Lonergan's *Method in Theology*

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A theology mediates between
a cultural matrix
and the significance and role
of a religion in that matrix.

Bernard Lonergan
Method in Theology

Notes by Jim Englert

[Page references to *Method in Theology* are to the 1972 Herder and Herder edition;
References to Insight are to the 1957 Philosophical Library edition.]

<u>18 September 1986</u>

The place of *Method in Theology* [*MT*] in the development of Lonergan's thought.

> In the "Preface" to David Tracy's *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (NY: Herder & Herder, 1970), p. xi, Lonergan writes: "For twenty-five years I was a professor of theology, first in Montreal, then in Toronto, and, finally, for twelve years in Rome. I turned out the usual notes and handbooks, contributed to periodicals, and *wrote a long book on methods generally to underpin an as yet unfinished book on method in theology*."
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> Thus, *Insight* [*I*] was written to underpin *MT*: *MT* was the goal of Lonergan's whole life work – a goal he set for himself in the late 1930s.
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> Valentine Rice (Lonergan's biographer) contends that in about 1936-37, Lonergan set for himself the task of making a contribution to the *total reconstruction of Catholic philosophy and theology*.
>
> > At that time, he judged that Catholic philosophy/theology were functioning for an age that no longer existed; they had not yet appropriated modern science, modern historical scholarship, and the advances of modern philosophy. It is in the context of those three modern developments, that he set for himself the task of contributing to the total reconstruction of Catholic philosophy/theology.
> >
> > The Thomistic synthesis (as it had been handed down) had been 'put together' prior to those developments.
> >
> > Lonergan's life work was to make it possible for Catholic philosophy/theology to prosper in an age and culture that was scientific, scholarly (in the sense of modern historical

scholarship), and that had taken the turn to the subject.

Insight was the first step in that, and was basically Lonergan's contribution to the reconstruction of the philosophical enterprise.

Pre-*Insight* writings:

I was preceded by two major historical studies on Aquinas:

1. He wrote his doctoral dissertation on the development of the notion of grace in Aquinas. The dissertation was reworked for publication as a series of articles in *Theological Studies*. These articles were published in book form as *Grace and Freedom* (NY: Herder & Herder, 1971).

   The original preface to the dissertation and a note about it by Frederick Crowe are published in *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 3/2 (October 1985): 1-46. The entire dissertation will be published as part of a set of ancillary volumes to Lonergan's collected works.

2. There was also a study of Thomist cognitional theory, which also appeared as a series of articles in *Theological Studies* (1946-1949). In book form, these are published as *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1967).

Also, the first seven papers in Collection (NY: Herder & Herder, 1967) also appeared originally before I:

- "The Form of Inference"
- "Finality, Love, Marriage"
- "On God and Secondary Causes"
- "The Assumption and Theology"
- "The Natural Desire to See God"
- "A Note on Geometrical Possibility"
- "The Role of a Catholic University in the Modern World"

Between *I* and *MT*: The most important writings between *I* (which was completed in 1953, though not published until 1957 – no one wanted to take a chance on it!) and *MT*:

1. The last nine papers in *Collection*:

   - "Theology and Understanding"
   - "Isomorphism of Thomist and Scientific Thought"
   - "I*nsight*: Preface to a Discussion"
   - "Christ as Subject: A Reply"
   - "Openness and Religious Experience"
   - "Metaphysics as Horizon"
   - "Cognitional Structure"
   - "*Existenz* and *Aggiornamento*"
   - "Dimensions of Meaning"

2. Three Latin Treatises (on two subjects):

   - Christology:
     - *De Constitutione Christi* (1956) [available in translation at LRI]

- *De Verbo Incarnato* (finished form = 1964)

- Trinity
  - D*e Deo Trino* (finished form = 1964)

    Most of this is available in translation in LRI. The first section of it is published as *The Way to Nicea* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976).

    The changes that took place in the various editions of DDT (especially chapter 1) are especially important in studying the development of Lonergan's thought on theological method.

3. Lonergan also gave a number of workshops on theological method during this period:
   - *De Intellectu et Methodo* (Rome)
   - *De Methodo Theologiae* (Rome)
   - Regis College, 1962
   - Boston College, 1968
   - Regis College, 1969
   - Boston College, 1970
   - Milltown Institute, 1971

   The development notable in these represent almost a 'sea-change' in mentality.

Post-MT writings:

A Third Collection (NY: Paulist Press, 1985):

- "Dialectic of Authority"
- "Method: Trend and Variations"
- "Mission and the Spirit"
- "Aquinas Today: Tradition and Innovation"
- "Prolegomena to the Study of the Emerging Religious Consciousness of Our Time"
- "Christology Today: Methodological Reflections"
- "Healing and Creating in History"
- "Religious Experience"
- "The Ongoing Genesis of Methods"
- "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness"
- "Theology and Praxis"
- "A Post-Hegelian Philosophy of Religion"
- "Pope John's Intention"
- "Unity and Plurality"

Lonergan's last years were spent mostly dedicated to macroeconomic theory.

From *I* to *MT*:

Lonergan's intentions were formed by a commitment to contribute to the reconstruction of Catholic philosophy/theology. In his writings, he frequently refers to Pope Leo XIII's programme (*Aeterne Patris*) for theology: *vetera novis augere et perficere* ("to augment and complete the old with the new"). This programme inspired Lonergan existentially/religiously to make the life's commitment that he made.

His Thomist studies (1938-1949) were an effort to understand what the *vetera* (the old) really were.

> What did Aquinas really say about the constitution of the supernatural entitative order and its relationship to human freedom? How is Aquinas to be understood on this?
>
> > What in Aquinas is called the "supernatural" becomes in Lonergan's later work the specifically theological principle: the dynamic state of being in love with God. Aquinas' expression was in a metaphysical context; Lonergan transposes it (in his later works) to the context of human interiority.
> >
> > Thus, understanding the *vetera* is a matter of understanding what Aquinas meant by the supernatural, and how he understood it in its relationship to human freedom. But the *nova* involves transposing that into an idiom that can be appropriated in the context of modern philosophy, modern science, and modern historical scholarship. And for Lonergan, that idiom is the idiom of human interiority. What Aquinas meant by sanctifying grace becomes the dynamic state of being in love with God.

One of the things that Lonergan is attempting is a transposition out of a metaphysical context as primary, into the subject as primary (as foundational); this, of course, does not involve any denial of metaphysics, but makes metaphysics critical.

Again, the *vetera* with regard to *Verbum*: what is the human understanding that, according to Aquinas, will be brought to bear on grace and freedom, and on everything else?

Thus, in his studies of Aquinas, Lonergan's concern was with the foundational realities of religious experience (*Grace and Freedom*) and human understanding (*Verbum*).

<u>The Context of Insight</u>

I (written 1949-1953) is concerned with the *nova*, the vistas that are opened up by what has happened in the world between Aquinas and the twentieth century.

> <u>*I*, p. 748</u>: "After spending years reaching up to the mind of Aquinas, I came to a two-fold conclusion. On the one hand, that reaching had changed me profoundly. On the other hand, that change was the essential benefit. For not only did it make me capable of grasping what, in the light of my conclusions, the vetera really were, but also *it opened challenging vistas on what the* nova *could be*."
>
> *I* is written in an entirely new idiom from either Aquinas himself or from Lonergan's own studies of Aquinas. It is concerned with questions that Aquinas could not and did not raise – i.e., those questions emerging from the modern sciences, historical scholarship and modern philosophy. Lonergan has appropriated those modern contexts, and now speaks to the issue of what they can be if one has some firm grounding in what human understanding really is. He is also concerned in *I* with issues of praxis and world constitution. He speaks, e.g., of the possibility (unique to the twentieth century) of a totalitarianism in which every hint of intellectual independence is discounted as myth.
>
> Thus, he is attempting to present a philosophy that is intended to permeate into the social milieu and to contribute to reversing the drift toward the social surd. A practical,

political context is never absent from his work; he is concerned with the state of culture. Thus, his interest in economics from the 1930s. He wants to make a contribution to the reversal of decline.

