psychological (sensitive consciousness) schemes; sensitive consciousness for the emergence of intelligence.

The basic problem of chapter four is whether the duality in scientific knowing (classical and statistical) is ultimate; it concerns whether the two procedures can be united to make possible a coherent world-view.

Einstein insisted that statistical laws are only a temporary aid, but ultimately all is to be known by classical law.

Indeterminists insist that all is chance, and ultimately they reject classical law.

Lonergan insists that the two processes are *complementary* in-the-knowing- and in-the-known.

Complementarity in the KNOWING is basically a matter of our consideration last week of the canons of empirical method in both classical and statistical science.

Complementarity in the KNOWN: Lonergan's world-view.

There will always be some correspondence between what you think knowing is and what is known: structural features of knowing are bound to be reflected in the known.

The question is: What world-view is involved in the affirmation of *both* classical and statistical laws?

There are earlier anticipations in *I* of Lonergan's treatment of this question:

a. 51-53, especially: "a pyramid of schemes resting on schemes in a splendid ascent of novelty and creativeness."

b. 57: "While such schemes of recurrence are many not only7 in number but also in kind, still each presupposes materials in a suitable constellation that the scheme did not bring about, and each survives only as long as extraneous disrupting factors do not intervene.

c. 91: "World process in its concrete historical unfolding rather conspicuously makes use of the statistical techniques of large numbers and long intervals of time; it exhibits not a rigid by a fluid stability; it brings forth novelty and development; it makes false starts and suffers break-downs. It would seem, then, that an understanding of the concrete unfolding of world process will not be based exclusively on classical laws, however exactly and completely known, but in a fundamental manner will appeal to statistical laws."

d. 96: "World process as a whole seems marked by the characteristically statistical devices of large numbers and long intervals of time."

e. 93-97: Lonergan gives the example of two cars heading toward point "Z", where it appears they will collide; that event is determinate resting on a whole series of conditions, each of which is itself dependent on a whole set of diverging conditions. The event occurs in all of its determinateness only if all of those conditions are met.

> When the series of conditions coil around in a circle (i.e., convergent, rather than divergent conditions, there emerges a scheme.

f. *I*, p. 113-114: "Why are there in the world of our experience such vast numbers and such enormous intervals of time? Because probabilities are low, numbers have to be large; because occasions are rare, time intervals have to be long."

"By itself, this is a very modest conclusion. Still, though the achievement is quite negligible, the potentialities are extremely significant. Statistical laws possess a capacity to generate explanation. Their heuristic assumption is simply that the non-systematic cannot diverge systematically from the systematic. But this incapacity for systematic divergence, when combined with large numbers and long intervals of time, is equivalent to a positive tendency, to an intelligible order, to an effective thrust, that is no less explanatory than the rigorous conclusions based on classical laws. In other words, probability is one thing, and chance is another. Probability is an *ideal norm* that, for all its ideality, is concretely successful in the long fun. Chance is merely the non-systematic divergence of actual frequencies from the ideal frequencies named probabilities. Chance explains nothing. It pertains irretrievably to the merely empirical residue, to the aspects of data from which intelligence always abstracts. But *probability is an intelligibility*; it is, as it were, rescued from the merely empirical residue by the roundabout device in which inquiring intelligence sets up the heuristic anticipations of the statistical type of investigation."

Emergent Probability is *explanation*. But what does it explain?

> *I*, p. 124: "Classical laws alone offer no insight into numbers, distributions, concentrations, time intervals, selectivity, uncertain stability, or development. . . they abstract from the instance, the place, the time, and the concrete conditions of actual functioning. Again, statistical laws, as a

> mere aggregate, affirm in various cases the ideal frequency of the occurrence of events. They make no pretense of explaining why there are so many kinds of events or why each kind has the frequency attributed to it. To reach explanation on this level, it is necessary to effect the concrete synthesis of classical laws into a conditioned series of schemes of recurrence, to establish that such schemes, as combinations of events, acquire first a probability of emergence and then a probability of survival through the realization of the conditioned series, and finally to grasp that, if such a series of schemes is being realized in accord with probabilities, then there is available a general principle *that promises answers to questions about the reasons for numbers and distributions, concentrations and time intervals, selectivity and uncertain stability, development and breakdowns*."
>
> It is a world-view that explains what classical and statistical law abstracts from. It explains such things as large numbers and long intervals of time.

Vis-à-vis Darwin, it is important to recognize that in chapter four of *I* Lonergan is not speaking of "things," but of "schemes;" this will be taken up again in chapter eight.

<u>General characteristics of the world-view</u> (cf. *I*, pp. 115-118):

1. It is concerned with the intelligibility immanent in the universe (what is the 'form'? – not the material, purpose, etc.).
2. It is generic, not specific; it is up to scientists in the individual disciplines to inquire into the specifics.
3. It is relatively invariant, in that it follows from the invariant structure of human knowing: the movement of human knowing (from experience to understanding) as it has unfolded in contemporary science.

   > 'Relatively' because the 'account' will be improved upon; future investigators will give better 'accounts' of human knowing, and there will result better 'accounts' of the world-view.

4. It is incomplete, until 'things' are treated in chapter eight.
5. It is not a deduction, but rather an appeal to insight.

Schemes of recurrence provide the *clue*. Doran gives the example of the converted person as being in the general pattern of self-transcendence; as conversion deepens, there is a further scheme of recurrence in the person's operations. This (self-transcendence, authenticity) is always precarious and has only a certain probability of survival; but defensive circles can be set up to protect against interferences. E.g., dreams can be warnings against dangers to authenticity/self-transcendence; the dream is part of a psychic scheme of recurrence, and it can be taken up into a higher scheme (consciousness), where its meaning can be interpreted – allowing the person to make judgments and decisions about what he wants to make of himself.

> The dream can provide data that indicates that I am moving into inauthenticity; from this I am better enabled to understand myself and make choices.
>
> On p. 118 of *I*, Lonergan refers to "defensive circles." Doran contends that "psychic conversion" is a matter of setting up defensive circles to keep one in a pattern of authenticity.

For Lonergan, there are three probabilities of schemes:

1. Before the conditions are realized, probability is the product of the probabilities of all the conditioning events.
2. As those conditions are realized, the probability of emergence is the sum of the conditioning events.
3. There follows the probability of survival of the schemes, which can be either low or high.

From (1) to (2) there is a leap from low to high probability.

Doran: "The probability of survival of Italian governments seems to be very low!"

<u>Consequences of Emergent Probability</u> (cf. *I*, pp. 125-126, where Lonergan makes ten assertions).

Lonergan is arguing against two extremes:

- Determinism (mechanism)
- Indeterminism (chance)

A *definition of emergent probability* is given on pp. 125-126 of *I*: "the successive realization in accord with successive schedules of probability of a conditioned series of schemes of recurrence."

The consequent twelve properties (*I*, pp. 126-128) are implications of the prior assertions.

Chapters four and five go back to the basic notion of "empirical residue" (cf. chapter one); insight abstracts from the empirical residue and one form of that abstraction gives rise to classical laws; but in the residue are the probabilities grasped by statistical laws; but even statistical law abstracts from numbers, times, and distributions – and the world-view of emergent probability deals with the intelligibility of these.

The abstract intelligibility of space and time (chapter five) concerns objects, thus is concerned with whatever geometry is verified by physicists.

E.g., Einstein's four-dimensional manifold is based on geometries that were verified more than Euclidean geometry.

Concrete extensions and durations (*I*, pp. 170-172) are the field/matter/potency in which emergent probability is the form or immanent intelligibility.

Chapter six deals with much more familiar material (art, politics, economic systems, etc.).

Two caveats: The style of writing does not change; Lonergan is not writing in a common sense style.

What he says about common sense is not necessarily pleasing; thus, he insists that common sense is not capable of changing political and economic systems that stand in need of changing.

Doran's experience in reading these chapters: "If he can do what he does in chapter seven, he must have something to say!"

Questions to keep in mind:

1. How does common sense differ from science?
2. General notion of 'pattern of experience,' and the four specific patterns treated here.
3. Special attention to the dramatic pattern of experience.

4. Note introduction of the term: "dialectic of the subject" – i.e., the limitation/transcendence dialectic.

7 November 1985

Chapter SIX: *Common Sense* and its Subject

Chapters 1-5 considered insight as it functions in mathematics and science, leading to a cognitional theory; chapters 6-7 explore insight in *ordinary human living*; i.e., with reference to the implications of his position for *human studies* in general. He is, therefore, relating his position to what is going on in the *human sciences*. And there are profound implications for the *reorientation* of the human sciences.

> Lonergan notes the success of the natural sciences, while calling into question the underlying philosophy; but he does not call into question the methods/procedures of the natural sciences. However, he does profoundly question the methods/procedures of the human sciences. He judges them to fail insofar as they fail to attend to the data of consciousness.

What will constitute the heuristic structure in human science (i.e., the 'from above' element)? What plays the role in the human sciences that, e.g., differential equations play in physics? Chapter seven will contend that the answer is *dialectic*.

The objective in these chapters is introduced in relation to the underlying *flow of sensitive consciousness*: the specific concern is with *insight in ordinary human living*.

> Chapter six examines the *dramatic artistry* through which we attempt *to create a work of art out of our own lives*; chapter seven concerns what we make of human society – the attempt to make a work of art out of the constitution of the human world.
>
> > "Common sense" = intelligence as it functions in ordinary human living.
>
> The "elements" of insight (cf. chapter 1) apply to common sense as well as to specialized theoretical knowing; but it is marked by notable differences:
>
> - In common sense, intelligence functions *spontaneously*, not methodically.
> - The *accumulation* of insights is stimulated, not by scientific experiments, but by expressing our insights in words and deeds and having them called into question by our fellows: the *self-correcting process of learning*. Thus, the development is also spontaneous.
> - The *communication* is also spontaneous, not methodical/deliberate; it is implicit, often non-verbal.
>
> > This implies a *communal* dimension in the development of common sense; a steady building-up of a common fund of answers to problems of living that constitute a heritage/culture.
> >
> > > We are born into a community/heritage that has a common fund of answers.
>
> - Common sense is a specialization in the *here and now*; it doesn't regard definitions, postulates, etc. its concern is with 'getting things done.'

I, p. 175: "It consists in a set of insights that remains incomplete, until there is added at least one further insight into the situation in hand; and, once that situation has passed, the added insight is no longer relevant, so that common sense at once reverts to its normal state of incompleteness."

There is always need for an added insight into the concrete situation.

Common sense generalizations are 'pointers', e.g., proverbs (not premises from which conclusions can be deduced).

- Common sense has a distinctive viewpoint and an ideal: its function is simply to master each situation as it arises (not to arrive at universal principles).
- Common sense communicates, not by a technical language, but by *ordinary language*, including tone of voice, gesture, silence; and only common sense can interpret common sense utterances.
- It works on a different plane of reality; its concern is with the *relation of things to us* (without concern for precise description leading to explanation).

  The supreme canon of common sense is to restrict further questions to the realm of the concrete and particular, the immediate and practical.

  It is complementary to science, not in opposition; each has its proper realm.
- There are many, many complex differentiations of common sense.

  Common sense differs with places, jobs, social situations, environments. I have common sense in places where I am at ease, knowing how to behave without awkwardness.

Common sense has much more *transformative effect* on the subject than does science; it involves my stance towards persons, situations, etc. It involves the *existential* question: "What do I want to be?" "What am I going to make of myself?"

Common sense does not develop without changing me; thus, we must investigate the subject in order to understand that change. 6.2 is the beginning of Lonergan's *position on the human subject* (what will later be called "authenticity"). This will be developed more fully in chapter eleven.

Here, the beginnings of Lonergan's position on the human subject is the exploration of patterns of consciousness: the pattern of common sense is "dramatic."

<u>PATTERNS of Experience</u>:

Experience = the first level of consciousness (sensations, memories, images, emotions, conations, bodily movements, spontaneous intersubjective gestures).

The patterns depend on *interest*, the direction we give to our behavior.

The acts that occur on the first level of consciousness don't occur in isolation from one another, not do they occur in isolation from other acts (e.g., lower bodily movements and higher acts of understanding and judgment).

Almost all sensations occur in a dynamic context that unifies them; there is an organizing control coming from interest/purpose/attention/striving/effort.

A repeated example of sensation-without pattern is coming to the bottom of the stairs, expecting one more step than is actually there.

1. The *Biological* Pattern of Experience

This is the normal prevalent pattern in an animal. Acts are linked together by direction towards biological functioning: intussusception, reproduction, survival.

Even at this level, Lonergan is beyond behaviorism because he is talking about linkage of *conscious* acts, as conscious; he is also beyond positivism, because he is not talking about isolated data, insofar as he is talking of a pattern that involves recognizing an intelligibility in the linkage of the data.

Even in animals, the conscious biological pattern is only part of life; there are unconscious vital functions (e.g., circulation).

Biological consciousness is characterized by *extroversion*; it has a confrontational aspect/dimension/tone; it is a response to stimuli – the stimuli is 'over against' the response. Naïve realism is an extension of this extroversion into a philosophical position on knowing.

2. The *Aesthetic* Pattern of Experience

A liberation of experience from biological purposes (e.g., children playing, the spontaneous joy in simply being); experiencing occurs just for the sake of experiencing.

This pattern can move over into being *artistic*, in which we *create* forms (e.g., in sound and color) for the unification and expression of experiential patterns.

In *MT*, Lonergan will follow Suzanne Langer is defining art as the "objectification of a purely experiential pattern."

Lonergan speaks of this as a two-fold 'liberation:' (a) from the drag of purely biological purposiveness; but also (b) from the "wearying constraints of science."

This is a beginning of Lonergan's reflection on symbol, which is characterized by an over-determinateness that theory can never exhaust. What the artistic is symbolic-of can be reached only by participation in the artist's inspiration/intention. The obscurity reflects the elemental wonder of the pure question: "What am I to be?"

3. The *Intellectual* Pattern of Experience

There is a flexibility of experience liberated from the biological pattern which makes it an instrument of inquiry. This demands an intense training. . . "in which one's living is more or less constantly absorbed in the effort to understand."

4. The *Dramatic* Pattern of Experience

Common Sense is not a matter of biological, aesthetic, or intellectual patterns – but of the dramatic/practical pattern: we want to get things done ('practical'), but in a way stamped with a certain style/dignity/grace ('dramatic'). There is an artistic component in our own living.

Our deepest desire is to make a work of art out of our own life; we want others to respect our lives as excellent in their self-constitution. (Otto Rank makes a great deal of this, as does Ernest Becker.)

But the artistic component in our living is different from the "artist," in that the *underlying materials* are not as flexible – they lie in our own bodies, and place limitations on our dramatic artistry.

The secret is to achieve a taut balance between the limitations and transcendence.

The limits are real; the materials must be treated delicately.

There is a surplus in 'energy' left over after meeting the needs of staying alive that needs to be shaped by representation in consciousness. (I.e., such energy is a coincidental aggregate at the level of the biological and requires intelligent integration at a higher level,, i.e., the psychic).

There are underlying *neural demands* for psychic representation that can be *transformed* and integrated in dramatic living.

There is a primordial intersubjectivity that constitutes the permanent but fragile base of all social relationships. From this stems our desire for recognition.

Distinct from 'theatre,' we don't take a 'role' and then adapt feelings to it; rather, the feelings emerge *already patterned*.

There is a pattern operative in bringing the materials of life into consciousness; such patterns begin already in the affectivity of the infant.

Note, e.g., Erikson's notion of "basic trust" which forms the pattern within which feelings emerge.

If I want to change my behavior, I have to reach to the pattern that is operative – and that pattern has largely been formed for me by how I have been treated in the primordial intersubjectivity.

What kind of ego emerges depends in many ways on the interactions that go on.

The pre-conscious pattern starts in the affectivity of the infant and is operative through life; it operates even to allow or disallow images from entering into consciousness. The pattern determines what affects accompany the images.

Reflection/choice have to go to work on that very pattern.

<u>Elements in the Dramatic Pattern</u>:

a) There is a subordination of neural process to psychic determination and control.

The relationship between neural and conscious is much less determined than in animals. E.g., the capacity for adaptation in fingers that makes possible a pianist.

There is a great variety in what can be done with the underlying materials.

b) The underlying materials do make demands (for psychic representation and conscious integration), and set limits to what can be done with them.

c) The way in which those demands will be met depend on what one's interest/orientation is.

That orientation establishes the dramatic pattern and what it will do in bringing images and affects into consciousness, and it determines how they will be treated.

Freud's *censor*: we can't let everything in and we can't let it in in one fell swoop.

d) Because of the variety, he refers to the underlying demands as "demand functions."

They call for some psychic representation, but this demand can be met in a variety of ways.

DRAMATIC *BIAS* affects the orientation (i.e., the desire to make a work or art out of my life); it is *an overwhelming of the orientation by underlying, primal passions*. (Thomas: the irascible and concupiscible appetites.)

Dramatic bias is the influence of elementary passions on the censorship; it is one of the ways that consciousness can be *oriented against insight*.

The elements that emerge through censorship into consciousness are images-accompanied-by-affects.

If I am oriented away from insight, the bias will manifest itself primarily in disallowing images and accompanying affects; the affects can be allowed into consciousness if attached to other images ("incongruous object relations").

Free association is an analytic technique trying to get through the associative paths that would link up the affects with the original image – for until this is done insight won't be possible.

The elements that emerge are images-for-insight; but besides the desire for insight, there is also the flight from it.

To exclude one insight is also to exclude the further questions that would be necessary for further insights; there results a 'split' in the personality.

2.7.1 Scotosis: The process is preconscious, but not actually unconscious; the images are there, but repressed; the insights can occur but are pushed aside. (From the Greek, σκοτος, "darkness.")

2.7.2 Whereas Freud had spoken of repression in terms of pleasure/pain, Lonergan affirms the censor to have a properly positive function: it serves to focus consciousness on the relevant and significant. In its malfunction, it works to exclude those materials that would give rise to the insights that I don't want.

By *psychic conversion*, Doran means the transformation of the censor from repressive to constructive function. There are many techniques for furthering this – e.g., Progoff.

<u>14 November 1985</u>

Chapters 6-7 focus on interest in everyday living ("common sense"): six is concerned with the *subject* of common sense (i.e., the subject to whom common sense relates the world); seven is concerned with the *object* (i.e., the world that is related to the subject). In both cases, the development of common sense involves changes: in the subject and in the world.

6: subject pole
7: object pole

We can see changes in common sense through history, e.g., in the development of technology; such development, of course, does not necessarily mean progress in culture.

Chapter seven is part of Lonergan's position on *praxis* – world constitution.

What Lonergan is moving toward in chapters six and seven is an essential element of the heuristic structure of human science: DIALECTIC.

In human science, the empirical method presented for the natural sciences in chapters 1-5 is *generalized* to include the *data of consciousness*.

Thus, the canon of selection changes from the natural to the human sciences: from the data of sense to include the data of consciousness.

"Generalized Empirical Method" – though in MT Lonergan began to refer to his method as "transcendental method," subsequent to MT he expressed his preference for the term "generalized empirical method" which expresses the distinctness of Lonergan's position vis-à-vis other thinkers (precisely in his stress on 'empirical').

The data of consciousness include:

a. the data within a single consciousness;
b. the relationship between different conscious subjects;
c. the relationship between conscious subjects and their milieu; and
d. the relationship between consciousness and its neural base.

The subject is implicitly defined by different patterns of experience.

In my emergence as a dramatic subject, I shape myself out of the possibilities which emerge into consciousness in the form of images for insight; such images have affective attachments, and the pattern within which such images-affects emerge is largely set for us.

We are not fully autonomous.

The pattern can be healthy; it can also be biased. One form of such bias is a matter of being overwhelmed by passions which creates scotoses (blindspots) from which it represses images rather than facilitating their emergence.

This relates to the experience of 'knowing' the value of a particular action, but finding it affectively difficult; I need to get at the pattern – in a participatory sense of knowing (e.g., real – rather than notional – assent; Newman).

Lonergan is establishing some 'functional correlation' between the flight-from-insight and psychic disturbance, and thus some functional correlation between insight and psychic health.

DIALECTIC

Three central quotations:

p. 217: "A dialectic is a *concrete unfolding of linked by opposed principles of change*. Thus, there will be a dialectic if (1) there is an aggregate of *events* of a determinate character, (2) the events may be traced to either or both of *two principles*, (3) the principles are *opposed yet bound together*, and (4) they are modified by the *changes* that successively result from them."

p. 244: "Dialectic stands to generalized method, as the differential equation to classical physics, or the operator equation to more recent physics. For a dialectic is a pure form with general implications; it is applicable to any concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles that are modified cumulatively by the unfolding; it can envisage at once the conscious and the non-conscious either in a single subject or in an aggregate and succession of subjects; *it is adjustable to any course of events, from an ideal line of pure progress resulting from the harmonious working of the opposed principles, to any degree of conflict, aberration, break-down, and*

disintegration; it constitutes a principle of integration for specialized studies that concentrate on this or that aspect of human living and it can integrate not only theoretical work but also factual reports; finally, but its distinction between insight and bias, progress and decline, it contains in a general form the combination of the empirical and the critical attitudes essential to human science."

The opposed principles are not to cancel one another out. E.g., in the dialectic of (a) neural demands and (b) conscious pattern – neural demands are not to overwhelm consciousness, nor is consciousness to repress the neural base. When they are working together in a creative tension there is an ideal line of pure progress; when they utterly conflict, there's trouble!

<u>p. 233</u>: "Dialectic rests on the concrete unity of opposed principles; the dominance of either principle results in a distortion, and the distortion both weakens the dominance and strengthens the opposed principle to restore an equilibrium."

<u>The *dialectic of the subject*</u> (chapter six):

Referring to the quotation from p. 217 (*supra*), the formal definition of dialectic can be seen as applied to the subject:

1. the aggregate of events = the contents and affects emerging into consciousness;
2. the two principles = (a) neural demands;
   (b) dramatically patterned intelligence acting as a censor.
3. linked: both are in the same subject; and the pattern influences/'patterns' the contents and affects;

   opposed: when the pattern is repressive or when it is overwhelmed by neural demands;
4. There is a 'cumulative change' in the subject as the two principles operate together.

Distortions of the dialectic:

Referring back to the quotation from p. 233 (supra): The (exclusive) dominance of either principle results in a distortion in the development of the subject. But the distortion weakens the dominant principle, strengthens the other principle and sets the stage for its reassertion.

"You can only hold out for so long!"

Dialectical integration: When the two principles are in a state of dynamic equilibrium, creative tension, working together.

(Cf., e.g., Rollo May, The Courage to Create.))

When each of the principles is in its proper place in the unfolding of events, there is an integral dialectic.

<u>DREAMS</u>:

Lonergan's position here is an *adaptation of the Freudian position*. The basic adaptation is the images are posited as heading for insight.

Lonergan grants that the Freudian position is valid for a psychoneurotic person; it does not, however, hold for a more integrated person.

To the extent that things are working in integration in us, the dream will reflect that; to the extent that there are dissociations operative in us, the dream will reflect that.

The question is: to what extent is the dream to be approached purely from the Freudian hermeneutic of suspicion.

Freud places great emphasis on *latent* and *manifest* content in the dream; this is valid to the extent that something has been repressed and made latent.

But Jung insisted that the dream can also reflect the ongoing integration of the person, in which the manifest content truly reflects this.

In developing a psychological/psychiatric theory, it is essential to develop *norms* as to what constitutes human integration; i.e., it must be based on a position as to what constitutes human authenticity.

When affects have been uncoupled from images and then coupled with incongruous objects, then there is dissociation in the personality; to the extent this occurs, the distinction between latent and manifest content in the dream is accurate.

When a person is basically in good contact with her/his affects, then if the interpretation of the dream *feels* like the dream itself *felt* – you're on the right track.

But if one is really out of touch with her/his feelings, this is obviously not true.

The dream must be approached with both suspicion and recovery; the relative balance of the approaches depends on the person.

Cf. Doran, "Aesthetic Subjectivity and Generalized Empirical Method," *The Thomist* 43/2 (April 1979): 257-278.

In the dream, the censor's activities are relaxed; neural demands that don't break through in waking consciousness will break through. Dreams will meet the claims of our nerves that we weren't able to meet in waking life, and they can do this without violating the patterns of waking consciousness.

The affects of the psyche that need expression not gotten in waking life can get that expression in dream; such affects can be associated with their proper object, though they can also be attached with incongruous objects.

Jung and existential psychiatrists have differentiated dreams far more than Freud was even able to do; e.g., archetypal dreams, which tend to occur at points of major transition in life – when they help one engage in the work of dramatic artistry.

Chapter Seven deals with *changes in the objects* by common sense.

Consciousness is used to make/do/transform the human world in which the drama of human living goes forward.

Here, Lonergan focuses on three areas of society affected by common sense:

Technological □□□ Economic □□□ Political

An essential notion in understanding technological, economic, and political changes is that of *recurrence*.

There is the *particular good* (object of desire): e.g., food, clothing, shelter.

But beyond the simple instance of such goods, technology – even in its most archaic forms – engages in capital formation to set up an order in which the recurrent satisfaction of these desires can take place: the *good of order*.

E.g., primitive hunters took time out from hunting to make spears.

In every society, there are these two levels: (1) particular good; and (2) good of order.

The good of order is first realized in tool-making; but desire and labor is not the only thing that is recurrent. Insight is recurrent, too, and people have better ideas. The history of human material progress is a matter of expansion of the basic ideas of technology and capital formation (e.g., taking time out to make tools).

p. 208: "As inventions accumulate, they set problems calling for more inventions. The new inventions complement the old to suggest further improvements, to reveal fresh possibilities and, eventually, to call forth in turn the succession of mechanical and technological higher viewpoints that mark epochs in man's material progress."

At each state, there is a certain structure of technology and capital formation. Thus, Lonergan closely relates the development of technology to capital formation.

Economy:

The good of order begins with technology and capital formation, but as this structure becomes more complicated, more human cooperation is demanded; this calls forth some economic system (i.e., *some procedure* that sets the balance between (a) production of consumer goods and (b) new capital formation, and that sets up a division of labor).

The economic system is a *function of human intelligence*; it was devised by human intelligence and can be changed by human intelligence.

But there are difficulties in getting people to cooperate, which gives rise to polity.

Politics/State regard the development of ways of encouraging the collaboration/cooperation necessary in the economy.

Technology, economy, and the State are all functions of human intelligence.

Technology is the first function; it *evokes* the economy in that it sets certain problems which are met by an economic system; that economic system solves those problems, but sets others which thus *evokes* the State.

There is an ongoing development upward in human creativity:



Out of this comes a position on society and its infrastructure.

In a 1935 letter, Lonergan admits being influenced by Hegel and Marx but sees the need and possibility of going beyond them.

In Marx, the key dialectic is between technology and economy; the political is not part of the base/infrastructure of the society.

Lonergan places the *political in the infrastructure* of the society.

Marx held that the political is part of the superstructure erected to protect the privilege of the advantaged. Lonergan grants that this may occur in a particular society, but insists that it need not happen.

For Lonergan, the basic social dialectic is between (a) technology/economy/politics and (b) *intersubjectivity*.

To fail to acknowledge intersubjectivity as an essential part of everyday life is to leave oneself open to totalitarianism.

He insists on a key role for intersubjectivity in social life.

Technology/economy/politics and intersubjectivity have to operate in collaborative tension with each other. Each group needs to be able to recognize that its place has not been violated in the society.

The biases interfere with the harmonious interaction technology/ economy/politics and intersubjectivity.

Cf. p. 212 for what Lonergan means by "intersubjectivity:" "Primitive community is intersubjective. Its schemes of recurrence are simple prolongations of prehuman attainment, too obvious to be discussed or criticized, too closely linked with more elementary processes to be distinguished sharply from them. The bond of mother and child, man and wife, father and son, reaches into a past of ancestors to give meaning and cohesion to the clan or tribe or nation. A sense of belonging together provides the dynamic premise for common enterprise, for mutual aid and succor, for the sympathy that augments joys and divides sorrows. Even after civilization is attained, intersubjective community survives in the family with its circle of relatives and its accretion of friends, in customs and folk-ways, in basic arts and crafts and skills, in language and song and dance, and most concretely of all in the inner psychology and radiating influence of women. Nor is the abiding significance and efficacy of the intersubjective overlooked, when motley states name themselves nations, when constitutions are attributed to founding fathers, when image and symbol, anthem and assembly, emotion and sentiment are invoked to impart an elemental vigour and pitch to the vast and cold, technological, economic, and political structures of human invention and convention. Finally, as intersubjective community precedes civilization and underpins it, so also it remains when civilization suffers disintegration and decay. The collapse of Imperial Rome was the resurgence of family and clan, feudal dynasty and nation."

Intersubjectivity is manifested spontaneously, e.g., when I pre-reflectively reach out to grasp someone who is falling.

In "The Role of the Catholic University (*Collection*), Lonergan refers to an "artificial intersubjectivity that has replaced real intersubjectivity in totalitarianism.

The worst thing that any political order can do is violate this intersubjectivity.

[Back to the dialectic of the subject:]

neural demands : dramatic pattern : : intersubjectivity : practical intelligence

21 November 1985

Doran engages here in what Lonergan elsewhere calls "clarification by contrast:" Lonergan vis-à-vis Marx.

It is evident that Lonergan takes very seriously the contribution of Marx to the analysis of history. There are, however, significant differences. Doran here highlights four:

1. Whereas Marx had posited the *fundamental dialectic* as being between technology and economy, Lonergan places it between: (a) technology/economy/politics and (b) intersubjectivity.

    Thus, for Lonergan, vital intersubjectivity (what Heidegger termed *Mitsein*, a primordial characteristic – existential – of human being) is in tension with practical intelligence (common sense) as it sets up an order of technology/economy/politica (Habermas: "instrumental reason").

        Habermas catches this dialectic well and criticizes Marx from this perspective.

    Chapter seven involves a reorientation of Marx, as chapter six had involved a reorientation of Freud; the fundamental reorientation here is the dialectic of intersubjectivity and practical intelligence. Marx gave far too little attention to intersubjectivity (as his focus was on the dialectic of technology and reason).

        There is first a question as to whether revolution is necessary in order to set up a new economy; Lonergan maintains that it is not. But more centrally, Lonergan insists, as Marx does not, on the centrality of intersubjectivity.

2. For Lonergan, *politics is in the infrastructure*; for Marx, it is in the superstructure.

        Lonergan acknowledges that politics can slip out of everyday life, but then it is inauthentic; when functioning authentically, p0olitics functions to keep technology/economy in healthy balance with intersubjectivity.

    Lonergan posits *recurrent interventions of common sense*: 'people get better ideas!' These are usually at the technological level, which requires adjustments in economy and polity.

        This is in harmony with Marx.

        These recurrent interventions provide better ways of meeting the recurrent vital needs/desires.

        Schumpeter spoke of business cycles of ca. sixty years, which are set up by technological developments: e.g., railroad.

            Cf. Lonergan's *Lectures on the Philosophy of Education*.

    At each stage, the problem is one of securing a *dynamic equilibrium* between technology/economy/politics and intersubjectivity.

        Totalitarianism is the extreme example of focus on the technological/economic/political to the exclusion of intersubjectivity. The contrary tendency would be present in romantic withdrawal from society.

3. Lonergan and Marx hold different evaluations of the role of *mentality* or horizon.

When one moves into a discussion of human affairs, emergent probability remains but is transformed.

Technology/economy/politics set up *schemes of recurrence* for the good of order; thus, the world-view of emergent probability 'comes over.'

But these schemes have only a certain *probability* of continuing to function.

I, pp. 209ff: "Their functioning is not inevitable. A population can decline, dwindle, vanish. A vast technological expansion, robbed of its technicians, would become a monument more intricate but no more useful than the pyramids. An economy can falter, though resources and capital equipment abound, though skill cries for its opportunity and desire for skill's product, though labour asks for work and industry is eager to employ it; then one can prime the pumps and make *X* occur; but *because schemes are not functioning properly*, *X* fails to *recur*. As the economy, so too the polity can fall apart. In a revolution violence goes unchecked; laws lose their meaning; governments issue unheeded decrees; until from sheer weariness with disorder men are ready to accept any authority that can assert itself effectively. Yet a revolution is merely a passing stroke of paralysis in the state. There are deeper ills that show themselves in the long-sustained decline of nations and, in the limit, in the disintegration and decay of whole civilizations. *Schemes that once flourished lose their efficacy and cease to function*; in an ever more rapid succession, as crises multiply and remedies have less effect, new schemes are introduced; feverish effort is followed by listlessness; the situation becomes regarded as hopeless; in a twilight of straitened but gracious living men await the catalytic trifle that will reveal to a surprised world the end of a once brilliant day."

The difference between the functioning of emergent probability in the cosmic order and its functioning in the human order, is that as human intelligence develops, the really significant probabilities are probabilities of insight – probabilities that persons will grasp significant ideas, communicate the, and implement them.

This is the matter of self-constitution of persons and of communities.

The schemes of recurrence of technology/economy/polity are "*not only intelligible*, *but intelligent*." (*I*, p. 210)

Lonergan (*contra* Marx) insists on the significance of "mentalities" (*I*, p. 211) – he will later speak of "horizons" – in the development of history.

Lonergan speaks of a relative autonomy for mentality.

E.g., Reagan-Gorbachev summit: they are influenced by the vital spontaneous level of intersubjectivity (in journalese: "chemistry") as well as by technology/ economy/politics.

Intersubjectivity – as well as economy (*per* Marx's insistence) – influences mentality/horizon. Is it possible that the impact of intersubjectivity can effect decisions made concerning technology/ economy/polity? Lonergan insists that the answer is yes.

The biases are among the obstacles to insight, communication, agreement, and decisions that are needed to effect progress in human life.

Thus, the biases lessen the probabilities of occurrence of the insights/communication/ agreements/decisions necessary for the construction of history.

For Lonergan, the principal question is what constitutes common sense in a group.

The basic social dialectic (sections three, four, and five):

Lonergan's whole position takes its stand on the basic analysis of the "*compound-in-tension* that is man."

Section three examines that compound-in-tension as it exists in vital sensitivity.

On the one hand, we sponsor the social order intelligently; on the other hand, we live in vital sensitivity.

The 'prior we' co-exists with the discovery of ideas by which the community structures technology/economy/polity which can conflict with spontaneous vital intersubjectivity.

I can't simply pursue my own desires and their objects; I have to make a contribution to the good of order.

The good of order is a set of "if-then" relationships.

The 'prior we' is indispensable to human living, as is the good of order, we must be committed to both.

The good of order is source of ever new changes to which intersubjectivity must adapt.

Doran poses the question: can we develop a cross-cultural intersubjectivity that corresponds to the international character of technology/economy/polity in the contemporary world?

Jung's discovery of the archetypes has provided a base for this, as had Lonergan's universal structure of consciousness.

Thus: the good or order has become global; so must intersubjectivity.

Section four: Tension of Community

Times of peace occur when common sense and human feeling are integrated; crisis results from their splitting apart. Such crisis is describer on p. 216: 'The time of crisis can be prolonged, and in the midst of the suffering it entails and of the aimless questioning it engenders, the intersubjective groups within a society tend to fall apart in bickering, insinuations, recriminations, while unhappy individuals begin to long for the idyllic simplicity of primitive living in which large accumulations of insights would be superfluous and human fellow-feeling would have a more dominant role."

Section five: Dialectic of Community

Lonergan shows how the situation fits the definition of dialectic which he had previously offered.

His treatment (*I*, p. 218) of the relationship between the dialectic of the subject and the dialectic of community could provide the basis for a significant understanding/account of *social sin*.

We are born into a situation which affects even our neural patterns; nonetheless, this dominance is not absolute.

The biases interfere with the horizon/mentality necessary for human progress in history.

At a first level, his analysis explodes the liberal myth of automatic progress.

Dramatic bias interferes primarily with intersubjectivity itself.

Individual bias (the "egoist"): Doran defines this as the interference of *self-centered* spontaneity with both intersubjective spontaneity and the development of intelligence.

It is the use of intelligence to solve one's own problems, but without raising the further questions of what effects my 'solutions' will have on others and on the social order.

Such a person can be extremely intelligent/resourceful in solving his/her own problems.

This is a radically *incomplete use of intelligence*.

4. Group bias is supported by intersubjectivity (but in a narrow sense) and it operates in the very genesis of common sense.

The contrast between Lonergan and Marx comes in Lonergan's notion of the *shorter and longer cycles of decline* and their reversal.

Intersubjectivity is a principle of *integration*; intelligence is a principle of *operation*. The operation of bias is discussed on p. 223.

There comes to be a distinction of *operative and inoperative ideas*; truly practical ideas become inoperative when opposed by 'powerful' groups.

The distortion arises when intersubjectivity becomes so dominant that it prevents truly practical ideas from being operative.

Group bias leads to the shorter cycle (minor premise) of decline; it is "shorter" because the oppression becomes so evident that opposition to it will be mobilized.

How that mobilization develops among dominated groups is largely determined by the attitudes/actions of dominant groups:

progressive □□□ reform

reactionary □□□ revolution

The form of the conflict is largely a factor of the attitude of the dominant group.

The shorter cycle can be recognized/reversed through common sense.

GENERAL BIAS: There is a *longer cycle of decline* in human history.

Lonergan sees us as being at a turning point in the longer cycle of decline; *it cannot be reversed by common sense*, for it turns upon long-term consequences that cannot be grasped by common sense. *Theoretic issues and ultimate questions* must be faced.

We must enlarge the realm of conscious grasp and ultimate choice in history.

We are at an epochal turning point; Lonergan is convinced that the future of humanity hangs in the balance of our ability to enter the third stage of meaning, develop it, and communicate it to common sense.