The distinct contribution of *I* is an *elucidation of the act of human understanding*, *as that act functions in every department of human activity*.

The book is not fundamentally a 'theory' about insight; it is an invitation to the personal act of discovering in my own consciousness the operation of understanding and its relationship to all of the other operations that I perform. It is a book that is informed by theory, but in a very definite sense it is post-theoretical. It invites the reader to the self-constitutive act of affirming that there are in fact such operations occurring in my conscious experience, as the act of understanding and all the other related operations.

Lonergan is convinced that almost all previous interpreters of Aquinas had missed the centrality of *intelligere* (understanding) in his thought. *Intelligere* as an active, creative, constructive ground of human knowledge. According to Lonergan's interpretation of Aquinas, insight grounds concepts; previous interpreters had it the other way around (i.e., a conceptualism which overlooked the centrality of the act of understanding). Insight is an active, creative pivot between experience and concepts.

<u>The Basic Positions of *I*</u>:

Modern philosophy in the form of idealism had acknowledged the role of understanding, but wasn't able to go beyond it. Idealism stops with understanding, and if you do that all you're able to know is your own ideas. Idealism is characterized by immanentism, an inability to account for the fact that human intelligence is self-transcendent and capable of objectivity. Idealism does not pay sufficient attention to the act of judgment.

Understanding	--	What is it?	--	(inquiry)
Judgment	--	Is it so?	--	(reflection)

Kant collapsed judgment into understanding; he did not attend to the operations of reflection and judgment. Lonergan insists that judgment is a distinct level of consciousness, a distinct operation. The clearest example of reflection (weighing and marshalling the evidence) and judgment is the experimentation that goes on in modern science (i.e., the verification of hypotheses).

I presents a generalized cognitional theory that does three things:

1. It acknowledged the role of *understanding* in human knowledge.

   <u>*I*, p. ix</u>: "(The function of insight) in cognitional activity is so central that to grasp it in its conditions, its working, and its results, is to confer a basic yet startling unity on the whole field of human inquiry and human opinion."

2. It does not leave human knowing at the level of constructive and creative intelligence; it acknowledges as well a further and distinct level where we are able to ascertain that in fact some of the creations of our mind are true (i.e., correspond to what-is, or approximate what-is).

3. It is written in the mode of a crucial, personal experiment: taking possession of myself, affirming myself as knower. (Cf. *I*, chapter 11.)

The contribution of *I* to the *nova* is mainly *cognitional* – what Lonergan will later call intellectual conversion. That context is only part of the whole picture, and needs to be completed by other, further considerations: i.e., the moral, religious, affective, and social-political dimensions of human life.

Between *I* and *MT*, Lonergan begins a further consideration of these other dimensions.

<u>Moral Consciousness</u>

In *I*, I am asked to affirm that I am a subject of conscious operations proceeding on three levels:



Thus, in the context of *I*, there are two questions giving rise to three levels of consciousness. Experience is the level of pure presentation, data; but this gives rise to questions for understanding, and that (inquiry) is the beginning of intelligent consciousness. Insight/understanding comes as a release to the tension of inquiry, and it does not occur without the tension of inquiry. Understanding is some kind of 'rest' to the movement of inquiry; but on this same level I move to formulate what I have understood. Thus formulated, the second question arises: is it true? There follows the process of reflection (weighing and marshalling the evidence) which proceeds to judgment.

What binds the whole process together is the fact that human consciousness is pure question (pure, disinterested desire to know). Human consciousness is constituted as a pure, unrestricted drive.

The first major development between *I* and *MT* is the emergence of a third question that results in a fourth level of consciousness; this is the *question for value*, and it is as central to human constitution as is the question for truth.

- "Is it worthwhile?"
- "Is it truly good? Or only apparently good?"

This question culminates in a fourth level of consciousness: *Decision*.

In *I*, decision is collapsed into judgment; in post-*I* works it emerges as a distinct level of consciousness with its own operations:

- Apprehension of value in feelings;
- Question for deliberation (of value);
- Judgment of value;
- Decision;

- Action.

Chapter 1 of *MT* reviews the four levels of consciousness. Cf. also Doran's unpublished lecture, "Bernard Lonergan's Notion of the Person" [available at LRI].

The Centrality of *Meaning*:

Meaning, as such, is not a major category in *I*; Doran, however, sees it as *the* central category of *MT*. In fact, *MT* can be understood as the application to theology of a generalized theory of meaning.

Many of the elements that enter into that theory of meaning are present in *I*, but meaning-as-such emerges as a central category only in the years between *I* and *MT*.

The Notions of *Mediation* and *Constitution*:

The world in which we live (the *real* human world) is a world mediated and constituted by meaning. [Cf. "Dimensions of Meaning," *Collection*, for the clearest expression of the pivot between I and MT.]

Mediation is what makes my world distinct from that of the infant. In his analysis of this, Lonergan depends largely on Piaget. Prior to the development of any linguistic skill, the infant lives in a *world of immediacy*.

MT, p. 76: "It is the world of what is felt, touched, grasped, sucked, seen, heard. It is a world of immediate experience, of the given as given, of image and affect without any perceptible intrusion from insight or concept, reflection or judgment, deliberation or choice. It is the world of pleasure and pain, hunger and thirst, food and drink, rage and satisfaction and sleep."

Piaget has shown that the infant is busy learning to develop, differentiate, combine and group skills in the area of sensitive operation. Even the infant's earliest speech is concerned with present objects; thus, even meaning is initially confined to that world of immediacy. But as the command and use of language develops, the world expands exponentially. Through language, we are brought to live in a world that involves the past, the future, the absent; it is a world brought to us through the memory of others, through the common sense of the whole community, through the pages of literature, etc.

The *world-mediated-by-meaning* does not lie within anyone's immediate experience; it results from *acts* of human understanding. Meaning is an *act*, or better, a set of acts: I *mean* by understanding and judging.

Meaning is not something 'out there' to be 'looked at.'

Constitution: The world in which we live is constituted by meaning. Meaning is constitutive of the human world.

Meaning is a formal element in the very structure of cultural achievement and social institutions. These institutions (e.g., family, state, law, economy) are constituted by certain acts of understanding; they are given their form by understanding, and they change with changing understanding.

You can change the state by changing its constitution; but you can also change the state by changing the way in which the constitution is understood. These social institutions are not immutable entities; they adapt to changing circumstances, etc.

This world is a precarious world, because meanings can be true or false, good or evil, noble or base, etc.

"Dimensions of Meaning," *Collection*, p. 255: "It is in the field where meaning is constitutive, that man's freedom reaches its high point. There too his responsibility is greatest. There there occurs the emergence of the existential subject, finding out for himself that he has to decide for himself what he is to make of himself. It is there that individuals become alienated from community, that communities split into factions, that cultures flower and decline, that historical causality exerts its sway."

Any social/cultural group is constituted by meaning.

Historicity; empirical notion of culture; abandonment of classicism:

Believe it or not, these notions become central in Lonergan's thought when he was in Rome (perhaps clarification by contrast!). Teaching in a transcultural context, he encountered students coming out of many cultural backgrounds and many European students who were familiar with the emphasis placed on historicity by German historical scholarship and existentialism. He had to relate to the concerns of these students.

I does not operate out of a classicist theory of culture; it begins with an exploration of modern physics, probability theory, evolutionary theory, relativity – moves on to a recognition of the vast varieties of common sense from one cultural matrix to the next – and includes such things as levels/sequences of expression, differentiations of consciousness, and so on. . .

"*Insight* Revisited," *A Second Collection*, p. 264: "In the summer of 1930 I was assigned to teach at Loyola College, Montreal, and despite the variety of my duties was able to do some reading. Christopher Dawson's *The Age of the Gods* introduced me to the anthropological notion of culture and so began the correction of my hitherto normative or classicist notion."

But the *thematic* replacement of that notion with a *thematic* expression of an empirical notion of culture occurs only in the period between *I* and *MT*. In that period, he was announcing to the church (the rest of the world knew it!) that the classicist notion of culture was dead. There is no one normative culture, normative for all humanity to which the rest of humanity must ascend; *there are as many cultures as there are different sets of meanings and values informing human life*. No one culture is in the position of being able to impose its standards on others. Lonergan realized that the Catholic church and its theology were still classicist, and that the desired *aggiornamento* would never be achieved unless and until those classicist assumptions were given up.

But the major problem that arises when a normative notion of culture is abandoned is the question of norms. A 'normative culture' provided objective norms in the normative meanings/values which constituted the culture; when that set of meanings/values is no longer recognized as normative, there still remains a need for some kind of norms for human authenticity. For Lonergan, every particular culture is a blend of authenticity and inauthenticity; no one culture truly provides norms for real

authenticity; thus, you have to move to a *transcendental understanding of the demands of the human spirit that lie behind all cultural achievement and find standards for human authenticity in the pure question for the intelligible, the true, the good and the world-transcendent God*. Human consciousness – wherever it exists, has existed, and will exist – is a pure question proceeding in accord with immanent norms that form a transcultural norm of authenticity. 'Unpacking' the exigencies of that pure question will therefore lead to the discovery of what is truly normative. Wherever human persons have existed, authenticity has consisted in persons who have (a) experienced, (b) tried to understand their experience, (c) tried to understand it as truly as they can, (d) tried to do what is good, and (e) however inarticulate, there has been an orientation to God. In addition, Lonergan would insist (with Rahner) wherever human consciousness has existed there has also been the grace of God communicated to that pure question – even though the language of grace may not have been used; thus, the offer of grace becomes another transcultural constitutive element, a strictly theological one, of the norms of human authenticity.

> In this, Lonergan's two concerns from his Thomist studies – grace and human understanding – are coming together; he will later thematize the two movements as "the way up and the way down," "creating and healing." Whereas Aquinas had presented these two ways in a metaphysical context, Lonergan presents them in a contemporary context in terms of human interiority.
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> These are what constitute the norms for genuine humanity, and these norms are true in all cultural contexts:
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> 
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> This whole explicitation of the normative notion of culture can be traced in developmental fashion through the essays in *A Second Collection*.

<u>Transformed Notion of Theology Itself</u>:

> The basic breakthrough in this regard came in February, 1965. Even in *DDT* (1964), it is evident in Lonergan's presentation of systematic theology (chapter 1) that he has not reached the breakthrough. In *DDT*, he still understands the nature of all theology in terms of Vatican I (*Dei Filius*): theology is the imperfect, analogous, but fruitful understanding of the mysteries of faith hidden in God and revealed by God. An initial problem with this in the contemporary context becomes one of granting biblical exegesis and historical scholarship equal footing with dogmatic and systematic theology. In the traditional notion (Vatican I), exegesis and history were mere appendages.
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> The breakthrough basically consists in recognizing that the notion of Vatican I is one *functional specialty* among eight; it thus constitutes part of the theological enterprise, but does not exhaust it. Thus, exegesis and history are also specialties within that enterprise. The whole theological enterprise becomes the *mediation of faith and culture*.
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> > <u>*MT*, p. xi</u>: "A theology mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of a religion in that matrix."

Lonergan insists that theology has always done that, but that it had not recognized it until this century (e.g., Troeltsch, Tillich). And this is true of any theology – e.g., Islamic and Hindu as well as Christian. Thus, Augustine's *City of God* is precisely such a mediation; what becomes possible in the twentieth century is the explicit acknowledgment of that mediation.

RD: "The theology of the Ayatollah Khomeini is mediation, however wacky it might be!"

This mediation proceeds through eight steps, in two phases:

Phase ONE: *in oratione obliqua* – from the past into the present; finding out what the *vetera* really were.

1. Research: making the *data* available (e.g., establishing critical texts).
2. Interpretation: *understanding* the data made available by research.
3. History: study of *development*, of what was going forward in the constitutive meaning of the community.
4. Dialectic: deals with *conflicts*, and attempts to reduce conflicts to their ultimate basis; Lonergan tries to provide a basis for deciding which conflicts are really important/basic.

Phase TWO: *in oratione recta* – from the present into the future; the *nova*; the theologian faces the question, 'what do *I* hold?'

5. Foundations: giving an account of the *grounds* for holding what I hold.
6. Doctrines: expression of what I hold; judgments of what I hold to be *true*.
7. Systematics: *integrated framework* for what I hold to be true.
8. Communication: *pastoral* praxis, and dialogue with other disciplines.

Reading *Method in Theology*:

The style of *MT* is entirely different from *I*. At one point, Lonergan said that *I* is a work of *eros*, *MT* is a work of *agape*. *I* is a striving-for integrated understanding; *MT* is written from that integration.

MT's style is much more accessible, but it is also very elliptical.

Thus, in reading *I*, the temptation is to think that you're never going to understand it. In reading *MT*, the temptation is to think you understand it when you really don't.

Suggested technique: write a one-page summary of each chapter after reading it several times.

MT is structured in two parts:

1. Background: Lonergan's notion of culture and religion.
2. Foreground: each of the functional specialties.

25 September 1986

Introduction

MT, p. xi: "A theology mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of a religion in that matrix."

> This sentence sets the theme for the entire book; it sets the task that Lonergan attempts to illuminate – i.e., the *mediation* of religion and culture.

Theology has always done this; however, theologians have only become self-consciously aware of this in the twentieth century. This is the result of historical consciousness. As long as the classicist, normative notion of culture prevailed – i.e., when it was thought that culture was a permanent achievement and that there was one normative culture for all times and places – theology was thought of as a permanent achievement, rather than as an ongoing process of continual mediation of the significance of the religion and the developing meanings and values of culture. But an empirical notion of culture recognizes such development, and thus theology becomes a continual, ongoing mediation.

Most twentieth century theologians recognize this, but mediation is conceived in various ways. A useful typology is given by H. Richard Niebuhr in *Christ and Culture* (NY: Harper & Row, 1951):

1. Christ *against* culture; e.g., Tolstoy; characterized by antagonism between Christian faith and culture.
2. Christ *of* culture; e.g., Schleiermacher, Ritschhl; accommodation of the religious tradition to culture.
3. Christ *above* culture; e.g., Clement of Alexandria, Thomas Aquinas; a synthesis of faith and culture is attempted; e.g., Thomas synthesized the theological theorem of the supernatural with Aristotelian philosophy.
4. Christ and culture in *paradox*; e.g., Luther, Kierkegaard; posits a dualism between faith and culture, such as Luther's 'Two Kingdoms' doctrine.
5. Christ, the *transformer* of culture; e.g., Augustine, F.D. Maurice; the function of theology is to mediate conversion to the culture.

> Doran locates Lonergan in model 5, but for the sake of model 3; thus, Lonergan sees theology as involved in the transformation of culture but for the sake of synthesis.

The way this question of mediation is asked is significant. Niebuhr seems to pose the question in this way: What is the relation of the categories expressing the meanings/values of a given culture to the categories expressing the meanings/values of a given religious tradition.