Stages of Meaning (cf. "Dimensions of Meaning," *Collection*):

1. Prevalence of common sense.
2. Theory is integrated with common sense, beginning in what Jaspers terms the "axial period" of 800-200 b.c.e.
3. The second stage of meaning is breaking down; theory is not adequate as integrating factor; there is need for development of interiority as a way of mediating the conflict of theories.

Common sense is not up to thinking on the level of history; we assume responsibility for the future without moving beyond the narrow confines of common sense.

The intellectual community has profound social responsibility.

However, culture tends to retreat and surrender to common sense; this is evident, e.g., when social science treats empirical data without raising critical questions made possible by dialectical method.

Lonergan contends that human science must be:

- empirical
- critical
- normative
- dialectical

The notion of "empirical" must be broadened to include the data of conscious; inquiry into the data must be critical; it is possible for such inquiry to be critical only if it is normative; and it becomes normative insofar as it attends to the dialectic.

Needed is concern for the *transformation* of the human sciences and of human living – and this concern must be exercised in collaboration.

These issues are disregarded at the expense of the human race, even though this may not be evident.

For seven centuries, we have witnessed a succession of ever constricting perspectives culminating in totalitarianism.

Cosmopolis = the horizon that will accept the challenge and meet it at this level.

<u>28 November 1985</u>

Chapter eight can be considered as an *integration* of what has preceded and as '*springboard*' for what is to come: it is "pivotal."

It is the last chapter to concentrate solely on the relation between the first and second levels of consciousness: chapter nine will consider judgment.

Up to this point, we have dealt with the duality in consciousness – between experience and understanding; here, we deal also with the *duality in knowing*.

Further, the discussion of "patterns of experience" reaches an integration in chapter eight, as we return to the intellectual pattern of experience (from the discussion of dramatic practical patterns in chapters six and seven).

Doran argues that the dramatic pattern governs and correlates our movement into and out of the other patterns; but there is a privileged position for the intellectual pattern with regard to certain questions: truth, objectivity.

And resistance to entering the intellectual pattern tends to come from the dominance of the general bias of common sense.

Chapter eight concerns the attitude/horizon of "cosmopolis;" the term "cosmopolis" is not mentioned between chapters seven and eighteen – but what Lonergan is doing is developing the horizon necessary for cosmopolis, i.e., for reversing the longer cycle of decline in whose later stages we find ourselves.

This chapter also regards the reorientation Lonergan is suggesting; chapter eight involves a reorientation of the philosophical assumptions of modern science.

There have been earlier anticipations for this chapter:

I, p. 81: "The reason for this omission is that the notion of 'things' is highly ambiguous and, as yet, we are unprepared to apply the canon of parsimony to it. . ."

I, p. 134: "We had not raised the question, What are things? We had not yet determined whether there is an answer to that question that satisfies the scientific canon of parsimony. Accordingly we presented the emergent probability in the present chapter with the qualification that later when the notion of thing has been investigated, there might be needed a further development of the analysis."

The 'duality of knowing' has to be broken by critically distinguishing the two kinds of knowing.

The duality of consciousness has to function in an integrated fashion in the dramatic/practical pattern(s) of experience; a creative tension is necessary.

In establishing criteria for the 'true' and the 'real,' however, it is essential to distinguish the two kinds of knowing – only one of which has a criterion for 'truth'/'objectivity'/'reality.' Extroverted/animal knowing has no such criterion.

I, pp. xx-xxi: "St. Augustine of Hippo narrates that it took him years to make the discovery that the name, real, might have a different connotation from the name, body. Or, to bring the point nearer home, one might say that it has taken modern science four centuries to make the discovery that the objects of its inquiry need not be imaginable entities moving through imaginable processes in an imaginable space-time."

To insist on the 'imaginability' of scientific objects is to assume that the 'real' is 'body,' that the criterion of the real is 'body,' that the criterion of the real is to be found on the level of experience; it is to adopt a confrontational notion of knowing – in fact, however, experience has no criterion of the real.

There is criterion for the real only where what is experienced is asked about, and where those questions give rise to insights, which lead to further questions, which lead to judgment. Only here is there a criterion for the real.

Chapters nine and ten will deal with this.

Chapter eight introduces the reader to intellectual conversion: overcoming the cognitional myth that the real is already-out-there-now to be known by experience. This conversion is what is involved in overcoming general bias.

There are times when the umbilical cord to imagination must be out, where we must be satisfied with *verified hypotheses* that cannot be imagined.

The images involved in the process are *heuristic* for the insight, but there are no pictures of the reality.

There is no imaginable picture of $e=mc^2$.

This is not easy because we are not pure intellect; we resist moving out of the dramatic/practical pattern(s) of experience.

Lonergan is saying that we have to overcome general bias if we are to tackle the problems of our history: e.g., economics. What is important is an understanding that goes beyond the imagination.

E.g., Lonergan's economic theory attempts a purely *explanatory* understanding. "Circulation" is used as a heuristic image, but his understanding of economic process cannot be imagined.

In the intellectual pattern of experience, the place of images is strictly heuristic.

Intellectual conversion is a matter of explicitly abandoning the effort to find the criterion of reality at the level of experience and the imaginable.

One of the problems facing history today is the integration of the sciences, understanding what is going on in the various sciences; a problem with much of human science is its operation with an inadequate criterion of reality.

MT, p. 95: "Philosophy finds its proper data in intentional consciousness. Its primary function is to promote the self-appropriation that cuts to the root of philosophic differences and incomprehensions. It has further, secondary functions in distinguishing, relating, grounding the several realms of meaning and, no less, in grounding the methods of the sciences and so promoting their unification."

Operative in *Insight* is a philosophy which takes its data from consciousness.

What is a *thing*?

It is known by a *new kind of insight*.

Insights in science are into relations between data; the notion of a thing is grounded in an insight that grasps unity/identity/whole *in* concrete data.

It is not concerned with data-of-a-certain-kind in relation to data-of-a-similar-kind; it is, rather, concerned with 'these' data.

It grasps the notion of data being "the *same*" over time and in space.

The *same* unity/identity/whole.

Some 'thing' is the same over time and despite space.

He mentions these concrete 'things:'
human beings
animals
plants
chemical compounds

subatomic entities

Each is a 'thing' in its free state; i.e., a subatomic entity in a chemical compound is known through (pure/explanatory) conjugates.

Thus, there are not things-within-things.

E.g., a cell in my body: insofar as it is explained by the laws of the larger system, it is not a 'thing.'

A reason for not using the Aristotelian term "substance" is that historically it has often been confused with "body."

Lonergan addresses the problem of *ding an sich* raised by Kant, for whom the *noumenon* is unknowable whereas the *phenomena* (appearances) are knowable.

In contrast, for Lonergan, there is the "thing as *described*;" and that is really known insofar as description culminates in true judgments. Then, there is the "thing as *explained*" (the thing 'in itself'); and that is really known in verified hypotheses.

Thus, *contra* Kant, "things themselves" can be really known.

The difference between the thing-as-described and the thing-as-explained is that in moving from description to explanation I am moving *beyond sense and imagination*.

For Kant, the thing-in-itself is the really real, but can't be known; we can 'know' the appearances, but they aren't really real.

Lonergan's notion of pure/explanatory conjugates enables him to posit *real knowledge of things-in-themselves*.

I, p. 250: "It follows that no thing itself, no thing as explained, can be imagined. . . As the electron, so also the tree, in so far as it is considered as a thing itself, stands within a pattern of intelligible relations and offers no foothold for imagination."

"Bodies" (section 8.2)

Previous allusions:

I, p. xxviii: "From the horns of that dilemma one escapes only through the discovery (and one has not made it yet if one has no clear memory of its startling strangeness) that there are two quite different realisms, that there is an incoherent realism, half animal and half human, that poses as a half-way house between materialism and idealism and, on the other hand, that there is an intelligent and reasonable realism between which and materialism the half-way house is idealism."

The notion of 'body' relates to naïve realism.

I, p. 69: "Our goal is the concrete, individual, existing subject that intelligently generates and critically evaluates and progressively revises every scientific object, every incautious statement, every rigorously logical resting place that offers prematurely a home for the restless dynamism of human understanding. Our ambition is to reach neither the known nor the knowable but the knower."

It is the question for judgment that moves us beyond idealism.

The question being dealt with in section 8.3 (genus): are all things of one kind or is there a series?

Does biology deal with a new kind of thing, or does it deal with a very complex form of 'the same old thing?' Am I, in biology, confronted with a whole new set of laws – with conjugates that simply cannot be dealt with in physics?

What conjugates are verified, and what laws have to be appealed to?

Are there events which are recurrent but that chemistry can only regard as coincidental (i.e., non-systematic divergences)? But if they are truly 'recurrent' events which can be explained by biological law but not by chemistry, the there is a *different kind of thing*.

Lonergan is presenting an explicit argument *against 'reductionism.'*

If there are systematized events that can only be regarded as coincidental from a lower viewpoint, there is then need for a higher science; and the things which recur are a new kind of thing.

Genera: human
zoological;
botanical
chemical
physical

He insists that the human being cannot be understood by animal psychology.

I am not a highly complex animal; I am a 'new kind of thing.'

Freud, e.g., tried to reduce the human to the animal.

Species: within the genera, there are differentiations: i.e., there are different kinds of chemicals, plants, animals. . . .

There are different kinds of physical aggregates known as "chemical elements."

There are certain chemical elements that are more suitable for the higher biological integration; there is an increasing autonomy as we move to more complex systems.

The species are differentiated by how the schemes of that level are realized in different ways.

There is an increasing significance of immanent intelligibility; e.g., chemical compounds are less dominated by subatomic conjugates/limitations then elements are; plants are even less dominated, and animals even less so.

Movement 'upward' involves movement beyond the dominance the underlying materials and progressively more autonomy for the higher system in-itself.

"Measurement" becomes less important as heuristic, with "development" becoming more important.

Human
Zoological
Botanical
Chemical
Physical

Eventually, with human beings we have independent, autonomous *sources of self-constitution and world-constitution*. I constitute myself as an intelligible system.

I, p. 266: "On the one hand, inquiry and insight are not so much a higher system as a perennial source of higher systems, so that human living has its basic task in reflecting on systems and judging them, deliberating on their implementation and choosing between possibilities. On the other hand, there can be in man a perennial source of higher systems because the materials of such systematization are not built in his constitution."

I, p. 267: "In man there occurs the transition from the intelligible to the intelligent."

I, p. 269: "in the limiting case of man, the intelligible yields to the intelligent, and the higher system is replaced by a perennial source of higher systems."

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Lonergan does not argue that we are to 'live' in the intellectual pattern of experience; rather we live in the dramatic/practical pattern(s) of experience, trying to make a work of art out of our lives and of our world. But there are times when the successful resolution of the tasks of the dramatic/practical pattern(s) of experience demand that we move into the intellectual pattern.

One of the results of failing to adopt fully explanatory understanding is the reductionism that Lonergan argues against in chapter eight.

To the extent that we think solely in terms of already-out-there-now 'bodies,' we will understand human beings as simply more complex concentrations of physical/chemical/ zoological bodies.

To understand the reality of new kinds of 'things' demands intellectual conversion.

Doran's definition of a thing: "an intelligible unification of explanatory conjugates."

Lonergan insists that a thing is to be understood in terms of its highest differentiation of conjugates. E.g., zoology properly *begins* with psychic conjugates – which shows how far the actual present practice of the academy is from what Lonergan is proposing.

McShane: "Konrad Lorenz won a Nobel Prize for discovering that zoology is about animals!"

The higher level conjugates of the human being are intelligence and freedom – which thus ought to be the organizing principles of human science.

Concerning "things within things:" spatially-temporally there may be a 'body' within a 'body,' but in terms of higher level conjugates, there are not 'things' within 'things.'

Chapter NINE: Movement to the *third* level of consciousness.

The point in reading is to find in my own consciousness the distinct *inner word of judgment*.

Aquinas posits (at least) two very distinct inner words:

1. that uttered in the act of *understanding*;
2. that uttered in the act of *judgment* in which the word uttered in understanding is pronounced as true or false (or possibly/probably true or false).

The inner word of judgment *commits* me to that which has been grasped; it is the termination of the ratiocination that goes on in thinking.

Here Lonergan is talking about judgment of *fact* (later he will introduce judgments of value) – here, the judgments are of reality/being.

Three determinations of the notion of judgment (I, pp. 271-272):

1. A judgment is an affirmation/negation of a proposition, which has been arrived at as a synthesis at the level of understanding.

    As propositional, a sentence is a conceptual synthesis (understanding); judgment *posits* the synthesis – it is a 'yes' or 'no' with regard to the conceptual synthesis.

2. A judgment is an answer to a question for reflection.

    There are two types of question dealt with in this part of *I*:

    a. Questions for *intelligence*: "What is it?" "Why?" How?" etc.

        These questions search for immanent intelligibility, and cannot be answered 'yes' or 'no.'

    b. Questions for reflection on the answers to questions for intelligence: "Is it so?"

        The answer given is 'yes' or no.'

3. A judgment, much more than insight and conceptualization, involves the subject's commitment to what is affirmed.

        "Cognitional commitment"

    There is a responsibility assumed by the subject in judgment, that s not assumed in simply 'thinking about something.'

    The question for reflection can be met with so many gradations, that I am responsible for what I affirm and the degree to which I affirm it.

        If the evidence is not in, it is rash to pronounce judgment; if the evidence is in, it is silly not to pronounce judgment.

    My *authenticity* is at stake; at this level, I have to take into account my own shortcomings much more than at the level of understanding.

        If I lack self-confidence, e.g., I can learn to take that into account: i.e., 'my judgment may very well be clouded by fear, but it seems that . . . .'

    Rashness and *indecision* are matters of "temperament;" thus, knowledge of my temperament can enter into the act of judgment.

    It is the very dynamism of our consciousness that drives us to judgment: we don't just want to think.

        BL: "Some people are always 'thinking' but never 'know' anything."

        Thinking has an ulterior finality.

    Doran tells the delightful story of a doctoral student who wanted to interview Heidegger. He hiked to the house in the forest where Heidegger lived. When he knocked on the door, Heidegger's wife opened it and said: "Mein Mann denkt!"

Here (I, pp. 273-274), Lonergan first expresses the three levels:

1. the level of *presentations*;
2. the level of *understanding*; and
3. the level of *judgment*.

Level ‘two’ presupposes something to be understood (i.e., the raw material of empirical givenness); level ‘one’ is sublated by inquiry, which is the operator that moves the subject beyond the level of pure presentation; that inner dynamism of consciousness as the “pure question” (the unrestricted desire to know) also moves the subject beyond understanding and conceptualization to questions for reflection.

Fidelity to the inner dynamism of my own being moves me to the higher levels of consciousness.

I, p. 273: “Thirdly, the level of intelligence, besides presupposing and complementing an initial level, is itself presupposed and complemented by a further level of reflection.”

“The formulations of understanding yield concepts, definitions, objects of thought, suppositions, considerations. But man demands more. Every answer to a question for intelligence raises a further question for reflection. There is an ulterior motive to conceiving and defining, thinking and considering, forming suppositions, hypotheses, theories, systems. That motive appears when such activities are followed by the question, ‘Is it so?’ We conceive in order to judge. As questions for intelligence, “what? And Why? And How often?, stand to insights and formulations, so questions for reflection stand to a further kind of insight and to judgment. It is on this third level that there emerge the notions of truth and falsity, of certitude and the probability that is not a frequency but a quality of judgment. It is within this third level that there is involved the personal commitment that makes one responsible for one’s judgments. It is from this third level that come utterances to express one’s affirming or denying, asserting or dissenting, agreeing or disagreeing.”

The question for reflection is to judgment what the question for intelligence is to understanding.

Lonergan posits two modes (‘direct’ and ‘introspective’) of moving in the process from experience to understanding to judgment.

The difference in modes depends on the data:

- date of sense;
- data of consciousness.

The direct mode depends on the empirical presentations of sense.

I, p. 274: “Data of sense include colours, shapes, sounds, odours, tastes, the hard and soft, rough and smooth, hot and cold, wet and dry, and so forth.”

There is movement form experience to insight and judgment beginning from the data of sense.

A question: might it be correct to say that Jung’s “extrovert” processes more easily the data of sense and his “introvert” processes more easily the data of consciousness?

The introspective mode starts with the data of consciousness, i.e., with conscious acts.

I, p. 274: “The data of consciousness consist in acts of seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, touching, perceiving, imagining, inquiring, understanding, formulating, reflecting, judging, and so forth. As data, such acts are experienced; but, as experienced, they are not described, distinguished, compared, related, defined, for all such activities are the work of inquiry, insight and formulation.”

I experience myself hearing; I experience myself inquiring; I experience myself inquiring; I experience myself 'catching on;' I experience myself reflecting. . . .

Consciousness is experience of self at all levels of operation.

I experience myself at all levels, and can inquire into that empirical experience, understand it, reflect on it, and affirm it.

Such "introspection" is not "looking in;" rather, it is experiencing myself experiencing/understanding/judging/deciding, inquiring into and understanding myself experiencing/understanding/judging/deciding and reflecting on and affirming myself experiencing/understanding/judging/deciding.

In *MT*, Lonergan warns of possible misinterpretation of the term "introspection."

The data of consciousness includes states (e.g., feelings) as well as acts.

Introduction of the "introspective mode" is Lonergan's initial reference to *self-appropriation*.

No other 'thing' besides the human is capable of bringing consciousness-as-intentional to bear on consciousness-as-conscious.

It is a question of "who I am going to be."

This process is presented very clearly in "Cognitional Structure" (*Collection*) and in the first chapter of *MT*.

Judgment is the way in which the whole process goes forward and comes to its term in the act of judgment.

The unification proceeds as the process goes forward and comes to its term in the act of judgment.

It is one cumulative process.

<u>The *content* of judgment</u>:

Proper content: 'yes' or 'no' – this is what judgment "adds."

Borrowed content: What is affirmed – the 'this,' i.e., the conceptual synthesis taken over from the level of understanding.

Judgment is the total increment in cognitional process; each prior act is a partial increment.

It is the total increment in that the process of asking about 'this' has come to an end.

<u>*Contexts* of judgment</u>:

Our judgments occur within various contexts:

The past: our pervious insights and judgments become habitual and work 'from behind the scenes' to direct our inquiry and reflection.

So to become a person of good judgment, I have to know myself and my past.

Thus, Erikson's work has profound implications for the exercise of judgment.

The present: a new judgment has to enter into integration with other present judgments.

The future: anything that I affirm now is going to influence my future affirmations.

My person is at stake in making affirmations; thus, there is a clearly existential dimension to the act of judgment

The human spirit is not content simply to contemplate what it already knows; it wants to move on. This is Lonergan's transposition of Thomas's "natural desire to know God.

Our restlessness is what moves us into the future; it is 'built into' the dynamism of our minds and hearts.

Chapter TEN:

What is the *link* between understanding and judgment? It is the process of reflection that terminates in the *reflective act of understanding* that *grasps the evidence to be sufficient* for the judgment (or insufficient, or probably sufficient, etc.).

The central influence on Lonergan is clearly *Newman*; he read *The Grammar of Assent* eight times as a philosophy student.

Lonergan acknowledges that Newman led him beyond conceptualism.

But what is it that constitutes sufficiency of evidence? This is the whole matter of what it is to "Be Reasonable!" (which is what Aquinas called "wisdom" = the habit of good judgment).

To be reasonable is to be a person who with facility grasps the sufficiency of evidence for a judgment.

To grasp evidence as sufficient is to grasp that the prospective judgment is *virtually unconditioned*.

It is *conditioned*: it arises in response to a question.

Virtually: not just apparently, nominally; but the conditions are satisfied.

Grasping that the conditions for the judgment are fulfilled.

First, it is a grasp of what the conditions are; and then that they are fulfilled.

Lonergan wrestled with the syllogism for years, mainly to move beyond it. 10.1 is Lonergan's transposition of Aristotle's "form of inference" (cf. *Collection* for a more extensive treatment).

The conclusion of a syllogism is a conditioned; the first proposition states what the conditions are; the second proposition states their fulfillment.

The pattern of the first two propositions leads ineluctably to the conclusion.

If A, then B.
But A.
Then B.

In fact, the first proposition is already a judgment; the second proposition is a judgment; and the conclusion is a judgment which follows upon other judgments.

Lonergan wants to analyze the prior cognitional process that makes possible the earlier judgments.

We tend to use the syllogism to confirm and communicate judgments we have arrived at in 'some other way.'

There are judgments that we arrive at through more rudimentary processes (than the syllogism); these judgments are more likely to be immanently generated, and to them we are more likely to give 'real assent.'

The form of reflective insights is more basic and more general than the form of logical deduction.

'Rudimentary elements' in cognitional process.

The fulfilling conditions for judgment are found in empirical presentations, discovered in experience.

In the example of a man coming home and finding his home different from when he left it, and making the judgment "something happened!":

a. the man's present experience;

b. his memory of what this house was like when he left it in the morning.

The link is a subtle combination of direct insight connecting the two sets of data with one set of things (i.e., his house); and reflective insight subsumes that combination of experience and understanding under some structure that grasps that this combination of understanding and experience is enough for a judgment.

There are many elements in such a structure that grasps that a combination of experience and understanding is enough for a judgment.

E.g., what Aristotle and Aquinas call "first principles" of non-contradiction and identity.

Lonergan proposes a "notion of knowing change" that is a heuristic (not a concept!) anticipating judgment; there is some operative structure that negotiates experience and understanding in such way to know whether understanding matches experience or not.

There is opened up a whole area of the "heuristics of reasonableness."

In different types of judgment, there is a structure that is capable of pronouncing on the adequacy of understanding to experience; that is what reflective understanding does.

It is a structure immanent and operative within human consciousness.

The general form of that procedure is: experience, understanding, and grasping the adequacy of understanding to experience.

This is a concretization of the classical "principle of sufficient reason."

<u>12 December 1985</u>

[In *MT*, chapters 8-9, Lonergan considers the nature of judgments involved in critical-historical studies, in which the flow of relevant questions gradually 'dries up.']

Summary of last week's consideration of judgment:

Cognitional structure unfolds on three levels; that structure is united by the power of human inquiry: consciousness as question. The later levels presuppose and complement the earlier ones; the earlier levels are 'for' the later. It is in judgment that one 'knows.'

Judgment *affirms* what the second level merely *considers*; as such it involves a commitment and calls personal responsibility into play in a way that is not characteristic of prior levels. One moves beyond (self-transcendence) what one thinks and takes a stand.

Intentional consciousness can be brought to bear on 9a) the data of sense and (b) the data of consciousness.

> Much wisdom literature is a matter of common sense insights into the data of consciousness (interiority).

Insight: consciousness-as-intentional is brought to bear on consciousness-as-conscious.

Pivoting between the second and third levels is the question for reflection: "Is it true?" That question leads to a reflective act of understanding, which grounds a second inner word: the judgment ('yes,' 'no,' 'I don't know,' 'probably,' 'possibly,' etc.).

> Reflective understanding grasps that the evidence is or is not sufficient for the judgment. That grasp produces the inner word of judgment. This is a distinct inner word from that of understanding. Grasp of that distinction *in me* is the task at hand.

To grasp that the evidence is sufficient for the judgment is to grasp that the judgment is virtually unconditioned. It is a conditioned, but the conditions have been fulfilled.

Lonergan's position on judgment is extremely important in locating his thought in the history of modern philosophy.

> For Kant, there was a great difficulty with the unconditioned. Since he posited only the formally unconditioned, one could know something-about-something only by knowing everything-about-everything.
>
> Lonergan grounds the possibility of making incremental judgments on concrete fact with the notion of "virtually unconditioned." Noting the distinction between the second and third levels is Lonergan's moving beyond idealism.
>
> Virtually = in effect
> for all practical purposes.
>
> Only God is unconditioned; everything else has conditions but these conditions are fulfilled (if it is real). The judgment that pronounces on the reality of such things is a virtually unconditioned.

Usually, a reflective understanding grasps the fulfillment of conditions in a more rudimentary form than the syllogism; the conditions are on the level of experience, and the link is a matter of the direct insight into the data and a reflective insight that grasps the adequacy of the direct insight to the data.

> There is some 'law'/procedure/pattern operative within human consciousness.

That process is that the insight is correct if there are no more relevant questions for a mind that is alert, familiar with the situation, and master of the situation.

> If there are further relevant questions, the judgment should not be made in any absolute way.

I, p. 284: "The conditions for the prospective judgment are fulfilled when there are no further pertinent questions."

Lonergan makes the *operational distinction* between vulnerable and invulnerable direct insights.

Vulnerable: give rise to further relevant questions.

Invulnerable: no further questions relevant to this issue arise.

"The link between the conditioned and its conditions is a law *immanent and operative in cognitional process*."

The *conditions of reasonableness* are analyzed on pp. 284-287:

It is not enough to say that no further questions occur to me, because I may be biased or temperamentally indisposed to the emergence of further questions in this area.

I, pp. 284-285: "Note that it is not enough to say that the conditions are fulfilled when no further questions occur to me. The mere absence of further questions in my mind can have other causes. My intellectual curiosity may be stifled by other interests. My eagerness to satisfy other drives may refuse the further questions a chance to emerge. To pass judgment in that case is to be rash, to leap before one looks.

"As there is rash judgment, so also there is mere indecision. As the mere absence of further questions in my mind is not enough, so it is too much to demand that the very possibility of further questions has to be excluded. If, in fact, there are no further questions, then, in fact, the insight is invulnerable; if, in fact, the insight is invulnerable, then, in fact, the judgment approving it will be correct."

Lonergan is here drawing attention to the personal responsibility of the subject.

Judgment is correct if there are no further questions for an authentic subject; thus, the authenticity of the subject is the key element. (Cf. Aquinas on "wisdom.")

The two poles of unreasonableness presented here are "rashness" and "indecision."

I, p. 285: "… happy balance between rashness and indecision. . . "

Lonergan speaks of factors in striking this "happy balance:"

1. I have to give the further questions a chance to arise.
2. Background understanding is essential in order for the problem to be accurately recognized/defined. Good judgment about any insight depends on the previous acquisition of a large number of integrated insights.

   Vicious circle: I can become a person of good judgment only by making good judgments; but how can I make these good judgments if I am not already a person of good judgment.
3. Lonergan affirms a *self-correcting process of learning* that can contribute to breaking this vicious circle.

   This process of human development tends to a limit in each domain, at which I become "familiar" (either in common sense or science).

Part of the problem of authenticity is knowing ;where I am' in the process of learning tending to a limit.

4. One's own temperament must be taken into account: rashness and indecisiveness.

Part of the collaboration of friendship is asking one another to help in attentiveness to these tendencies.

I need to appropriate the problem of being an authentic subject as a major problem. The whole issue is becoming a reasonable human being.

What Lonergan means by "reflective understanding" is what Newman meant by "the illative sense."

I am a demand for the unconditioned, and I am able to recognize the unconditioned when I reach it.

There is a 'vicious circle' in the very structure of cognitional process. (Rahner: "gnoseological concupiscence.")

In the section on concrete analogy and generalization, Lonergan notes that we are rightfully suspicious of generalization.

Situations do differ, and it is difficult for us to know the differences. Further, it is very difficult to become master of the initial situation.

Common sense results from the collaboration of my community over centuries. I begin by believing and proceed to 'test out' what I have learned.

This can be extremely helpful in enabling me to move into new situations without going through the entire self-correcting-process-of-learning in each new situation.

But common sense is ambiguous, easily influenced by bias; common sense can be a common deviance from intelligence.

Doran refers, e.g., to psyches 'battered by the violence of hard rock.'

And even though I take my common sense from the community, I am the one who makes the judgment. I can raise the question as to the authenticity of common sense.

In MT, Lonergan speaks of mayor and minor authenticity:

- Minor: a person is faithful to his/her tradition and its accumulated wisdom.
- Major: the quality of the authenticity of the tradition itself.

Kierkegaard: am I an authentic Christian if I simply appropriate a tradition which itself is inauthentic?

But *contra* Cartesian universal doubt, Lonergan goes with Newman in positing universal belief as the beginning point which one then proceeds to question.

Against the Enlightenment, Gadamer drew attention to the essential nature of tradition; but Lonergan (with Habermas) criticizes Gadamer for not having a criterion on which to judge the authenticity of the tradition.

Common sense judgment can be trusted in ordinary descriptions of things in their relations to us. With regard to those types of situations, common sense is competent, if the person is not biased (dramatic, individual, group).

Lonergan presents a very high evaluation of common sense (especially pp. 291-293), but nonetheless affirms that there are issues for which it is not adequate.

In fact, common sense often recognizes and accepts the distinction of the domains – common-sense/science – more than science has.

The person of common sense tends to accept the validity of science; but scientists often do not accept the validity of common sense in its own domain.

What Lonergan denigrates is the tendency of common sense to deny the need for theoretical questions to deal with certain questions.

Common sense description differs from scientific description.

Scientific description quickly becomes technical, and its terminology becomes special. And the scientist describes in relation to him-/herself in a way that will quickly lead to explanation of things in terms of the relations of things among themselves.

In principle, common sense and science should not conflict – if they could each grasp that they are speaking about the same things from radically different viewpoints and they each have their own validity. (Cf. *I*, pp. 294-296.)

Lonergan wants to affirm that there are two domains, each with their own validity. Later (*MT*), he will refer to these as "differentiations of consciousness."

He posits methodological differences (cf. *I*, pp. 295-296) which involve different standards for what constitute further relevant questions.

The problem arises when you try to impose the standards of one domain on the other.

The two domains are complementary as well as distinct; they are functionally related and operate together.

Probable judgments: we have the capacity to sense whether we are "approaching the limit" of the virtually unconditioned.

Probable judgments result when we have not yet grasped the virtually unconditioned, but we realize that the evidence is heading in a particular way. In such a situation, the reasonable thing is to make a probable judgment.

The probability refers to a "quality of judgment," not to a frequency.

E.g., with regard to a probability-expectation, I can make either a certain or probable judgment.

A probable judgment is not a guess (a leap in the dark); it is a judgment made as the light is increasing.

It is a rational pronouncement on the state of the evidence as it is known at the present time.

We can begin to recognize that we are approaching the limit when the flow of further pertinent questions begins to slow and eventually dries out.

Scientific judgments are probable (cf. *I*, pp. 301-304) because there remain immense numbers of further pertinent questions.

Classical science is probable because its laws are abstract, and moving to the concrete would necessitate knowledge of all classical laws – which is not (yet) attained.

I, p. 302: "The generalization of classical laws, then, is not more than probable because the application of single laws raises further questions that head towards the systematization of a whole field."

Statistical science depends on classical laws; so its judgments are also probable.

9 January 1986

Once I have made my way through *Insight*, the rest of Lonergan's work lies open; and chapter 11 is the key to I. Thus, chapter 11 on self-appropriation is the key to interiorly differentiated consciousness, it is not the whole of such differentiation, but it is the foundation.

Self-appropriations is the key to the third stage of meaning, where meaning is controlled – not by common sense or theory – but by self-knowledge.

Cf. "Dimensions of Meaning (in Collection) where Lonergan speaks of the 'control of meaning' in modernity. Theoretic control of meaning is no longer adequate, and a new control is needed. This is the problem which sets up the need for interiorly differentiated consciousness."

This chapter is the key to the 'intellectual dimension of conversion.'

Doran is coming more and more to speak – not of different conversions – but of various moments/dimensions of an ongoing process of conversion.

Lonergan is seeking to provide a foundation for the reorientation of the human sciences, including theology.

The basic *terms and relations* of chapter 11 are proposed as such an unrevisable *foundation*.

Concerning the motivation of Lonergan's work, *Aeterne Patris* (Leo XIII) had proposed this project: "to augment and complete the old with the new" (*vetera novis perficere et augere*).

Lonergan quoted this in a letter to his superior in1935; he seeks a reconciliation of the classical tradition with modernity.

In this chapter, Lonergan tries to bring the classical Greek achievement (differentiations of *logos* from *mythos*) forward to meet the modern turn to the subject and to bring that turn to its completion.

On the Greek achievement, cf. Eric Voegelin, "Reason: The Classic Experience," *The Southern Review* (1974): 252-267.

This 'turn to the subject' was in search of an unrevisable foundation; it can be found in this chapter.

Natural law theory and historical consciousness can be reconciled in human interiority, where the natural law is the exigence of the subject-in-history for understanding and truth.

Historical consciousness has raised the spectre of relativism; but self-appropriation makes it possible to speak of norms within historical consciousness. Cf. Natural Right and Historical Mindedness" (*A Third Collection*).

The goal of chapter 11 is to move from thinking about ('understanding') cognitional process to affirming it (i.e., judging that understanding to be correct.) that is a judgment each reader must make for her-/himself.

As a judgment, it involves *responsibility/commitment*; thus, it moves beyond theory to praxis.

The chapter names and affirms what is *basic* in cognitional process, and thus in philosophy and theology. It is doing what he said he could do in chapter 9 – using the cognitional process on the cognitional process.

I am invited to make a judgment about myself: "*I am a knower*."

"I" -- a concrete and intelligible unity/identity/whole differentiated as a unity by explanatory conjugates at the level of intelligent and rational consciousness – conjugates that are not found in the other genera and species.

"I" am a unity/identity/whole characterized by such acts as sensing, perceiving, imagining, inquiring, understanding, formulating, reflecting, grasping the unconditioned, and judging.

This chapter (11) invites me to affirm myself as such a unity/identity/whole.

These acts set part of the standard for authenticity which is ever precarious; thus, the chapter sets forth a potential.

<u>Characteristics of this judgment: "I am a knower."</u>

1. It is a judgment of *concrete fact*: not "I necessarily am a knower," but "in fact I am a knower" (contingent fact, not necessary fact).

   There is not yet any consideration of 'what' I know, but simply that I exist as a unity/identity/whole who performs these acts as *my* acts.

2. As a judgment, it rests on the grasp of the virtually unconditioned.

   - Conditioned: I am a knower.
   - Link: I am a knower if I am a concrete and intelligible unity/identity/whole who senses, perceives, imagines, inquires, understands, formulates, reflects, grasps the unconditioned, and judges.
   - Fulfillment: The fulfillment is *given in consciousness* (and finding the fulfillment in *my* consciousness is the invitation of the chapter).

<u>The fulfillment of the conditions for judgment</u> (cf. sections 1-4):

This fulfillment is found in consciousness. Consciousness is not knowing, not perception, not understanding, not judgment; it is neither an outward nor an inward perception. Consciousness is an awareness that characterizes all those operations, as well as our feelings, dreams, decisions, etc.

Consciousness is an awareness immanent in all states and acts that we call 'conscious.'

Consciousness is not knowledge; thus, since *Bewusstsein* means 'consciousness' and 'knowledge' the Germans have a difficulty distinguishing them.

Lonergan speaks of three kinds of presence:

1. The chairs are present in the room;
2. You are present to me, and I am present to you;
3. Presence (2) is different from presence (1) because I am present to myself and you are present to yourself.

Consciousness is this *self-presence*.

In *de Constitutione Christi*, Lonergan writes of consciousness as *experience*, not as perception.

Consciousness is the *pure question* that runs through all questions.

For Jung, "consciousness" is a kind of knowledge; it is the ego. The unconscious refers to that which is not known.

Much of what the depth psychologists call "unconscious," Lonergan speaks of as being *conscious but not differentiated*.

Thus, for Lonergan, a cream is a movement out of unconsciousness into consciousness; it is conscious, but obscure. E.g., an aging mountain climber dreams of falling off a mountain; this is something to be attended to.

Consciousness is not an awareness of something else, it is an awareness of myself immanent in my awareness of something else. Consciousness is what makes certain acts/states different from the growth of my beard.

Conscious self-presence differs with different kinds of acts; and in knowing there are three kinds of acts: empirical, intellectual, and rational. Lonergan will later speak of a "*fuller self-emergence*" as the operations become more self-involving. I become more self-transcendent as I move from experience to understanding to judgment to decision, at which final level my self and my world can be radically changed.

I, p. 322: "By consciousness is meant an awareness immanent in cognitional acts. But such acts differ in kind, and so the awareness differs in kind with the acts. There is *empirical consciousness* characteristic of sensing, perceiving, imagining. As the content of these acts is merely presented or represented, so the awareness immanent in the acts is the mere givenness of the acts. But there is an *intelligent consciousness* characteristic of inquiry, insight, and formulation. On this level cognitional process not merely strives for and reaches the intelligible, but in doing so it exhibits its intelligence; it operates intelligently. The awareness is present but it is the awareness of intelligence, of what strives to understand, or what is satisfied by understanding, of what formulates the understood, not as a schoolboy repeating by rote a definition, but as one that defines because he grasps why that definition hits things off. Finally, on the third level of reflection, grasp of the unconditioned, and judgment, there is *rational consciousness*. It is the emergence and the effective operation of a single law of utmost generality, the law of sufficient reason, where the sufficient reason is the unconditioned. It emerges as a demand for the unconditioned and a refusal to assent unreservedly on any lesser ground. It advances to

grasp of the unconditioned. It terminates in the rational compulsion by which grasp of the unconditioned commands assent."

This threefold consciousness is operative (with different interests, different 'orientations of the subject') in the various patterns of experience.

In *I*, judgments of value are compacted into third level consciousness; but references to "worth while" (p. 322) etc., demonstrate anticipations of Lonergan's later delineation of existential consciousness.

Intelligent and rational consciousness are contrasted most clearly on page 523: Intelligence and intelligibility are the obverse and reverse of the second level of knowing: intelligence looks for intelligible patterns in presentations and representations; it grasps such patterns in its moments of insight; it exploits such grasp in its formulations and in further questions equally guided by insights. In like manner, reasonableness and groundedness are the obverse and reverse of the third level of knowing. Reasonableness is reflection inasmuch as it seeks groundedness for objects of thought; reasonableness discovers groundedness in its reflective grasp of the unconditioned; reasonableness exploits groundedness when it affirms objects because they are grounded."

Intelligent and rational conjugates are what characterize the human; these are what I am being asked to affirm.

My reasonableness is evident in the distinction I make between alchemy and chemistry, astrology and astronomy.

The very fact that "I want to understand" is enough to affirm the fact that I perform intelligent conscious acts.

Sections three and four concern the "I," the unity/identity/whole of consciousness. Lonergan argues that the very unity itself is found in consciousness.

1. The contents cumulate into unities: "what is perceived is what is inquired about; what is inquired about is what is understood; what is understood is what is formulated; what is formulated is what is reflected on; what is reflected on is what is grasped as unconditioned; what is grasped as unconditioned is what is affirmed." (*I*, p. 324)

   E.g., trying to understand a 'mysterious situation': I experience, ask questions, have insights, etc. The content cumulates into a fuller unity.

2. The more radical argument has to do with the fact that the *acts* cumulate into a single knowing; many acts coalesce into a single knowing.

   The "I" is the identity involved in all the operations; consciousness is more the presence to that unity/identity/whole than it is presence to the differentiated acts.

To Kant who 'postulated' the unity of consciousness as a necessary condition for the possibility of knowing, Lonergan answers that this unity is given.

You have acts of seeing, and I have acts of seeing; your acts are yours, and mine are mine; the unity of consciousness is what makes your acts yours and my acts mine.

In this analysis, the subject-as-subject becomes the subject-as-object, but never fully because it is the subject-as-subject that is going the analysis!

Consciousness is given independently of being formulated and affirmed; it is given at the empirical level of consciousness.

The formulation does not make me more conscious.

The experienced fulfillment of the conditions is in the subject-as-subject.

Consciousness-as-given is to cognitional analysis as the data-of-sense are to empirical science.

As in empirical science one reverts to the data in order to verify a theory, so in cognitional analysis (and by extension in human science) theories are verified by reversion to the data of consciousness.

To understand the data of consciousness is to have a foundation for understanding humanity.

I, pp. 327-328: "Hence in the self-affirmation of the knower, the conditioned is the statement, I am a knower. The link between the conditioned and its conditions is cast in the proposition, I am a knower if I am a unity performing certain kinds of acts. The conditions as formulated are the unity-identity-whole to be grasped in data as individual and the kinds of acts to be grasped in data as similar. But the fulfillment of the conditions in consciousness is to be had by reverting from such formulations to the more rudimentary state of the formulated where there is not formulation but merely experience."

Lonergan argues that anyone who asks the question "*Am* I a Knower?" is *engaged* in rational consciousness: dissatisfaction with mere theory.

The fact that I ask the question shows that I am reasonable (at least in an incipient sense).

Sections 6, 8, and 9 are presentations of different sources for confirmation of the judgment.

- Logical confirmation (p. 329, especially paragraphs two through four).
- Argument from 'retorsion" (bottom of p. 329f.): Lonergan appeals to the natural spontaneities that are a part of our very constitution.

Lonergan discusses "fact" in section 6 (p. 331): By fact is meant what is known by judgment; by data is meant what is known by experience. Thus, fact includes all three levels. It is: concrete, intelligible, and virtually unconditioned.

Fact is the natural objective of the human cognitional process. In the next chapter (12), it will be seen that fact and being are identical.

The judgment – "I am a knower" – is self-authenticating and foundational.

- *Self-authenticating*: "If rational consciousness can criticize the achievement of science, it cannot criticize itself." (*I*, p. 332).

  I need offer no excuse/reason for wanting to know the truth; it is my very dignity.

- *Foundational*: "Nor in the last resort can one reach a deeper foundation than that of pragmatic engagement." (*I*, p. 332)

  In the self-affirmation of the knower, theory and praxis become one.

  The deepest foundation is pragmatic engagement in the search for truth.

If I pronounce the judgment – "I am a knower" – is this descriptive or explanatory knowing?

By explanation, Lonergan argues that human science is different from natural science. I have immediate access to the data-of consciousness. With that immediate access to data, I am allowed to (in some sense) transcend the merely supposed/hypothetical. I don't have that kind of access to the data of sense.

Thus, I can affirm here with a certainty that goes beyond the probability of judgment in natural science.

The fundamental terms and relations of cognitional analysis are fundamental in a sense that they are not in physical science.

E.g., whereas "mass" need not always be a basic term of physics, "judgment" will remain.

I can affirm myself as a knower with greater certainty than I can affirm that $e=mc^2$.

Lonergan is talking about deriving the primitive terms and relations of human science through self-appropriation.

Lonergan posits that the self-knowledge reached in the judgment – "I am a knower" – is unrevisable in a radical sense; whereas $e=mc^2$ may be revisable precisely through cognitional process.

Any judgment of fact involves the dynamic structure; thus, the very judgment that the structure is not real would involve in performance the structure that it verbally denied.

<u>18 January 1986</u>

Chapter eleven deals with Lonergan's position on the subject.

Lonergan posits three basic questions for philosophy and for the philosophical component in theology:

1. What am I doing when I am knowing? (*I*, chapter 11)

   This is a question about *concrete praxis*.

   Cognitional Theory.

2. Why is doing that knowing? (*I*, chapters 12 & 13)

   Epistemology

3. What do I know when I do that? (*I*, chapters 14-17, though initially in chapter 12)

   Metaphysics

In contrast to the scholastic tradition, metaphysics is not the foundation; rather, it is derivative. Lonergan's metaphysics is *critically derived* from cognitional theory and epistemology.

The modern 'turn to the subject' had considered epistemology ("what are the conditions of valid knowledge?") to be the foundation; Lonergan pushes beyond this to the concrete question of the *praxis*, the process of operations that occur when I know.

This enables a critically grounded epistemology and metaphysics.

Cognitional process unfolds on three levels – empirical, intelligent, and rational – and is unified by inquiry (questions for intelligence and for reflection). Cognitional process can operate in two modes: direct and reflective. In chapter 11, Lonergan is employing the reflective mode. The position presented in chapter 11: I am a concrete unity with distinct acts of my own, which unfold on the empirical level – sensing, perceiving, imagining: they unfold on the intelligent lever – inquiry, insight, conceptualization, formulation; they unfold on the rational level – reflecting, weighing the evidence, grasping that the conditions are or are not fulfilled, and judging. It is the concrete process of inquiry, which is identical with consciousness, that is oriented to meaning (questions for intelligence) and truth (questions for reflection).

The Thomistic foundations for this kind of position are theological: the natural desire to know God. L Consciousness is for the completeness of intelligibility, truth and goodness. (Cf. *ST* I, q. 12; I-II, q. 3, a. 8; *CG* III, 25-63.)

Cf. "The Natural Desire to See God" (*Collection*).

Consciousness is self-presence in *all* the acts that unfold in cognitional process, and the states which accompany those acts.

In the beginning (Descartes) and the end (Kant on pure reason) of the first phase of the turn to the subject, consciousness is "representation;" the question is for certitude. The quest is for some representation that is undoubtable.

Lonergan's quest is not for certitude, but for understanding.

Cf. John S. Dunne, *The Way of All the Earth*, on abandoning the quest for certitude. If my quest is for understanding, there is a kind of waiting that I am content with. That waiting is consciousness. There is a receptive moment in understanding as well as the active moment of asking questions.

"To pass judgment on what one does not understand is not human knowledge but human arrogance." ("Dimensions of Meaning," *Collection*.)

Re: "Retorsion' argument – If I want to deny Lonergan's argument, what would I do? I would present certain experiences, a specific understanding of them, and ask for a judgment?

This chapter (11) tries to put the reader on the spot: I must make the judgment for myself.

He is trying to offer a way through the polymorphism of my own consciousness.

Chapter Twelve: Suppose I came to the judgment – "I am a knower?" What is the validity of that?

Cf. *MT* 262-265: Lonergan contends that Karl Jaspers (for whom he has great respect) would argue this position to be a clarification of who I am, but not objective knowing.

Lonergan treats three different views of this: positivism, idealism, critical realism. All three would agree that there are certain areas (e.g., mathematics and natural science) where objective knowledge occurs; all three would also say that there are areas where agreement is lacking (philosophy, ethics, religion, human science). How do you explain the lack of agreement in those areas, while there is general agreement in mathematics and natural science? All three agree that *subjectivity* is involved in the human sci3ences in a way that it is not in mathematics and the hard sciences.

- Positivism: anything attributed to subjectivity is wrong.

- Idealism: when subjectivity is involved and is the source of a judgment, the subjectivity might be authentic of inauthentic. If it is authentic, it results in a genuine 'clarification,' but it is not objective; if it is an inauthentic subject from the judgment comes, it is mistaken.

    Objectivity is still limited to the 'hard sciences.'

- Lonergan: *Objectivity **is** authentic subjectivity*. Objectivity results from authentic attentiveness, authentic intelligence, and authentic reasonableness.

    This objective knowing is the fruit of attentiveness, intelligence, and reasonableness in both natural and human science.

    If a judgment is the fruit of attentiveness, intelligence, and reasonableness, it is objective.

    There is no difference in the criteria for making a judgment in the natural and human sciences: the conditions need to be fulfilled in each.

To say that a judgment is objective means that it is a knowing of what-is. If it is a judgment that proceeds from the fulfilled conditions, it is a judgment of fact – i.e., a judgment of what-is. It is a *knowing* of what-is, not simply of what appears.

Being is the objective of the pure desire to know. L I.e., it is what I want when I ask questions.

The only Existent who can give another definition of being is God; all I can say is that being is what I want to know when I ask questions, and it is what I know when I make a judgment based on the fulfillment of conditions.

"I want to know what-is."

Modern science continues to reach ever more probable hypotheses; it has not reached what-is and thus science does not come to a halt.

If I affirm myself as a knower (chapter 11), I have not just adopted a model that is useful to have around. I am affirming that this *is* what I *am*. I am making a true judgment, and insofar as I have done this I have reached being. There can be further questions (e.g., with regard to my feelings), and these can lead through insight and reflection to further judgments that really reach reality.

This is Lonergan's *position on being*; he will offer further clarifications, but no further definition. Being is what I know when I make a true judgment; it is what I know when I say "is" in answer to a question for reflection that follows upon insight, that follows upon a question for intelligence.

Lonergan affirms a *pure* desire to know: the process of raising questions does not cease until it reaches unlimited understanding, unconditioned truth, and unqualified goodness.

There is in my polymorphic consciousness a dynamism that occasionally is released to raise questions for intelligence and reflection; that is the orientation Lonergan terms "the desire to know," and being is what it desires. Being is what I reach when the stream of further questions 'dries up' because I have reached the virtually unconditioned; when questions dry up for an authentic subject, s/he knows what-is.

There is in subjectivity a desire/drive that moves me beyond sense/imagination to questions for understanding, and beyond mere bright ideas to questions for reflection.

I am not simply experiencing, I want to understand; and I am not simply understanding, I want to understand correctly; and when I have made individual judgments, there remain an infinity of further questions.

I am not satisfied simply with the flow of experience, nor with simply having brilliant ideas.

The desire is not the achievement: I want to know many things that I don't know. Thus, *the range of my desire far exceeds the range of my achievement*. Being is what I already know and all that remains to be known. And since knowing is through correct judgment, being is what is to be known by the *totality of true judgments*.

Being is the complete set of answers to the complete set of questions that ever were, are, will be, or could be asked.

Philip McShane insists on the importance of authentic nescience, i.e., humble awareness of what a minute fraction of the totality of true judgments that I have made or will ever make.

At this point, Lonergan has not dealt with questions of whether being is material, spiritual, in my mind, etc.; it all depends, i.e., on what judgments are true.

The criteria are no whether it is matter, etc.; the criteria are the virtually unconditioned of true judgment.

Lonergan's subsequent presentation of metaphysics will simply be a presentation of general characteristics of what can be affirmed. In the process of making true judgments, I gradually build up my knowledge of being.

Lonergan is insisting on the concrete process of knowing being: whatever-is is concrete.

Abstraction is characteristic of concepts; Lonergan's *notion* of being is not a concept, but a heuristic anticipation.

Scotus's definition, e.g., of being – "not nothing" – is abstract.

Lonergan's notion has a *determinacy* of the process by which I reach incremental advances of knowing.

Concreteness is a matter of judgment of fact.

"Things" are unities within being.

The NOTION of being is my desire to know.

'Notion' is to be distinguished from 'idea' and 'concept;' God has an idea of being, but I do not.

A 'notion' is a dynamic anticipation heading toward an objective; it is an anticipation that is *intelligent and reasonable* (and thus not simply empirically conscious). Precisely because it is intelligent and reasonable it can recognize when it has reached the objective.

This is true of me *spontaneously*; I am a concrete anticipation.

In *MT*, Lonergan will write of a 'notion of value;' a concrete anticipation of the good.

This is the perennial philosophical question raised by Plato: how can I realize when I reach knowledge?

Later, Lonergan will speak of consciousness as "intentional;" the language comes from Brentano and Husserl. An operation is intentional if it intends an object; it does not necessarily connote deliberation.

["Conceptualism is the dullest thing in the world; who wants to sit around relating concepts to one another?"]

Both being and the notion of being are "*unrestricted*." Both the objective and the notion which heads toward the objective are unrestricted.

Being is not only what we know but everything that remains to be known. Being is everything about everything.

Being is not what I can hope to know through the questions that I can hope to ask and answer; it is what is to be known by all possible questions.

Because I don't/can't ever hope to crack quantum theory doesn't mean that quantum theory is about nothing!

Being can't be other than what is to be known by true judgment; because if it were I could only know that by a true judgment.

Lonergan asserts the *complete intelligibility* of being.

He further asserts that there is nothing beyond the range of the pure desire to know.

It is in 14.1 that the three positions (on the subject, on being, and on objectivity) come together as *foundational* for philosophy and theology.

<u>23 January 1986</u>

Review of the previous session:

→ The self-affirmation that we are invited to in chapter eleven is not simply a 'disclosive' judgment, but a '*transformative*' one (Tracy): it is a *self-constitutive* act. I am not only recognizing myself, but making myself. That self-constitution is what Lonergan means by *intellectual conversion*.

This is the kind of experience that Plato (The Republic) speaks of as the periagoge, the turning around from the shadows of the cave into the light of the sun. Just as in Plato, there is a 'pull back' into the cave that is gradually overcome; the philosopher returns to the cave only to help others.

That self-constitutive act pulls one out of the realm of 'seeming' into the universe of being 9what-is) that is disclosed as the objective of my desire to know. It is what I desire in asking questions, and what I know (only incrementally) in judgment.

→ There is a drive/desire that moves me from experience through inquiry and understanding to conceptualization and formulation, to reflection, grasping fulfillment of conditions, and judgments.

The desire occasionally comes to rest in true judgments, but only to raise further questions.

→ There *is* nothing besides being. The mind/heart's restlessness is the notion of being.

→ Lonergan proposes three *basic* (*MT*: 'foundational') positions:

1. self-affirming subject;
2. being;
3. objectivity.

Section four (of chapter 12): The notion of being is *all-pervasive*: it pervades the entire process of knowing (experience. . . . understanding. . . . judgment). It underpins/penetrates/constitutes cognitional process.

The notion of being *underpins* all cognitional contents.

It is the reason I don't/can't remain in a pattern of mere perception/conation/instinct/stimulus-response – because the mind is restless until it reaches what-is.

I spontaneously break out of this level when wonder (the desire to know) is aroused.

It is that desire which *selects* the data I will pay attention to; thus, even at the empirical level, it affects/shapes experience.

This raises the question of censorship (chapter 6) and thus the question of authenticity.

All ideas/concepts and judgments are responses to the exigencies of the desire to know.

The notion of being *penetrates* all cognitional contents. It is the supreme heuristic, prior to the emergence of cognitional acts.

It is a universal anticipation: the to-be-known that precedes every known.

It is like a 'motor' that keeps cognitional process moving.

The notion of being *constitutes* cognitional process as-knowing.

Understanding becomes a dimension of knowing because it characterizes/defines what is to be known, but judgment is the complete increment of knowing. However, judgment cannot occur without the prior levels/acts and thus they are truly cognitional levels/acts.

Each level is for the rest until we reach judgment.

<u>Section 5: 'The core of *meaning*'</u>

Lonergan's later work demonstrates a far more developed understanding of meaning than is evident here; but this is where he first introduces meaning.

Meaning is an *act*, an operation of the subject; it is not 'out-there' to be looks at. ("Meaning" is a verb/participle, not a substantive.) Meaning is the subject-in-act: I mean.

As an act it proceeds from the structure of cognitional performance.

Formal acts of meaning are second-level acts: conceiving, formulating.

In those acts, I mean something; I mean what I have understood. Thus, the concept means what I have grasped in insight.

These acts are the “inner words;” they *mean* what is understood. Thus, what-is-meant is the content of insight.

The *full* act of meaning is judgment, which means what has been understood, formulated, and grasped as unconditioned.

The *instrumental* act is the outer word (speaking, writing, etc.); Doran prefers the term “communicative” (because of the pejorative connotations of “instrumental” associated with critical theory).

In talking, I mean what I have already meant in the formal and full acts of meaning.

In later writing, Lonergan will speak of the real world *mediated by meaning*. Reality is mediated to us by acts of understanding and judging. As real, the world is immediate; I am not immediate to the world as real, I am immediate to data. The real world is mediated to me through acts of understanding and judging.

Immediate presence is what Lonergan calls experiential objectivity in chapter 13: the given-as-given (‘nothing has been sorted out yet’).

A hallucination is as much a part of experiential objectivity as is touching the desk; I distinguish between them only by understanding and judging. At the level of immediacy, there are no criteria for making the distinction.

I ‘get’ from experiential objectivity to absolute objectivity (i.e., the known) by normative objectivity (which Lonergan will later term “authentic subjectivity”).

Normative objectivity is the whole process of acts of meaning; the real-known-in-judgment is mediated by acts of meaning.

Thomas: Truth is the medium of reality.

The expression of meaning (instrumental acts) frequently takes the form of judgment even when expressing hypothesis (second level); the distinction is a matter in inner acts.

Thus, e.g., e-mc^2 looks the same as a hypothesis that it does as a judgment.

Nicea dealt with a post-biblical question/problem; since the question was put in non-biblical (Greek philosophical) terms, it had to be answered/expressed in those terms. And yet an answer is wanted that is not contrary to the biblical source of faith.

Eventually the formulation of *homousion* was accepted as satisfying the contemporary question and as not in conflict with Scripture. They arrived at the judgment: it is true.

Subsequent generations are not necessarily grappling with the same questions; thus I do not go through the same process as they did at Nicea. I believe: I make the judgment that it is reasonable to believe what was proposed/affirmed at Nicea.

I go through the process of experience/understanding/judgment/decision, but not in the way the original question was posed; rather in terms of belief.

Concerning this, Newman had asserted universal credibility rather than Descartes’ universal doubt.

The outer word means the inner word, and the inner word means what is known in judgment: thus, the inner word means being (what-is).

Sources of meaning: any events in cognitional process (presentation of data, questions, insights, concepts, etc.) can be sources of meaning.

Terms of meaning: what is meant by the formal and full acts of meaning.

Thus: what is understood (formal)
what is affirmed (full)

The notion of being is the core of all acts of meaning, because those acts are moments in the constitutive process that leads to the "*is*" in which the process terminates.

All the acts of meaning are heading to what-is.

At the third level (acts of judgment), the desire for being is the core.

The desire for being is what keeps me moving beyond one judgment to further judgments. So any given judgment is enriched by being placed within the context of further judgments. Being is what I intend when I place any single judgments within a context of further judgments.

Judgments may be true or false. A judgment is said to be true because it means what the process was heading towards: the process was heading toward what-is and true judgment reaches what-is. Thus, there is *a correspondence between what I intend and what I mean*.

At the second level (acts of understanding):

Both horses and unicorns are valid objects of thought; yet spontaneously there is a difference between thinking-about-horses and thinking-about-unicorns. But since acts of understanding also intend being, there is a futility in thinking-about-unicorns that is not characteristic of thinking-about-horses.

Thus, the notion of being is the core of meaning even at the second level.

Section six: I do not have a concept or idea of being; to do so, I would have to know everything about everything. I have a *notion* of being – a dynamic anticipation.

Lonergan wants here to 'cur through' philosophical difficulties that result from failing to distinguish between concepts and notions.

Chapter XIII: OBJECTIVITY

Objectivity is the fruit of authentic attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility. This is what he means here by absolute objectivity.

There is an *absolute objectivity* in every single judgment; authentic subjectivity reaches absolute objectivity. Absolute objectivity means that if "yes" or "no" are, *de facto*, true, then they are absolutely true. I only reach this through subjectivity, but it is not created by subjectivity.

Absolute objectivity is grounded in the grasp of the virtually unconditioned.

'Absolute:' it is not relative to the subject who uttered it, not to the place or time of its utterance. If it is truth, there is a permanence to its truth, however it might continue to be enriched by being incorporated in broader contexts of judgments.

If I hold that a judgment is true, it has a permanent validity. The same judgment may, however, have to be expressed differently:

12:30 p.m.: "I am here now."
1:15 p.m.: "I was there then."

There is a publicity to truth, because it is not utterly relative to the subject. Judgment is beyond privatization. Truth is accessible to others in a community of authentic intelligence and reasonableness.

Every true judgment is objective absolutely.

Concerning 'space' and 'time:'

Absolute objectivity has no implications for positing or not positing absolute space or absolute time.

If it is true that space is absolute, then what is absolute is the truth of the judgment, not space.

Thus, Lonergan argues that Kant got 'thrown off' by Newton's ideas of absolute time and space.

To affirm that 'something is' is not necessarily to affirm that is in space and in time.

"Is" means "is," not "is in space and time."

To interpret being in terms of space/time is an intrusion of imagination that is unwarranted.

Absolute objectivity is simply a function of the unconditioned and has nothing to do with space/time.

Space is by being within the universe of being, and not the other way around.

Time is because it is unconditionally affirmed.

Absolute objectivity is the term of normative objectivity (which is what I mean when I say "She's an objective person!" – i.e., "she is attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible).

An objective person is one who follows the norms implicit in cognitional process:

Be *attentive*!
Be *intelligent*!
Be *reasonable*!
Be *responsible*!

Objectivity is characteristic of persons (normative) as well as characteristic of judgments (absolute): persons who are faithful to their restlessness for truth.

To be objective is to give free rein to the desire to know – to its questions for intelligence and questions for reflection (and previously, to the emergence of images).

On the basis of absolute and normative objectivity, we can discuss the subject-object relationship: the *principal notion*.

The notion that there are subjects and objects in 'principal' in the sense that it is widely taken from granted.

This can only be reached by grasping a pattern immanent in (at least) three judgments:

- I am.

- The desk is.
- I am not the desk.

If each of those judgments is true, then there is a subject and an object which is distinct from the subject.

I know the subject through experience, understanding and judgment; I know the object through experience, understanding and judgment.

It is not a matter of getting from "in here" to "out there." Rather, it is a matter of moving from data to understanding to judgment.

It is not a matter of knowing myself and wondering how I get to knowing anything else.

Rather, it is a matter of how I get from data to knowing.

The process is the same in knowing myself and in knowing anything else.

I, p. 377: "The principal notion of objectivity solves the problem of transcendence. How does the knower get beyond himself to a known? The question is, we suggest, misleading. L It supposes the knower to know himself and asks how he can know anything else. Our answer involves two elements. L On the one hand, we contend that, while the knower may experience himself or think about himself without judging, still he cannot know himself until he makes the correct affirmation, I am. Further, we content that other judgments are equally possible and reasonable, so that through experience, inquiry, and reflection there arises knowledge of other objects both as beings and as being other than the knower. Hence, we place transcendence, not in going beyond a known knower, but in heading for being within which there are positive differences, and, among such differences, the difference between object and subject. Inasmuch as such judgments occur, there are in fact objectivity and transcendence; and whether or not such judgments are correct, is a distinct question to be resolved along the lines reached in the analysis of judgment."

I presume this notion all the time; but to articulate it is more difficult.

Experiential objectivity: the data-as-given, equally valid in all its parts. I.e., all parts of the data are valid for judgments.

Thus, even the data of a hallucination is pertinent to understanding and judgment; it is more apt to be pertinent to the judgment of a psychiatrist than of a physicist, but nonetheless it can be taken into cognitional process leading to its term in judgment.

30 January 1986

Metaphysics is the science that sets forth the general nature (i.e., the "broad outlines" of the objective of the process of inquiry – i.e., the broad outlines of being. It then reorientates and integrates other scientific and common sense knowledge.

Metaphysics is *derived* from the basic positions (on the subject, being, and objectivity); thus, it is not the first science, as it was in Aristotelianism and scholasticism.

It is derived-from and critically-based-in cognitional theory and epistemology. It deals with the question: What do I know when I know 'that'? (which follows the questions: What am I doing when I am knowing? And Why is doing that knowing?).

There is a further question? What do I do when I have grappled with the prior three questions? This is the question of the praxis of the intellectual.

<u>14.1 deals with philosophy in general</u> (and, by extension, theology).

To this point we have affirmed three positions, and on the basis of them (i.e., on the basis of my own self-appropriation); I am now invited to engage in an inquiry into philosophical and theological understanding.

Philosophy is considered under three headings:

Metaphysics (chapter 14-17)
Ethics (chapter 18)
Philosophical theology (chapter 19)

Chapter 20 and the epilogue point toward a grasp of what it would be to do theology intelligently.

The 'underlying problem' is peculiar to philosophy, theology, and the human sciences – in these areas disagreement does not 'go away' as it tends to do in mathematics and the natural sciences. In natural science, verified advances eventually gain universal acceptance. But in philosophy, theology, and human science there is no common fund on which the whole community draws; people so often are 'talking beyond one another.' Some of these differences are a function of the fact that in these fields there is necessarily an existential engagement of the subject, in a way that is not true in mathematics and the natural sciences; the subject is put on the line (i.e., s/he is asked to state – implicitly or explicitly – what s/he is.

Lonergan has met this problem head on: this is the self I am going to be. The self is affirmed in this way: I am oriented to a universe of being and I reach that universe incrementally in intelligent understanding and rational judgment.

Such judgments are a matter of authentic self-transcendence.

Thus, the underlying problem is the problem of authentic subjectivity; irreconcilable differences will come back to that problem.

There are, of course, differences that are complementary and are not irreconcilable.

Irreconcilable differences are based in the kind of subject you have chosen to be.

The three basic positions are thus foundational issues: everything follows from one's stance on the basic positions (or counterpositions).

The problem is the *polymorphism of human consciousness*. Human consciousness is not just what has been affirmed to be in chapter eleven. The polymorphism is a factor of the complexity of human consciousness.

a. The duality of human knowing; i.e., the difference between experiential and absolute objectivity.

The experiential is given-as-given, but possesses no criterion of the real. It is prior to questioning; it is the unquestioning orientation of extroverted biological consciousness.

'Already-out-there-now!'

Absolute objectivity is the fruit of intelligent inquiry/understanding and rational reflection/judgment. I reach absolute objectivity via normative objectivity.

In a true judgment, what-is is known.

b. The problem is generally the uncritical survival of remnants of extroverted consciousness not simply in my dramatic living, but in my philosophy and theology.

E.g., the philosophical question: how do I get from in-here to out-there? The presupposition of this question is a remnant of extroverted biological consciousness.

In fact, judgment is self-transcending, even when it is a judgment about myself.

I need to allow my orientation to the universe of being to penetrate all the patterns of experience of my life, to let my orientation to what-is to penetrate all the departments of my life.

The polymorphism involves projection, transference, expectations, etc.

A dimension of therapy is individuation: development of authentic faithfulness to the exigencies of my dynamism of consciousness.

Lonergan will later insist that this faithfulness can result only as the gift of God's love and my cooperation with it.

I want to be oriented to a real universe of being and value that I reach incrementally in judgments through my faithfulness to the transcendental imperatives.

[Later, we will talk about how symbols are manifestations of our orientation to the mystery of the unknown (Jung's archetypes); Doran also posits anagogic (N. Frye) symbols as manifestations of our orientation to the unknown God.]

Doran fears that some contemporary music is an immersion in pure sensitivity (i.e., purely biological consciousness) – this can lead to short-circuiting the fullness of authentic consciousness.

c. The different patterns of experience: they could all participate in the orientation to what-is. I can make, e.g., dramatic decision out of that orientation.

But Lonergan argues that making a self-affirmation in the intellectual pattern can help in the reorientation of the other patterns.

On the basis of that polymorphism, we can set up sharp anthitheses.

I, p. 385: "It is not difficult to set antitheses against the conclusions of the preceding three chapters. Against the objectivity that is based on intelligent inquiry and critical reflection, there stands the unquestioning orientation of extroverted biological consciousness and its uncritical survival not only in dramatic and practical living but also in much of philosophic thought. Against the concrete universe of being, of all that can be intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed, there stands in a prior

completeness the world of sense, in which the 'real' and the 'apparent' are subdivisions within a vitally anticipated 'already out there not.' Against the self-affirmation of a consciousness that at once is empirical, intellectual, and rational, there stands the native bewilderment of the existential subject, revolted by mere animality, unsure of his way through the maze of philosophies, trying to live without a known purpose, suffering despite an unmotivated will, threatened with inevitable death and, before death, with disease and even insanity."

The question is: what is going to be the ground of my understanding of self, and of my (re)orientation of the other patterns of the dynamism of my consciousness?

Is there some way that my conscious dynamism can be sublated into an orientation to the universe of being/value?

Everyone's world (*Welt*) is a function of one's care (*Sorge*); is there a 'care' that can make the 'world' radically open, i.e., a world of being.

Can there be a transformation of my life so that I 'care' for the universe of being.

Thus, for Lonergan, the notion of being becomes sublated into the notion of value: openness to "the good" and thus the potential making-good of the human world.

When some other concern is operative, the self seems very different than what has been affirmed here.

In a personal relationship, e.g., projection will falsify/distort another; that absence of objectivity will distort the relationship until I reorient my dramatic interpersonal living to be toward what-is.

When Lonergan talks about the reorientation of common sense, he is not talking about making it a science. Rather, he is concerned with the development of a "universal willingness: -- allowing my practical/dramatic patterns to be open to face the facts (what-is) and value.

An example is the experience of facing death for an older person. The struggle is whether one can face death as an aspect of the universe of being, and still trust.

This occurs within the dramatic pattern of experience; the question is whether I can approach death with objectivity (i.e., authentic subjectivity) and the trust implied in it: letting go into the hands of a Transcendent Mystery greater than myself.

The polymorphism of consciousness has implications for philosophy and theology: philosophy can become contradictory. (Cf. *Doctrinal Pluralism* to realize that Lonergan has a very positive understanding of the enriching nature of pluralism) He insists that basic contradictions must be deal with.

The philosophies are many because the ground of philosophy is the mind of a philosopher and the mind is a pluriform "bewildering fact."

The differentiations of consciousness have only been worked out in recent centuries because of the turn to the subject; a philosophical understanding of interiority has resulted.

We are now able to gain some mastery of the human mind.

I, p. 386: "In fact, the mind is polymorphic; it has to master its own manifold before it can determine what utterance is, or what is uttered, or what is the relation between the two; and when it does so, it finds its own complexity at the root of antithetical solutions."

what utterance is = outer word
what is uttered = inner word; grasp of virtually unconditioned

This enables us to understand the complexity of the human mind as the basis/foundation of philosophical differences. Thus, philosophy can be seen as being a cumulative advance in the implications of that for other areas: metaphysics, epistemology, theology, psychology, and other human sciences.

We read previous philosophers in order to learn about the polymorphism of human consciousness and its implications.

McShane speaks of Lonergan's systematic theology as genetic-dialectical systematics: reading past theologians to understand developments of positions and to reverse counter-positions.

This allows all previous philosophers and theologians to be read as contributions to the clarification of our understanding of the human mind.

The method of philosophy becomes a matter of tracing the outer word of philosophers to the inner word, and the inner word to the act of understanding – and then to discover whether that inner word is or is not compatible with understanding it intelligibly and affirming it reasonably, and I can only do that on the basis of my own intelligence and rationality.

At times, one will grasp that the inner word is not compatible with the operations of intelligence and rationality, but rather is a function of, e.g., biological extroversion (which results in the philosopher's expression of insight in an idealism or materialism – or some other horizon more restrictive than the universe of being).

The result will be a cumulative and progressive interpretation of human consciousness and the worlds it constructs.

I, pp. 387-388: [Regarding this, McShane remarks that 'when you turn this page, you enter another world!']

"First, in any philosophy, it is possible to distinguish between its cognitional theory and, on the other hand, its pronouncements on metaphysical, ethical, and theological issues. Let us name the cognitional theory the basis, and the other pronouncements the expansion.

Secondly, there are two aspects to the basis. On the one hand, cognitional theory is determined by an appeal to the data of consciousness and to the historical development of human knowledge. On the other hand, the formulation of cognitional theory cannot be complete unless some stand is taken on basic issues in philosophy.

Thirdly, the inevitable philosophic component, immanent in the formulation of cognitional theory, will be either a basic position or else a basic counter-position.

It will be a basic position, (1) if the real is the concrete universe of being and not a subdivision of the 'already out there now;' (2) if the subject becomes known when it affirms itself intelligently and reasonably and so is not known yet in any prior 'existential' state; and (3) if objectivity is conceived as a consequence of intelligent inquiry and critical reflection, and not as a property of vital anticipation, extroversion, and satisfaction.

On the other hand, it will be a basic counter-position, if it contradicts one or more of the basic positions."

The counter-positions come from biological extroversion.

In the utterances of philosophers/theologians there will sometimes be remnants of biological extroversion, which will result in utterance of idealism and materialism.

Such thinkers' contributions make real contributions – but the effects of the remnants of biological extroversion need to be sublated.

The project in reading a philosopher is to make of what the person says even more than what s/he explicitly said!

The dialectic is for the sake of being enriched – even by the contradictory understandings. He is not out for a 'witch hunt.'

<u>METAPHYSICS</u>

Recall I, p. xxviii: "Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand *the broad lines of all there is to be understood* but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding."

'…the broad lines of all there is to be understood' is metaphysics.

Metaphysics is the science that progressively fills out the notion of being, by adding to it newly emerging specific heuristic structures (which emerge in the development of human knowledge).

There is a *latent* metaphysics of the human mind in the notion of being – empirical, intelligent, rational human consciousness is operative in all human knowing. But this is not explicitly grasped at this stage (thus, 'latent').

A spontaneous metaphysics underlies and penetrates all other knowing.

Problematic metaphysics is a state of confusion: explicit questions have emerged, but there is a confusing state of contradictory answers.

Latent metaphysics becomes *explicit* as a result of self-appropriation.

<u>*I*, p. 391</u>: "Explicit metaphysics is the conception, affirmation, and implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being."

Thus, it is *progressive*.

Implementation: reorientation and integration of the sciences and common sense.

The human mind would be the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being if it knew everything about everything; thus, we are on the way (progressive) – we are not yet there.

"Metaphysics on the move!"

<u>6 February 1986</u>

Three basic positions are worked out in *I* (subject, being, objectivity): they are *basic* because all other (derived) philosophical positions are worked out on the basis of these.

> Derivative positions: positions which are coherent with the basic positions on subject, being, objectivity.
>
> Derivative counter-positions: positions which are incoherent with the basic positions on subject, being, objectivity.
>
> > The source of the counterpositions is the remnant of biological extroversion which remains in our consciousness, even as our consciousness becomes differentiated.

Derivative positions in philosophy regard epistemology and metaphysics, ethics, and philosophical theology.

Lonergan's later work will regard positions on religion, morality, and affectivity – which will also be seen as foundational (even for philosophy).

> Voegelin will agree that religious experience of world-transcendent-Reality was behind the Greek philosophical breakthrough.

The counter-positions invite reversal because they are incoherent (not with one another, but) with the praxis of grasping them intelligently and affirming them reasonably; there is a contradiction between theory and praxis in the counter-positions. Lonergan's example is Hume's argument that mind is nothing but an aggregate of sense impressions; this is inconsistent because Hume's *performance* demonstrates the intelligent creativity of mind (which does not correspond to his theory that mind is simply an aggregate of sense impressions).

> The performance of intelligence and reasonableness contain the positions-in-act (latent); explicit metaphysics is an objectification of this performance – i.e., metaphysics settles the question of the broad outlines (general nature) of what is to be known. These broad outlines are set by heuristic anticipations of what-is-to-be-known; metaphysics is a progressive discipline (i.e., the heuristic structures develop incrementally in the ongoing process of inquiry – e.g., differential equations).
>
> > Lonergan delineates four diverse but interrelated heuristic anticipations:
> >
> > - Classical method
> > - Statistical method
> > - Genetic method
> > - Dialectical method
> >
> > There is a metaphysics latent in the human mind; it lies in the empirical, intelligent, and rational consciousness that is operative in all our knowing. From this spring all intellectual disciplines.

Metaphysics becomes *problematic* when the need to clarify the reality of the subject emerges into consciousness ("the turn to the subject").

> Doran asserts that Lonergan has arrived at a resolution of the first problematic of the Enlightenment (Descartes, Kant); he did this by pushing back to the priority of cognitional praxis (behind theory).

Everyone has a self to be appropriated; it is the appropriation of that self and the 'filling out' of that appropriation that makes for explicit metaphysics.

Definition of *explicit* metaphysics (*I*, p. 391): "*The conception, affirmation, and implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being*."