> Framing the question in this way gives rise to a method of correlation, which can be conceived in various ways:
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> a. Culture and religion are virtually identical; e.g., what religion means by 'sin' is identical with what the culture means by 'alienation.'
> b. Paul Tillich: culture raises the questions, and religion provides the answers.
> c. David Tracy: mutually critical correlation between religion and culture.
>
> Doran regards this way of asking the question as an abstraction. He insists that the categories of the culture already stand in some relationship to the categories of the religious tradition. The culture is already – in one way or another – informed by a religious reality; there are no cultural

categories altogether independent of religious influence. There is some kind of religious dimension to the culture's self-understanding. And *vice versa*, no religious tradition understands itself independently of categories that are already operative in culture; cultural categories already come into the understanding of the religious tradition.

> E.g., contemporary religious understanding of 'sin' is influenced from the outset by Marxist notions of alienation and Freudian psychotherapeutic notions; from the beginning there is a meshing, and it is therefore an abstraction to raise the question in the form of correlation.

Lonergan puts the question this way: what is the relationship between (a) the categories that theology shares with other disciplines (*general*), and (b) the categories that are proper to theology (*special*).

> Thus, a good physicist can do physics without talking about "Providence;" there is no methodological need for the physicist-*qua*-physicist to talk about this. But no good theologian can do theology without some idea of what physicists are talking about; thus, familiarity with such things as 'relativity theory' will enable one to better understand and speak about "Providence" and the way in which it can influence the ongoing course of events. Quantum theory will preclude determinism and open up ways of talking about the intervention of God in the ongoing process of the universe.
>
> > There are categories which theology shares with the other sciences (general), but there are also categories which are proper to theology (special).
>
> Rather than correlation, the relation is one of integration, leading toward a unified interdisciplinary project of heading toward an understanding of everything about everything.
>
> > Thus, leaving theology out of the collaboration involves a mutilation of the culture. [Cf. Newman's *The Idea of a University* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1929).] Human science is impossible without a consideration of the realities studied in theology; you cannot understand human beings correctly in abstraction from saving grace. Doran argues that theology provides a dimension of the foundation for human science.

Neither culture nor the religious tradition can be the ultimate foundation for theological mediation, because theology is a mediation – not of categories from the culture and categories from the tradition – but an integration of categories that theology shares with other disciplines and categories that are specific to theology. The foundation has to somehow lie in the theologian, who appropriates the culture in a certain way and who appropriates the religious tradition in a certain way; that appropriation enters into the foundation of theological mediation. But the appropriation will be different depending on who the theologian is. Thus, e.g., Hans Urs Von Balthasar and Leonardo Boff have appropriated both culture and religious tradition in quite different ways! The difference is not in the data; it is in von Balthasar and Boff.

> Any kind of theological extrinsicism (such as 'revelational positivism') is out of the question. The Word-of-God is not the foundation, because it is always filtered through somebody's understanding.

<u>Chapter ONE: *Method*</u>

The chapter on method is placed at the beginning because neither the religious tradition nor the culture is foundational; thus, Lonergan must state what is foundational, and part of that is *the mind of the theologian intent on this integrated understanding of reality*.

The foundation is two-fold:

1. The authentic unfolding of the dynamism of inquiry in the authentic theologizing subject (interiorly differentiated consciousness).
2. Religious conversion through which one falls-in-love and abides-in-love with God (religious differentiated consciousness).

The foundational reality of any theology is *the mind, heart, and religious stance of the theologian* doing the theology: the subject s/he is. The functional specialty of foundations is the objectification of what I hold to be authenticity of mind, heart, and religious stance.

Everything, including the religious tradition, is mediated through the mind, heart, and religious stance of the subject/theologian.

Chapter one introduces us to interiorly differentiated consciousness.

A preliminary notion of method: "*Method is a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results*" (*MT*, p. 4). This is a general notion of method, particularly true of the sciences. He is not, however, reducing method to the successful (natural) sciences. Rather, he is saying 'Let's look at where human knowing has succeeded, and where our culture generally agrees that it has succeeded, and let's see what we can learn about the way in which people proceed in coming to know.'

There are *recurrent* operations. In a science, inquiry keeps recurring. In the history of physics, e.g., from Galileo to Einstein, it becomes evident that Galileo's answers to his questions simply give rise to new questions – and thus the process goes on through Kepler, Newton, etc. Observation, description, discoveries, hypotheses, verifications all recur over and over again.

These operations are *related* to one another. Inquiry takes observations and turns them into scientific descriptions, which then are used as material for scientific insights, which are expressed in hypotheses, which are tested by experimentation, and thus either falsified or verified as increasingly probable.

Because of the relation between the operations, there is a *pattern* and this pattern is *normative*: 'there is a right way to do the job.' E.g., if you move immediately from experience to judgment without going through understanding, you're not doing it right.

The normative pattern yields cumulative and progressive results. Galileo's law of falling bodies has been verified over and over again in scientific experiments which presume it. Thus, it is preserved and so further developments are cumulative upon that development. But physicists know a great deal more now than Galileo knew; the results have progressed beyond Galileo's law. Thus, theology should lead to ever further, richer, deeper understanding of the revelation of God, in relation to the meanings and values which constitute human cultures.

The operations occur on distinct *levels* of consciousness, and this pattern lies behind and enforms the methods of the sciences. Thus, 'transcendental method' (Generalized Empirical method) is present in different ways in the specific methods of the particular sciences.

These operations can be identified as elements within one's interiority; they are the *data of consciousness* (*I*). *Interiorly differentiated consciousness* is a consciousness that has come into

‘possession’ of this realm of interiority – i.e., understands it, is familiar with it, ‘at home’ with it. Finding these operations in myself and understanding their interrelationships will promote interiorly differentiated consciousness.

“Being at home in transcendental method.”

Basic *Characteristics* of the Operations:

1. *Intentionality* – This does not mean deliberate; rather, he means it in Husserl’s sense of intentionality, *viz*., the *operations have objects*.

   Seeing is never seeing without a ‘seen;’ there is never inquiry without something that is asked about; there is never understanding without something being understood; there is never judgment without something that is affirmed (or denied); there is never decision without an object.

2. *Consciousness* – None of these operations occur in dreamless sleep or in a coma. When they are performed, I am *aware of myself performing them*. I am *present to myself operating*.

   Thus, ‘consciousness’ is the characteristic of certain operations that I perform, aware of myself performing them. This consciousness is *not knowledge*; it is *not self-knowledge*, which develops from reflecting on conscious operations. Consciousness itself is simply *experience* of myself operating.

   Lonergan’s meaning of self-presence can be clarified by noting that he distinguishes three meanings of ‘presence:’

   a. The chairs are present in the room;

   b. I am present to you and you are present to me;

   c. But I couldn’t be present to you, unless you were present to yourself; that self-presence is consciousness.

   It is important to realize here that Lonergan’s linguistic usage in this regard differs from that of most depth psychology (e.g., Freud, Jung). What Jung terms “unconscious” Lonergan terms “*conscious but not known*.”

3. These operations (as conscious) are *data that can be objectified* (analogous in the way that a physicist, e.g., objectifies the data of sense – by description, scientific explanation, and so on).

   The data of consciousness are *given*, just as much as are the data of sense; they are experienced.

   I can *experience* my own experience/understanding/judgment/decision; not only ‘can’ I, I always do. I can *understand* my experience of experience/understanding/judgment/decision in their relationship to one another. I can *affirm* that in fact this is a correct understanding of myself as a knower (self-affirmation). I can *decide* that I want to operate in accordance with the norms that are implicit in the unfolding of the dynamic pattern of these operations.