> "Proportionate" being is being prescinding from the question of world-transcendent-Reality – i.e., being 'proportionate' to human experience, human understanding, and human affirmation. I.e., it regards immanently generated knowledge (not revelation); thus, proportionate being is whatever can be known by the sciences and common sense working according to their own autonomous methods (and not by revelation).
>
> > Metaphysics is not that knowledge (science and common sense); rather, it is the affirmation of the heuristic structures developed by science and sound common sense (dialectic of intelligence and neural demands – cf. chapters 6 and 7).
> >
> > Science is heuristic, and metaphysics is the continual addition of the heuristic structures worked out in science to the human mind that anticipates what-is-to-be-known.
>
> The basic conception and affirmation regard especially chapters eleven through thirteen; chapter fifteen is the beginning of the attempt to implement the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being.
>
> > Implementation = reorientation and integration of science and common sense on the basis of what has been understood, conceived, and affirmed about the structure of our own consciousness. Method in metaphysics regards the method of attempting to reorient and integrate the sciences and common sense (chapter fourteen).
> >
> > > Chapter fifteen is the 'outline' of the reorientation and integration of the sciences and common sense.
>
> Thus, 'implementation' involves *unifying* the various departments of human knowing in a single comprehensive whole.
>
> > Explicit metaphysics exists only in a human mind; it comes to exist there by raising the latent metaphysics to self-affirmation and a consequent affirmation of the implications of that self-affirmation with regard to the reality that is known by human empirical, intelligent, and rational consciousness.
> >
> > > A person will possess explicit metaphysics in proportion to his/her advance in self-knowledge, in interiorly differentiated consciousness.
> > >
> > > Self-knowledge in interiorly-differentiated-consciousness is the process of explicitating metaphysics. From the advance into interiorly-differentiated-consciousness, one can *issue certain directives to her-/*himself in scientific and common sense knowing – reorienting and integrating, e.g., what social scientists are saying.
> > >
> > > This involves (at the most basic level) recognizing that biological extroversion is the foundation of the counter positions. This can help me to recognize projection.
>
> The *method* of metaphysics is to move from 'latent' to 'explicit' metaphysics on the grounds of the basic positions through the reorientation of science and common sense to their integration.

The basis for integration of knowledge is the isomorphism between the knowing and the known.

If the knowing consists in a series of acts (empirical, intelligent, rational) and the known is the related set of content of those acts, then the known will be what-is-experienced, what-is-understood, and what-is-affirmed.

- The content of empirical consciousness is what-is-experienced.
- The content of intellectual consciousness is what-is-understood.
- The content of rational consciousness is what-is-affirmed.

Thus, the content will have the same structure as the acts. Thus, in everything that is known, there will be something that has been experienced, something that has been understood, and something that has been affirmed.

> Every instance of knowing is a unification of experiencing/understanding/judging, and so every instance of the known is a parallel of unification of the content of experience, the content of understanding, and the content of judgment.

There is a structure of the known that is *isomorphic* with the structure of the knowing.

Everything that is known is a *unity* of the content of the experienced, understood, and affirmed.

Integration: unification of the broad lines of all there is to be known (on the basis of the affirmation of the isomorphism of the structure-of-the-knowing with the structure-of-the-known).

I, p. 401: "The goal of the method is the emergence of explicit metaphysics in the minds of particular men and women. It begins from them as they are, no matter what that may be. It involves a preliminary stage that can be methodical only in the sense in which a pedagogy is methodical, that is, the goal and the procedure are known and pursued explicitly by a teacher but not by the pupil. The preliminary stage ends when the subject reaches an intelligent and reasonable self-affirmation. Such self-affirmation is also self-knowledge. It makes explicitly the pursuit of the goad that has been implicit in the pure desire to know. From that explicit pursuit there follow the directives, first, or reorientating one's scientific knowledge and one's common sense, and secondly, of integrating what one known and can know of proportionate being through the known structures of one's cognitional activities."

> Concerning "pedagogy," Lonergan is referring to what he was doing in the first ten chapters. The end of the preliminary stage coincides with chapter eleven. The "making explicit" regards chapters twelve and thirteen, and the "directives" chapter fourteen.

The rest of chapter fourteen is a clarification of his position by contrasting it with other positions.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

The basic *elements* that will be involved in all integration of science and common sense will be those derived from the isomorphism of the structure-of-knowing and the structure-of-the-known.

Proportionate being is whatever-is-to-be-known by experience, understanding and judgment.

The dimension of proportionate being that is not yet known is that to be known in understanding (i.e., the content of intelligent grasp); that will be known when one arrives at full explanation.

The 'content' at the level of judging = "Yes!"

The 'content' at the level of experience = empirical residue

- individuality (here and now)
- succession in time, conjunction in space
- space/time continuum
- non-systematic divergence from probabilities

When everything about everything is known; we will have full understanding and the content at the level of intelligence will be known.

The content of the level of experience and the content of the level of judgment are 'already in' and ready to be specified.

The sciences will be integrated in terms of the elements of: potency
form

act

Lonergan sets up an equivalence between metaphysical terms and the levels of consciousness:

- potency = the known at the empirical level
- form = the known at the intellectual level
- act = the known at the rational level

What Aristotle/Thomas meant by potency is what modern science means by "individuality, succession in time and conjunction in space, the space/time continuum, and non-systematic divergence from ideal frequencies."

What Aristotle/Thomas meant by form (though a bit ambiguously in Aristotle), is what modern science knows by explanatory understanding (i.e., what the sciences know by the relations of things to one another).

What Thomas meant by act is what is known by grasping the virtually unconditioned and uttering the 'yes' of reasonable judgment.

Potency/form/act constitute a *unity* because they are the contents of three levels of cognitional activity that yield a *single* knowing: what-is-experienced *is* what-is-understood; what-is-understood *is* what-is-affirmed.

The specification of what-is-known comes from form: *what*-is-known; that is the content in the sense of the determination of what-is-known. And we will not have that fully until everything is known about everything.

Example: "Mass" is a category that names a conjugate form (i.e., at the level of understanding); but we do not know if that category will remain as physics develops. We don't know whether it will be replaced by a category that will prove to be more adequate. We won't know the complete form of the universe until we know everything about everything.

[Note that the distinction between "mass" and "weight" is between description (weight) and explanation (mass). Mass is implicitly defined by relations. Thus, conjugate forms differ from proper sensible.]

This structure of potency/form/act covers any scientific explanation, because science is a "theory verified in instances:"

- theory = form
- verified = act
- instances = potency

Thus, the account is capable of integrating what is known in the sciences.

Three kinds of scientific theory (to this point):

1. Classical theory refers to form as form (i.e., the content of explanatory understanding);
2. Statistical theory refers to form as setting ideal frequencies from which acts do not systematically diverge;
3. Genetic theory refers to the conditions of the emergence of form from potency.

Two kinds of potency/form/act must be distinguished; (because there are two kinds of form there must also be two kinds of potency and act). Because of the isomorphism, if there is, e.g., a conjugate form, there will also be a conjugate potency and conjugate act.

1. *Conjugate* form consists in terms implicitly defined in verified correlations (explanatory/pure conjugates).

   $E = mc^2$ -- mass is implicitly defined by the relation between energy and the speed of light.

   Conjugate ***form*** = explanatory/pure conjugates: implicitly defined in verified correlations. It is known through similarity: i.e., from relations among sets of data (prescinding from relations to our senses).

   Conjugate ***act*** = occurrence: i.e., "what" occurs is what is understood in conjugate form. Occurrences are the operations of conjugate forms.

   Conjugate ***potency*** = spatial-temporal continuum
   succession, conjunction
   random divergence from ideal frequencies

2. *Central* form makes a thing one; it is the 'unifying principle' of a thing.

   Central ***form*** = the unity that makes a thing a thing; i.e., the data known in conjugate form is known in another way as central form. Grasping data as existing in a concrete unity/identity/whole. (Aristotle: "substantial form.")

   Central ***act*** = existence ("what" exists is what is understood in central form)

   Central ***potency*** = individuality in the empirical residue

Different combinations of sub-atomic conjugate forms give rise to different sub-atomic things; they will differ specifically (i.e., in species) from one another because the forms specify the acts differently, but they will remain at the same genus (i.e., sub-atomic). Different combinations of these correlations will yield schemes of recurrence that systematize the conjugate acts at the level of sub-atomic occurrence. There may be occurrences -- ;random' at the level of sub-atomic physics – that are chemical (i.e., not in the sub-atomic schemes, and unable to be understood by sub-atomic physics); i.e., they are potency for chemical elements.

Occurrences (act) at the sub-atomic level can become systematic at a higher level and yield the need for new conjugate form.

Conjugate acts of realities (random sub-atomic occurrences) that cannot be explained at one level become potency for a new conjugate form (i.e., they become systematized at a new level).

You have a new set of conjugate forms defining a new genus of things yielding a new range of schemes of recurrence to be known by a new science.



E.g., there were instances of life that were simply non-systematic divergences from chemical forms; but once those became systematic there are 'living things' and a whole new set of schemes of recurrence (Teilhard: "biosphere").

Schemes of recurrence are set up to be understood by a new science. There are distinct and autonomous sciences dealing with new conjugate forms – successive higher viewpoints, none of which can be reduced-to or deduced-from the prior schemes. These sciences are successive higher viewpoints,

set up in terms of the coincidental manifold of lower conjugate acts becoming systematized in forms that give rise to a new genus of things.

> The acts of a lover level become the potency for a form on a higher level.

As an example, "habit" develops beginning with acts that are non-systematic; but continued performance of those acts becomes schematized in a "habit" (i.e., a new set of schemes of recurrence which is a conjugate form). Those initial acts are potency for habits in intellectual consciousness (which is not a matter of becoming a new 'thing'/genus – but, nonetheless, there is real 'development').

> Once the habit is developed, the acts proceed spontaneously, whereas they did not before. A new habit is a new scheme of recurrence at the same generic level.

Lonergan asks whether this structured account of the emergence of the universe is demonstrated; he claims that it has high probability (in terms of what science knows today).

> He does not claim the same kind of certainty for this that he does for the structure of consciousness in the subject. But he also indicates that he knows of no real 'competitors.'

Potency and *Limitation*:

> Each higher genus is *limited* by the preceding lower genus: I cannot interfere with the autonomy of my animal functions; (despite my intelligence, I have to sleep – there is some flexibility, bit if I don't get enough sleep, I will die!). There are limits that are set by the lower genus whose conjugate forms are continued in the higher genus. And yet the higher form is a higher systematization of those lower functions; e.g., hopefully I eat differently than a pig does (there is a certain ('artistry'); there is (in me) a higher capacity for systematizing the lower function.
>
> If each higher genus is limited by the lower genus, then the lowest genus (whatever it is) thus provides a *principle of limitation* for the whole universe:
>
> > *Prime potency*/matter = the potency of the lowest genus
> >
> > We can (with high probability) identify what Aristotle meant by prime matter with what modern physicists call "energy."
> >
> > *I*, p. 444: "Finally, there has been suggested a correlation between the expanding universe and the emergence of additional energy. If this happens to become accepted, is it to be explained because prime potency grounds both the space-time continuum and the quantity of energy, so that an increase of one involves an increase of the other?
> >
> > > "What would seem desirable is a single coherent answer to all these questions such that prime potency would be conceived as a ground of quantitative limitation and general heuristic considerations would relate quantitative limitation to the properties that science verifies in the quantity it names energy."
> > >
> > > Note, e.g., Jung's notion of "psychic energy" – i.e., energy becomes conscious.

FINALITY

Despite the limitations in the universe of proportionate being (and the limitation of higher conjugates by lower conjugates) there is an incompleteness and a *dynamic orientation to completeness* (towards fuller being) that becomes determined as the process of completion goes forward.

There is an isomorphism between (a) the incompleteness of the notion of being (raising ever further questions) and (b) the dynamic orientation of the entire universe.

I, pp. 444-445: "Just an intellectually patterned experience heads towards insights and judgments, so potency heads towards forms and acts. Just as cognitional activity mounts through accumulations of insights to higher viewpoints, so objective process involves the information and actuation of prime potency only to uncover a residue of coincidental manifolds and so mount through successive levels of higher systematization. Just as cognitional activity does not know in advance what being is and so has to define it heuristically as whatever is to be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation, so objective process is not the realization of some blueprint but the cumulation of a conditioned series of things and schemes of recurrence in accord with successive schedules of probabilities. Just as cognitional activity is the becoming known of being, so objective process is the becoming of proportionate being. Indeed, since cognitional activity is itself but a part of this universe, so its heading to being is but the particular instance in which universal striving towards being becomes conscious and intelligent and reasonable."

Finality = orientation toward ever fuller completeness; the fluidity/restlessness of being moving toward ever greater completeness.

The "passionateness of being." (Rosemary Haughton)

Lonergan elsewhere (e.g., "Finality, Love, and Marriage," *Collection*) makes an important and helpful distinction.

Horizontal finality: the finality of a being towards its own completeness on its own level; the finality of my own intelligence for knowledge and my affectivity for wholeness.

Vertical finality: the finality of lower generic levels for higher generic levels; the potency of lower forms for higher.

There is an open dynamism of the universe of proportionate being, and the ground of that is potency. Thus, potency is both the principle of limitation and the ground of transcendence.

Development of culture becomes a means of ongoing evolution. Thus, even if human beings are the last genus (and we don't know that) the finality of the universe goes on in our own advancing differentiations of consciousness, our own development of knowledge, and our own creation of ever more cultured forms of living.

The dynamism of finality is *directed*.

The negative picture (entropy, death) is not the whole picture; in addition, there is also a directed dynamism toward fuller being; because potency stands in some dynamic direction for form, form to act, and coincidental acts in potency to new form.

This is not, however, a determinate direction; it keeps heading forward. If it is halted at some genus, it reveals limitations which seek to be transcended in a new way.

This is what Lonergan has previously in *I* referred to as "emergent probability."

It is characterized by *flexibility*.

Potency is a tension of opposites: limitation and the tendency to transcend limitation.

This is not to be identified with "final causality;" whereas final causality is extrinsic, what Lonergan is referring to here is intrinsic.

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Explicit metaphysics is the conception, affirmation and implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being. Thus, a *foundation* is achieved in one's affirmation of a consciousness that is at once empirical, intelligent and rational. This self-affirmation is a *breakthrough*; that breakthrough/foundation is confirmed in the *envelopment*/encirclement through which being is defined 9as whatever can be intelligently grasped and reasonable affirmed); there is a *confinement* in the dialectical distinguishing of the positions from the counterpositions.

I, p. 484: The advance of metaphysical evidence is at once a breakthrough, an envelopment, and a confinement. The breakthrough is effected in one's affirmation of oneself as empirically, intelligently, and rationally conscious. The envelopment is effected through the protean notion of being as whatever one intelligently grasps and reasonably affirms. The confinement is effected through the dialectical opposition of twofold notions of the real, of knowing, and of objectivity, so that every attempt to escape is blocked by the awareness that one would be merely substituting some counter-position for the a known position, merely deserting the being that can be intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed, merely distorting the consciousness that is not only empirical but also intelligent and not only intelligent but also reasonable."

The breakthrough is in the self-affirmation of the knower. The envelopment is in grasping the notion of being. There is a confinement (dialectical restrictions) when one contrasts these notions of knowing, being and objectivity with the notions that are at the origins of the counter-positions.

On this basis one can reorient one's scientific and common sense views, and can fill in the heuristic structure of metaphysics (with classical, statistical, genetic, and dialectical methods – which are specifications of the over-all heuristic structure that being is whatever can be intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed).

On the basis of the isomorphism of knowing and known, what is known by these methods can be integrated in terms of the metaphysical elements: conjugate potency/form/act and central potency/form/act.

On can thus reach a view of the sciences as successive higher viewpoints.

The tension that is responsible for the emergent universe is rooted in potency: which is at one and the same time the principle of limitation and the principle of finality (which reaches toward ever higher being).

These categories (potency/form/act) enable Lonergan to understand and discuss the sciences which treat development: genetic method. He did not want to study this method until after outlining the metaphysical elements because the potential for counter-positions is so great in the sciences which treat development.

Clarifications from last week:

- ✓ Concerning Lonergan's use of the word "terms" – in that conjugate forms are terms defined by relations. Doran uses "habits" as a prime Analogate for getting ahold of what is meant by conjugate form.

  Habits are "properties" (not things?) that are implicitly defined by certain correlations (i.e., by "if-then correlations). I have a habit in this sense: "*If* certain things occur, *then* I am likely to react in a certain way." That is a relationship, implicitly defining a property/habit – that is a conjugate form.
- ✓ In the remainder of this chapter, Lonergan is concerned almost exclusively with conjugate form. In the next chapter he will deal with the relationship between central and conjugate form.

<u>The *Notion of Development* (15.6)</u>

Develoment occurs in the hierarchy of the sciences; it is studied from the emergence of life (organism) on upwards. Genetic method is what is employed in botany, biology, sensitive psychology, human science.

Development requires a new set of heuristic structures; besides classical and statistical methods, there is a need for genetic heuristic structures.

Lonergan lists seven *principles of development*: [and they's all quite easy to understand given the first four hundred and fifty pages of the book!].

1. The principle of emergence: otherwise coincidental manifolds of lower conjugate acts invite the higher integration effected by higher conjugate forms.

   This is involved in the movement of science from one level to the next.

   Acts become potency for the emergence of new things: chemical elements/compounds are higher integrations of otherwise coincidental manifolds of subatomic events; so too organisms to otherwise coincidental manifolds of chemical processes; sensitive consciousness to changes in neural tissues; and accumulating insights as higher integrations of otherwise coincidental manifolds of images/data.

   The concern of this chapter is the emergence *within* cells, *within* organisms, *within* the psyche, *within* intelligence. E.g., the emergence of new 'habits' because of the integration of otherwise coincidental acts.

2. The principle of *correspondence*: Significantly different underlying manifolds require different higher integrations.

    This reaches far beyond the sciences we are discussing here; e.g., it is what Marx was getting at in his analysis of the tension between technological and economic relations. Significantly different technological arrangements require different economic integrations.

    Concerning human communities: significantly different traditions require different higher integrations of human communities.

    Lonergan's examples: chemical elements differ by atomic numbers and atomic weights; those differences are grounded in the underlying manifolds which are significantly different. You have different organisms because there are different aggregates of aggregates of chemical processes in the underlying manifold. Sight and hearing are different psychic acts, because there are significantly different underlying neural manifolds.

    There is a certain measure of *flexibility* in this: within limits, the same higher integration can systematize different manifolds (cf. examples on *I*, p. 452). The same kind of atom can have subatomic components at different energy levels; the same kind of organism admits differences of size/shape/weight.

3. The principle of *finality*: The underlying manifold is an upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism towards ever fuller realization of being.

    This principle enables us to distinguish between static and dynamic higher integrations.

        Static: the higher integration dominates the lower manifold with complete success and thereby brings about a notable imperviousness to change. (E.g., inert gasses; or in societies, totalitarian government.)

        Dynamic: The higher integration is not content to systematize the underlying manifold but keeps adding to it and modifying it until, by the principle of correspondence, the existing integration is eliminated and, by the principle of emergence, a new integration is introduced.

            At any point in my own development, "I" am not content to simply stay where I am (static); by trying new things I keep adding to the underlying manifold and bringing forth new and hopefully more comprehensive higher integrations.

4. The principle of development itself: Development is what occurs in organism/psyche/intelligence – it is the linked sequence of dynamic higher integrations.

    At any state, the 'thing' is integrated in a certain way; but it is a dynamic higher integration which will give rise to further integration.

    I, p. 452: "The initial coincidental manifold is systematized and modified by a higher integration so as to call forth a second; the second leads to a third; the third to a fourth; and so on, until the possibilities are exhausted and the relative stability of maturity is reached."

5. The principle of *increasing explanatory differentiation*:

If you want to understand a dog, don't start with a puppy. The understanding of a species is best done in terms of the differentiations that are generated from the initial state. At the beginning (puppy) you have generic potential; but the real understanding is to be found in the unfolding of that potential.

6. The principle of *minor flexibility*: the same ultimate goal can be reached by different routes.

    Tad Dunne: "option play"

    Psychic health can be reached by ordinary development or by the process of psychotherapy.

7. The principle of *major flexibility*: the ultimate objective itself can shift and be modified.

    Lonergan gives the Freudian example of sublimation (though Doran prefers Jung's notion of 'transformation'): the ultimate objective of some of our drives left to themselves is simply on the biological level – but through transformation of energy, the ultimate objective of those very drives can enter into the fully human work of making a work of art out of our lives.

    These two flexibilities don't conflict with one another because they are rooted in the tension of potency between limitation and finality.

        In minor flexibility, what is at work is the determination of the development from the initial manifold (potency as ground of limitation); in major flexibility, we see the dynamism toward ever fuller realization (potency as ground of finality).

    A higher integration – e.g., in my becoming whatever I become – is characterized only partly by systematization of the initial manifold that I had to work with. In addition, there are many other factors; what I become is the solution to a complex problem of living that is determined not only by my initial manifold but also by my milieu/context/environment/family/friends/tasks, etc. That solution is not simply a set of conjugate forms 'in me;' but also a set of conjugate forms in the society of which I am part.

        The higher integration is the unfolding of me in relationship with others in society.

<u>DEFINITION of development</u>: A flexible, linked sequence of dynamic and increasingly differentiated higher integrations that meet the tension of successively transformed underlying manifolds through successive applications of the principles of correspondence and emergence.

Development understood in terms of the seven principles is what Lonergan is suggesting as the basic heuristic notion of genetic method.

It is thus the basic heuristic structure for the study of organisms, animal and human psyche, and human intelligence. (And later he will acc 'for the study of human morality, affectivity, and religion.')

The initial instances of development is the division of the cell which can lead either to reproduction or growth; when it leads to growth (increase in differentiation on the organic level) you have development.

<u>*I*, p. 454</u>: "As there are stable chemical elements, that block the road to development, so too there are unstable elements that easily form compounds. The compounds in turn may be more or less unstable and vast aggregates of them provide a coincidental manifold of processes that in

> the cell is made systematic. *The cell, however, sets up not a static but a dynamic integration*. It is ever intussuscepting fresh materials and extruding others that have served their purpose. Nor is it content merely to maintain the balance of this process, but heads towards a duplication of its dynamic pattern, and then it divides. Such a division may be an instance of reproduction or of *growth*. In the former case, there is the multiplication of life in different instances. In the latter case, *there is development. Higher integration is on the move, for growth is not merely an increase in bulk but also an increase in differentiation; the initial manifold is subjected progressively to ever more intricate arrangements and patterns; the principle of correspondence repeatedly forces out earlier integrations and, on each occasion, the principle of emergence evokes a more definitely differentiated integration*."

The next instance of development is *psychic*: a sequence of increasingly complex forms of sensitive consciousness.

> It occurs in the animal (e.g., sensitive habits in a pet). But psychic development is most richly diverse and highly integrated in human persons, who have a far wider range of affective/psychic responses.
>
> Psychic development has, as its underlying manifold, the neural system; but psychic development is not neural tissues/configurations/events. Rather, it is a sequence of increasingly differentiated and integrated sets of capacities for conscious perception, aggressive or affective responses, memory, imaginative projects, and skillfully and economically executed performance (*I*, p. 456).
>
> The fact that psychic and neural development are different from one another is evident, e.g., in the phenomenon of multiple personality (cf., e.g., *The Three Faces of Eve*). Different personalities are different psychic integrations of the same underlying neural manifold.

Lonergan sees this definition of development as being able to provide a single scheme that can unify wish fulfillment (Freud), sublimation (Freud – or Jung's 'transformation'), and archetypal symbols (Jung).

> *I*, p. 457: "The unconscious neural basis neither means nor wishes in the proper senses of those terms, for both meaning and wishing are conscious activities. But the unconscious neural basis is an upwardly directed dynamism seeking fuller realization, first, on the proximate sensitive level and, secondly, beyond its limitations on the higher artistic, dramatic, philosophic, cultural, and religious levels. Hence it is that insight into dram symbols and associated images and affects reveals to the psychologist a grasp of the anticipations and virtualities of higher activities immanent in the underlying unconscious manifold."
>
> Doran notes that Jung adopts a teleological approach to psychic phenomena (which is closely related to "finality"). I.e., to understand a dream you have to understand where it is heading, what it is anticipating. Freud had insisted, rather, that you had to understand where the dream 'comes from' (origin).
>
> > The full understanding of a dream would have to take account of both these perspectives. Thus, Ricoeur refers to archaeological (Freud) and teleological (Jung) dimensions of interpretation. This is related to Lonergan's notions of finality (teleological) and limitation (archaeological).
>
> There are also elements here for understanding Freud's notion of the super-ego and the censor (cf. *I*, p. 457).

> Lonergan also throws light on the key role of sexual development in the human person that Freud has highlighted. From Lonergan's perspectives, sexual development in the human being is so complex because there is a developing integration from the generic to the specific, and integration cannot precede the unfolding of its underlying manifold. Psychic integration becomes a real problem at puberty precisely because there is an enormous development in the underlying neural manifold.

Intellectual development is the principal illustration of the notion of development because it is one that we can identify in our own experience: "an otherwise coincidental manifold of data or images is integrated by insights; the effort to formulate systematically what is grasped by insight or, alternatively, the effort to act upon it gives rise to further questions, directs attention to further data, leads to the emergence of further insights, and so the cycle of development begins another turn. For if one gives free rein to the detached and disinterested desire to know, further questions keep arising." (*I*, p. 458)

> "In each of these fields (mathematics, common sense, empirical science, philosophy), as in organic growth and in the unfolding of the psyche, development is a flexible, linked sequence of dynamic and increasingly differentiated higher integrations that meet the tension of successively transformed underlying manifolds through successive applications of the principles of correspondence and of emergence."

GENETIC METIOD: the set of heuristic structures for the study of development (which is part of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being – because there are 'things' that develop).

single development:	organic
twofold development:	organic, psychic
threefold development:	organic, psychic, intellectual

General notions of genetic method:

1. In any one of those cases (plant, animal, human) there is to be affirmed an individual, existing unity (a 'thing' that develops): individual by central potency, a unity by central form, and existing by central act.
2. There are also conjugate potencies/forms/acts. Whereas central potency/form/act remain constant throughout development, development is to be formulated precisely in terms of conjugate potency/form/act.
3. Conjugate acts are occurrences/events/functions:

organic:	intussusception, assimilation, excretion
psychic:	perception, conation, response
intellectual:	insight, formulation, reflective understanding, and judgment

> These acts are recurrent and their recurrence establishes schemes of recurrence. But these schemes differ from the schemes at the level of physical/chemical reality; they are not fixed in some single scheme of recurrence, but rather there is a *flexible circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence*.
>
> > In terms of 'if-them" relationships: The psychic/affective responses of a human being do not function in some single scheme of recurrence. L Rather, depending on different circumstances (if:' you've had enough sleep, enough exercise,

enough to eat. . .). The schemes of recurrence in your affective responses to different stimuli will be different; psychic responses to academic work, e.g., exhibit a whole range of feeling depending on a lot of factors (including sleep, eating, teachers, etc.) – and that range functions in a flexible circle depending on such factors as interest, stimulation, collaboration with others, etc.

So – there is a whole circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence that is flexible and dependent on a whole set of other phenomena.

I, p. 459: "The same development can result in widely different operations under different conditions and in accord with different circumstances."

4. Conjugate forms (of the organism, psychic, intelligence) are discovered by proceeding from the schemes of recurrence to underlying correlations. The basic procedure in genetic method is to start with the acts as they occur in schemes and proceed to underlying correlations.

In psychoanalysis, we start with the schemes of recurrence in which my affective responses occur – e.g., the various recurrences of symbols in my dreams which point to underlying correlations.

Inversely, once the underlying correlations are known, you can begin to work out the acts that are likely to happen. E.g., the better I know myself, the better I am able to determine whether I should go in a certain direction in life.

5. There are quéte different kinds of conjugate forms in (a) physical/chemical and (b) organic/psychic/intelligent.

The flexibility is much greater in level (b); also, the advance of conjugate forms from generic indeterminacy to quite specific sets and patterns is present in (b). As that takes place, the 'circle' shifts and expands.

I, p. 460: "Operations that initially were impossible or extremely awkward and inefficient become possible, spontaneous, economical, rapid, and effective."

The physicist/chemist is out to determine single sets of conjugate forms, but the biologist/psychologist/intellectual-theorist is out to determine *genetic sequences* of conjugate forms, and sequences of flexible circles of ranges of schemes of recurrence.

6. Classical method (which studies 'form') will be used in genetic method, but classical method is concerned to reduce regular events to laws, whereas genetic method is concerned with sequences of laws in which regularities change.

The principal object of genetic method involve a movement 'from above' and a movement 'from below.'

The heuristic assumption from above is the notion of development. This is the 'upper blade' (general procedures which are implicit in the notion of development itself):

a. The general direction of development will be from generic potential to specific determination.

b. The general mode of development will be a sequence of conjugate forms, a sequence of higher integrations of otherwise coincidental lower manifolds.

c. The field in which development occurs is the field of finality, i.e., the field of the upwardly directed dynamism ('generalized emergent probability').

He calls it 'generalized' here because when he first introduced emergent probability it regarded only schemes; now it regards 'things' as well.

"Generalized emergent probability" = "finality"

I, p. 462: "It is emergent probability that provides the compound conditioned series of things and of schemes of recurrence such that the developing organism or psyche or intelligence will have an environment in which it can function successfully. It is with respect to this field of emergent probability that the genetic sequence enjoys a twofold flexibility, a minor flexibility that reaches the same goal along different routes, and a major flexibility that shifts the goal in adaptation to environmental change."

'From below' there are more specialized directives that will differ depending on whether you are studying organisms, psyches, or intelligence.

In general (with regard to all three of these) 'measurement' increasingly loses significance and efficacy as one studies these higher integrations.

It *loses significance* because the higher integration is relatively independent of the exact quantities in the lower manifold (e.g., my dreams are not a function of my weight).

It *loses efficacy* because the notion of development is not mathematical (whereas, e.g., the differential equation is).

Students of organisms/psyches/intelligence have to work out their own heuristic structures, rather than copying the physicists and chemists just because they are successful.

With regard to organic development (15.7.2), he makes some initial suggestions concerning method. Start with the thing-for-us, the thing-as-it-appears-to-our-senses (description) in order to gain basic familiarity with the data: anatomy. From anatomy, you move to physiology (relating the described parts to events/occurrences/acts/operations – thus grasping described parts as "organs" with immanent intelligibilities ('forms') – identifying what one part will do and relating that to what other parts will do. Thus, physiology is still descriptive, though moving toward explanation. Then you move to the thing-itself by moving to conjugate forms that systematize the otherwise coincidental manifolds of physiological process; thus, you move to the explanatory perspectives of biophysics/biochemistry. Here, you have to invent appropriate symbolic images for those physical and chemical processes; and in those images you have to grasp the laws of the higher systems that account for regularities that can't be accounted for by the laws of chemistry and physics. When you reach those laws that account for the higher systems, you are specifying conjugate forms. From those laws, you can reach out towards the flexible circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence that will be exhibited in the acts that follow upon the forms:

- anatomy
- physiology
- biophysics/biochemistry

Those three steps reveal one aspect of the development: the higher system as *integrator* of the underlying manifold (cells, chemical processes, physical changes). The higher system is a set of conjugate forms that integrates the underlying manifold.

In addition to this, however, there is also the higher system as *operator* of further development. The study of development is not complete until you understand how the higher system operates its own development – how it promotes/provokes/encourages/invites its own development.

The higher integration in a plant, e.g., so organizes the underlying manifolds that it calls forth – by that very organization – a further development, a further higher system.

Once you have life, the higher states operate their own development – by putting forth operations that provoke the further development.

E.g., children 'trying things out;' in this they are operating their own development by performing acts that become potency for new developments.

In general, the operator of development is finality – which has been 'sp0ecified' – the problem is specifying the operator; specifying how the 'thing' integrates underlying manifolds is much easier.

You specify the operator by trying to arrive at the laws by which a given thing is the source of its own development ('laws of operation').

Lonergan here gives the example of the *law of effect*: a thing will develop along the lines of already successful functioning; this is especially true in plants and animals – because a human person is capable, via imagination, of taking steps outside presently successful functioning.

In *psychic* and *intellectual* development (15.7.3) essentially the same heuristic structure ('from above' and 'from below') is involved, but the developments are much more complex.

Further, in studying human development the data are much more accessible – in that the data is conscious.

In an organism, both the underlying manifold and the higher integration are unconscious.

In psychic development, the underlying manifold is unconscious but the higher integration is conscious.

Thus, it is in the psyche that the tension between spirit and matter is felt. The psyche mediates between the organism and intelligence. The psyche participates in the schemes of recurrence of the organism but is 'headed towards' the schemes of recurrence of intelligence.

The higher the level of integration, the greater is the freedom from material limitation – i.e., the dynamism of the operator itself becomes more dominant.

Doran gives the example of how Lonergan's intellectual development of the fourth level of consciousness occurred precisely at the time when his body was racked with cancer.

Perhaps the operator even used the diminishment of body (suffering, facing death, etc.) for its own purposes.

Organic differentiation reaches its maximum, not in plants, but in animals; psychic differentiation reaches its maximum, not in animals, but in human beings.

Psychic development in the animal is the higher integration on the move of conscious perceptions and responses as these integrate the underlying neural events. At any stage of

development, the behavior of the animal exhibits a flexible circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence.

In *intellectual development*, the underlying manifold is the sensible presentations and imaginative representations. By the principle of correspondence, insights emerge to unify the sensible 'flow.' But the insights also ground further development (formulations and further questions).

Any given conceptual construction is the higher system as integrator; if, right now, I were to state my present understanding of what Lonergan is talking about, that formulation is higher system as integrator of my development in this particular area at the present time.

But further questions continue to emerge, and those further questions function as the operator of my development in understanding to yet higher integrations.

There are two peculiarities to intellectual development:

1. It is exceptionally free from the limitations of the underlying manifold.

   The higher system of the organism or the psyche develops in an underlying material manifold that is subject to its own proper laws. But the higher system of intelligence does not develop in an underlying neural manifold, but rather *in the psychic representation* of the underlying material manifold.

      I.e., intelligence develops in image which are a conscious representation of the underlying manifolds. Thus, the higher system of intellectual development is largely dependent upon the creativity of the imagination.

2. There is an exceptional *principle of control* in intellectual development.

   This is the capacity of human intelligence to grasp that the conditions for affirmation either are or are not fulfilled; this allows control over one's intellectual development. I can discard certain things as mere 'bright ideas,' or I can affirm certain things as 'true.'

<u>27 February 1986</u>

Genetic Method introduces a new set of heuristic structures: the structures that are employed in the study of development (and thus in botany, biology, zoology, psychology, and the study of the human person: the 'life sciences').

The heuristic notion of genetic method is the notion of development itself (as worked out in section six of chapter fifteen):

- Emergence
- Correspondence
- Finality
- Development itself
- Increasing explanatory differentiation
- Minor and Major flexibility

Genetic method studies living/sensate/intelligent 'things' differentiated by conjugate potency/form/act; development occurs in terms of *conjugate* (not central) potency/form/act.

When we get to 'living things,' we are dealing with *acts* in a flexible circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence – rather than fixed schemes (as in physics and chemistry): if. . . . then.

Higher system can be considered as 'integrator' and as 'operator.'

> The higher system integrates the lower coincidental manifold; and it operates its own development by putting forth acts that are outside the present schemes of recurrence and thus are potency for new schemes.
>
> In intelligence: concepts are the integrator; questions are the operator.

7.3 Psychic and Intellectual Development (continued)

The heuristic structure (under the notion of development) is employed not only in the study of organisms, but also in studying the developments that take place on the psychic and intellectual levels. These developments are far more complex.

> In any thing in which psychic development occurs, psychic development supervenes on organic development and thus there is a two-fold development. Intellectual development supervenes on psychic development, and so there is at least a three-fold development that must be considered in studying the human person.
>
> > A classic example of genetic method in studying intellectual development is the work of Jean *Piaget* (cf. Lonergan's *Lectures on the Philosophy of Education*).
>
> In studying the human person, the data is far more accessible – because both the underlying manifold and the higher system are conscious.
>
> > In the organism, both the underlying manifold and the higher system are unconscious; in psychic development, the underlying manifold is unconscious, whereas the higher system is conscious.

The higher the level of integration, the greater is the *freedom from material limitation*. The intellectual development of the human being is obviously dependent upon the neural system; but there can be certain breakdowns of the underlying material manifold of the human being that can be used creatively by the person in his/her own intellectual development.

> An excellent example of this is Helen Keller, who not only transcended her limitations but creatively used them; she did not allow these to restrict her psychic/intellectual development. Rather, through the higher system, these 'organic limitations' were integrated into psychic and intellectual development. Thus psychic/intellectual development is not necessarily destroyed by even serious impairment of organic development; the operator can make creative use of what has happened. (Cf. the notions of minor and major flexibility.)
>
> The higher the system, the more important/dominant the operator becomes in development; it takes greater charge in the development of the person.
>
> > One example of this is the way that questions can affect the emergence of images: if the question (intellectual development) had not been asked, the image (psychic development) would not have emerged.
>
> With respect to the underlying manifold, there is also a progressively greater differentiation: organic development is more differentiated in animals than in plants; psychic development is more differentiated in humans than in animals.

In intellectual development in the human person, the underlying manifold consists in sensible presentations and imaginative representations. In accord with the *principle of correspondence*, insights will emerge to unify and correlate elements in the sensible flow. These emergent insights will ground

the formulation of the unification in concepts (which is the higher system as integrator). But the emergence of further questions will effect the transition of that higher system in intellectual development into operator.

> Such further questions are 'acts' that are not contained within the integrator, but are forced from the integrator to move one's intellectual development to higher system.
>
> Thus, logic performs only a temporary service. The major issue in epistemology is not logic, but method – but because it is method that pushes you on., that raises the further questions. L Being able to raise further questions in a methodical fashion is what assures intellectual development.
>
> > Logic unifies what has been arrived at in the conceptual order and thus functions as 'integrator;' but intellectual development moves on ('operator') through method.
>
> The point of intellectual development is even more comprehensive understanding through the raising of intelligent and reasonable (thus, 'methodic') questions.

Lonergan notes two peculiarities of intellectual development:

1. Exceptional freedom from limitation: because it itself develops not in a material manifold at all, but rather in the psychic representations of material manifolds. It is able to make creative use of the psyche.

> Intellectual development is primarily the higher integration not of the person, but of the universe that the person comes to know.
>
> Cf. *I*, p. 515: "Human intellectual activity provides the higher system for sensitive living both unconsciously [spontaneously] and consciously [deliberately]. It does so unconsciously inasmuch as it grounds the pattern in which sensitive experience occurs, and in this respect it is a higher system to sensitive living as sensitive living is a higher system to organic living. But there also is a conscious intellectual control of one's sensitive living, and this differs enormously from the former. For conscious intelligence is engaged primarily in grasping the intelligible systems relevant, not to one's sensitive living, but to the contents of one's sensitive experience. By this shift from subjective acts to objective contents, it is headed towards the systematization, not of the particular animal that I am, but of the whole universe of being. And it is within its knowledge of the universe that knowledge of itself is attained, knowledge of its function in the universe is acquired, and the grounds for willing the execution of that function provided. Finally, it is through willing that conscious intellectual control of sensitive living is effected."
>
> > Thus, if I am in the dramatic pattern of experience, then my underlying psychic manifold will be patterned in a particular way; the interest I have is a spontaneous effect. If I am in the intellectual pattern of experience, my underlyi8ng manifold will be patterned in a different way.
> >
> > When this becomes deliberate, the higher system is not simply an integration of my sensitive living, but of the *contents* of my sensitive experience. This is not simply a higher systematization of myself, but is headed towards a higher systematization of the universe of being.

2. There is an exceptional principle of control through the grasp of the virtually unconditioned. The control is not simply through pragmatic success (as it is in the plant and the sensitive psyche); but also through the criterion of grasping the virtually unconditioned.

7.4 Human Development

I, p. 469f: "Organic, psychic, and intellectual development are not three independent processes. They are interlocked with the intellectual providing a higher integration of the psychic and the psychic providing a higher integration of the organic. Each level involves its own laws, its flexible circle of schemes of recurrence, its interlocked set of conjugate forms."

> To study the development of the human person one must study (at least) three systems and their relations with one another.

The problem of achieving human integration is due to the fact of the distinctness of the three systems – each does have its own laws and its own flexible circle of schemes of recurrence. The problem is achieving integration of those schemes of recurrence.

> The schemes of recurrence of intellectual development and the schemes of recurrence of organic development are quite capable of potential conflict with one another.
>
> > The schemes of recurrence of organic development have a certain quality that approaches being 'cyclic.' There is a dependence of the organism on the laws of nature; it is closely tied to material limitation in its development.
> >
> > The freedom of intellectual development from that material limitation can give to intellectual development a series of schemes of recurrence that are far more flexible/free, but also far more capable of losing touch with the development of the underlying organic system.
>
> It is possible for intellectual and organic development to split apart; when they split apart in the most serious way you have schizophrenia (in which insights/concepts have no roots in the organism; there is complete dissociation). The person's understanding of his/her situation in the world has no connection with the underlying organic limitations.
>
> The psychic mediates between and participates in the schemes of recurrence of both organism and intellect; its own forms/acts are material, but it also participates in the schemes of recurrence of the higher system. For instance, there are feelings involved in having an insight; the feelings change, but they perdure.
>
> > I feel differently with the emergence of insight, and differently again with the emergence of judgment, and differently again with the emergence of (good) decision.
> >
> > A great deal of the problem of integration (as Lonergan will alter emphasize more than he does here) is a problem of negotiating the psychic development where the two systems can meet. The psyche 'feels' the tension of the organism and the higher system; that is where the tension is part of the data of consciousness.
>
> Thus, the problem of achieving human integration is because of the different schemes of recurrence of the higher and lower systems. They can split apart in different ways.
>
> > E.g., whereas schizophrenia is the complete dissociation of intellect from organism, psychotic (catatonic) depression is the complete collapse of the higher system into the lower system ("vegetable").

Any single human action involves a series of components at all the levels: physical, chemical, neural, psychic, intellectual.

McShane: "There is never a twisted thought without a twisted molecule!"

The developments occur in accord with their own laws, in their own schemes, at their own levels.

Physical/chemical laws are 'static;' organic/psychic/intellectual are 'dynamic,' on-the-move.

Lonergan delineates the *heuristic structure for the study of human development* in six points:

1. "At any state of his development a man is an individual existing unity differentiated by physical, chemical, organic, psychic, and intellectual conjugates" (*I*, p. 470). The last three of these levels exhibit flexible circles of ranges of schemes of recurrence.

   The experience of the person shifts from one pattern to another depending on one's 'interest.' The total person is involved in the experience in any one of those patterns (dramatic, intellectual, artistic, mystical). But the different patterns will ground differing relations among the different levels of conjugates.

   I, p. 470: "Absorption in intellectual issues [intellectual pattern] tends to eliminate sensitive emotions and conations and, inversely, mystical absorption tends to eliminate the flow of sensitive presentations and imaginative representations; again, aesthetic experience and the pattern of practical activity tend to be mutually exclusive; finally, while the dramatic pattern of one person dealing with other persons draws upon all one's resources, still it subdivides. . . into a series of zones."

2. The individual (human) unity develops because the conjugates at the organic, psychic, and intellectual levels pertain to systems on-the-move; they are the ground of both integration and operation.

   And at least in the organism, development will tend to occur along the line of least resistance ('the law of effect'); in the human person this law of effect becomes an "anticipated law of effect." I.e., a person can grasp where s/he needs development and take the steps that will bring that development about.

      One can anticipate the habits that s/he would like to have and take the steps so that at some later date his/her continual development in those habits will be along the lines of least resistance.

   I, p. 471: "Because one wants to develop, one can frequent the lectures and read the books that put the further questions and help one to learn. Again, one develops through functioning and, until one has developed, one's functioning has the lack of poise, or economy, of effectiveness, that betrays as yet undifferentiated potentialities. Unless one is encouraged out of shyness, timidity, pretended indifference, to zest and risk and doing, to humility and laughter, one will not develop but merely foster the objective grounds for one's feeling of inferiority."

3. The law of *integration*: the initiative of any given development can come from at least four sources – organic, psychic, intellectual, external.
   - Organic: e.g., puberty
   - Psychic: feeling of attraction for another person

- Intellectual: a question is raised
- External: something surprising has a dramatic impact

But the development remains fragmentary unless all of these different levels come to some kind of 'correspondence.' Human development is the correspondence of the organic, psychic, intellectual, and external.

> E.g., organic development (such as sexual) must effect changes in one's external behavior; it must be integrated in the ways I relate to other people. It must also be integrated with my psychic and intellectual development.

I, p. 472: "Because man is a unity, his proper development is no more than initiated when a new scheme of recurrence is established in his outward behaviour, in his thinking and willing, in his perceptiveness and feeling, in the organic and neural basis of his action. Generally speaking, such an initiation of development invites complementary adjustments and advances, and unless they are effected, either the initiated development recedes and atrophies in favour of the dynamic unity of the subject, or else that unity is sacrificed and deformed to make man a mere dumping ground for unrelated, unintegrated schemes of recurrence and modes of behaviour."

> E.g., if an employer told me to stop smoking at work, this would necessitate not only change in behavior, but a whole psychic change as well.
>
> Lonergan gives the example of making a "resolution." Unless the other adjustments are effective, the resolution is apt to remain sterile.
>
> My intention to initiate a new habit will remain just a set of coincidental acts unless supported by psychic feeling, intellectual comprehension, and outward circumstance.

John Dunne images the alternatives of "walking through life upright or being dragged through life." One walks through life upright to the extent that the schemes of recurrence at these various levels are integrated.

4. The *law of limitation and transcendence*: Development is *in* the subject and *of* the subject; but is *from* the subject-as-one-is *towards* the subject-as-one-is-to-be. (There are many complexities involved in this; in fact, one could write an entire book on just this.)

> The subject-as-one-is is a *unity* of laws, spontaneities, habits, and schemes of recurrence (that may be functioning in an integrated fashion, or in a more-or-less disintegrated fashion). There are laws, spontaneities, habits, and schemes that basically define who one is at a given point in her/his life.
>
> *Finality* involves a change in the laws, spontaneities, habits, and schemes. The law of limitation and transcendence is a law of change in the laws, spontaneities, habits, and schemes. Finality introduces new laws, new spontaneities, new habits, and new schemes by putting forth acts that are coincidental in terms of the old laws, but that become integrated in their own schemes of recurrence with new laws.
>
> > The whole direction is against remaining as we are; and so there is a *tension*. That tension is inherent in the finality of all proportionate being, but in us it becomes a *conscious tension*. This is, then, a law of conscious limitation and transcendence.

I, p. 473: "Present perceptiveness is to be enlarged, and the enlargement is not perceptible to present perceptiveness. Present desires and fears have to be transmuted and the transformation is not desirable to present desire but fearful to present fear. Moreover, as has been noted, the organism reaches its highest integration in the animal, and the psyche reaches its highest differentiation under the intellectual integration in man. *Because psychic integration is so much more extensive and intricate in man than in other animals, it is involved in a more prolonged tension and it is open to more acute and diversified crises*."

> Lonergan is pointing to the *psyche* as the place where the tension is experienced.

"There is a further and deeper aspect to the matter. Intellectual development rests upon the dominance of a detached and disinterested desire to know. It reveals to a man a universe of being, in which he is but an item, and a universal order, in which his desires and fears, his delight and anguish, are but infinitesimal components in the history of mankind. It invites man to become intelligent and reasonable not only in his knowing but also in his living, to guide his actions by referring them, not as an animal to habitat, but as an intelligent being to the intelligible context of some universal order that is or is to be. Still, it is difficult for man, even in knowing, to be dominated simply by the pure desire, and it is far more difficult for him to permit that detachment and disinterestedness to dominate his whole way of life."

> He is pointing here to the authentic way of negotiating the tension; this 'authentic way' is through development of 'detachment' (as in Ignatian spirituality and the Bhagavad Gita), or "affective freedom from disorder." To permit that detachment to dominate one's whole life (intellectual and dramatic) is necessary for the following reasons:

"For the self, as perceiving and feeling, as enjoying and suffering, functions as an animal in an environment, as a self-attached and self-interested centre within its own narrow world of stimuli and responses. But the same self, as inquiring and reflecting, as conceiving intelligently and judging reasonably, is carried by its own higher spontaneity to quite a different mode of operation with the opposite attributes of detachment and disinterestedness. It is confronted with a universe of being in which it finds itself, not the centre of reference, but an object co-ordinated with other objects and, with them, subordinated to some destiny to be discovered or invented, approved or disdained, accepted or repudiated. Such then is the height of the tension of human consciousness."

> You cannot put off either of the poles of the tension; you cannot divest yourself of either one of them – neither one's animality nor the eros of one's mind.

I, p. 474: "To inquire and understand, to reflect and judge, to deliberate and choose, are as much an exigence of human nature as waking and sleeping, eating and drinking, talking and loving. . . Nor are the pure desire and the sensitive psyche two things, one of the 'I' and the other 'It.' They are the unfolding on different levels of a single, individual unity, identity, whole. Both

are I and neither is merely It. If my intelligence is mine, so is my sexuality. If my reasonableness is mine, so are my dreams."

There is a conscious tension of limitation and transcendence that has to be preserved and that leads to the fifth law of human development.

5. The *law of genuineness*: bringing that tension into consciousness and living in the tension (wi9thout displacing it in either direction). The genuine ('authentic') person is one who consciously/deliberately lives in that tension.

The displacement can go in either direction. The extremes would be schizophrenia and depression.

Genuineness is to live in the tension, in the taut balance, always knowing that the finality is from the self-that-I-am towards a fuller self – but recognizing that it is from the self-as-I-am and I cannot obliterate that. Genuineness is allowing the development to take place I the conscious tension of those two poles.

Genuineness involves correct apprehensions (along the way) of (a) the starting point, (b) the goal, and (c) the process; it is a conscious/deliberate development.

Conditional nature of the law of genuineness: if a development is conscious, then the success of the development depends on correct apprehension of the starting-point, goal, and process.

To the extent that my apprehensions are correct, all the systems (laws, spontaneities, habits, schemes) will be cooperating with one another.

Mistakes are possible in both directions: I can both underestimate and overestimate my capacities. And to the extent that my apprehensions are mistaken, the systems will not be cooperating.

Analogous nature of the law of genuineness: the apprehensions can be either 'minimal' or 'extensive.'

There are some individuals whose development goes forward rather spontaneously, with relative ease and without complicated introspection and study; to the extent that one's culture is simple, development tends to occur in this way.

But the apprehensions become more extensive when one begins to delve into the background, the context, the motives, the interrelations of one's acts. Particularly if one begins to coordinate one's self-understanding in line with some theory of development.

In this, the risk of displacement becomes greater. These 'explorations' can go astray. Thus, if my theory is mistaken/inadequate, the attempt to live in accordance with it will lead to displacement and simply compound the difficulties. (Thus, some psychotherapies simply make people sicker.) This would be true of someone who holds a behaviorist position on human development.

Paolo Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* contends that self-understanding is the problem. Oppressed groups tend to accept the definition of themselves created by the dominant groups. Their real problem is that self-understanding. There must be a change in self-understanding which praxis can then follow.

Conflict arises among the various systems because of displacement of the tension of limitation and transcendence. If my development could go forward living in that taut balance, there would be relatively little breakdown of the systems. The fact is that we do not constantly live in the tension.

Ignatius, e.g., speaks of doing discernment in different ways depending on whether one is living within the equilibrium or outside of it. If I am in the state of equilibrium ("third mode of election") I simply weigh the pros and cons of the alternatives, and go with whichever alternative has the greater 'list' in its favor; but I can't do that if I am not in the state of equilibrium because I am incapable of objectively weighing the pros and cons. In this latter case, I need to "test the spirits:" are they leading me toward the equilibrium or away from it?

At this point (*I*, p. 477f) Lonergan introduces a theme that will later become the dominant theme: We can't fulfill this law of genuineness. There is a basic problem: we have to fulfill the law, and yet we can't. Living in the light of correct apprehensions of that tension in its integrity is beyond our power unless there is some other source of development besides our own immanent development.

"Such genuineness is ideal. It goes far beyond the native endowment of detachment and disinteredness that we possess in the pure desire to know. For it *presupposes* the accumulations of direct, introspective, and reflective insights that re needed to discriminate between issues. Without due perspective and discrimination, the exercise of genuineness results only in the earnest person with a remarkable flair for concentrating on the wrong questions. Nor can perspective and discrimination be acquired without asking the significant questions. *There is, then a vicious circle to be broken, for we cannot become wise and discriminating without concentrating on the right questions, and we cannot select those questions unless we are wise and discriminating*."

This is a first approximation of what Lonergan will speak of as *moral impotence* in chapter eighteen: the problem of evil in human existence.

6. The *sanction* of genuineness:

To fail in genuineness is not to escape but only to displace the tension between limitation and transcendence. That displacement (I, p. 478) "is the root of the dialectical phenomena of scotosis in the individual, of the bias of common sense, of basic philosophical differences, and of their prolongation in natural and human science, in morals and religion, in educational theory and history."

This displacement can occur in either direction; Lonergan tends to emphasize the displacement 'downward' – e.g., the extroversion of biological consciousness. But there is a converse displacement 'upward' (such as 'inflation,' schizophrenia, false consolation, delusions of grandeur, etc.).

It is the negotiation of the psyche that will enable one to persist in the tension – because it is the psyche that feels the tension, that feels the displacement, and that goes awry when one becomes schizophrenic or depressed.

An excellent work in this area is Ernest Becker's *The Denial of Death*. Becker is basically speaking of displacement in the directions of depression and schizophrenia. He says most of us life somewhat displaced in the direction of depression. We are not creative, but fall into cultural systems that imprison us – because of our fears and insecurities, which prevent us from taking creative initiatives.

Becker refers to Kierkegaard's notion of "shutupness" which goes off in this direction.

The thesis is that because of fear, we embed ourselves in cultural systems for the sake of self-esteem, which comes from fulfilling cultural/social requirements; in doing so we minimize our freedom. By allowing myself to gain self-esteem from a system that is basically set up to protect people from their fears, I truncate the dynamism of my own consciousness.

The threat of social systems to us is that they tend to displace the tension.

<u>6 March 1986</u>

Introductory comments:

Last week's emphasis on the psyche is Doran's addition to what Lonergan himself said, though that position was affirmed explicitly by Lonergan.

E.g., the psyche as mediator between organism and spirit; psyche to which to turn for affective criteria of authenticity, etc.

Qualification in reading Becker. Becker posits a dualism of body/self – whereas Lonergan posits organism/psyche/spirit. In this, Lonergan is much closer to Kierkegaard than Becker is; Becker is simply wrong in his interpretation of Kierkegaard. An implication of Becker's position is that the body is left outside the self. For Lonergan, self is body/psyche/spirit, and problem is integrating the three.

Nevertheless, Becker is excellent on the tension of limitation and transcendence and especially on the displacement of the tension in depression and schizophrenia.

There are times in *I* when Lonergan uses the term "intelligence" where he is actually speaking of "*spirit*" (intellectual/moral/religious). From this point on, the book is moving away from just a study of human understanding (which it has been up to this point), towards a study of human authenticity in its totality.

Lonergan will later acknowledge that he was still working out of a 'faculty psychology' (intellect and will as distinct faculties, with the intellect presenting distinct materials to the will)p; in Thomist faculty psychology there is a priority given to the intellect. That is in the background to explain the perdurance of the term "intelligence."

He later moves from faculty psychology to intentionality, which recognizes that in addition to intending the true, we also intend the good, the beautiful, and God; it becomes a matter of the objectives of this total intentionality.

Thus, from chapter fifteen on, he is often talking about more than just intelligence intending truth.

The *METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS* (central and conjugate potency/form/act) do not possess any 'what' of their own; rather, they outline the structure from which one will know 'what' being is. They are 'that by which' one will know what being is.

> They do not possess a 'what' in the sense that a thing of a conjugate form possesses a 'what' (an essence). They outline the mold through which an understanding of proportionate being will flow.
>
> To know what things are, you have to turn away from metaphysics to the sciences; to know what things are is to know 'form' not just as a general constituent of being but in its details. Form is known in its specificity by the sciences (physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, human sciences).
>
> > The metaphysician works out the structure that controls authentic scientific thought; s/he works out the way in which the sciences are related to one another.
> >
> > Metaphysics assigns the general characteristics of proportionate being, but it does not give detailed answers.
>
> In the context of neo-Thomism (1950s), this is quite a radical departure; many scholastics claimed that the metaphysician does know 'form.'
>
> Metaphysics his helpful in keeping scientists from reducing everything to their own level; thus, metaphysical integration opposes any reductionism.
>
> > The metaphysician will point out that there are levels of conjugates in the world of proportionate being and that no one level is explanatory of the others.

Are these metaphysical elements merely cognitional or are they real? Are they just the structure in which proportionate being is known or are they the structure of the reality of proportionate being? Lonergan's answer is important for the remainder of the book (especially chapter nineteen on the existence of God).

> If you accept Lonergan's previous positions (i.e., that being is what is to be known [12], and that knowing is correct understanding [11]), then you have already implicitly affirmed that being/reality (what-is) is intrinsically intelligible.
>
> > There is some kind of relationship between knowing and being (isomorphism) such that the structure of one is isomorphic with the structure of the other.
> >
> > > This overcomes the subject/object opposition which has plagued modern philosophy.

There are different kinds of intelligibility to the being that is known:

- In the empirical residue (individuality/succession/conjunction/non-systematic divergence) being is *potentially* intelligible: "potency" is the potential intelligibility of proportionate being.
- Insofar as anything is actually understood, there is a *formal* intelligibility; something (being) is grasped by understanding: in terms of 'terms and relations' in conjugate forms; probabilities in statistical method; unities/identities/wholes in concrete data.
- Answering the question "Is it so?" arises from a distinct intelligibility involved in grasping the fulfillment of conditions for affirmation: act (*actual* intelligibility).

By our experience we know potential intelligibility, because we experience things in their empirically residual background functions; by understanding we know the formal intelligibility of proportionate being; by judgment we know actual intelligibility. Thus, these metaphysical elements are real, and not merely cognitional.

> Lonergan affirms a *realism* to his metaphysics; he is not just talking about the structure of knowing, but also about the structure of the known.

[Authentic nescience = realizing how few conjugate forms I actually know.]

> Nevertheless, there is a sense in which the universe of being comes to a unification in my understanding; this relates to the traditional notion of *imago Dei* – there is a sense in which we are images of God through understanding. There is some analogy between the way in which we are capable (through metaphysics, "wisdom") of understanding and the Unrestricted Act of Divine Understanding.

<u>The Unity of the Human Person</u>:

Each human person is one (a unity):

- individual by central potency;
- unified by central form; and
- existent by central act.

> <u>*I*, p. 515</u>: "This basic unity extends to the *distinctive* conjugates of human intellectual activity. The conjugate forms of the atom constitute the higher system of the atom's own subatomic events. The conjugate forms of the organism constitute the higher system of the organism's own chemical processes. The conjugate forms of the psyche constitute the higher system of the animal's own organic processes. In like manner, *the conjugate forms of human intellectual activity constitute the higher system of man's sensitive living*. In each case an otherwise coincidental manifold of lower conjugate acts is rendered systematic by conjugate forms on a higher level."
>
> The conjugate forms of human intellectual activity constitute the higher system of human sensitive living in two ways:
>
> 1. Spontaneous unification brought about by the higher conjugate forms as in any other being.
> 2. Conscious and deliberate unification.
>
> In both ways, the human central form has to be differentiated by the conjugates of human 'spiritual' (intellectual/morel/religious) conjugates. Human central form has to be understood in terms of the conjugates of spirit and not simply in terms of the sensitive psyche.
>
> > The psyche has the role of participating in both higher and lower conjugates; but it is not the principle of unity in the human person.
>
> Doran offers experiential arguments: sensation and feeling remain coincidental in the human being unless they are organized by acts of understanding, judgment, and decision. Actual, experiential unity comes from understanding, knowing, and acting (rather than through simply psychic acts). As a purely psychic being, I am fragmented: "I" am a unity in understanding, knowing and deciding.

Psychically, there are 'pulls' and 'counter-pulls' in different directions; I experience being 'torn' in facing a decision. When I make the right decision, a feeling of unity comes and that is a 'sign' of having made the right decision.

The psyche may give me the sense (affective criteria) of correctness with regard to a decision; but it is the acts of the higher system that effect the unity.

Human unity comes from the spiritual higher integration. The human central form has to be understood in terms of the acts and conjugate forms of the higher system.

Lonergan distinguishes 'the *intelligible*' and 'the *intelligent*.'

Conjugate forms insofar as they 'spontaneously' integrate underlying coincidental manifolds are intelligible; and that extends to the human intellectual conjugate form, as well as to the psychic, biological, chemical, and physical. Intelligibility is a function of the form *unifying* the underlying coincidental manifold.

Conjugate forms at the physical/chemical/organic/psychic levels are intelligible (i.e., unities) but are not intelligent.

In the human person, there is not only that spontaneous unification, but there is also a quite deliberate control that I can exercise over our sensitive living through the implementation of the capacities of human intelligence and freedom. We can understand our place within the entire universe of being (both generally and individually) and through freedom implement that understanding.

This is "intelligent intelligibility;" it unifies deliberately through understanding and implements freely.

This is the differential of *matter and spirit*.

Matter = non-intelligent intelligibility

Spirit = intelligent intelligibility

Spirit = intelligibility that is capable of grasping itself as well as the universe, and freely implementing that grasp.

Thus, spirit involves 'self-reflection' (beyond consciousness).

If spirit and matter are thus distinct, then the human person is a unity of spirit and matter. There are material conjugates in the human person (physical/chemical/organic/psychic), and there are spiritual conjugate forms. The "I" is differentiated by the *spiritual* conjugate forms (inquiry, insight, conceptualization, reflection, judgment, deliberation, decision, etc.).

Lonergan raises the question as to whether the spiritual conjugates can perdure through the breakdown of the material conjugates (i.e., death). Can the "I" live on?

He argues that the central form of the human being is *not constituted nor intrinsically conditioned by the empirical residue* (i.e., matter).

All the acts of a dog, e.g., are either constituted by or intrinsically conditioned by the empirical residue; they all occur within the field of individuality, succession, conjunction.

> But if the central form of the human being is not constituted or intrinsically conditioned by the empirical residue, then there is no reason why the identity of the human person ("I") cannot survive the breakdown of the lower conjugates.

His argument is that it is reasonable to maintain that the human person can survive the breakdown of the material conjugates.

The argument is this: acts of understanding *abstract from the empirical residue*, and thus are not constituted by or *in*trinsically conditioned by the empirical residue. Judgment grasps the virtually unconditioned – and there is a difference between sense experience which may give the fulfillment of the conditions and the internal grasp that gives rise to the judgment ("inner word").

> Understanding and grasping the virtually unconditioned may be *ex*trinsically conditioned by sense experience, but not *in*trinsically conditioned.
>
> Doran would add that "decision" could also be added here: through free decision, I am not intrinsically conditioned, but rather control the empirical residue. I can introduce a certain control over sensitive living.

A key question here is the meaning of "*in*trinsic conditioning:"

- Color conditions seeing intrinsically insofar as the object of seeing is spatial (empirical residue);
- Understanding 'presupposes' experience, but is not intrinsically conditioned by it insofar as the object of understanding is not spatial.

[Christian belief in the resurrection of the body (i.e., the transformation of the material conjugates) is a totally different question.]

Chapter Seventeen: *Insight* on HERMENEUTICS

> [Massive development of Lonergan's hermeneutics occurs after *Insight*; the *Insight* position is 'sublated' in those developments.]

Before writing *I*, Lonergan engaged in hermeneutic praxis in interpreting Aquinas (cf. *Grace and Freedom* and *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*). In these works he simply followed the 'self-correcting process of learning;' in his methodic hermeneutics, he is proposing something that goes beyond this earlier praxis.

> In *Verbum* (p. 216), he expresses this praxis: "Only by the slow, repetitious, circular labor of going over and over the data, by catching here a little insight and there another, by following through false leads and profiting from many mistakes, by continuous adjustments and cumulative changes of one's initial suppositions and perspectives and concepts, can one hope to attain such a development of one's own understanding as to hope to understand what Aquinas understood and meant."
>
> What remains throughout Lonergan's writing on hermeneutics is the notion that *to interpret another is to understand what the other understood and meant*.

One way of doing interpretation is through the self-correcting process of learning: you think 'x' means this, but then you ask "but what about what he says on page 622?" Further questions arise that give rise to further insights and eventually the stream of further questions dries up. By making mistakes and correcting yourself you can come to some grasp of what another person understood and meant.

With *I* the goal remains the same, but a *methodical* procedure is introduced; there is a development in method. There is not a *basis in self-knowledge* that enables one to move to the acts of understanding of another person with greater methodical control.

> The breakthrough in self-knowledge is (a) the notion of being; (b) the position on knowing (distinguishing the positions from the counter-positions); and (c) recognizing the polymorphism of human consciousness (the patterns of experience).
>
> One has entered a new realm through self-affirmation. One has a basis that can be expanded, but not fundamentally reversed.
>
> This gives a *control* over the self-correcting process of learning.

In between *Verbum* and *Insight*, Lonergan has explored his own mind, and on the basis of this he has found out for himself what there is to be known/meant; and from that basis he is moving to a heuristic anticipation of the whole range of possible meanings.

This is quite distinct from Hegel, who claimed to be setting forth the actual range of possible meanings; Lonergan claims simply to be setting forth an heuristic anticipation of that range.

> Philosophers after Hegel must have a method that enables them to explain the views of others, as well as grounds their own views.
>
> > In chapters fifteen and sixteen, Lonergan shows how his own views on reality are grounded in the method he lays out in the first fourteen chapters.
> >
> > > His own views are derived from the isomorphism of the structure of knowing with the structure of the known.
> >
> > In chapter seventeen, he wants to show how this method enables him to understand what others have understood and meant.
> >
> > > He accounts for other views in terms of the polymorphism of human consciousness and a genetic account of the sequences of expression (and differentiations of consciousness).
>
> Lonergan explicitly claims that any philosophy will rest upon the dynamic structure of cognitional activity (knowing) either as correctly conceived or mistakenly conceived. He extends this to include other pre-philosophical works – e.g., literature.
>
> Not only can one develop a general notion that there is a similarity of structure between what one says about knowing and what one says about being, one can also come to a quite specific understanding of problems peculiar to particular places and times and the responses that philosophers have made to them.
>
> > There is a single base of operations from which any philosopher can be interpreted correctly; that single base of operation is provided in cognitional structure.

Lonergan makes several important related additions to the structure of human subjectivity (17.1).

> The SYMBOLIC: He offers a structure for understanding symbolic expression
>
> The MYSTICAL: He introduces the mystical pattern of experience.

17.1 turns to a general account of pre-philosophical expression (e.g., song, poetry, ritual, myth, etc.) and asks whether or not such expression and experience pertains only to earlier stages of the human mind – or whether it endures no matter how far the human mind develops in philosophy and science.

Lonergan opposes August Comte, who posited three stages of historical development (myth, metaphysics, science) and argued that the earlier stages are to be 'left behind.'

Contra Comte, Lonergan posits an enduring significance to the symbolic.

It is very important to understand Lonergan's use of the terms "myth" and "mystery."

"Myth" has a pejorative meaning for Lonergan, and "mystery" has a positive meaning; they are both expressions of symbolic consciousness.

[In "*Insight* Revisited," *A Second Collection*, Lonergan acknowledged that "myth" may have been an unfortunate choice of words because "myth" has come to be spoken of positively (e.g., Eliade).]

The difference between the two could be exemplified by the following:

Myth = alchemy, astrology, scientology

Mystery = gospel, poetry

In "myth," Lonergan is speaking of collapses of symbolic consciousness into counter-positions; mystery is positional symbolic consciousness (in an authentic orientation).

Mystery: orientating ourselves through symbols to a known unknown that is weighted with significance (that is best expressed through symbol).

17.1.1 The *Sense* of the Unknown (At the *sensitive* level we are oriented into the unknown.)

'Sense:' feelings of awe, reverence, etc.

"Known Unknown"

We know of an unknown through our unanswered questions; at the intelligent level, we know of an unknown because we know how many questions we have/can not answer. ('Nescience'): We know that there are conjugate forms that we do not know.

Because of the law of correspondence between levels of conjugates, there must be at the sensitive level some corresponding orientation to the unknown. This is the 'sense' of the unknown; it is not a matter of disembodied intellect raising questions it cannot answer – rather, along with that and corresponding to it, there is a sense of the unknown.

There is an operator of development at the psychic level oriented into the unknown that corresponds to questions at the level of intelligence.

"Symbol" is the operator of psychic development – corresponding to the question at the intellectual level.

"Mystery" = orientation of psyche into the unknown.

Biblical expression (e.g., 'burning burn') tends to be symbo9lic expression at this level; it has the purpose not simply of saying what simply might have happened, but to speak to me with a symbol that will 'animate my heart' and allow me to relate at the sensitive level to the Mystery that is being spoken of.

Thus, in Scripture the Mystery is spoken of in terms of symbol that will orient me at the sense level into the unknown.

Cf., e.g., the Ignatian exercises.

Doran refers to the Incarnation as the entrance of Transcendent Being into proportionate being so that it can be experienced, as well as understood and judged.

Word-become-flesh = Symbol of the Mystery

On the psychic level (sensation/feeling/emotion, etc.), there are two spheres of existence/experience: (1) the familiar, ordinary, common; and (2) the strange, unfamiliar, unexplored.

This is true at the level of experience; Lonergan is asking the reader to identify his/her own experiences of the familiar and of the strange. We experience the sense of the unknown, and that differs from the experience of the everyday.

For some people these spheres might overlap (e.g., Wordsworth); and the intensity of the experience of the unknown/unfamiliar will vary with circumstance, temperament, etc.

Cf. Clifford Geertz on the "uncanny mushroom"

It is in the domain of sense experience of the unknown/strange that mystery and myth arise as *expressions*.

Mystery and myth try to say something about that realm of the sensed unknown.

In Doran's work he refers to this realm as 'the *imaginal*.'

In addition to being immediately symbolic (primary field) of that realm, they are frequently linked with interpretations (secondary field).

Lonergan mentions a variety of interpretations: *I*, p. 534: "The full range of interpretations includes not only the whole gamut of religions but also the opposite phenomenon of anti-religious feeling and expression, not only anti-religious views but also the intense humanistic idealism that characterized liberal display of detachment from all religious concern, not only elevated humanism but also the crudely naturalistic nationalism that exploded in Germany under the fascination exerted by a Hitler, not only such social aberrations but also the individual aberrations that led Jung to declare that very commonly psychoneural disorder is connected with problems of a basically 'religious' character. In brief, there is a dimension to human experience that takes man beyond the domesticated, familiar, common sphere, in which a spade is just a spade. In correspondence with that strange dynamic component of sensitive living, there is the openness of inquiry and reflection and the paradoxical 'known unknown' of unanswered questions. Such directed but, in a sense, indeterminate dynamism is what we have called finality. But whither finality leads, is a question that receives countless answers, pragmatic or conceptual, naturalistic, humanistic, or religious, enthusiastically positive or militantly negative."

"countless answers" = different interpretations of the experience that have been given in the course of history.

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[Pages 112-114 of *I* throw light on the intelligibility of being; e.g., aspects of the data not covered by classical method are covered by statistical method and *vice versa*.]

HERMENEUTICS (cf. Paul Swartzentruber's thesis ["The Development of an Approach to Hermeneutic Method in the Work of Bernard Lonergan, S.J.: From *Insight* to *Method in Theology*," University of St. Michael's College, 1981):

This chapter (17) heads toward providing foundations for hermeneutics (i.e., the 'upper blade' of hermeneutic method).

> Lonergan's argument is that Insight's cognitional theory provides a base from which any *philosophy* can be interpreted directly. (The theory has implications for other things – e.g., literary criticism – but his explicit concern is with interpreting philosophy.)
>
> By this he means not just the 'general tendencies' in other philosophies, but interpreting the concrete response that a given philosophy was able to make to the problems of its day.

<u>17.1 Metaphysics, Mystery and Myth</u>

This introduces a further dimension to the cognitional theory in speaking of the *sense* of the unknown; he is filling out what he has said about experience (first level) and is giving it a much richer depth/tonality.

> There is an orientation on the sense level itself that corresponds to the intellectual operator that raises and answers questions, headed into a k*nown unknown*. He calls this "some cosmic dimension (*I*, p. 532), "some intimation of unplumbed depths that accrued to man's feelings, emotions, sentiments."
>
> The field of the known unknown is represented at the sensitive level is *affect-laden images and names*. [Cf. the whole realm of the symbolic opened up by Jung, Otto, Eliade, et al.] The images that emerge at this level are representations of the known unknown.
>
> > These images and names constitute the *primary* field of mystery and myth; the *secondary* field lies in the interpretations that are given to the feelings and images that emerge on the sensitive level.
> >
> > > Eliade has attempted a phenomenology of the emergence of those images opening upon the realm of the unknown as the field of mystery and myth.
> >
> > The interpretations attempt to answer the question: 'Where is the finality experienced in this orientation headed?' 'What is the ultimate in this process of going-beyond?' (I.e., the question of *transcendence* is primarily raised out of the feelings, emotions and sentiments that orient us at the sensitive level into the known unknown.)
> >
> > > In chapters 19 and 20, he will return to the question of transcendence; here he is speaking strictly of proportionate being.

Lonergan here attempts to discuss the past and present unfolding of this unfolding – the development of human consciousness itself. Thus, human consciousness in its development is a manifestation of finality; as consciousness develop, humanity is headed towards ever fuller being. What Lonergan attempts here is to show how the development of consciousness throws light on the images and meanings that integrate and transform our sensitivity.

> This is one of the bases in which Lonergan makes a contribution to the reorientation of depth psychology. The images and meanings that emerge cannot be accounted for, e.g., in Freudian theory.

The process that has culminated in self-appropriation (chapter 11 and the consequent positions on being and objectivity) is a "long ascent" in the development of human consciousness itself that has led us to the point where we are able to engage in the self-appropriation to which Lonergan introduces us (and that is going on in the twentieth century).

Myth and Mystery are part of that long history of human consciousness; and Lonergan insists that they do not disappear now that consciousness has arrived at self-objectification.

I, p. 536: "The goal toward which it [the development of history] tends cumulatively is an awareness and an ever more distinct formulation of the nature of the originating subject."

In that history we find a whole series of transformations of the images and meanings through which we express this sense of the unknown. Lonergan's list of these transformations (*I*, p. 536):

- stories of the gods
- stories of the heroes
- tragedy
- lyric
- irony

This corresponds rather remarkably with Northrop Frye's cycle of literature (cf. *An Anatomy of Criticism*):

- myth
- romance
- tragedy
- comedy
- irony

The sensitive counterpart to the orientation of intelligence has assumed two forms: Myth and Mystery.