      The entirety of this process is self-appropriation: self-possession in quite explicit and explanatory fashion. According to Lonergan, Augustine’s *Confessions* and Newman’s *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* are true ‘descriptions’ (common sense); Lonergan wants to be explanatory (terms and relations fixing each other). You begin with description, but move beyond it to explanation. This is true of both modern science (with its development of explanation) and modern philosophy (in its turn to the subject).

But this is not merely a theory. It is informed by theory, but as self-appropriation it is a matter of existential praxis.

This is a matter of bringing the operations-as-intentional to bear on the operations-as-conscious.

In *MT*, Lonergan does not use the language of a faculty psychology: 'intellect' and 'will.' In this metaphysical context, traditional scholasticism had always affirmed that intellect precedes will. But this framework cannot handle the reality of falling-in-love with God whom I do not know. *Intentionality analysis* can deal with this in the notions of "the way up" and "the way down." In the way up (creating), I move from experience through understanding to judgment and decision; in the way down (healing), I fall in love and my decisions are informed by that state of being-in-love, which then transforms my judgments, understanding, and experience.

In *I*, there is tension in this regard; Lonergan is doing intentionality analysis, but he is still using the language of the metaphysical framework of faculty psychology; in *MT*, he has moved beyond that framework and no longer speaks of 'intellect' and 'will.'

4. Lonergan maintains that *four levels* of consciousness will be found in this process of objectification; operations at each level are consciousness and intentional, but consciousness and intentionality differ from one level to the next – consciousness is progressively 'fuller.' Understanding brings something more that is not present in pure experience; judgment adds a certain sureness; good decisions bring us the peace of a good conscience. Thus, intentionality and consciousness change.

   He is asking me (as reader) to identify this in myself: Is this true about myself or isn't it?

5. *Transcendental notions* – There is a different mode of intending at each level of consciousness, but there is a radical intending which underlies every specific process of intending; this radical intending is constituted by the 'transcendental notions.'

   The operations-as-performed are always 'categorial' (i.e., they are limited to some x, y, or z); whenever I ask a question, it is a question-about-something. I always perform the operation of experience, understanding, judgment, or decision with respect to some particular x, y or z (however complicated that x, y or z may be).

   But in all of those, there is operative a set of transcendental notions. They are 'transcendental' in the sense that they permeate every performance with regard to any x, y, or z.



A notion is *not a concept*, which is always formulated; rather, a 'notion' is a vital, heuristic anticipation. Consciousness is a pure anticipation of the intelligible, the true, and the good. Pure consciousness is an open, dynamic desire for understanding, truth,

and goodness. We are structured in such a way that it is our native endowment to want these objectives; that 'wanting' (which is conscious) is what Lonergan means by 'notion.'

> This relates to the problem that has plagued philosophy from the time of Plate: how is it that we can start out trying to know what is unknown, and despite the fact that it is unknown when we get to know it we know that we know it. How is that possible? How is it that that-I-don't-know can become what-I-know, and can become what-I-know in such a way that I know that I know it?

We are so constituted that our consciousness contains immanent criteria for what is intelligible, true, and good. These transcendental notions are *unrestricted*; the authentic person wants to know everything about everything; and every limited achievement of the good remains open to criticism.

These notions are present and operative in the child, evident in the fact of questions.

> 'You are a set of transcendental notions, whether you know it or not!'

The transcendental 'concepts' are formed by philosophers in reflecting on this reality; but the transcendental 'notions' are constitutive of the consciousness of everyone. We are constituted by desire for unlimited intelligibility, unconditioned truth, and unqualified goodness.

6. Knowing is *compound*, in that knowing consists of an element provided by experience (potency), an element provided by understanding (form), and an element provided by judgment (act). No one of these operations constitutes knowing; rather, knowing is the compound of the operations in their dynamic interrelationship.
7. The operations are *unified in a single unfolding* insofar as one operation 'calls forth' the next: experience is *for* understanding; insight is *for* judgment. This yields a pattern that is *formally dynamic*.

<u>*Functions* of Transcendental Method</u>:

Normative: associated with each of the levels is a precept constitutive of human authenticity.

> Human authenticity is the ever-precarious fulfillment of these transcendental imperatives, which are the 'natural law.'



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Heuristic function: A 'heuristic' is anticipatory of discovery. Thus, transcendental method is heuristic in the sense that it propels us toward the discovery of what is intelligible, true, and good. Questioning itself is an anticipation. The general form of questioning is transcendental method; in the concrete, I am always asking about something.

Functions of Transcendental Method:

1. Normative
2. Critical
3. Dialectical
4. Systematic
5. Hermeneutic
6. Heuristic
7. Foundational
8. Relevant to Theology
9. Integrative
10. Universal and permanent
11. Interdisciplinary
12. Philosophic
13. Opens religious question

Methodological Positions emerging from Chapter One:

1. Theology, as a mediation of religion and culture, is an ongoing process requiring a method to assure cumulative and progressive results.

2. The method will be a realization (embodiment, concretization, specification) of transcendental method in the (specific) discipline of theology.

3. Transcendental method is the general form of every valid method, every normative pattern of related and recurrent operations yielding cumulative and progressive results. That general form is the authentic unfolding of intentional consciousness:

a. From the *experience* of the data of sense and of consciousness to the *understanding* of those data;

b. From understanding to the *judgment* that the understanding is correct (incorrect, probable, possible, etc.);

c. From judgment as to what is true to deliberation and *decision* as to what is good.

4. Intentional consciousness is thus a set of transcendental notions intending the intelligible, the true, and the good.

5. The criteria of intelligibility, truth, and the good are constitutive of the dynamic unfolding of intentional consciousness itself, and are to be located here (in the very unfolding of the dynamism of conscious intentionality) and nowhere else.

6. Theological method will thus be that specification of transcendental method that will enable theology to mediate between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of a religion within that matrix. Insofar as it is a genuine realization of transcendental method, theological method will perform the functions outlined in the final section of Chapter One.

Chapter TWO: *The Human Good*

Concerning the *transition* from chapter one to chapter two, the question arises: If 'Method' is one foundation of theology and 'religion' is the other, why are chapters on the human good and on meaning inserted between the chapters on method and religion? Doran suggests three answers to this question:

1. Theology mediates between religion and culture, and any culture is a set of *meanings and values*; thus, chapters 2 and 3 present the *generalized form of a cultural matrix*.

These two chapters give the basis of Lonergan's theory of culture. And since religion is to be mediated with culture, it is necessary to spell out this notion of culture.

2. Religion is *God's entry into the world mediated and constituted by meaning and motivated by value*; thus, chapters 2 and 3 set up the function that authentic religion will perform in a culture.

    Both these chapters end with mammoth problems; in Lonergan's viewpoint, religion (grace) is the only answer to these problems.

    Rahner refers to "the point of insertion of grace in human history."

3. These two chapters represent definite developments of Lonergan's thinking beyond *I*, and so he wants to present them at the very outset.

As time went on, Lonergan more and more referred to theology as praxis; cf., e.g., "The Ongoing Genesis of Methods" in A Third Collection, pp. 160-161: "It follows that, while empirical method moves, so to speak, from below upwards, praxis moves *from above downwards*. Empirical method moves from below upwards, from experience to understanding, and from understanding to factual judgment. It can do so because it can presuppose that the data of experience are intelligible and so are objects that straightforward understanding can master. But praxis acknowledges the end of the age of innocence. It *starts from the assumption that authenticity cannot be taken for granted*. Its understanding, accordingly, will follow a hermeneutic of suspicion as well as a hermeneutic of recovery. Its judgment will discern between product s of human authenticity and products of human unauthenticity. But the basic assumption, the twofold hermeneutic, the discernment between the authentic and the unauthentic set up a distinct method. This method is a *compound of theoretical and practical judgments of value*. The use of this method follows from a decision, a decision that is comparable to the claim of Blaise Pascal that the heart has reasons which reason does not know."