In "*Insight* Revisited" (*A Second Collection*) he tries to clarify his terminology as follows:

"In chapter seventeen my usage of the word 'myth' is out of line with current usage. My contrast of mystery and myth was between symbolic expressions of positions and counterpositions. It was perhaps justifiable in the context of Insight, but it is not going to be understood outside of it, so another mode of expression is desirable. Further, the account of mystery has to be filled out with what chapter four of Method in Theology says about religious experience." (p. 275)

- Myth = symbolic expression of counter-positions
- Mystery = symbolic expression of positions

Myth is symbolic expression of disorientations in the world of being; mystery is symbolic expression of positional orientation in the world of being.

MYTHIC CONSCIOUSNESS is the limit of confusion regarding three issues:

1. the criteria of the real;
2. the distinction regarding explanation and description; and
3. the distinction between understanding and heuristic anticipation of understanding.

Confusion regarding *criteria of the real* (*I*, pp. 537-538):

The real is known by the rational 'yes' following upon grasp of the virtually unconditioned; but for untutored consciousness, the real must also be imaginable and since imagination is ever fluid the real attains the stability of reality only when it is named.

Note the biblical significance of 'the name.'

Cf., E.g., the Exodus story regarding "Yahweh." The Israelites wanted a name; but 'Yahweh' is no-name – "I will be who I will be."

This is a development beyond purely symbolic consciousness. Voegelin is excellent on asserting that the revelation is not merely an intrusion but is simultaneously a development of human consciousness. Revelation is a movement out of cosmological myth into existence and mystery.

Real difference (*I*, p. 538) is to be known by comparative negations and judgments. But for the symbolic mentality, mere judgments are not enough; there also have to be different images and names.

For symbolic consciousness, a different image-name means a different reality. Thus, even after the Sinaitic revelation not how long it took Israel to understand that "I will be who I will be" is the *only* God, despite the continuing plurality of 'names-images' which had been held to be different gods.

Mythic consciousness goes through all the stages of cognitional process (experience, imagination, understanding, judgment) but it *doesn't distinguish* among those activities. Accordingly, it is incapable of guiding itself by the rule that the act of rational assent alone is the necessary and sufficient condition for knowing the real.

For mythic consciousness, "the real is the object of a sufficiently integrated and a sufficiently intense flow of sensitive representations, feelings, words, and actions." (I, p. 538)

"It's *real*, man!"

For mythic consciousness, contrary judgments have a round only in the familiar world of the everyday, and not in the world of the known unknown.

Thus, ancient civilizations developed extraordinary *practical techniques*, thus being able to move out of myth in certain areas dealing with the familiar; but they remain in the realm of *magic* regarding the known unknown.

Cf. Bronislaw Malinowski, *Magic, Science, & Religion*.

Contrary judgments have no ground in this area until consciousness gets analyzed, and distinctions can be made between the levels of consciousness.

In mythic consciousness, there is an inadequate differentiation of explanation and description:

One has to grasp that all explaining is done by insight (i.e., at the level of understanding, not of experience); until one grasps that distinction, s/he tends to attribute explanatory power to feelings/emotions/images.

E.g., the dream is data to be understood/explained, it is not itself understanding/ explanation.

Thus, we tend to explain *causality* (not as intelligible dependence) but by appealing to the sensation of 'before and after,' and by the image of the transmission of contact. If one does this

and then proceeds to place a 'first cause' as 'first-in-time,' it is an easy leap to postulate a 'universal fate' that begins with the first cause and links all things together – keeping the stars on their courses and setting human destinies simultaneously: astrology.

Or again, recreating the past *via* cinema and soundtrack does not give us understanding/ explanation; rather, it simply gives us data to be interpreted.

> Interpretation of the past is the recovery of the *viewpoint* of the past, and that viewpoint itself is on the level of understanding. The important thing is not recovery of the words of the past – except insofar as that helps one get to recovery of the viewpoint of the past. This demands a move away from the search for understanding at the level of images.

Mythic consciousness does not grasp the distinction of (a) understanding from (b) the heuristic anticipation of understanding.

The heuristic anticipation of understanding can be mistaken for understanding itself.

- Anticipation = knowing that there is a 'nature of x'
- Understanding = knowing what the 'nature of x' is

I, p. 542: "It is through this gap [between anticipation and understanding)]that there proudly march the speculative Gnostic and the practical magician. They anticipate scientific understanding of what things are and how results are to be produced. They anticipate the pure scientist's preoccupation with numbers and the applied scientist's preoccupation with tools. They are necessary factors in the dialectical development of human intelligence, for without their appearance and their eventual failure men would not learn the necessity of effective criteria for determining when adequate insight actually has occurred."

Mythic consciousness is a *lack of self-knowledge*, and myth is the corollary of that absence (just as explicit metaphysics is the corollary of explicit self-knowledge).

Myth is the *permanent* alternative to mystery/metaphysics; there is a *permanent* task of overcoming myth through adequate self-knowledge (since myth and mystery/metaphysics are dialectically related).

I, p. 543: "Because men do not develop intellectually or, if they do, because they become involved in counter-positions, they cannot be dealt with on the basis of intelligence and reason; but this makes it all the easier to deal with them on the sensitive level, to capture their imaginations, to whip up their emotions, to lead them to action. Power in its highest form is power over men, and the successful maker of myths has that power within his reach and grasp."

> Cf., e.g., Hitler's manipulation of people through myth and images.

"But, clearly, if an adequate metaphysics can do something to overcome philosophic misinterpretations of the notion of myth, it needs to be extended into a philosophy of education and the education has to be made effective before there can be exorcized the risk of adventurers climbing to power through sagacious myth-making."

The sensitive orientation into the unknown permanently remains; *Mystery* is the sensitive operator functioning largely through symbolic representations that effects the transformation of our sensitivity itself. It holds our sensitive integrations open to transforming change.

There will always be the further question, and corresponding to this will be the sensitive orientation into the known unknown.

Further, we cannot *live* on the level of explanation: "Explanation does not give man a home" (*I*, p. 547). Doran admonishes that one shouldn't even cross the street while in the intellectual pattern of experience!

> We have to *embody* our insights, the direction of our judgments, the dynamism of our decisions and images. And those images will release feelings and will flow into deeds through which we constitute the world and ourselves.
>
> And so the question arises as to what symbolic story I am living, and what symbolic story characterizes our time/culture. And what are the images that can tell the story in such a way that they capture the sense of the dynamism?

Our sensitive images will always be either (a) involved in the proper unfolding of human finality (mystery) into the world of being, or (b) distorted into myth. But there will always be sensitive images that ar3 the mass and momentum of our lives.

> If one myth is abolished, it can always be replaced by another and bolstered by a philosophy and implemented by people hungry for power.
>
> The question is: What sensitive integration am I living out? Is our culture living out?
>
> > Each person is inescapably living out a story, and that story is either mystery or myth.

I, p. 539: "So we are brought to the profound disillusionment of modern man and to the focal point of his horror. He had hoped through knowledge to ensure a development that was always progress and never decline. He has discovered that the advance of human knowledge is ambivalent, that is places in man's hands stupendous power without necessarily adding proportionate wisdom and virtue, that the fact of advance and the evidence of power are not guarantees of truth, that myth is the permanent alternative to mystery and mystery is what his hybris rejected."

> Think of the historical context of the 1930s and 1940s in which Lonergan's thinking was going forward.
>
> The differentiation of myth and mystery raises the question of power and truth.
>
> > *I*, p. 549: "The real issue is truth."
> >
> > Mystery = openness to truth on the level of the sensitive psyche.

17.2.1 The Criterion of Truth

The *proximate* criterion of truth is reflective grasp of the virtually unconditioned. The conditions are fulfilled when, in fact, there are no further questions to a mind that is open, familiar with the situation, and ready for anything.

> That grasp of the virtually unconditioned makes the content of one's understanding *independent of the subject*. Once I have affirmed something it becomes 'public;' thus, there is a public domain in which persons can communicate and agree.

The *remote* criterion is the *authentic unfolding of the desire to know*. This regards the genuineness of the whole process from the unconscious which 'throws up' images, through inquiring and understanding, to reflecting and judging, and ultimately deliberating and deciding.

> Later, Lonergan formulates these *transcendental imperatives* (as his formulation of natural law):
>
> ▲ Be in love!
> Be responsible!
> Be reasonable!
> Be intelligent!
>
> Be attentive!
>
> This criterion is the integrity of the process. Negatively, this means that I don't let other desires/ processes interfere with the orientation to truth that is reached at the level of judgment. Positively, it means grasping the following distinctions: infallibility/certitude, certainty/ probability, and ideal/actual frequencies (cf. *I*, pp. 550-552).
>
> Certainty/probability: The probability of a judgment (which Philip McShane terms "v probability") – "This is probably true" – is a function of its content (and not of its frequency).
>
> > *I*, p. 550: "The probability of a judgment, like the certainty of a judgment, is a property of its content. If that content coincides with what is grasped as the virtually unconditioned, then it is a certainty. But what is grasped as virtually unconditioned may be that a content *heads toward* the virtually unconditioned, and then the content is a probability."
>
> Infallibility/certitude: What is in doubt here is the subject her-/himself. How authentic/genuine am I?
>
> > Perhaps I have grasped the virtually unconditioned, but am still unsure regarding my own authenticity. I can doubt myself. Perhaps the reason there are no further questions is that I am biased.
> >
> > Am I habitually and actually open to the truth? Am I disinterested and detached in my cognitional activities?

17.2.2 The Definition of Truth

> Truth is a relation between knowing and being. In the limiting case (of God), it is an *identity* of knowing and known. In us, truth is *conformity/correspondence* of my affirmation with what-is, and of my negation with what-is-not.
>
> > This is the traditional "correspondence theory of truth" (Aristotle, Thomas).
> >
> > Heidegger criticizes this theory, and prefers to speak of truth with the Greek *aletheia*. However, Doran judges this to be less a contradiction of the correspondence theory than

it is a drawing of attention to the 'remote criterion' of truth, i.e., the authenticity of the subject – this is Heidegger's central concern.

17.2.3 The Ontological Aspect of Truth

Being is true in the sense of being intelligible.

17.2.4 Truth and Expression

1. Expression (verbal) has three components which correspond to (but are not identical with) the three levels of consciousness.
    a. Affirmative/negative utterance (judgment)
    b. Meaningful combinations of words (understanding)
    c. A contingent multiplicity of words (experience)

        This 'contingent multiplicity' simply means that the same meaning can be expressed in different ways.

2. This isomorphism (of 'outer word') and 'inner word') is not an identity.

    E.g., I can make a judgment that 'x is true" ('inner word'), but lie in my expression ('outer word').

3. Yet, despite the fact that there is no identity – knowledge and expression tend to *interpenetrate*.

    I, p. 554: "At each stage of the process it is helpful to fix what has been reached and to formulate in some fashion what remains to be sought. So expression enters into the very process of knowledge and tends to coincide with the attainment of the ability to express it."

        There is "*almost* a fusion," but still not an identity.

        E.g., if a physicist is to teach the theory of relativity s/he cannot simply express her/his own understanding. Rather, there is need to take into account the ability of the students and to express in such fashion that they will be led to understand.

    Most of the time in communication, my attention is focused on the content and the words spontaneously flow; this is what is meant by the interpenetration.

        Rem tene et verba sequenter = "Hold on to the content and the words will follow."

    Lonergan insists that words are related not simply to one another, but to a *term* in being. (And this seems to involve a contrast with Frye).

    In my expression, I am grasping the relation of words to one another and of words to the term in being.

    I, p. 555: "This basic reference, which is the core of all meaning, admits differentiation and specialization. There are many words: some are substantival because they refer to intelligible and concrete unities; some are verbal because they refer to conjugate acts; some are adjectival or adverbial because they refer to the regularity or frequency of the occurrence of acts or to potentialities for such regularities or frequencies. Finally, since the development of language fuses with the development of knowledge, the meaning of

words not only depends upon the metaphysical matrix of terms of meaning but also upon the experiential sources of meaning. Prior to the explanatory conjugates, defined by their relations to one another, there are the experiencial conjugates that involve a triple correlation of classified experiences, classified contents of experience, and corresponding names. The being to be known as an intelligible unity differentiated by verifiable regularities and frequencies begins by being conceived heuristically, and then its unknown nature is differentiated by experiential conjugates."

All expressions are expressions of some differentiation or some combination of differentiations of consciousness, i.e., of the notion of being. L Thus, interpretation of expression is an *understanding of the viewpoint of the person who made the original expression*; that viewpoint is a set of insights and judgments which are themselves differentiations of human consciousness.

E.g., what I'm trying to grasp in interpreting a text are the insights and judgments which have come to expression in the text.

What illumination of being has come to expression in this text?

There is an experiential/intelligent/rational consciousness that comes to expression in the text.

I understand, e.g., a Platonic text to the extent that I understand the differentiation of consciousness that is expressed in the text.

To the extent that I am able to 'rearrange' things in my own experience so that I can understand that viewpoint as the product of an intelligent/reasonable human being, I understand.

Because of the interpenetration, knowing and expression are inseparable – though distinct; what-is-known and what-is-meant is what-is-said can be distinguished, yet they all refer to the same thing.

Yet communication is between people with different habitual accumulation of insights. For instance, there will be a tremendous gap between a teacher's knowledge and her/his expression in attempting to communicate with students.

[RD: "If you can raise a question in a class of college freshmen, you've done something!"]

4. Expression is better called "adequate/inadequate" than "true/false."

The 'adequacy' is not simply a matter of whether it conforms with what-is-true; adequacy is also a function of the situation in which one is trying to communicate.

Newman: If you want to try to convince someone of something, don't use a syllogism; father, 'talk around corners' and lead them to the insight.

And note that Paul spoke differently in different situations.

<u>17.2.5 The APPROPRIATION of Truth</u>

The safeguard against becoming victimized by myth is making what-I-have-come-to-know *my own* ("appropriation").

E.g., regarding the question as to how a people living in such an extraordinary culture as Germany's could have been overtaken by the myths of Nazism – it was a matter of not having

appropriated that culture. And the same thing can happen time and again if this appropriation does not occur.

a. *Cognitional* appropriation (corresponding to understanding) involves several elements:

- *Learning*: truth is made my own in an accumulation of insights that become habitual. There is an assembly of a series of viewpoints: moving from the lower to the higher, yet making sure that the higher don't discard anything of value from the lower.

  E.g., Doran acknowledges the need for enormous expansion of Christology, yet he insists that there is no need to lose the valuable insights/affirmations of Nicea and Chalcedon.

- *Identification* of the 'relevance' of the insights (i.e., being able to use them) – this corresponds with experience.

  Beyond coming to understand something is the development of being able to make use of it in different situations.

- *Orientation to truth*: development of reflective consciousness.

  This is a matter of becoming a person of good judgment, so that I don't shift to other criteria of judgment (e.g., power and expediency, or intensity of feeling, etc.). This involves becoming a person who recognizes when the evidence is in, and using that alone as criterion for judgment.

b. *Volitional* appropriation of truth = willingness to face the truth.

   Bad will makes truth unwelcome, and unwelcome truth will be overlooked. Bad will prevents a person from even initiating inquiry, much less sustaining it.

   This involves the vicious circle of *moral impotence*. The attainment of truth demands good will (openness to truth), but what is good will but the willingness to follow the lead of truth/intelligence? We're caught in a vicious circle.

   I, p. 561: "So it is that man is boxed in; without the appropriation of truth his will cannot be positively good; and without good will he cannot proceed to the attainment of truth."

   This is another development of a major theme that Lonergan will develop in chapters 18 and 20.

   If there is not some 'other' dimension of reality that opens us to what we are closed to of our own resources, we are 'caught.'

   The function of 'grace' is to open us to truth that our hearts are closed against.

c. Sensitive appropriation of truth

   E.g., note the situation in which I 'know' something (intellectually), but it hasn't reached my feelings yet. We are embodied spirits, and truth is grasped spiritually but must be appropriated sensitively; it has to work its way through our molecules, blood vessels and nerves and become a part of us.

   There is a correspondence between the intellectual and sensitive levels.

I, p. 562: "the basic problem is to discover the dynamic images that both correspond to intellectual contents, orientations, and determinations yet also possess in the sensitive field the power to issue forth not only into words but also into deeds."

This is the function, e.g., of contemplation on the Gospels.

Intellectual development occurs through insight, but authentic human living is effected only to the extent that w have the symbols and images that will enable us to 'translate' what we have come to understand to our sensitivity itself.

Unless we can carry out in deeds what we know is true, and what we will the will is a failure – and from failing will to bad will to unconcern for truth are frequently and unfortunately familiar steps.

Appropriation of truth is a safeguard against falling prey to the myths that prey upon us.

20 March 1986

The real object of chapter seventeen is the upper blade of hermeneutic method (17.3).

Throughout chapter seventeen, Lonergan is emphasizing finality (the upwardly directed dynamism of proportionate being) as it continues in the development of human consciousness: thus, human consciousness in its development is being considered *as being*. The process of emergent probability (which resulted in human consciousness in the first place) continues in the differentiation (and conversion) of human consciousness itself. Thus, the differentiations/conversions of human consciousness are new conjugate forms of being. Therefore, this chapter is studying the *being* of human consciousness; this is why the chapter is entitled the Dialectic of *Metaphysics*.

It is a "dialectic," because human consciousness is caught in the play of positions and counter-positions; it is metaphysics because it is a continuation of the study of emergent probability in chapters fifteen and sixteen. Lonergan is now studying being-as-intelligent in its emergent probability.

Scientific interpretation is the specification of the differentiation of the notion of being that comes to expression in the articulation of other human beings; scientific interpretation is trying to 'name' the differentiations/conversions of the notion of being (or lack thereof) that come to expression in the articulate utterance of other speakers/writers.

Trying, e.g., to specify the differentiation of consciousness that emerged in the writings of Plato.

Thus, what-is-going-forward-in-human-consciousness IS what-is-going-forward-i-being.

Interpretation is of VIEWPOINTS – specifying the viewpoint that is present in the writings of another.

Viewpoint = a habitual accumulation of insights and judgments in a given pattern of experience.

Thus, viewpoints are differentiations of the notion of being.

An *interpretation* is the expression of an insight into the expressed insights of others.

A *scientific interpretation* interprets the insights of another precisely as differentiations of the notion of being.

Lonergan uses the expression, "the *protean* notion of being." In Greek mythology, Proteus was a figure who was capable of appearing under very different forms. Thus:

being becomes many different things, and because of the polymorphism of human consciousness it is highly elusive and appears to take on many different aspects.

Interpretation can take three forms: simple, reflective, scientific.

Simple: expressing for a present audience what another expressed for another.

E.g., a good preacher expresses Paul's insight for a present audience; the expression is different, but in good preaching the original insight remains.

Reflective: the interpreter explains why the two expressions differ, while the insight is the same.

Here, the interpreter reflects back and realizes that s/he cannot use first century expression and explains the differences in context which necessitate the difference in expression.

Scientific: works from an articulate upper blade – a heuristic structure – that is an appropriation of the notion of being (i.e., the self-appropriation of human consciousness). Because the notion of being is the core of all meaning (as act), this heuristic structure *contains potentially the totality of viewpoints and expressions*.

UNIVERSAL VIEWPOINT: every viewpoint and every expression will come out of the heuristic structure of human consciousness; every viewpoint and every expression originates in human consciousness. Thus, if you can appropriate the structure of human consciousness, you have appropriated the structure out of which every viewpoint and every expression emerge.

Thus, self-appropriation gives one possession of a potential totality of viewpoints and expressions because one is in possession of the source out of which all viewpoints and human expressions emerge.

The universal viewpoint is the self-appropriation of:

- the psychic operator
- waking experience
- understanding
- decision
- love
- the various patterns of consciousness
- conversions

To the extent that I have made this structure 'my own,' I am in possession of the basis out of which all viewpoints and expressions emerge.

Accordingly, Lonergan's argument is that the achievement of self-appropriation (expresses in the cognitional theory of *I*) provides the upper blade for scientific interpretation.

This heuristic structure contains the "*Potential Totality of Viewpoints*"

1. This totality is *potential*; when I have appropriated the source out of which another's viewpoint arises, I have the potential for understanding.

   Lonergan's position here is distinct from Hegel and Kant, insofar as this is not *a priori* in any *content* sense – but rather is a *heuristic* sense. The 'contents' are provided only by concrete lower-blade studies.

2. The potential totality is of viewpoints; it is a potential totality of insights, judgments, and orientations.

    To the extent that I have made my own what it is to experience, to understand, and to judge, and to decide, and to love, and to be in different patterns of experience, and to be converted/ unconverted, I am in a position to be able to understand insights, judgments, and decisions and orientations of other people.

    The sources of interpretation do not lie in books; the only things present in books are "spatially ordered marks on paper." The *source* of interpretation is in the experience, understanding, judgment, decision, and existential orientation of the reader/hearer.

        This depends on my own ability to distinguish and creatively recombine elements in my own experience; my ability to work back from a contemporary viewpoint to an earlier development; to envisage various meanings, to relate to different patterns of experience, to identify different fundamental orientations.

3.1 That potential totality is *ordered*: it has a base and an expansion.

    Its *base* lies in adequate self-knowledge and in the consequent metaphysics.

    Its *expansion* is twofold:

    a. Genetic: studying the actual course of development; i.e., human consciousness emerges in an ever more differentiated fashion.

        This history of the discoveries through which the human race came to the point of interiorly differentiated consciousness.

    b. Dialectic: the 'back and forth' of position and counter-position in history.

    Eventually, what Lonergan has in mind here is a collaborative program that would extend over generations of interpreting the history of philosophy from this standpoint. He contends that when this is done both a genetic and dialectical component will be discovered in that history.

    One can reach a concrete presentation of another's formulation of his/her discovery, by being able to identify these elements in my own experience.

3.2 Even this ordering is only potential.

    By self-appropriation of the structure, I don't have this genetic and dialectic order; rather, I have the potential for it. The order itself has to emerge in concrete historical study.

    I, p. 566: "What is ordered is itself advancing from the generic to the specific, from the undifferentiated to the differentiated, from the awkward, the global, the spontaneous to the expert, the precise, the methodical."

        Every text that is studies can be studied as a 'step' along the way.

4. By saying the "universal viewpoint" is "universal," he means that it is *potentially complete*.

    There is no interpretation without interpreters; there are no interpreters without the polymorphic reality of human consciousness; there are no expressions to be interpreted without other similar polymorphic unities of human consciousness.

        Thus, what I am trying to interpret is an expression of a polymorphic human consciousness; to the extent that I know my own polymorphic human consciousness, I am able to understand that of the other.

5. The *language* in which the "universal viewpoint" is expressed (e.g., in *Insight*) is not a universal language; the language is revisable.

    The whole thing can be improved upon, but the improvements themselves will arise out of the structure (cf. retorsion argument).

The Universal Viewpoint contains the *Potential Totality of Expressions*.

1. *Levels* of Expression (of meaning)

    Expression can arise from any of the elements that enter into human consciousness; the levels of expression correspond to the levels of consciousness out of which they arise.

        It can have its source in experience alone; it can be an artistic ordering of experience; it can be on the levels of insight and judgment – resulting from reflectively tested judgment, or intelligent ordering of experience; it can be an expression o n the level of will (wish/command).

        Thus, the totality of expression has its source in the four levels of consciousness.

    Further, the person expressing her-/himself may intend the hearer/reader to *respond* on one or on several levels.

        E.g., an artist may want to communicate purely at the level of experience (e.g., feelings, mood, sentiments); but also at this level, an advertiser/propagandist may not want the hearer/reader to move to the level of questioning intelligence and reflective judgment.

        But I may want one who reads my expression to respond at the levels of understanding and judgment (and perhaps decision) as well as the level of experience.

    But note that this grounds only a *potential* classification of expression.

2. *Sequences* of Expression

    Specialized expressions have to emerge from non-specialized expressions – differentiated from undifferentiated.

    I., p. 512: "Some early Greek philosophers wrote verse; Plato employed a highly literary dialogue; Aristotle proceeded in the manner of descriptive science; the medieval writers, in their quaestiones, developed a compound of the dialogue and the dogmatic decision; Spinoza and Kant moulded philosophy in the form of the scientific treatise; Hegelian dialectic seems the initial essay in philosophic writing that envisaged the totality of possible positions. If there is any truth in this *hurried and rough indication of the evolution of philosophic expression*, then there will be a complementary truth inasmuch as scientific writing will pass through a period in which its difference from philosophy will be obscure. . . and, similarly, literary writing will have its period of fusion or confusion with scientific and philosophic concerns."

    The problem is to find the *operators* of the development: what moves expression to a new form?

        A new form emerges as the old form cannot contain the 'new wine' of the new insight that the person is trying to express. Thus, Doran interprets Lonergan's reflections on the limitations of the treatise (17.3.4) to be partially biographical: i.e., the treatise was the form available to Lonergan, and yet it is not really adequate to express fully his insight into the necessity of the activity of self-appropriation.

Similarly, note the fact that John of the Cross wrote both poetry and philosophy. Obviously, the poetry was a more adequate expression of his mystical insight. But he also wanted to communicate this philosophically; however, the decadent scholasticism at his disposal was not adequate for what he wanted to express.

This inadequacy is the operator.

Thus: the upper blade is human consciousness as the source of viewpoints and as the source of expressions; the lower blade consists in techniques worked out in scholarship.

17.3.8 Canons for a Methodical Hermeneutics

1. Canon of *relevance*: begin from the universal viewpoint and head toward some differentiation of the notion of being as that came to expression in the work being studied.

   Begin from the notion of being, and interpret what you are studying as some differentiation/ illumination of that notion of being itself.

   E.g., Frederick Crowe speaks of the 'leaps' in differentiation of the notion of being itself: thus, the differentiation of understanding from experience appears in Plato; the differentiation of judgment appears definitively in Aquinas; the differentiation of decision in Kierkegaard.

2. Canon of *explanation*: make your interpretation explanatory by relating the contents and the contexts of the documents being studied; (this refers to the community of interpreters).

   E.g., cf. Voegelin, who related Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Plato as successive developments in the differentiation of understanding from experience that comes to sharp expression in Plato. He relates them to one another in terms of the theoretic differentiation of consciousness.

      The question: "What is going forward?"

3. Canon of *successive approximations*: This task will take generations, but the work can *begin* now.

   Thus, further detailed study may reveal that the differentiations which Crowe notes in Plato/ Aquinas/Kierkegaard may be found in earlier thinkers; but now, at least Crowe's 'approximation' is possible and can contribute to the possible development of 'successive approximations.'

4. Canon of *parsimony*: eliminate the unverifiable.

   Interpretation is not a matter of presenting a cinema of past deeds and a soundtrack of past words.

   Thus, the point to interpreting the 'trial of Socrates' is not to determine the exact words which Socrates used, but rather to grasp the point (i.e., the insight being expressed).

   The techniques of moving towards the virtually unconditioned with regard to the viewpoints are much clearer and more concrete in *MT*.

5. Canon of r*esidues*:

   Genetically, there might be a shift in a writer's viewpoint, but it goes unnoticed or inadequately noticed; in other words, the writer doesn't go back and rewrite everything. Someone eels may see that the expression is coincidental unless there is acknowledged a real shift if viewpoint.

   Dialectically, counter-positions will work their way into the best writing.

Expression-wise, the thought may be ahead of the means/resources of expression; so, the expression itself will be coincidental to the expression of the thought. In this case, the interpreter can perhaps give more adequate form (expression) to the thought.

Three will also be 'accidents' in the very production of documents; e.g., manuscripts can be revised, lost, etc. In such cases, you simply have to admit your ignorance; there will be gaps.

Chapter Eighteen: *The Possibility of Ethics*

[This are underwent enormous development in Lonergan's post-I work; cf. especially chapter two of *MT*, "The Human Good."]

A key development concerns the question: 'What constitutes the reasonableness of a decision.' In *MT*, Lonergan goes into the negotiation of feelings.

"*Insight* Revisited" (*A Second Collection*), p. 277: "In *Insight* the good was the intelligent and reasonable. In Method the good is a distinct notion. It is intended in questions for deliberation: Is this worthwhile? Is it truly or only apparently good? It is aspired to in the intentional response of feeling to values. It is known in judgments of value made by a virtuous or authentic person with a good conscience. It is brought about by deciding and living up to one's decisions. Just as intelligence sublates sense, just as reasonableness sublates intelligence, so deliberation sublates and thereby unifies knowing and feeling."

The overall thrust of chapter eighteen is set by the question: "Do the basic 'positions' (on the subject, being, and objectivity) ground an ethics?" I.e., is ethics also an implementation (in the realm of doing) of the heuristic structure of proportionate being?

We are beings within the universe of being, and our actions influence/change the universe of being. Thus, the (metaphysical) context is the making of being.

Theological context: collaboration with God in the making of being (and in the divinely originated solution to the problem of evil).

This question was earlier left hanging in two places in *I*: (1) the chapters on common sense (general bias, the longer cycle of decline, and the need for a higher viewpoint); and (2) the section of development (limitation and transcendence).

Lonergan is considering human subjects in history making being; ethics regards the question of integrity in this making-of-being.

We are in the context of finality as it has come to unfold in human development. The question: what is integrity in the making of being?

Lonergan's answer will not be a 'code' of ethics – but rather a *general form* of moral precepts. This chapter leads to the impossibility of reaching that 'form' (higher integration) on our own resources; the conjugate forms of faith/hope/charity are necessary for us to attain integration in the making of being.

18.1 The Notion of the GOOD (Ethics within the universe of proportionate being)

He begins with our experience of the good, and then moves to the universal context of the ontology of the good and our participation in it.

Our experience of the good unfolds on three levels, corresponding to the levels of consciousness:

- Experience : : object of desire/aversion

This is the experience of attraction/repulsion as sensitive beings; this is the first element of our experience of the good. Desire on the sensitive level, of itself, is headed toward *satisfaction* (of the desire).

But as we have seen in the desire to know, 'satisfaction' (e.g., attained in insight) is not enough for the human being; so too in the order of the good, the human being has to place her/his satisfactions within some order that is an intelligent ordering of the desires of many.

We are inclined to a level of the good that is not the satisfaction of any single desire.

- Understanding : : good of order

We disapprove of a person simply seeking her/his own satisfaction and saying 'the hell with everyone else;' that is not the fullness of our human experience of the good. We want people's attraction to objects of desire to be within the framework of some intelligent order which orders the desires of the community. (E.g., legal systems are set up to order the desires of individuals for the good of the community.)

This is purely *formal*, as are insights; actual orders can be good or bad. This is a formal imposition of order on the desires of human beings.

We criticize certain orders, and human consciousness is a matter of the development of that power of criticism.

E.g., slavery was part of an accepted order for centuries but is no longer acceptable.

The good of order functions to secure an otherwise unattainable abundance of particular goods for a larger segment of the community.

But there is the further question with regard to any order as to whether it is worthwhile? Whether it can be made better so that an even greater abundance of particular goods can be secured for an even larger segment of the community.

- Judgment : : the notion of *value*

The 'notion of value' is what forces us to raise the question of the worthwhileness of an order. It is the in-built notion of value that forces us to raise this question just as the notion of being forces the question of truth.

This is the source of: social criticism

social change

The notion of value is what leads people to reject one system and embrace another (cf., e.g., Philippines).

This is the objective – not of the sensitive desire – but of "will" (desire on the part of people who are sensitive *and* intelligent *and* reasonable).

Will = an intelligent and reasonable inclination to an order that is good.

Distinction --- will/willingness/willing : : potency/form/act

[What Lonergan terms "will" here, he will later term the "notion of value."]

will	: :	notion of value	:	potency
			:	
willingness	: :	habits	:	form
			:	
willing	: :	decision	:	act
			:	

Cf. Frederick Crowe, "An Exploration of Lonergan's New Notion of Value," *Lonergan Workshop* III, pp. 1-24.

- Will = desire for the objects of an intelligent/reasonable/responsible being (as opposed to a merely sensitive being).

  Here, Lonergan speaks of the desire for objects grasped by intelligence and judgment; later, he will speak of feelings (affect-laden insights and judgments) through which we apprehend these objects-as-values.

  This is a desire for order (i.e., objects grasped by an intelligent and reasonable person) and not simply individual satisfaction.

- Willingness = concretely, will is always informed by habits, by habitual willingness specialized in particular directions and antecedently disposed in a certain way. That antecedent disposition is partly psychic and partly spiritual. I have an antecedent willingness for and against certain kinds of objects/choices.

  Will always appears under the form that is given it by the habitual inclinations.

  Just as in knowledge a person who has not learned a subject has to go through the laborious process of learning in order to acquire the habit so that one can 'pick up' anything in that subject and master it – so too in this dimension of the existential areas of our lives, the person who has not developed the willingness in certain directions has to go through a process of 'being persuaded;' until one has acquired such willingness, she has to work every ti8me to make a good choice. But once the willingness has taken place, one has leapt to a higher integration of being (a higher conjugate form) and the act of willing emerges from the willingness without the need for persuasion.

- Willing = the act, the actual event of decision.

  To know what your willingness is, attend to the frequency of your acts. To know what a person's will is is to study the changes of his/her habitual orientations over a whole lifetime – and that only God knows.

  This is called "rational" because intelligence and reason can grasp not only the facts as they are – but also the possibilities in the facts for possible transformations of the environment in which we live.

  Not only what-is, but what-should-be.

  In order for this to be a matter of authenticity, the same detachment that is necessary in the desire to know must extend through the whole of living – so that my orientation is not towards just what will satisfy but towards what is truly good.

Ultimately, this is also the natural desire for the vision of God – which manifests itself in many ways, among which are the desire to know and the desire that life be good.

Re: detachment, cf. T.S. Eliot:

- “Teach us to care and not to care / Teach us to sit still.”
  - From “Ash Wednesday”, VI.27-28
- “There are three conditions which often look alike
  Yet differ completely, flourish in the same hedgerow:
  Attachment to self and to things and to persons, detachment
  From self and from things and from persons; and, growing
  Between the, indifference
  Which resembles the others as death resembles life. . .”
  - From *Four Quartets*, “Little Gidding,” lines 16=50-155.

Detachment, in Lonergan’s sense, is freedom from self-interest and narrow concerns; i.e., detachment from individual and group bias.

Disinteredness = freedom *for* the good

With the extension of this detachment/disinterestedness from knowing into the whole of living, the subject – whom to this point we have considered as empirical, intelligent, rational – becomes *morally self-conscious*.

Self-consciousness: being led to ask oneself what her/his orientation is. There is an experienced demand for consistency between the orientation that informs my knowing and the orientation that informs my doing.

“Be responsible!” means: the integrity that informs my knowing must also inform my doing.

→ self-transcendence in the realm of doing
→ extension of cognitive integrity into existential integrity

Lonergan notes three ways of ‘dodging’ the demand for consistency:

1. avoiding self-consciousness;
2. rationalization, whereby I revise my knowing into harmony with my doing;
3. renunciation of moral living altogether.

“Ought” = the demand for consistency all the way through knowing to doing.

Moral codes will change/develop with the advance of knowledge; but the form of moral consciousness (‘conscience’) is that demand for consistency, and this remains constant.

Value is the good as the possible object of reasonable choice.

[Later, Lonergan will work out the role of affectivity in discovering what constitutes ‘reasonable choice.]

Value is the good of order, not just as order, but as *good* order. Just as an intelligibility grasped by understanding may be or not-be, so an order grasped by practical intelligence may be worthwhile or not.

It is in terms of this demand for self-consistency that human beings, in fact, work out their concrete moral codes. And it is that 'demand' that Lonergan wants us to appropriate.

27 March 1986

The context for ethics in *I* has been set by metaphysics: human action is action within the universe of proportionate being, and in a very basic sense it is measured by the order of that universe. It is another implementation (i.e., at the level of doing) of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being.

> "Ethics" is the science that studies action measured by the universe of proportionate being. (Ethical) action is the making of being; 'ethics' is the knowing of that action.

The *Ontology* of the Good (18.1.5)

Lonergan situates the human good in the context of finality (the full metaphysical context of emergent probability); the 'human' good is a dimension of the good of the universe.

> *Objects of human desire* are things/events that are bound through natural laws and actual frequencies with the total manifold of the universe of proportionate being. Thus, the objects of human desire do not exist in a vacuum. By reason of that connection, we can say that the entire manifold of the universe constitutes a potential good. Human desires are satisfied only in the concrete universe, and so the concrete universe is just as much a potential good as the satisfaction of our desires.
>
> The human orders that we create (e.g., social systems/institutions, technologies, economies, politics) are *exploitations of pre-human orders* ("nature"), and so they too fall within the universal order of emergent probability. Just as human orders are intelligible goods, so too is the whole order of the universe, which underlies/precedes/includes our inventions and creations.
>
> > This is significant, e.g., for ecological questions.
>
> Insofar as the good of order is a possible object of rational choice, it is a *value*; so too is the universal order of emergent probability a value. The actual intelligibility of the universe is an actual good.

The point is that every consistent rational choice is – at least implicitly – also a choice of the order of the universe: it is saying "yes!" to the order of the universe, and promoting that order. (Later this becomes sublated into the notion of cooperating with God in the ongoing making of the order of the universe.)

> This involves the criterion of rationality (as Lonergan has developed it to this point): are our choices a choice of the genuine order of the universe, and a promotion of the upwardly directed dynamism of finality?

This notion of being-as-good does not eliminate pain and suffering from the world; they are part of the total manifold of the universe. It does not eliminate indifferent objects and objects of aversion; those too are a potential good within this metaphysical context.

> We are not the center of the universe, and our desires are not the ultimate criterion of what-is-good.
>
> So, he does not deny that there are unordered manifolds and disorder and false values; rather, he speaks of even these things as *potential goods* within some higher order. Because the order of the universe is understood by four distinct methods: classical, statistical, genetic, and

dialectical. Within that context, even objects of aversion, disorder, and false values can become elements or an arrangement that is itself good.