Note the insistence on the need for more than the movement form below upwards; in chapters 2 and 3 of *MT*, Lonergan is setting up the *need* for that method. Our creative making of the world through the intending of the good and the intending of meaning is insufficient; there is need for healing. Thus, he is setting up the problem that religion is meant to meet in human history.

The fundamental questions of Chapter Two are these: (a) What is authentic intending at the fourth level of consciousness? And (b) What is the objective of that intending (i.e., the objective of deliberation, evaluation, decision, action)?

a. What is the structure of the intend*ing*?
b. What is the structure of the intend*ed*?

This is analogous to the material of chapters 11 and 12 of *I*:

11 sets forth the intend*ing* at the cognitive level.

12 sets forth the intend*ed* at the cognitive level.

The objective of fourth level intentionality is THE HUMAN GOOD: authentic fourth level intending will intend the human good. The intend*ing* of that objective is the *notion of value*. Thus, consciousness-as-the-notion-of-value intends the human good.

The problem is complicated because the intend*ed* includes the intend*ing*. In other words, *part* of the human good (what I intend) is human authenticity (i.e., my own intend*ing*). The intend*ed* includes the development of the intend*ing*, so that I can be an originating value for others ("a source of beneficence

and benevolence"). Further, the state of the social-cultural milieu (which is intend*ed*) affects my intend*ing*; i.e., my familial and social experience has a profound impact on my development as a notion of value. I am involved in the unfolding of the culture.

A capsulization of what Lonergan means by the human good is found in *MT*, p. 52: "The human good then is at once individual and social. Individuals do not just *operate* to meet their *needs* but *cooperate* to meet one another's needs. As the community develops its institutions to facilitate cooperation, so individuals develop *skills* to fulfill the *roles* and perform the *tasks* set by the institutional framework. Though the roles are fulfilled and the tasks are performed that the needs be met, still all is done not blindly but knowingly, not necessarily but *freely*. The process is not merely the service of man; it is above all the making of man, his advance in authenticity, the fulfillment of his affectivity, and the direction of his work to the particular goods and a good of order that are worth while."

> Note that *authentic* institutions would facilitate cooperation; this indicates the *un*authenticity of many of our economic institutions.
>
> The institutional framework is the good of order. But such frameworks give rise to further questions as to whether or not they are truly worthwhile. The notion of value intends that process, *viz*., the process of creating institutional frameworks and then questioning their worthwhileness.
>
> > Lonergan was convinced that neither of the two dominant economic systems (late capitalism and state socialism) are truly worthwhile goods of order.

The process of our intending the human good includes a number of elements:

1. The development of *skills*:
    a. *Immediate* skills, such as sensory operations – many of which are developed in infancy (cf. Piaget).
    b. The skills through which the world is *mediated by meaning*, i.e., the development of intelligence and reasonableness.
        > The dramatic instance of this is Helen Keller, for whom the entrance into the world-mediated-by-meaning was sudden.
    c. *Reflexive* skills, by which we are able to gain some control over the mediation by meaning. These skills enable us to 'operate on our operations,' giving us some control over them.
        > Reflexive skills such as logic enable us to transcend 'myth' (in its pejorative sense); for example, it enables the advance of chemistry beyond alchemy. The classical instance of this is the leap forward in classical Greece, beginning with Socrates' questions as to what is truly meant by the words which mediate the world of meaning. The words were commonly used, and thus truly mediated meaning; but there was little control over that mediation. Thus, Socrates pushes forward to the reflexive skill of defining.
        >
        > > In his trinitarian theology, Lonergan argues that the definition of Nicea represents precisely such reflexive operations. The rule of Athanasius ("All that is said of the Father is also to be said of the Son, except that the Son is Son, and not Father."). This is an attempt to exercise control over the biblical mediation of meaning. (Cf. *The Way to Nicea*, pp. 47ff.)
        >
        > In "Dimensions of Meaning" (*Collection*), Lonergan argues that the Greek achievement of *theoretical* control is no longer adequate. The fundamental problem is that theory

can arrive at nothing more than hypothetical control; and if human intelligence can arrive at nothing more than the hypothetical, then the relativists are right. If our only control is hypothetical, then there is no absolute control – and this easily leads to nihilism, such as in deconstructionism (cf. Derrida). To achieve this greater control, it is necessary to more beyond theory to interiority.

The goal of this movement is to arrive at a development where one is able spontaneously to recognize authenticity and unauthenticity. The greater one's development of reflexive skills, the greater the probability of authenticity.

2. The Development of *Feelings*: (This represents a major development in Lonergan's own understanding of human reality; much is said in I about the positive development of feelings, but it is not highlighted as it is in *MT*. Now, he posits the good as the fulfillment of human affectivity.)

He makes a key distinction between intentional and non-intentional feelings:

Non-intentional feelings arise independently og being sparked by the apprehension of an object. E.g., I can feel hungry without seeing a meal; I can feel tired without thinking about my bed!

Intentional feelings arise from the apprehension of an object. That apprehension can be visual, auditory, etc.; it can be quite complex (e.g., certain theories 'thrill' some people and 'bore' others).

Intentional feelings are further distinguished between (1) intentional feelings that respond to objects-as-*satisfying*, and (ii) intentional feelings that respond to objects-as-*values*.

These may coincide, insofar as something of value is satisfying. But it may also be the case that there is conflict: I may have to do things for the sake of the good that are not satisfying.

The difference in response is *self-transcendence*; response to values carries us toward self-transcendence (which may itself be satisfying). That is, by responding to value I go beyond myself.

C.S. Lewis (in *The Screwtape Letters*) is very good on this; he emphasizes the need to focus on the objects as valuable. Screwtape (the devil) is continually trying to bring the focus back to the self (what is satisfying).

Moral Conversion is a shift in the criterion of one's decision from satisfaction to values.

The criterion of self-transcendence is the basis for Lonergan's construction of the scale of values; at each level there is a greater degree that we are 'called out of ourselves' with regard to the object:



> There is more called forth from me in contributing to the values of others (social) than there is in simply meeting my own vital values, and yet more in developing a mentality that is capable of criticizing the meanings and values that are operative (cultural), in trying to become an authentic person in everything that one does (personal), and then finally in the surrender to transcendent mystery (religious). At each level, there is a higher degree of freedom.
>
> Doran also argues that there are *reciprocal relations* from above and below between the levels of value. Thus, the problems set by the lower levels can be met only by higher levels. A theory of history can be developed from this perspective.
>
> > E.g., a maldistribution of vital goods can only be met by a reorganization of social structures; but that very reorganization demands cultural criticism, which demands personal authenticity, which is enabled by grace.

The development of affectivity is a matter of coming to respond spontaneously to values in this hierarchy; affective development is growth toward spontaneity which responds to an ordered hierarchy. We move toward the development of our feelings by taking cognizance of them and working on them – encouraging some and discouraging others (which is *not* repression, which is precisely failing to take cognizance of them).

> There are many depth-psychological techniques for working-on one's feelings; e.g., Jung's active imagination, where you embody the feeling in a symbolic figure and give it a name, and perhaps carry on a conversation with it. This is a way of working-out a 'negative feeling,' getting it out of my system.

The development of feeling sis a development toward a certain set of *affective habits* through which we respond spontaneously to the realm of values, somewhat at least in line with the hierarchy of values.

> In many of our dreams, the symbols which are produced are indications of what those habits are, or of some movement toward the transformation of those habits.

But besides the development of feelings, there is also the *aberration of feelings*; so, in all this Lonergan is setting up the contradictories of authenticity and unauthenticity. Here, Lonergan draws on Scheler's notion or *ressentiment*, as 'a hatred of what is good;' this relates to Kierkegaard's notion of 'the demonic' as 'dread of what is good.' This involves a cumulative deteriorization of the whole scale of values.

> *Ressentiment*: Rather than humble and joyful participation in the excellence of another human being, I hate that person because his/her excellence reveals my mediocrity.
>
> Recall Gregory Baum's story of a religious community "that seemed to take a fourth vow, of mediocrity!" He noticed how they were always cutting each other down, and criticizing anything that bordered on excellence.

We can develop or we can decline (cf. *MT*, pp. 38-39). Development moves towards the condition in which whatever one loves is a value and whatever one hates is evil; in this state there is a recovered innocence about one's spontaneity, and thus Augustine can say 'Love, and do what you will!' Decline moves toward the position where one comes to hate the truly good

and to love what is truly evil. Thus, Lonergan speaks of 'the monster that has stood forth in our day' – competing systems, both of which hate what is good; the person of integrity is hated in either system.

> Concerning, development, cf. MT, p. 39: "At the summit of the ascent from the initial infantile bundle of needs and clamors and gratifications, there are to be found the deep-set joy and solid peace, the power and the vigor, of being in love with God. In the measure that that summit is reached, then the supreme value is God, and other values are God's expression of his love in this world, in its aspirations, and in its goal. In the measure that one's love of God is complete, then values are whatever one loves, and evils are whatever one hates so that, in Augustine's phrase, if one loves God, one may do as one pleases, *Ama Deum et fac quod vis*. Then affectivity is of a single piece. Further developments only fill out previous achievement. Lapses from grace are rarer and more quickly amended."

Feelings are the *mass and momentum* of the whole process of intentional consciousness; we feel throughout the whole process, and we feel differently at different levels. I feel differently with insight than I felt before; I feel differently when I know that I have grasped the sufficiency of the evidence to pass judgment; and I feel quite differently when I am moving toward a decision and when I have made it.

> Human consciousness is both intentional/spiritual and psychic/affective: it is the spirit that raises questions, but the psyche that feels.

3. Structure of the Intend*ing*, i.e., of the movement toward the good:

The *apprehension* begins in feeling (and this is a major movement beyond anything found in I). It is in feeling that I first apprehend possible value.

> This is apparent in situations, e.g., in which I am faced with an existential problem and a course of action is suggested to me; my reaction to such a suggestion is affective, and it is in that feeling that I am apprehending possible value in the suggested course of action.

That feeling still needs to be examined, and so the subsequent process is one of *deliberation* on what I have apprehended as a possible value: "Is it truly good, or only apparently good?" The feeling is the apprehension of a *possible* value.

> Ordinarily, then, the feeling stands to the judgment of value as insight stands to the judgment of fact. In other words, as insight is a possible intelligibility, so the feeling is a possible value.
>
> Insight ⇨ Reflection ⇨ Judgment of fact
>
> Feeling ⇨ Deliberation ⇨ Judgment of value
>
> There are occasions, however, in which a feeling stands to judgment of value as the act of reflective insight stands to judgment of fact. In other words, sometimes in the feeling itself it is clear that there are no further questions for deliberation.
>
> Being a person of discernment is a matter of being able to recognize when the apprehension of value in feeling requires further deliberation and when the full demands of consciousness have been fulfilled in the feeling itself.

In the framework of the Ignatian *Spiritual Exercises*, there is a "first time of election" in which the apprehension of value is given clearly in the feeling; there are no further questions. In the "second time of election," we have to follow the affective inclination with questions for deliberation. The "third time of election" is made independently of this affective process, because one has to make a decision even though s/he is not 'inclined' one way or another.

One can speak of 'vulnerable' and 'invulnerable' apprehensions of value (as in I Lonergan spoke of 'vulnerable' and 'invulnerable' insights).

We are so constituted that we do not simply judge what is good; we are *moved* to the depth of our being by what is good.

In *I*, "being" and "the good" are still identical, because the good is the objective of the same levels of consciousness (experience, understanding, judgment) that intend being; i.e., "the good" is a further unpacking of our intention of what-is. In *MT*, there are identical in our desire – we *want* what-is to be what-is-good – but we can recognize that often what-is is not good, and this is what enables us to change the world. We can disapprove of what-is and approve what-is-not; this enables us to be dissatisfied with what-is and to change it.

It is important to acknowledge the *contexts* in which our judgments of value occur. Thus, individual judgments of value occur within certain contexts in our lives: Am I *developing*? Am I *collapsing*?

Growth and *collapse* are opposing contexts in our lives. And thus, Ignatius notes that God deals differently with people depending on whether they are going forward or backward.

Lonergan writes of the summit of growth in *MT*, p. 39, quoted above.

Various contexts of greater/lesser collapse are spelled out in *MT*, pp. 39-40: "Continuous growth seems to be rare. There are the deviations occasioned by neurotic need. There are the refusals to keep on taking the plunge from settled routines to an as yet unexperienced but richer mode of living. There are the mistaken endeavors to quiten an uneasy conscience by ignoring, belittling, denying, rejecting higher values. Preference scales become distorted. Feelings soured. Bias creeps into one's outlook, rationalization into one's morals, ideology into one's thought. So one may come to hate the truly good, and love the really evil. Nor is that calamity limited to individuals. It can happen to groups, to nations, to blocks of nations, to mankind. It can take different, opposed, belligerent forms to divide mankind and to menace civilization with destruction. Such is the monster that has stood forth in our day."

'*Vertical liberty'* is a movement from one horizon to another, whereas 'horizontal liberty' is movement within a given horizon. Thus, movement from a context-of-collapse to a context-of-growth requires an exercise of vertical liberty (which is what contemporary moral theologians mean by "fundamental option"). Thus, one example of vertical liberty is conversion.

Lonergan, of course, firmly rejects the Cartesian proposal of methodic doubt: "To take Descartes seriously would be to revert at least 300,000 years!" Far wiser is Newman's counsel to begin with universal credibility, and to then proceed to question what needs to be questioned and to eliminate what needs to be eliminated.

<u>STRUCTURE of the HUMAN GOOD</u>:

The key to the structure is the distinction of three levels: particular good
good of order
terminal value

Our desires head toward the satisfaction of our *needs*, and we have the *capacity to operate* toward that satisfaction in the attainment of *particular goods*. But I not only want supper tonight, I want it every night – and so does everyone else in the society – so society sets up schemes of recurrence for the sake of better meeting the needs of individuals in the society; it sets up an institutional framework that is meant to deliver in a positive fashion so that people have energy to do other things besides going out hunting every time they want to eat. This framework is the *good of order*: a set of schemes of recurrence (if x happens, y happens; if y happens, z happens, x happens, etc.). Then, *terminal values* are what make the difference between a good of order that is truly good and one that is not.

The other terms in the chart on p. 48 of *MT* are derived from the three-fold distinction of the good.

Individual		**Social**	**Ends**
Potentiality	*Actuation*		
Capacity, need	Operation	Cooperation	Particular good
Plasticity, perfectibility	Development, skill	Institution, role, task	Good of order
Liberty	Orientation, conversion	Personal relations	Terminal value

At the individual level, capacity/need/operation move toward the particular good; cooperation moves in a better way toward the particular good. That cooperation can develop into an institutional framework, which is more than simply intersubjective cooperation (e.g., economic, technological systems, polity); this is the good of order. But that is not the radical level of the good. There is always the question as to whether the 'good of order' is really good or not. We are so constituted as to not be satisfied without raising that question. Our freedom/liberty is what enables us to raise the question of the worthwhileness of the good of order. And that potential to intend terminal value is actuated in our effective orientation within the context of personal relations in community.