E.g., if it were the case that the only intelligibility in the universe were that studied by classical law, then disorder, false values, unordered manifolds ("chaos)" would not be a potential good. Classical method understands only 'form,' and these things are without form. However, insofar as the intelligibility of the universe is statistical, there is a potential good even in unordered manifolds that are on-their-way towards order. The formal good in the universe is the 'eventual' emergence of order; the actual good of the universe is that order that eventually emerges. Insofar as the intelligibility of the universe is genetic, even the incompleteness/ awkwardness of earlier stages of development are a potential good; the formal good consists in the operators that bring about the development, and the actual good is the attainment of the development. Insofar as there is a dialectical intelligibility there is a potential good even in the failures and refusals of human beings to walk with integrity.

This human failure is a potential good that is overcome through the emergence of the reversal of those refusals; and there is an actual good in the actual removal of disorders and false values.

All this needs to be placed within the context of REDEMPTION. The conjugate forms that are capable of the transformation of evil into good remain to be discussed. This is the context for his introduction of the conjugate forms of charity/hope/faith.

This Lonergan's whole notion of "the *law of the cross*."

Cf. *De Verbo Incarnato*, 3rd ed., rev. (Rome : Gregorian University Press, 1964).

Also, cf. William Loewe, "Lonergan and the Law of the Cross: A Universalist View of Salvation," *Anglican Theological Review* 59 (1977), pp. 162-174.

Redemption in Christ Jesus means that through his loving acceptance of the suffering and hatred that was perpetrated upon him – that evil is transformed into good. There is a dialectical overcoming of sin. The girt of charity to us is the gift of being able to live in this way: to meet evil with love and thus transform it.

<u>The Notion of Freedom</u> (18.2)

'Ethical' action is possible only if human beings are free. Thus, the question is raised: What is human freedom?

Freedom is not necessarily implied by modern science's awareness of statistical residues; this awareness doe overcome certain notions of mechanistic determinism, but that does not 'prove' human freedom.

Cf. Sir John Eccles, who notes statistical residues at the very emergence into consciousness of certain neural components which demonstrates that human consciousness is not determined by the underlying manifold. This statistical residue is systematized only by conscious acts themse3lves. Rather than being determined by underlying neural manifolds, consciousness actually imposes an order on those manifolds.

The determinism Lonergan is considering is cognitive: is action determined by knowledge, or is there an openness of consciousness beyond knowledge?

What are the *cognitive antecedents to decision* in consciousness itself?

1. The underlying sensitive flow (2.2): What Lonergan is talking about as a 'free ct' is an act that imposes order on otherwise coincidental sensitive manifolds (images, feelings bodily movements).

    There are acts of human beings that occur merely through sensitive routine, and these can be accounted for without the introduction of any higher integration. These are not 'free acts.'

    Lonergan is here asking whether there are also higher acts that place order on otherwise coincidental (i.e., non-routine) sensitive elements.

2. *Practical insight* (2.3) is not concerned with the knowledge of being (as is speculative insight) but rather with the *making of being*; thus, its concern is not with what-is but what-is-to-be-done.

    Practical insights = insights into situations to determine what is to be done.

    As every insight is followed by reflection, the reflection that follows upon practical insight is concerned with the question: Is it to be done? Is it really worthwhile/good?

        The question is not whether I have grasped a correlation that exists, but whether I have grasped some possible relationship that I am going to bring about. The question is whether I am going to make a correlation govern events.

3. Practical *reflection* (2l4): It is here that we move beyond experience/understanding/judgment to *rational self-consciousness* (the "existential subject") – making oneself and constituting the world.

    It is in this reflection that I become concerned with my action, with 'why' I do things. It is here that I recognize and exercise responsibility for making my self and the world; it is here that I emerge as an ethical subject.

    And it is here that Lonergan argues that our *decisions are note determined by our knowledge*. This reflection (*qua* reflection) is still simply 'knowing.' It has no internal term, since the term toward which t tends is the doing which is beyond it. What it heads toward is not simply the affirmation 'yes' or the negation 'no,' but rather the *implementation* of that affirmation. That is its term, and that term is beyond reflection in a distinct act of decision.

        Kierkegaard and Nietzsche speak of our situation in the modern world (resultant from uncertainty, and the pluralism of interpretations) as being a situation in which we are faced with the danger of "infinite reflection." There are some people who are temperamentally disposed to reflect virtually forever over a possible course of action.

            - "analysis paralysis"

    Reflection on a factual insight comes to term in the grasp of the virtually unconditioned, and the utterance of 'yes/no' – but practical reflection *qua* reflection does not come to any internal term and demands a further going-beyond to the further act of decision.

        This is what constitutes the subject as free; i.e., I am not determined by knowledge. Beyond reflection, there is another intervention of the subject: Will I do it?

    What Lonergan is developing is a set of *ever further enlargements of consciousness*

> This process is not simply headed toward judgment; rather, reflection is for-decision. And it is only decision that brings the process to its term.

What is reached in the judgment is a sense of necessity: 'this is good and is to be done!' But because of the further enlargement of consciousness beyond knowing, this necessity becomes *contingency*; there is the further question, 'will I do it?'

> Recall the parable: "But what do you think about this? A man had two sons. He went `to the first, and said, 'My boy, go and work today in the vineyard.' 'I will, sir,' the boy replied; but he never went. The father came to the second and said the same. 'I will not,' he replied, but afterwards he changed his mind and went. Which of these two *did* as his father wished?" (Mt 21.28-30)

In the judgment I am imposing necessity on myself; but there is the contingency of the further question, 'will I do it?' This necessity that is also a contingency is what is meant by obligation. Even after I have grasped the 'ought,' there remains the need for the further act, the free act.

> > The necessity is this: if I am to be rational/responsible person, then there are certain things that I 'must do. But the mere affirmation that they must be done does not constitute myself as responsible; this affirmation is contingent insofar as it demands the further act of doing.
>
> Freedom is the capacity of meet one's obligation, to introduce the higher integration into human living through action. The higher integration comes not simply through knowledge, but only from the action. Freedom is the capacit6y to introduce into human living through action the higher integration that consists in certain courses of action that emerge as possibilities in practical insight, as necessities in judgments of value, but as actual integrations only through decision/action.

It is clear that in decision we reach higher integration than we do in knowing.

<u>The PROBLEM OF *LIBERATION*</u> (18.3): Can we meet our obligations?

<u>Essential and Effective Freedom</u> (3.1)

I am *essentially* free insofar as de facto I do grasp possibilities in practical insight, judge them after practical reflection to be what-ought-to-be-done, and decide and carry through on my decision to do them.

But the *operational range* of any human being's essential freedom is *restricted*. There is a greater or lesser operational range of effective freedom.

> *I*, p. 620: "Thus, one may be essentially but not effectively free to give up smoking." Doran notes that Lonergan got lung cancer because he wasn't effectively free to quit smoking!"
>
> > The restriction here is a matter of being determined in a certain area by an underlying sensitive habit.
>
> This 'effective freedom' is explicitly spoken of as a matter of *openness to grasping*, *motivating*, *and executing possible courses of action*.
>
> > Grasping: There are intellectual limitations; some people simply cannot understand possible courses of action – "There hear but do not understand."

The *gap* between essential and effective freedom exists in every person – no matter how psychically, religiously, morally, and intellectually developed. The saints tend to be those most aware of this gap (cf., e.g., Teresa of Avila).

> This 'gap' is what constitutes *moral impotence* – and, to greater or lesser extent, it affects absolutely every human being.
>
> Lonergan uses the image of a set of concentric circles. There is a luminous inner center where we are effectively free [a]; there is a penumbra (combination of light and darkness), where we know that if we put forth a little more effort we could in fact be free [b]; then there is an outer shadow where we are simply bound for one reason or another [c].
>
> > [Note the interesting use of 'shadow' terminology; this does in fact roughly correspond to Jung's notion of the shadow.]
>
> As we develop, the luminous are a expands – as does the penumbra.

What are the *sources* of the restriction, of moral impotence? (3.2)

1. *External circumstance*: e.g., the social circumstances in which I am born and raised make it such that there are some possibilities that simply are not open to me. I may not even be able to grasp them, much less motivate myself and execute them.

    Some of these are relatively harmless (e.g., an Eskimo is not going to think of solving a problem by procuring a herd of camels!) But there are others that are themselves the product of *sin* (e.g., the circumstances of poverty and oppression that limit the freedom of the people who are caught by them).

2. *Psychic disturbance* ("the subject as sensitive")

    Earlier, Lonergan referred to scotosis, "blindspots" – the neural overwhelming of sensitive consciousness. Dramatic bias; anxieties.

[Even if the first two were to be overcome, the third and fourth sources of moral impotence would remain; they are, thus, the radical source. L The only way these would be eliminated would be if the way human beings develop were itself eliminated. Thus, moral impotence is a permanent and radical problem.]

3. *Limitations of intellectual development*

    Until I've understood, I have to struggle through the process of learning (in any area); but once I've understood, I can reproduce the act of understanding almost at will.

        The greater my accumulation of habitual insights, the broader is the base from which I can move toward the practical insight as to what is to be done now. Conversely, the narrower my accumulation of insights, the narrower is the base for practical insight.

4. *Limitations of volitional developments* ('antecedent willingness')

    Once I am willing/open, there is no problem in carrying out what I see that I am to do; but until I am willing/open there is need for persuasion – and that takes time.

        For willingness to be adequate it has to acquire the height, breadth, and depth of the unrestricted desire to know: "*universal willingness*."

        We must be open to all possibilities in this emergent universe. We must adopt an attitude toward the universe of being that is effective, an attitude where our

performance matches the aspiration that is ours as human beings within this universe.

That is what a rational person is: completely open to reflection and rational persuasion.

I, p. 624: "How is one to be persuaded to genuineness and openness when one is not yet open to persuasion?"

This is the 'vicious' circle at its most radical.

If human development is only from below-upward (experience under-standing judgment decision) – it is almost certain that there will be a breakdown at the point of decision/action.

The very fact that higher integrations emerge later makes moral impotence inevitable, even in propitious external circumstances.

The problem of moral impotence extends into and is heightened by the social sphere.

I, p. 628: "We can expect that individual decisions will be likely to suffer from individual bias, that common decisions will be likely to suffer from the various types of group bias, and that all decisions will be likely to suffer from general bias."

The social situation in which we exist is the cumulative produce of individual and group decisions. Insofar as those decisions are effected by bias, the social situation is a compound of the rational and irrational. Thus, it demands a compound of direct and inverse insight if it is to be understood, and a dialectical attitude if it is to be properly negotiated in our actions.

The social situation is a compound of the intelligible and the surd.

And it is this situation that provides the materials for further practical insights. And people can regard the 'surd' as 'objective fact,' proving their unintelligent view.

Doran tells the story of teaching undergraduates at Marquette. He mentioned Lonergan's economic theory in which there is profit, but there is no emphasis on the maximization of profit as motive. These students laughed – taking the objective fact (people don't behave that way" as norm (they can't and won't behave that way).

Taking the absurd situation as a fact that proves my unintelligent views. When that happens, the surd becomes greater and greater (and you get 'voodoo economics'~).

The problem of our *incapacity for sustained development* is radical and permanent; and it is independent of external circumstances and underlying sensitive flow – i.e., it would be there even if these were taken care of.

I, p. 631: "The problem is not to discover a correct philosophy, ethics or human science."

I, p. 632: "The problem is not met by setting up a benevolent despotism to enforce a correct philosophy, ethics, or human science. [RD: 'Cardinal Ratzinger, take note!'] No doubt if there is

to be the appeal to force, then it is better that the force be directed by wisdom than by folly, by benevolence than by malevolence. But *the appeal to force is a counsel of despair*. So far from solving the problem, it regards the problem as insoluble."

The SOLUTION has to be a yet higher integration of human living that will systematize what is coincidental at the levels of intelligence and willing.

There is need for higher conjugate forms that will replace our incapacity for sustained development with capacity for sustained development – without removing development, tension, freedom.

This higher integration is not just a higher viewpoint in the mind ("cosmopolis"), though this is part of it; rather, it has to be a higher integration in our entire being. Out of that higher integration in being, a higher viewpoint/science (theology) will develop.



But theology emerges precisely because higher conjugate forms have emerged, and a new science is needed to understand them.

We have to execute our own development, and we can't – unless there is some higher integration that is given to us that gives us the capacity to sustain development.

The question arises as to whether this higher integration has emerged in human history. This is a question of fact calling for empirical investigation.

- Chapter18: the need for a higher integration;
- Chapter 20: heuristic structure of what that higher integration must be;
- Chapter 19: discussion of the realm of being (transcendence) from which that higher integration would come.

Chapter NINETEEN is concerned with what we can and do know about *transcendent being* now – prior to any act of understanding that grasps what transcendent being is.

As the mathematician says "let 'x' be the required number," and then proceeds to work out what s/he already knows about 'x' is – so here, Lonergan is developing a heuristic *anticipation* of what we would grasp if we had insight into God.

He also moves to the affirmation that what-we-would-grasp IS (i.e., really exists).

He acknowledges that this effort will stretch the human mind to its limit.

In Thomistic terms, the concern here is with knowledge *that*-God-is, not of *what*-God-is.

If the basic positions have been affirmed, Lonergan argues that affirmation of the existence of God follows inevitably.

What Lonergan is engaging one in here is an *extrapolation* form the universe of proportionate being to transcendent being – what one 'grasps is not God but the extrapolation to God.

The extrapolation is to an *unrestricted act of understanding* – we do not grasp that unrestricted act; rather we grasp our extrapolation to that act and affirm that our extrapolation is valid.

This affirmation is intelligent and reasonable.

I, pp. 683-684: "If one is genuine in denouncing obscurantism and in demanding the unconditioned, either one already adores God without name him or else one has not far to go to reach him."

Thus, the position on being as the objective of the pure, unrestricted desire to know has opened us up to the consideration of transcendence.

The extrapolation arises from the question: What is being? – Only an unrestricted act of understanding can answer this question, because the question cannot be answered without knowing everything about everything. But that statement allows us to extrapolate to an unrestricted act of understanding.

The *content* of an unrestricted act of understanding is the *idea* of being (i.e., the idea of everything about everything) – because this act leaves no room for further questions, it is absolutely transcendent; it sets the absolute limit for going-beyond.

Since being is intrinsically intelligible, this idea of being is the idea of the full range of intelligibility.

So, what Lonergan is doing is presenting heuristically determined *characteristics* of the idea of being (I, pp. 645 ff.):

The idea of being is:

- the content of an unrestricted act of understanding;
- absolutely transcendent;
- an act that grasps everything about everything;
- the idea of the total range of intelligibility;
- a single act;
- one idea, but of many;
- immaterial, but of the material;
- non-temporal, but of the temporal;
- non-spatial, but of the spatial.

It would contain a primary intelligible and a secondary intelligible. Lonergan is here working from the analogy of the human mind: insofar as, e.g., a mathematician grasps mathematical insight itself, s/he grasps what will be generated by that insight (e.g., the series of positive integers). If you have an insight into what constitutes positive integers, you have in principle grasped the whole set of positive integers.

Thus, the insight is the *primary intelligible*, and the whole set that is generated from the insight is the *secondary intelligible*.

I can know the numbers (secondary intelligible) without having insight into insight (primary intelligible) – but if I have the insight into insight (if I know what constitutes positive integers) I have insight into the totality and possible infinity of positive integers.

The mind of the mathematician generates the numbers; if s/he understands her/his own mind *qua* mathematician, s/he understands the numbers that s/he is capable of generating.

So, too, the absolute transcendent being understands itself as generative source for the understanding of everything else; the secondary intelligible are everything else that it understands.

Doran offers this interpretation of the structure of Lonergan's argument: the argument to the unrestricted act of understanding is complete at the end of section either (p. 657); section nine deduces further properties; section ten should really be called the general form of all affirmations of God.

The important point: the argument is not in the syllogism of section ten; section ten gives a logical expression after one has come to the conclusion; the heart of the argument is complete by section eight ('causality').

Essentially, the argument is that what we do in being authentic knowers (i.e., in demanding the virtually unconditioned) is pointless if God (the formally unconditioned) does not exist. There is no point in our raising further questions if the universe does not have an intelligent ground. Section eight is the primary locus of this argument that the whole process is pointless without the existence of a God who grounds this universe. Section ten logically reformulates the argument.

Doran contends that Lonergan's 'notion' of God is very traditional (and Thomistic), but that his 'approach' is innovative.

I, p. 679: "The transition to the transcendent is effected by *proceeding from the contingent subject's unrestricted desire to know to the transcendent subject's unrestricted act of understanding*."

Lonergan proceeds "on the side of the subject." Not (as in traditional Thomism) from 'limited act' to 'unrestricted act,' but from 'limited insight' to 'unrestricted insight.'

Thus, don't begin with the syllogism in section ten (p. 672: "If the real is completely intelligible, God exists. But the real is completely intelligible. Therefore, God exists."). By this point, the argument is already finished.

The argument begins: The real is identical with being (which is the objective of the pure desire to know); apart from being (the objective of the pure desire to know) there is nothing.

The alternative to this 'position' is that the real is a subdivision of the already-out-there-now that can be known unquestioningly (i.e., apart from intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation).

On the counter-position, there can be mere matters of fact without explanation that are 'just there.'

But if the real is identical with what is intelligently grasped and reasonable affirmed, unexplained mere matters of fact cannot 'be.'

Science handles 'what' exists and 'how often' it occurs; but existence and occurrence *in se* cannot be handled by science. But on the position there cannot be 'mere matters of fact without explanation;' thus, there has to be a *ground* for existence and occurrence.

I, pp. 653-654: "The most fundamental of all questions asks about existence yet neither empirical science nor a methodically restricted philosophy can have an adequate answer. Statistical laws assign the frequencies with which things exist, and the explanation of statistical laws will account for the respective numbers of different kinds of things. But the number of existents is one thing, and their existing is another. Again, in particular cases, the scientist can

deduce one existent from others, but not even in particular cases can he account for the existence of the others to which he appeals for his premises. *As far as empirical science goes, existence is just a matter of fact*. . . What is true of existence, is no less true of occurrence."

Ludwig Wittgenstein: "Why is there something rather than nothing?" This question cannot be answered on the basis of proportionate being itself.

Thus, the first step of the argument is to identify being with what is intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed; thus, mere matters of fact without explanation cannot 'be.'

The next step of the argument is to identify being with *complete intelligibility*.

The realities of this world (e.g., existence and occurrence *in se)* are not completely intelligible. One item can be accounted for by referring to another; but sooner or later you are going to be left with mere matters of fact.

But one must account for the world, or else cease the exercise of intelligence and reasonableness. *De facto* we all operate on the supposition that being is completely intelligible.

It is senseless to pursue the process of knowing that in face we all pursue if the world in fact is not completely intelligible.

The force of the argument goes back to the validity of our own processes. There is no way to commit myself to the exercise of ever further questioning, on the one hand, and yet say that what I'm after is unintelligible.

That is the context for the transition to transcendent being through the causal argument.

Complete intelligibility is to be identified with the unrestricted act of understanding; the world would not be completely intelligible if there were not an unrestricted act of understanding.

The intelligible is in two forms:

1. What is understood (material intelligibility);
2. The understanding that understands all the rest (spiritual intelligibility) – and this is the profounder sense of intelligibility.

The world would not be completely intelligible unless there were some ground of understanding, some act of understanding, that is intelligible in this profounder sense of understanding and – by understanding – understanding everything else there is to be understood.

The intelligible as *act* of understanding is the ground of the intelligible as content of understanding.

This is true in human beings; the intelligible that is the act is the ground of the intelligible that is the content.

Understanding of the act gives one a profounder/deeper understanding of the content. E.g., for a mathematician: the act of the mathematician's understanding grounds the numbers; if the mathematician understands the mathematical act, s/he has a profounder grasp of the content that proceeds from that act.

But at the transcendent level, we are talking about 'everything about everything.' For everything-about-everything to be intelligible there has to be an act that in understanding itself understands everything-about-everything.

So, the world is understood in its reality as everything-about-everything to the extent that there is an understanding of an understanding which understands the intelligibility of the world as generated from itself.

Complete intelligibility has to be the unrestricted act of understanding that primarily understands itself, and since it is complete understands everything else because it understands itself – and accounts for the complete intelligibility of e3verything else.

The analogy is from the human scientific: to the extent that we understand our understanding, we have an understanding of the content of what we understand. The analogy is from that limited insight to the unrestricted act which, in understanding itself, understands everything about everything and thus grounds the complete intelligibility which we presume.

3 April 1986

A. The first step is an extrapolation to the unrestricted act of understanding and the idea of being that is its content. The question that leads to the extrapolation is, *What is being?* Only an unrestricted act of understanding can meet the issue. Knowledge of what being is cannot be had in anything less than an act of understanding everything about everything. Only the *content* of the unrestricted act of understanding can be the idea of being (i.e., the answer to the question: What is being?). The idea of being is the content of an unrestricted act of understanding.

We are not here affirming the idea of God; we are affirming the validity of the extrapolation.

B. What is the idea of being? We can work out a number of features by proceeding on the side of the subject from restricted to unrestricted understanding, and on the side of the object form the structure of proportionate being to the transcendent idea. *Heuristic procedures* – what we would know if we did grasp it.

SO:

1. Since an idea is the content of an act of understanding, and since being is the objective of the unrestricted desire to know, the idea of being is the content of an unrestricted act of understanding.
2. Apart from being there is nothing. So the idea of being is the content of an act of understanding that leaves nothing to be understood, no further questions to be asked; and so it is absolutely transcendent. (There is no reason to go beyond it, since it answers everything.)
3. Being is *completely universal and completely concrete*. So the idea of being is the content of an act of understanding that grasps everything about everything, with nothing implicit or obscure of indistinct.
4. Being is intrinsically intelligible, so *the idea of being is the idea of the total range of intelligibility*.
5. The good is identical with intelligibility, so the idea of being is *the idea of the good*.
6. The unrestricted act is one act. Otherwise it would be an aggregate or succession of acts. If none of these was the understanding of everything about everything, then the denial of unity would be the denial of unrestricted understanding. If any was the understanding of everything about everything, at least the unrestricted act would be a single act (and there would be no need for another act).
7. The idea of being is *one idea*. If it were many, they would be related intelligibly or not. If so they would be intelligibly one, and so one idea. If not, there would not be one act but many.

8. The idea of being is:

    a. One, but of many;

    b. Immaterial, for intrinsically independent of the empirical residue; but of the material, for it is unrestricted. Similarly, non-temporal (not developing, because it already understands everything and there is no need for developing) but of the temporal; non-spatial (even ours is), but of the spatial.

9. A distinction is drawn between a primary and a secondary component, for the one is not identical with the many, the immaterial with the material, the non-temporal with the temporal, the non-spatial with the spatial. So, because in the one idea there are grasped many beings, because in the immaterial, non-temporal, non-spatial idea there are grasped the material, the temporal, and the spatial, there must be a *primary component* grasped insasmuch as there is a single act, and a *secondary component* grasped inasmuch as the primary component is understood.

    He is working here from the analogy of human insight; e.g., from the mathematician's one insight into the positive integers the infinity of integers flows.

    The argument of the whole book is trying to bring us to better understanding of everything precisely by understanding understanding.

10. "Intelligible" thus denotes:

    a. what is or can be understood;

    b. more profoundly, the primary component in an idea, as root or ground of (a).

11. (a) can be understood without understanding understanding; (b) is identical with understanding.

12. Therefore, the primary component in the idea of being is the unrestricted act of understanding. For if an unrestricted act is unrestricted, it understands understanding. It understands not only restricted acts but also the unrestricted act; understanding the unrestricted act it must understand its content, otherwise its understanding would be restricted; but its content is the idea of being; and so if the unrestricted act understands itself, it thereby also understands everything else.

13. Instead of "the primary and secondary components," distinguish primary intelligible and secondary intelligibles. The *primary* intelligible is the unrestricted act of understanding, the *secondary* intelligible are what are also grasped inasmuch as the unrestricted act understands itself.

    To this point, the extrapolation has been on the second level of consciousness; he is not moving to the third level of consciousness, i.e., toward an existential affirmation.

C. Does the unrestricted act of understanding exist? The answer emerges from an understanding of causality (section 8) combined with what we have already seen.

Causes, then, are either external or internal. Internal causes are central and conjugate potency, form, and act. External causes are efficient, final, and exemplary. If these principles of external causality have a general validity in being, we will be led sooner or later to affirm a first agent, a last end, and a primary exemplar of the universe of proportionate being, and to identify the efficient and final cause with the unrestricted act of understanding, and the exemplary cause with the idea of being that is the content of the unrestricted act. Are they of general validity? Yes, for:

1. Being is intelligible, what is to be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation (cf. chapters 12 and 16).

2. What is apart from being is nothing, and so what is apart from intelligibility is nothing.

3. There are thus no mere matters of fact without explanation. If existence is mere matter of fact, it is nothing. If occurrence is mere matter of fact, it is nothing. If it is a mere matter of fact that we know and that there are to be known classical and statistical laws, genetic operators and their dialectical perturbations, explanatory genera and species, emergent probability and the upward finalistic dynamism, then both the knowing and the known are nothing.

4. One cannot, then, confine human knowledge within the domain of proportionate being without condemning it to mere matters of fact without explanation, and so stripping it of knowledge not only of transcendent but also of proportionate being. For *we do not know until we judge*, our judgments rest on a grasp of the virtually unconditioned, and the virtually unconditioned is a conditioned that happens to have its conditions fulfilled. If that happening is not to be mere matter of fact without explanation, and so nothing, a further question arises. So, too, every proportionate being is in its every aspect a virtually unconditioned. Its conditions happen to be fulfilled. If that happening is ultimate, it is a mere matter of fact without explanation, and so either it is not being and so is nothing, or being is not intelligible.

5. Thus, knowledge of transcendent being cannot be excluded:

    a. if there is proportionate being; and

    b. if being is intelligible.

    This transcendent being must not be contingent in any respect, for again there would be mere matter of fact without explanation. And *this transcendent being must be able to ground the explanation of everything about everything*, or else it would leave unsolved the problem of contingence in proportionate being.

6. It is in such grounding that we grasp the general validity of efficient, final, and exemplary causality.

    a. Efficient causality does not consist simply in the necessity that conditioned being becomes virtually unconditioned only if its conditions are fulfilled. The real requirement is that, if conditioned being is, it has to be intelligible, and cannot be or exist or occur merely as matter of fact without explanation. Infinite regress and schemes of recurrence do not meet his requirement, for they are aggregates of mere matters of fact, and so do not assign an efficient cause for intelligible but conditioned being. Only a being without any conditions (i.e., whose essence is existence) that can ground the fulfillment of conditions for everything else will do. L If proportionate being exists, and if it is intelligible, there must be such an unconditioned being.

    b. If there are conditioned beings, there also is the fulfilling of their conditions, and if there are no mere matters of fact without explanation, no conditions are fulfilled simply at random; all are fulfilled in accord with some exemplar; the exemplar of the universal fulfillment of conditions is the idea of being; the idea of being is the content of an unrestricted act of understanding; the unrestricted act is itself the primary intelligible in the idea of being; so *there must be an exemplary cause that as idea of being can ground the intelligibility of the pattern in which the conditions are or would be fulfilled*. But the idea of being is the content of an unrestricted act of understanding, which itself is the primary component in the idea of being. Therefore the unrestricted act of

understanding must exist. Complete intelligibility thus exists, the intelligibility that is the root or ground of key of intelligibility in the ordinary sense – the act of understanding that, in this case, understands everything about everything.

c. If there is one actual order of the universe, and if it stands within being and so is intelligible and not mere matter of fact, it is a value, and so the object of a rational and free choice on the part of the unrestricted act. Here contingence and arbitrariness are overcome at their deepest level.

> *If the real, then, is being, and if being is completely intelligible, there must exist a transcendent being not contingent in any respect, and capable of grounding the explanation of everything about everything. But the unrestricted act of understanding alone meets these specifications, and so it must exist*.

D. Further properties of the unrestricted act of understanding are deduced in section 8, linking the unrestricted act with the Thomist notion of God. Section 10 presents the point of the argument. The point of the argument is that God exists, if the real is being, and if being is completely intelligible. These identifications are the *ground of the validity of any other valid arguments for God's existence*, including those of Aquinas. There is no way of arguing validly to God's existence apart from these prior identifications in the realm of epistemology. Aquinas's proofs are valid if, and only if, being is what can be intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed, and thus is, apart from what can be intelligently grasped and reasonable affirmed, there is nothing. If being is something other than this, then there is no valid argument for God's existence, for then there could be mere matters of fact without explanation. But if being is what can be intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed, and if it is nothing else than this, then it is completely intelligible, for outside of intelligibility there is nothing. If there is nothing outside of intelligibility, there are no mere matters of fact without explanation. And if being is completely intelligible, God exists, for the reasons posited in the section on causality.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Is this a new argument for the existence of God? It states the conditions of the possibility of any valid argument for the existence of God. Those conditions lie in the epistemology affirmed in the core chapters of the book on being and objectivity. In this sense it is a transcendental argument for the existence of God. But in this sense, too, it is the inevitable conclusion of what has already been said about understanding and judgment. For this reason, Lonergan is able to write, ". . . if one is genuine in denouncing obscurantism and in demanding the unconditioned, either one already adores God without naming him or else one has not far to go to reach him" (*I*, pp. 683-684).

> Cf. Frederick Crowe, "Bernard Lonergan's Thought on Ultimate Reality and Meaning," *Journal of Ultimate Reality and Meaning* 4/1 (1981): 58-89.
>
> Bernard Tyrrell, *Bernard Lonergan's Philosophy of God*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974.

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Note Lonergan's comment in the "Epilogue" of *I*: "General transcendent knowledge is concerned with the ultimate condition of the possibility of the positions, and special transcendent knowledge is concerned with the *de facto* condition of the possibility of man's fidelity to the positions."

MT involves a transposition of Lonergan's treatment of God in chapter 19 of *I*. In chapter 4 ("Religion") of *MT*, he speaks of four forms of arguing to the existence of God.

> *MT*, p. 101: "The facts of good and evil, of progress and decline, raise questions about the character of our universe. Such questions have been put in very many ways, and that answers given have been even more numerous. But be4hind this multiplicity there is a basic unity that comes to light in the exercise of transcendental method. We can inquire into the possibility of fruitful inquiry. We can reflect on the nature of reflection. We can deliberate whether our deliberating is worth while. In each case, there arises the question of God."

1. *MT*, p. 101: "The possibility of *inquiry* on the side of the subject lies in his drive to know what, why, how, and in his ability to reach intellectually satisfying answers. But why should the answers that satisfy the intelligence of the subject yield anything more than a subjective satisfaction? Why should they be supposed to possess any relevance to knowledge of the universe? Of course, we assume that they do. We can point to the fact that our assumption is confirmed by its fruits. So implicitly we grant that the universe in intelligible and, once that is granted, there arises the question *whether the universe could be intelligible without having an intelligent ground*. But that is the question about God."

2. *MT*, pp. 101-102: "To reflect on *reflection* is to ask just what happens when we marshal and weigh the evidence for pronouncing that this probably is so and that probably is not so. To what do these metaphors of marshalling and weighing refer? . . . Judgment proceeds rationally from a grasp of a virtually unconditioned. By an unconditioned is means any 'x' that has not conditions. By a virtually unconditioned is meant any 'x' that has no unfulfilled conditions. In other words, a virtually unconditioned is a conditioned whose conditions are all fulfilled. To marshal the evidence is to ascertain whether the fulfillment of the conditions certainly or probably involves the existence or occurrence of the conditions. Now this account of judgment implicitly contains a further element. If we are to speak of a virtually unconditioned, we must first speak of an unconditioned. The virtually unconditioned has no unfulfilled conditions. The strictly unconditioned has no conditions whatever. In traditional terms, the former is a contingent being, and the latter is a necessary being. L In more contemporary terms, the former pertains to this world, to the world of possible experience, while the latter transcends this world in the sense that its reality is of a totally different order. But in either case we come to the question of God. *Does a necessary being exist? Does there exist a reality that transcends the reality of this world?*

3. *MT*, pp. 102-103: "To *deliberate* about 'x' is to ask whether 'x' is worthwhile. To deliberate about deliberating is to ask whether any deliberating is worth while. Has 'worth while' any ultimate meaning? Is moral enterprise consonant with this world? We praise the developing subject ever more capable of attention, insight, reasonableness, responsibility. We praise progress and denounce every manifestation of decline. But *is the universe on our side, or are we just gamblers and, if we are gamblers, are we not perhaps fools, individually struggling for authenticity and collectively endeavoring to snatch progress from the ever mounting welter of decline?* The questions arise and, clearly, our attitudes and our resoluteness may be profoundly affected by the answers. *Does there or does there not necessarily exist a transcendent, intelligent ground of the universe? Is that ground or are we the primary instance of moral consciousness? Are cosmogenesis, biological evolution, historical process basically cognate to us as moral beings or are they indifferent and so alien to us?*

4. *MT*, pp. 115-116: "Besides the factual knowledge reached by experiencing, understanding, and verifying, there is another kind of knowledge reached through the discernment of value and the judgments of value of a person in love. Faith, accordingly, is such further knowledge when the love is God's love flooding our hearts. To our apprehension of vital, social, cultural, and personal values, there is added an apprehension of transcendent value. This apprehension consists in the experienced fulfillment of our unrestricted thrust to self-transcendence, in our actuated orientation towards the mystery of love and awe. Since that thrust is of intelligence to the intelligible, of reasonableness to the true and the real, of freedom and responsibility to the truly good, the experienced fulfillment of that thrust in its unrestrictedness may be objectified as a clouded revelation of absolute intelligence and intelligibility, absolute truth and reality, absolute goodness and holiness. With that objectification there recurs the question of God in a new form. For now it is primarily a question of decision. *Will I love him in return, or will I refuse? Will I live out the gift of his love, or will I hold beck, turn away, withdraw?* Only secondarily do there arise the questions of God's existence and nature, and they are the questions either of the lover seeking to know him or of the unbeliever seeking to escape him. Such is the basic option of the existential subject once called by God."

Between *I* and *MT*, Lonergan acknowledged that it would have been better to begin his treatment of chapter nineteen of *I* with religious experience. Cf. "*Insight* Revisited (*A Second Collection*), p. 277: "In *Insight* the treatment of God's existence and nature, while developed along the lines of the book, nonetheless failed to provide the explicit context towards which the good was moving. In *Method* the question of God is considered more important than the precise manner in which an answer is formulated, and our basic awareness of God comes to us not through our arguments or choices but primarily through God's gift of his love. It is argued that natural and systematic theology should be fused in the manner of Aquinas' *Contra Gentiles* and *Summa theologiae*."

Thomas says that all arguments for God's existence are arguments of one who is already in love with God.

Metaphysics is transformed as a result of what has been opened up in chapter nineteen; is not includes what can be grasped with regard to transcendent being. Ethics is also transformed; human doing becomes cooperation with God in the making of being, in the creation of the order of the universe. Thus, wrong-doing becomes sin. But God is not the cause of sin, for *basic sin* is a non-event (cf. Augustine and Thomas) of not-willing; it is a failure of the will to choose the good or reject the reprehensible; it is the non-occurrence of an event that should have occurred. Moral evils are the inevitable conseque3nce of that failure.

Augustine: basic sin if a *privatio boni*.

It is important to distinguish inabilities (which have intelligibility in terms of external factors and lagging development) and refusals which have no intelligibility.

We are affected by the evils in the world from the very beginning of our lives.

Karl Rahner's notion of *concupiscence* is closely related to this: displacement of the tension in either the direction of spirit or matter.

It can be said that bias is a matter of finitude; sin is uttering "yes" to the bias.

We are being led to the affirmation that we do not live in a world of pure nature.

We are victimized by the sin of the world: but a great deal of human inability itself results from unwillingness (our own and others).

Chapter TWENTY

I is written *from* a moving viewpoint and *about* a moving viewpoint. Lonergan is very much in the spirit of the Enlightenment in affirming *progress*: human beings do progress in understanding; they are capable of progressing in every fuller willingness; they are capable of progressing in sensitive freedom.

> *I*, p. 688: "the cult of progress has suffered an eclipse. . . Yet as things are, in the aftermath of economic and political upheavals, amidst the fears of worse evils to come, the thesis of progress needs to be affirmed again. For the very structure of man's being is dynamic."
>
> Progress means that we have not attained the goal, we are on-the-way, ultimately heading towards an unrestricted act of understanding and unconditioned good. Each one of us in our own development is heading toward an ever greater willingness that becomes holiness (i.e., a willingness that matches the unrestricted desire to know in its commitment to love); and our sensitivity/intersubjectivity are developing and becoming free.
>
> > At the level of sensitivity, we are heading toward experiencing the world/people as symbols and signs of the mystery of God; but we are not there.
> >
> > Our knowledge is incomplete; our willingness is imperfect; our sensitivity is unfree; our intersubjectivity is caught in bondage.

But in the midst of all that, no one can postpone living until s/he has arrived at the goal; I learn, am persuaded, and become free only in and through living.

> Thus, there is a *lag* in development; we all experience it. This lag is compounded by the social surd: choices based on ignorance and bad will compound the problem of the lag in our development.
>
> And we ourselves – until we have learned to distinguish what is intelligible and unintelligible in the social surd – tend to regard the whole situation as just an array of homogeneous 'fact' to be affirmed. To the extent that we derive our criteria for reality from the social surd, we compound that surd. We start adjusting ourselves, becoming conformers/drifters.
>
> > Common sense alone cannot meet this issue (as we have seen before); but neither can philosophy.
> >
> > 'It's all fine to appeal to people of good will, if you can find them.'

There is a further *theological* dimension: Bad will is not just inconsistency in rational self-consciousness; it is also sin against God. From this perspective we have to regard the hopeless tangle of the social surd, the impotence of our common sense, and even the existence of the endlessly multiplied philosophies that can themselves compound the problem as being caught up in this mystery of sin and this despotism of darkness. There is a problem of evil and we are caught in it.

The fact of evil is a statistical rule; you can expect it. But if it is true that there is a God who is unrestricted understanding, then that God knows our plight. If there is a God who is unlimited power, then that God can do something to remedy it. And if there is a God who is complete goodness, that God wants to remedy our plight. So: if we affirm the existence of God, we affirm that there is a further intelligibility to be grasped in the universe (beyond that grasped by the methods of physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and philosophy).

> It is not the case that the problem exists first and the solution is given as an after-thought; they both exist together.

Together in *any* human life, there is *development-from-below* and *development-from-above*.

From the very beginning there is development-from-above insofar as the child is truly loved, and there is communicated to the child a sense of trust.

The problem and the response-top-the-problem exist simultaneously.

MT, p. 290: "It is as though a room were filled with music though one can have no sure knowledge of its source. There is in the world, as it were, a charged field of love and meaning; here and there it reaches a notable intensity; but is ever unobtrusive, hidden, inviting each of us to join. And join we must if we are to perceive it, for our perceiving is through our own loving."

Re: "notable intensity," cf. William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*.

The *mystery of grace* is at work in the world; it is present from the beginning. It is not just an after-thought in response to the problem.

What is the *heuristic structure* of that 'charged field of love and meaning'? This is what the mystery of grace in the world is.

1. The solution will be *one* solution – simultaneously individual and social.
2. The solution will be *universally accessible* and *permanent* – offered to *all* men and women.

   It has been available from the beginning of human history (as "inner Word"), and is available to all men and women of every time and place.

   Cf. Karl Rahner: the universal gift of God's self-communication.
3. The solution will be a *harmonious continuation of the actual order of this universe*; it does not violate any of the laws of physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, intellectual and moral development. It is not a matter of extrinsic violence.

   The higher conjugate forms do not violate the laws of the lower forms, but cannot be understood from those lower forms.
4. The solution will *not consist in the introduction of new central forms*; the problem is human and the solution has to lie within human life. (There may be other higher species in the universe; but they are not the solution to our problem.)
5. The solution *can* consist in new conjugate forms in human intelligence, will, sensitivity ("habits").

   This would not violate the actual order of the universe, and would meet the problem as human-problem.
6. The solution *will* involve the introduction of such conjugate forms.

   To the extent that these new conjugate forms penetrate human life, the priority of living over learning/being-persuaded can be reversed.

   Habits can be introduced from the very beginning, and at any time in the course of a person's life.
7. The relevant conjugate forms will be in some sense "*supernatural*." They are not resultant from our insights, judgments, and decisions.

   They are given, "gift;" from above.

8. As harmonious with the actual order of the universe in which higher integrations systematize lower manifolds, they will constitute a *new and higher integration of human activity and living* – controlling elements that are otherwise irrational.

    "Authentic religion is the highest development of the human person." (*Philosophy of God and Theology*.)

        And the key to the "authenticity" of religion is precisely the constitution of new and higher integrations of human living.

9. These forms pertain to system-on-the-move and so may develop and adapt to different circumstances.

    They are not perfect from the beginning; but they are offered from the beginning.

10. Like other conjugate forms, they leave intact the laws and natures of the underlying manifolds.

    And insofar as they leave our intelligence and freedom intact, they come to us *through our apprehension and consent*; they are not imposed. We have some apprehension of the mystery of love in the world and we are invited to consent to it; we participate in it through that apprehension and consent. L Grace does not necessitate or force us; it does not violate the underlying elements.

11. As harmonious with the actual order of the universe, the emergence, development, and spread of these forms will be *in accord with emergent probability*.

    E.g., development in me will be in accord with emergent probability. I will perform certain acts under the influence of grace, and those acts become potency for the form of grace.

    Also in the course of the history of the human race, the development is from what is apprehended in an obscure way to what is apprehended in a more clear fashion.

12. We have to distinguish the realization of the full solution 9through apprehension and consent) from an 'emergent trend' in which the full solution becomes effectively probable.

    "In the fullness of time. . ." = The full solution became effectively probable at a certain point in human history.

    In Lonergan's later terminology, the full solution is the "outer Word" in Jesus Christ that clarifies the "inner Word" of the gift of the Holy Spirit that is offered to all.

        Cf.: "Mission and the Spirit" (A Third Collection, pp. 23-34).

            Frederick Crowe, *Son of God*, *Holy Spirit*, *and World Religions* (Toronto: Regis College Press, 1985).

            Frederick Crowe, chapters 6 and 7 of *Theology of the Christian Word* (New York: Paulist Press, 1978).

        The "Inner Word" is offered to all, and is universally accessible; the "Outer Word" is the differentiation and clarification of consciousness, the message/speaking of the gift that is given.

    Thus, the history of Israel is an emergent trend that made is possible for the Word to be spoken and understood.

        Note, e.g., the Suffering Servant hymns: the manner in which they enter the people's consciousness and made it possible to grasp the meaning of the Word spoken in Jesus.

This also refers to the differentiation of consciousness in other cultures that made it possible for the word to be spoken. Cf., e.g., E. Voegelin on Greece (*The Gospel and Culture*).

Individually, we can distinguish this emergent trend in ourselves that led us to the point where we can fully appropriate the religious tradition. We grow in the ability to make the Word our own.

13. The appropriate willingness will be some type of *charity* – some gift of love, some ability to love that is given: a willingness that, as we develop in it, comes to match the unrestricted desire. It becomes the universal willingness of the 'saint,' where the person wills and loves God prompted only by God's own goodness – and wills everything else because of the order of the universe, and loves the order of the universe because of God and loves all persons in the universe because of being rooted in one's love of God.

    Because the order of the universe is an emergent probability, the person-who-is-in-love-with-God expects and wills that things and persons will grow and develop, and is patient; this is one of the fruits of this charity.

    To acknowledge the social surd as a problem and embrace its solution is to meet it with a *dialectical attitude* that parallels the dialectical method of intelligence.

        I, p. 699: "The dialectical attitude of will is to return good for evil. L For it is only inasmuch as men are willing to meet evil with good, to love their enemies, to pray for those that persecute and calumniate them, that the social surd is a potential good. It follows that love of God above all and in all so embraces the order of the universe as to love all men with a self-sacrificing love."

        Cf., e.g., Lonergan's "law of the cross," which is thesis seventeen in *De Verbo Incarnato*: a translation of this thesis (by Charles Hefling) is available in the Lonergan Research Institute.

        The sermon on the mount, e.g., can be put into this context.

    This love will be *repentant*, deploring and regretting the scotosis of dramatic bias, its involvement in individual/group/general bias; it will repent of its flight from self-knowledge; its rationalizations and moral renunciation; it will detest one's own contribution to human decline, one's own share in the genesis and propagation of myth.

        And this repentance is not just a sensitive feeling of guilt. He is talking about an *act* of good will that comes from one's personal relationship to God. That good will that is in love with God will be simultaneously *joyful*, because it is love and love is joy. Its repentance and sorrow regard the past, but it is hopeful toward the future. It is 'at one with the universe in being in love with God,' and it shares the dynamic resilience and expectancy of the universe.

        As emergent probability it ever rises above past achievement; as genetic process it develop generic potentiality to its specific perfection; as dialectic it overcomes evil by meeting it with good, and using its effects to reinforce the good through one's love.

14. There will be a gift of *hope* that maintains the pure desire in its purity, over against attachment and self-interest and rationalization.

Hope is a habitual determination for the objective of the pure desire for God; it counteracts the despair that allows us to surrender, and it counteracts the presumption that elevates our present attainment to the pinnacle of perfection.

The pure desire, under grace, becomes hope.

15. The relevant conjugate form for intelligence will be *faith*.

In later writings, Lonergan differentiated "faith" from "beliefs" (cf., e.g., *MT*, pp. 115-118).

There is a knowledge born of religious love, and that knowledge is faith; and that knowledge is present form the beginning, even before the explicit preaching of the word.

> *MT*, p. 116: It is a knowledge that "places all other values in the light and shadow of transcendent value. In the shadow, for transcendent value is supreme and incomparable. In the light, for transcendent value links itself to all other values to transform, magnify, glorify them. Without faith the originating value is the human being and the terminal value is the human good man brings about. But in the light of faith, originating value is divine light and love, while terminal value is the whole universe. Bo the human good becomes absorbed in an all-encompassing good."
>
> Where before an account of the human good related people to one another and to nature, now human concern reaches beyond the human world to God and God's world . . . . "The limit of human expectation ceases to be the grave."

Beliefs differentiate faith; they are important as constitutive: the more clearly I can express my love the more I am in love. And so beliefs are constitutive of the life of love.

> By focusing on the primacy of faith, it becomes clear that the solution is universal. Faith is universally accessible. There is a knowledge born of religious love prior to articulation in beliefs (doctrines); the "Inner word" itself gives a knowledge. Beliefs are consequent upon faith; they are differentiations of faith.
>
> Beliefs are effective ways of pulling our minds out of the counter-positions and fixing them in positions.

In the 'excursus' of chapter twenty, Lonergan argues that *belief is an intelligent and reasonable procedure*.

> Most of what we say we "know" is actually a symbiosis of immanently generated knowledge and belief.
>
> > In this sense, belief regards what we have received as reliably communicated knowledge of others.
> >
> > > E.g., in figuring out my bank balance, I believe the reliability of the calculator.

Collaboration exists all throughout human life. Without belief, every human generation would have to start all over. In conversation, Lonergan once remarked that "without belief we would go back 300,000 years."

To talk about belief is not to talk about some extrinsic intrusion into human knowledge.

Belief spreads into a highly differentiated network of independent specialties.

10 April 1986

In review of the beginning presentation concerning the heuristic structure of 'the solution,' cf. *I*, pp. 718-719: "Though it was clear that many solutions lie within the reach of divine omnipotence, it was seen to be possible to determine the general characteristics common to all solutions. Thus, any solution would be *one*; it would be *universally accessible and permanent*; it would be some *harmonious continuation of the actual order* of the universe; it would consist in some *reversal of the priority of living over the* knowledge needed to guide life and over the good will needed to follow knowledge; this reversal would be *effected through conjugate forms* that in some sense would *transcend human nature*, that would constitute a *new higher integration* of human activity, that would pertain not to static system but to *system on the move*, that would be *realized with man's apprehension and consent* and *in accord with the probabilities of world order.* Finally, it was seen that these conjugate forms would be *some type of charity, of hope, and of belief*."

R. Doran's interpretation is in light of Lonergan's complete development. Thus, in *I* (chapter 20) there remains an unresolved tension between a kind of 'pre-Vatican II parochialism' and a universalism that will emerge in his later work. Even in *I*, however, Lonergan does clearly affirm that the solution is "universally accessible" (p. 696).

Doran understands one of Karl Rahner's most significant contributions to be his insistence that we have a *conscious* experience of grace; it is not some metaphysical mechanics (conceptualism). This is Lonergan's meaning in affirming the need for human apprehension and consent.

> Related to this is Eric Voegelin's notion of the experience of grace outside the Judeo-Christian tradition. His focus is especially on the Greeks. He notes, for example, that Heraclitus speaks of faith, hope, and love. Thus, there are inclinations in the human heart and mind that are attuned to God; these are conscious inclinations, and we must consent to them in opposition to inclinations that lead us away from authenticity.
>
> > Plato was very sensitive to the movement of 'the golden cord,' that moves us gently to attunement with the transcendent world.
>
> The 'emergent trend' Lonergan speaks of is not leading up to grace, for grace is always-already present; rather, it is leading up to the 'full realization.'
>
> > By this 'emergent trend,' Lonergan specifically means the history of Israel; but it also involves other cultures/religions.

In later works, Lonergan distinguishes faith and beliefs (following the influence of Wilfrid Cantwell Smith). Faith is more radical than belief, but this in no way relegates belief to any secondary status. Beliefs are constitutive of our relationship with God. Just as in human relationships, what-I-see-in-you and you-see-in-me constitutes our relationship; so too, do beliefs constitute the faith relationship.

Excursus on *Belief*:

Concerning its 'function,' Lonergan affirms that belief is an *intelligent and reasonable procedure*; that is his central point. It is not an escape from intelligent and reasonable behavior.

The general *context* of belief is *collaboration in the advancement and dissemination of knowledge*.

Definition: Belief is the *reception of reliably communicated knowledge*. (Cf., I, p. 704).

> This collaboration exists across the human scene; it is not merely a religious phenomenon. Wherever human beings collaborate, there is belief. It pertains to science and to all human

endeavor. Without belief, each generation would need to 'start all over;' there would be no advancement beyond primitive levels.

Belief is *inevitable* in human life, and spreads into a highly differentiated network of interdependent specialties.

Thus, what is communicated in mathematics becomes highly important in many sciences.

The mentality of any human being is composite produce of belief and immanently generated knowledge; the two elements are extremely difficult – if not impossible – to sort out.

In the habitual background of my mind, belief is as operative as immanently generated knowledge; there is an essential symbiosis. Every belief involves at least some element of immanently generated knowledge; and for every act of immanently generated knowledge, there is a network of beliefs standing in the background.

What makes belief possible?

The remote possibility is the 'unconditioned.' Truth is public and can be publicly communicated. Insofar as truth is an unconditioned, it is essentially detachable from the mind and thus communicable to other minds.

The *proximate* possibility is demonstrated by the very fact that human beings do collaborate in this way.

In delineating the process of belief, Lonergan is highly influenced by John Henry Newman's *Essay In Aid of a Grammar of Assent*; Lonergan's formulations (five 'stages'), however, are his own.

1. A set of judgments on the value of belief in general, on the reliability of the source for a particular belief, and on the accuracy of the communication from the source.

   Concerning the Christian tradition: 'He appeared – not to all – but to those who ate and drank with him.' That is knowledge. Then 'those who ate and drank with him' become 'tellers of the word' – i.e., of the knowledge that they have. There is a source, communicating what it has experienced; I must then make a set of judgments on the reliability of the source and the accuracy of the communication.

2. The key act is this: a reflective grasp of understanding that grasps in this particular case the value of deciding to believe; and it grasps that value as virtually unconditioned.

   I grasp as a virtually unconditioned that it is a value to believe what is communicated, i.e., to believe this particular proposition.

   William James: "the *will* to believe"

   This is not some arbitrary, irrational, voluntaristic leap in the dark; it is a grasp of the value of believing this particular proposition.

   This step is grasping the virtually unconditioned of the value of deciding to believe a given proposition.

   The 'conditioned' is the value: "It is good to believe this proposition *if* . . . ."

   The 'ifs' are:

   a. It has been grasped by someone in a manner that satisfies the criterion of truth;

b. That 'someone' has communicated it accurately.

Thus, the judgment regards the objectivity (i.e., the authentic subjectivity) of the 'teller.'

There are no specific rules for this. The only general rule is to be alert, intelligent, critically reflective, and responsible.

This regards the responsibility of the Church to be authentic, so that it might provide truly credible witness.

There are persons who cannot accept the message of the solution because of lacking integrity in the 'tellers' of that message!

3. From that reflective act of understanding, there follows the actual judgment of value: 'It is good for me to believe this!'

   This is a judgment not of fact, but of *value*; it is a value for intelligence.

   Thus, Augustine: *Crede ut intelligas* – 'Believe in order to understand.' I will understand the fullness of the world better if I believe.

   It is authentic to believe if in fact that belief helps me understand better. This is the criterion of integrity in belief.

4. The decision to actually believe; this is a free and responsible decision to believe a particular proposition as probably or certainly true or false.

5. A personal assent of intelligence. This is not motivated by a grasp of the unconditioned; this is what differentiates it from intelligence (i.e., from immanently generated knowledge).

   This comes from a decision to profit from human collaboration in pursuit of the truth.

<u>Critique of Beliefs</u>:

Everyone has the experience of believing things that they later on find out not to be true.

Belief is no more intelligent than the collaboration of human beings in the advancement and dissemination of knowledge.

Communities can reverse themselves; Walter Principe, C.S.B., e.g., notes several instances in which the Church de facto has reversed itself (without, of course, acknowledging that it has been wrong!). But this communal reversal is possible only through the reversal in individuals.

Mistaken beliefs do exist; they are rooted in bias, in the counter-positions, in ignorance. They occur more readily in areas that affect our (dramatic) living more directly.

No evil is greater than beliefs that distort our minds and make the aberrations of our conduct systematic (e.g., propaganda, brainwashing).

But we can learn from our errors; the self-correcting process of learning takes place In the area of belief, as it does in that of immanently generated knowledge.

Beginning with the uncovering of one error, I can begin to inquire into the sources and motives that led me to believe something that is not true. There is a process of correcting mistaken beliefs.

This 'critique of beliefs' is not a Cartesian process of methodic doubt; Descartes had advocated holding on to only what could be known through immanently generated knowledge – throwing out all beliefs. That is not only foolish, but basically impossible.

> *MT*, p. 223: "It was Newman who remarked, apropos of Descartes' methodic doubt, that it would be to believe everything than to doubt everything. For universal doubt leaves one with no basis for advance, while universal belief may contain some truth that in time may gradually drive out the errors."

The discovery of even one mistaken belief has far-reaching consequences. From this, a person can discover the process that led to that belief; s/he can learn something about her/his own temperament and go to work on one's biases.

> The most important thing is to correct the mistaken *believer*: why do I 'fall for things?'
>
> There are many psychic factors to be considered here more explicitly than Lonergan has.

Resumption of the heuristic structure of 'the solution:'

16. The solution will include a *new and higher collaboration* of human beings in the pursuit of truth. This collaboration will be based on these beliefs; these are what make it a 'new' and a 'higher' collaboration.

    Thus, theology is a *higher integration* of human knowledge. Theology is not an isolated compartment of human knowing. It employs the categories (general) that are used in the other sciences, as well as categories (special) that are specifically theological and come from our beliefs.

    This higher collaboration is a religious and theological transformation of 'cosmopolis' (*I*, pp. 238-242).

    > Cf. R. Doran, "Education for cosmopolis," *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 1/2 (October 1983): 134-157.
    >
    > This is a reference to the intellectual ministry of the Church which Lonergan judged to have been somewhat eclipsed. Doran judges Lonergan to have suffered quire considerable disappointment, insofar as he had hoped for much more collaboration in his own lifetime.

17. This new and higher collaboration will be – not just a collaboration of human beings with one another – but also *our cooperation with God* in solving our problem of evil.

    Collaboration of the community of human beings with God. This is principally the work of God. Implied in this is the fact that theology must be rooted in the theologians' relationship with the Mystery of God.

18. Our entry into this collaboration and our participation in its fruits is *by faith* ('beliefs').

    In Lonergan's later works, it is clear that this collaboration extends beyond just the Christian communion.

    Lonergan is influenced by Friedrich Heiler ("The History of Religions as a Preparation for the Cooperation of Religions," *The History of Religions*, edited by Eliade and Kitagawa [University of Chicago Press, 1959]). Heiler maintained that there is a tremendous collaboration of the world

religions that can be fostered through dialogue; such dialogue will reveal that the world religions have many insights in common.

> *MT*, p. 109: "There is at least one scholar on whom one may call for an explicit statement on the areas common to such world religions as Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Zoroastrian Mazdaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism. For Friedrich Heiler has described at some length seven such common areas. While I cannot reproduce here the rich texture of his thought, I must, at least, give a list of the topics he treats: that there is a transcendent reality; that he is immanent in human hearts; that he is supreme beauty, truth, righteousness, goodness; that he is love, mercy, compassion; that the way to him is repentance, self-denial, prayer; that the way is love of one's neighbor, even of one's enemies; that the way is love of God, so that bliss is conceived as knowledge of God, union with him, or dissolution into him."
>
> These common characteristics can inform collaboration. But there is a specific Christian contribution to that collaboration.

19. There are *stages* in the transformation of human intelligence by faith.
    a. There are introductory collaborations ('emergent trends'). This refers especially to Israel, but Lonergan's later use of Heiler would indicate that this refers well beyond just this tradition.
    b. But there is also a full collaboration, a full realization of the solution, which entails affirmation of the central doctrines of Christian faith.
    c. There is the final stage in the transformation of human intelligence when 'we know even as we are known' – the eschatological realization of the full object of our faith.
20. The act of faith is an *assent of human intelligence* to truths transmitted through the collaboration in history.

    This assent is motivated by reliance on the truthfulness/goodness of god and God's intention to redeem.
21. This act of faith will include an affirmation of some truths that we could discover on our own; e.g., the spirituality and freedom of human persons, their responsibility and sinfulness, God's existence.

    Human beings would discover such truths on their own, but often don't; thus, they are part of what is transmitted in the collaboration of the faith community.
22. We are intelligent and reasonable in *grasping that we have a problem and we can't solve it*.

    In a French interview that was recently found, Lonergan talked about 'being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible – yet, still realizing that we are in a mess and need someone to save us.'

    Further, we will be intelligent and reasonable in inferring that God does know of our problem and responds. We live in a universe in which God is interested; it is not a Deistic, clockwork universe.

    We are intelligent and responsible in searching for the signs of both the emergent trends and the full realization of the solution. We are using our minds to investigate this – just as Jesus, on the road to Emmaus, was 'opening their minds' to what the Scriptures meant.
23. It is intelligent and reasonable to grasp as unconditioned the value of deciding to *assent to what this community has transmitted*.

It is intelligent and reasonable to want to be part of a collaboration under God in trying to meet the problem of evil in human life.

24. The collaboration entails *making known to others the good news* of the solution and its nature.

    This involves transmitting the message of the solution, recasting it for different audiences in different cultures – yet also expressing it theologically in a way that comes from the 'universal viewpoint' that enables people to move into the different cultures.

    Systematics = expression of the solution in a cross-cultural way; drawing on the cross-cultural factors of human consciousness.

    Communications = adapting the message to the resources of each audience in each culture.

25. The solution will *leave human freedom intact*; it is not a violation of any laws of the universe, including the laws of human freedom.

    Because it leaves human freedom intact, our collaboration will be marked by deficiencies. Thus the church must be *ecclesia semper reformanda*; it is a 'sinful church.' The deficiencies come from our own biases; collaborating with God does not mean that we cease to be sinners.

26. Error and sin in the Church will not eliminate the solution because the solution is principally the work – not of the Church – but of God.

    It is to be expected that God's work will involve some appropriate institutional organization, with some guarantee of God's assistance.

    As in any other human collaboration, an institutional framework is needed. This institution will be inevitably deficient, but that deficiency will not eliminate the solution.

27. The solution is *implemented primarily in our intelligence and freedom*; this parallels Thomas's insistence that grace is rooted radically in the intellect and will. But it *must also penetrate to and envelope our sensibility and intersubjectivity*.

    It has to provide sensitive and imaginative representations (images) charged with feeling to guide and propel our action. The primary image is the Incarnation itself (i.e., the entry of God into the world of proportionate being). It is a matter not only of understanding and judgment, but also of experience at the sensitive level.

    > "It was there from the beginning; we have *heard* it; we have *seen it with our own eyes*; we looked upon it, and *felt* it with our own hands; and it is of this we tell. Our theme is the word of life. This life was made *visible*; we have *seen* it and bear our testimony; we here declare to you the eternal life which dwelt with the Father and was made *visible* to us. What we have *seen* and *heard* we declare to you, so that you and we together may share in a common life, that life which we share with the Father and his Son Jesus Christ. And we write this in order that the joy of us all may be complete." (1 Jn 1.1-4)

    I, p. 723: "Besides the image that is a sign of intelligible and rational contents and the image that is a psychic force, there is the image that symbolizes man's orientation into the known unknown; and since faith gives more truth than understanding comprehends, since hope reinforces the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know, man's sensitivity needs symbols that unlock its transforming dynamism and bring it into harmony with the fast but impalpable pressures of the pure desire, of hope, and of self-sacrificing charity."

Sebastian Moore, e.g., has done marvelous work on how the symbol of the crucified transforms sensitivity and brings it into harmony with the pure desire and the gift of charity.

- "Christian Self-Discovery," *Lonergan Workshop* I, pp. 187-222.
- "The Language of Love," *Lonergan Workshop* III, pp. 83-106.
- *The Crucified Jesus Is No Stranger* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1977).

The solution will be not just a renovation of will and a new/higher collaboration of intellect, but also a *mystery* that is a symbol of the incomprehensible: "a psychic force that sweeps living human bodies, linked in charity, to the joyful, courageous, whole-hearted, yet intelligently controlled performance of the tasks set by a world order in which the problem of evil is not suppressed but transcended." (*I*, pp. 723-724)

The mystery needed must be history/fact. Thus, Hugo Meynell speaks of "myth become history in Jesus." Jesus satisfies our sensitive demands for psychic transformation.

The emergent trend and the full realization of the solution must include sensible data that are demanded by our sensitive nature and that can command our attention, nourish our imagination, stimulate our intelligence/will, release our affectivity, control our aggressivity, and intimate our ultimate finality.

28. The solution has to meet the problem – not by suppressing the consequences of sin – but by introducing a higher integration that enables us to rise above those consequences to begin something new.

    God does not change the course of human history violently by suppressing the consequences of sin – rather, by raising up human beings who are able to rise above those consequences and start something new. L god gives – not a negative suppression – but a new and more solid base for our own personal and social development. We are enabled to meet evil with a more generous good.

29. The solution is not just an answer to a problem; it has 'a life of its own.' It is a new level on which human living develops and rejoices; it has its own nature, content, meaning, and power.

    We can enter into that and make it the center of our lives, not just use it as a response to a problem when we need it. It can be an entirely new supernatural level of living that we can foster as the basis of everything else.

30. To the extent that it is more than just a solution, it will introduce into human life truths/objects that go beyond the natural reach of any finite understanding.

    E.g., the Incarnation and the mystery of the Trinity; neither is just a response to a problem. If grace is the abundance of God's love, the Incarnation is the superabundance of God's love.

    Our hope becomes hope for a vision of God that exhausts the unrestricted desire; and charity becomes – in the saint, at least – transport, ecstasy, unbounded intimacy.

31. To the extent that it is supernatural, it will *heighten the tension in human living* between limitation and transcendence. This heightened tension will be conscious; there will be a heightened opposition and struggle, which will be objectified socially in the community.

    The realization of God's gift of grace is still imperfect in us; thus, we will oscillate between imbalance in one direction or another.

The tension: "in the world but not of it."

[Doran has a friend who was once told that was "of the world but not in it!"]

Epilogue

The question is: Does *Insight* have any contribution to offer to this higher collaboration?

1. Contribution to *fundamental theology*: a proposed synthesis between scientific reason and faith.

   He attempts to put the Church on a new basis in responding to the world, noting that traditionally it has arrived on the scene "a little breathless and a little late."

   He contends that much of the difficulty between theology and science has resulted from an insufficient cognitional theory on the part of theologians.

2. (Remote) contribution to the *method of theology*.

   [In the light of his later work, the contribution proved to be in no means 'remote'!]

   a) It enables us to affirm the validity of doctrine – because truth is reached in the "yes!' of rational assent and responsible belief. The revolt against doctrine basically comes from an insufficient cognitional theory which holds that the truth is reached on the level of experience.

      Cf. Charles Hefling, Jr., *Why Doctrines?* (Cowley Publications, 1984).

      Lonergan's cognitional theory with its insistence that truth is reached by rational affirmation and responsible belief, 'rehabilitates' the role of doctrine in human life.

   b) This cognitional theory enables theologians to cut short a lot of useless disputed questions: start with the world that exists and try to understand it.

      For example, much theological energy had been put into the question as to whether the incarnation would have occurred had there been no sin.

      Doran comments: 'As the modern world was being lost to the church, theologians were debating what would have happened in other possible worlds!'

   c) Lonergan believes that he has clarified the role of understanding in faith. I.e., it is necessary to grasp that understanding is the basis of concepts, rather than the result of concepts.

      Thus, you can speak of *theology as understanding the mysteries of faith* (with Vatican I).

   d) The metaphysics of Insight is cross-cultural, insofar as potency/form/act are defined by their relations to human knowing; and human knowing in any culture is experiencing, understanding and judging. If your metaphysics is derived from that invariant structure, then your metaphysics is cross-cultural.

      Cf., e.g., Frederick Crowe, "Neither Jew nor Greek, but One Human Nature and Operation in All," *Philippine Studies* 13 (1965), pp. 546-571.

      The metaphysics comes from the intellectual pattern, and that is universally human, not merely 'Western.'

         Much of the distinction between East and West stems from the fact that much of Eastern insight stems from the mystical pattern of experience, whereas the Western insight tends to stem from the intellectual pattern of experience.

Recognition and acknowledgement of the fact of operating out of different patterns of experience can enable fruitful dialogue.

Doran is convinced that if we reach to human interiority, we can reach to what we all have in common. He sees Lonergan and Jung as the major contributors to the cross-cultural human unity that is required. Jung by distinguishing the symbols that appeal to psyches across cultures; Lonergan by disclosing the invariant structure of consciousness.

e) Concerning the *development of doctrine*, Lonergan's exposition of the manners in which concepts change is significant.

Concepts change if the things we are trying to understand change; but concepts also change if our understanding of things develops. And that is what happens in the understanding of doctrine. *As our understanding develops, so will the concepts expressing that understanding develop*.

Sebastian Moore tells the story of having written a letter to Lonergan about the development of doctrine. When he met Lonergan for the first time, the first words that Lonergan spoke were: "Concepts have dates!" (Lonergan wasn't a master of small talk!)

The point of the comment was that concepts are historical realities that develop as human understanding develops.

What can, however, be unchanging is the heuristic anticipation of the understanding. Thus: what I want to know is the nature of. . . grace, incarnation, redemption, etc.

That heuristic anticipation remains the unifying principle throughout a series of successive explanations.

Thus, there can be development in explicit metaphysics. For example, Aquinas added 'existence' to Aristotle's 'potency' and 'form.' Kierkegaard added the fourth level of consciousness. Lonergan added explanatory genera and species.

But behind this development, the latent metaphysics remains constant. Explicit metaphysics is a making explicit 'what human beings are after.'

Concepts will change insofar as we correct previous understanding. And that correction will come out of minds that go through the same processes of experiencing, understanding, and judging.

f) Accordingly, the answer to relativism does not lie in concepts – which will continually change as understanding develops. Rather, the answer to relativism lies in the intelligence that gives rise to the concepts. What is constant is the demand on human beings to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible.

g) Concerning *interpretation*, he affirms the possibility of reaching true interpretation; we can, e.g., today understand correctly what the Church taught at Nicea. We can understand that correctly and formulate it in a new way for our time.

Doran sees an example of this in Schillebeeckx's book on the Eucharist; it is a correct retrieval of what Trent meant concerning the Eucharist, and has put it in a modern context.

Lonergan is talking about a *transposition* of doctrine without relinquishing what has been affirmed in another culture and under different circumstances.

h) Concerning development: (i) of the individual, and (2) of the church in history.

i. In the individual, the advent of grace adds another level to the human aggregate.

Grace
Intelligence
Psyche

Organism

There is a fourth level on which persons develop: the conjugate forms of faith/hope/charity, the supernatural life that advances toward an absolutely supernatural goal.

We can now understand human development even more concretely, precisely by understanding the relationship of grace to intellectual, psychic, and biological development.

E.g., human intelligence anticipates grace by raising the Pauline question: 'Who will save me from this body of death?' Human intelligence is faced with a problem of evil that it cannot solve, and is anticipating the gift of grace by adverting to its need for the divine solution.

The gift of grace makes possible the sustained development of rational self-consciousness; it can help to reverse counter-positions (e.g., as in Augustine's movement beyond equating 'reality' with 'bodiliness'); it can enable the overcoming of evil in both our intelligence and our psyche.

The mysteries of the Gospels and of the liturgy, e.g., can assist in the sustaining of development by transformation at the level of the psyche. These symbols can constitute a new psychic integration. This psychic transformation can penetrate to the very physiological level (e.g., mystical experience).

But with a four level development, there is also a four level problem because of the need to maintain harmony between the levels.

ii. Concerning *historical development*, there is historical development in the emergent trend and in the church.

I, p. 742: "It was at the fullness of time that there came into the world the Light of the world. It was the advent not only of the light that directs but also of the grace that gives good will and good performance. It was the advent of a light and a grace to be propagated, not only through the inner mystery of individual conversion, but also through the outer channels of human communication. If its principal function was to carry the seeds of eternal life, still it could not bear its fruits without effecting a transfiguration of human living and, in turn, that transfiguration contains the solution not only to man's individual but also to his social problem of evil."

Lonergan is calling for a treatise on the church (the mystical body of Christ) that is a theory of history, i.e., an understanding of the community of disciples in history.

> The church must lift up into its own concerns the concerns of its day; this is the point, e.g., of the social encyclicals.
>
> The organizing principle of ecclesiology is the transformative role of the community in history; it will not be organized simply by talking about structures, institutions, hierarchy, etc.

The contribution of *I* to the development of method in theology is far greater that Lonergan realized in 1953. The functional specialization, e.g., of *MT* has its source in the four levels of consciousness and the 'way up' and the 'way down' which he has already unpacked in I. The whole thing gets sublated into a far more extensive and programmatic set-up for an entire discipline in MT (that he was not aware of in *I*).

> The breakthrough for structuring theology as a discipline in this way came in about 1964.

3. Contribution to the relationship between theology and *human science*.

I, p. 743: "The development of empirical, human sciences has created a fundamentally new problem. For these sciences consider man in his concrete performance, and that performance is a manifestation not only of human nature but also of human sin, not only of nature and sin but also of a *de facto* need of divine grace, not only of a need of grace but also of its reception and of its acceptance or rejection. It follows that an empirical human science cannot analyse successfully the elements in its object without an appeal to theology. Inversely, it follows that if theology is to be queen of the sciences, not only by right but also in fact, then theologians have to take a professional interest in the human sciences and make a positive contribution to their methodology."

Doran is convinced, e.g., that the foundations of psychology are theological (i.e., the conversions). The foundation is a position on what it means for a person to be 'well;' and that is a theological position. It is from that foundation that you can talk about aberrations and therapies, etc.

> In a private conversation with Doran, Lonergan acknowledged that chapters six and seven of *I* (on the social sciences) were the first chapters written; they are the manifestations of his central concern. 'That's what I really wanted to say; I had to write the rest of the book to put it into context.' His central focus was the reorientation of the human sciences.

Lonergan has preserved the universal relevance of theology, while accepting the independence/ autonomy of these other inquiries. The sciences are capable of reaching valid conclusions out of their own resources; thus, in the first eighteen chapters there is no mention of God, grace, etc. He wants to demonstrate clearly that he accepts the autonomy of the sciences. But he also goes on to say that the search for God arises right out of scientific presuppositions.

On the relevance of theology to the human sciences: the theologian is able to point out how our unrestricted desire can be interfered with by the biases, and how the gift of grace can overcome the biases. The theologian is able to help the human sciences come to a correct interpretation of their results, by showing how the gift of grace can overcome the determinism and evil that is in the human situation.

> Many psychologists are today coming to an acknowledgement that there is only a religious answer to some of the determinisms that bind people.
>
> The systematic treatment of the solution is a theological treatment, and that theological treatment can/must enter into the human sciences. In this, theology helps the human sciences become 'practical,' for they are not practical without dealing with all the data.
>
> *I*, p. 745: "In a word, empirical human science can become practical only through theology, and the relentless modern drift to social engineering and totalitarian controls is the fruit of man's effort to make human science practical though he prescinds from God and from the solution God provides for man's problem."

The theologian can encourage scientists to be completely faithful to their calling, because s/he grasps that the desire to know is itself a desire for God. There is no need for theology to warn scientists to avoid some questions (as unfortunately has been done in the past). The desire to know manifested in science is itself a manifestation of the desire for God and there is no need to shut it off.

> Thus, the theologian can encourage science out of mechanistic determinism by showing that that does not follow from scientific method.

4. A contribution to Leo XIII's programme for the intellectual ministry of the church: *vetera novis augere et perficere* ('to augment and bring to perfection the old with the new').

> Lonergan spent eleven years trying to understand the *vetera*; with Insight, he is turning to the *nova*.
>
> 'Lonergan is one of the few minds I have ever encountered who is equally at home with the old and the new; equally at home with Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas and Einstein, Heisenberg, Freud.'

CONCLUDING REMARKS:

Doran affirms Lonergan's basic positions as irreversible. But in *I* there are multiple *tensions*:

1. A tension between the intellectual and the existential; this is overcome in the delineation of the fourth level of consciousness.

> In the last chapters of I he still uses the language 'intellectual,' when he is actually referring to 'moral' and 'religious' as well.

2. A tension between classicism and historical mindedness; this is definitively overcome in his later development

> But especially in chapter twenty, it is arguable that he is still promoting the pre-Vatican II Roman Catholic church with its classicist hierarchy, etc.

3. A tension between parochial and universal mentality.

All of *Insight* needs to be sublated into a higher viewpoint; Lonergan saw that and he did it, especially by delineating the fourth level of consciousness and by recognizing that there are other differentiations of consciousness besides the intellectual.

On the differentiations of consciousness, e.g., cf. *MT*, pp. 258-262 and 303-305.

What is still needed is a stronger emphasis on the role of the human psyche in human living, and on the contribution of the psyche to moral impotence.

Lonergan emphasizes intellectual and volitional development, and the breakdowns there. But Doran emphasizes also the way in which psychic traumas can really prevent people from being effectively free.

Thus, attention needs to be paid to the whole realm of feelings, symbols, affects, etc.

'In reading *Insight*, you've passed the dragon!' The rest of Lonergan's works now life open.

As Pogo said: "From here on down, it's uphill all the way!"