The question of the worthwhileness of the good of order asks whether it is truly meeting needs for vital and social values; but it also asks whether it respects the scale of values.

Doran is convinced that both state socialism and late capitalism have collapsed the scale of values into the vital and social levels. In neither is there real concern for cultural, personal, or religious values. There is a real question as to whether a good of order promotes culture, the authentic development of persons, and whether it grants religious freedom.

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The structure of the human good fits any technological, economic, political, cultural, religious development; the constituents of the human good presented in chapter two are invariant, in the sense that in any pursuit of the human good there is the distinction to be drawn between particular good, food of order, and terminal value. In any society, at any stage of development, there will be individual and social components with these ends on three levels; and that gives you the structure. The 'details' will depend on the various factors of development; but the basic structure is invariant.

Early in the chapter, he treats individual development and collapse; he concludes the chapter by discussing the components of *social* progress and decline.

> This theme of 'progress and decline' is a major theme throughout Lonergan's work, evident as early as his concern in the 1930s with economics and history. One could write an interpretation of his entire *ouvre* from the notions of progress and decline as the organizing factor.
>
> Social progress and decline is what provides the *context* for the pursuit by any person or group of individuals. Chapter 7 of *I* provides a fuller discussion of this notion of socio-cultural progress and decline.

The agents of progress are *authentic human subjects* (originating values; subjects being their true selves by observing the transcendental precepts). Thus, it is *sustained observance of the transcendental precepts* that will make for cumulative *progress* in history: persons who grasp the possibilities inherent in situations, and base their decisions on unbiased evaluation of short-term and long-term costs and benefits to themselves, their own group, and other groups.

> Human history would be pure progress if human beings were consistently authentic. But authenticity is never a secure possession; it is ever precarious, and ever a withdrawal from unauthenticity.

The opposite of authenticity is the source of *bias*; thus, the roots of decline are in bias, and *decline* is a function of bias. Bias, in general, is an *orientation against self-transcendence*.

> *Dramatic* bias (cf. *I*, 191-203); not explicitly treated in *MT*, but related to the "aberration of feelings," pp. 33-34): This is a matter of psychoneurosis; it is more an *inability* than mere unwillingness; it is psychic orientation against the emergence of insight, against the desire to pursue the truth, and against self-transcendence in love; it is a bias in our *sensitive spontaneities*. This is the sort of thing that the depth psychologists are talking about, and thus chapter six of I can be read as Lonergan's sustained dialogue with Freud. Much of our inability to transcend ourselves has a psychogenic origin.
>
> *Individual* bias, 'egoism" (cf. *I*, 218-222): This is the bias of the person who is very intelligent in pursuing *his/her own advantage*, but neglects/rejects the question as to whether what is to one's own advantage is also to the advantage of others; it's 'looking out for number one!'
>
> *Group* bias (cf. *I*, 222-225): This results in the *powerful groups bringing influence to bear to influence social institutions to their own advantage* and to the exclusion of others; this sets up the stratification of rich and poor, and the ongoing process of 'the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer.' In this regard, Doran is convinced that chapter seven of *I* is a sustained dialogue with Marx.
>
> *General* bias (cf. *I*, 225-242): This is a reluctance to face questions of *long-range* consequences, questions that demand theoretical answers, questions that regard *ultimate* issues. This bias afflicts us all and, Lonergan contends, was largely overlooked by Marx. This is the *major source of decline in human history.* For example, Lonergan argues that the key thing needed for righting imbalance of rich/poor is development of adequate economic theory; without this, all efforts will be patchwork. Interestingly, Marx *did* this in his actual performance, but did not allow for it in his theory.

Lonergan gives meaning to "*alienation*" and "*ideology*" deriving from his position:

The basic form of *alienation* is our neglect of the orientations that propel us to self-transcendence; all other forms of alienation derive from this radical alienation from what is best in ourselves

The basic form of *ideology* is any rationalization of this neglect of transcendental precepts/orientations.

The *function of religion* in a society in which sin is responsible for decline is to overcome evil through 'the law of the cross' (cf. *De Verbo Incarnato*, thesis 17): the overcoming of evil through the power of self-sacrificing love. Authentic religion is the power of love that enables love to absorb the effects of evil and transform those effects into a greater good, by returning good for evil.

MT, p. 55: "A religion that promotes self-transcendence to the point, not merely of justice, but of self-sacrificing love, will have a redemptive role in human society inasmuch as such love can undo the mischief of decline and restore the cumulative process of progress."

The gift of charity enables this self-transcending love which is the only way to overcome decline and restore progress.

Cf. "Healing and Creating in History," *A Third Collection*, p. 106: "But there is also development from above downwards. There is the transformation of falling in love: the domestic love of the family; the human love of one's tribe, one's city, one's country, mankind; the divine love that orientates man in his cosmos and expresses itself in his worship. Where hatred sees only evil, love reveals values. At once it commands commitment and joyfully carries it out, no matter what the sacrifice involved. Where hatred reinforces bias, love dissolves it, whether it be the bias of unconscious motivation, the bias of individual or group egoism, or the bias of omnicompetent, short-sighted common sense. Where hatred plods around in ever narrower vicious circles, love breaks the bonds of psychological and social determinisms with the conviction of faith and the power of hope."

Cf. Eric Voegelin on the "mission of the servant" which goes on until everyone is in the cycle of love (*Israel and Revelation*). The promotion of authenticity never ceases.

We are born into a society more or less characterized by progress or decline. We are influenced by that, that sets the situations for us. Yet that dominance is relative, and it is through a 'creative minority' of people who authentically size up the situation and take responsibility for it – and only through that – that decline can be offset and progress established.

Chapter THREE: *Meaning*

Lonergan does not give a definition of meaning, but assembles its features. The context for the discussion of meaning was set up by chapter two on the human good; the context for discussing meaning is the pursuit of the human good. Among the most significant factors in the development of the human good is the development of meaning. Meaning is what distinguishes human *history* from nature, and thus what distinguished the human pursuit of the human good from the laws of nature. *Meaning constitutes human history*.

Both 'history' and 'nature' are under the laws of emergent probability. [For the general notion of emergent probability, cf. *I*, 123-128, 171-172; regarding nature, 130-134; regarding history,

209-211, 227.] In human history, the significant probabilities are the probabilities of insight, judgment, decision; these are the probabilities that determine the course of human history.

> Meaning is being, when being is known. Human history is constituted by the history of meaning. What is going forward in human being is the emergent probability of meaning.

A religion that is mediated with culture will have to take a position on the meanings and values that are operative in a given culture. Thus, theology will have to address all the aspects of meaning in mediating religion and culture.

Chapter three (like chapter two) concludes with a statement about the situation which theology addresses, i.e., with a consideration of the problem of contemporary meaning; this is the problem of achieving an adequately differentiated consciousness, and the problem of addressing effectively undifferentiated consciousness. Note the power of contemporary communications media to do this and to sway people without their knowing it.

> *MT*, p. 99: "Never has the need to speak effectively to undifferentiated consciousness been greater."











<u>*Carriers* of *Meaning*</u> (sections 1-6 of chapter 3):

Intersubjectivity, art, and symbol are carriers of '*elemental*' meaning (i.e., prior to conceptualization). This term ("elemental") did not occur in I (though the notion is at least implicitly there); the first explicit use of the term comes in his lectures on the philosophy of education (1959).

> Our experience (first level of consciousness) is hardly ever just pure experience. Our first level consciousness (experience) is *patterned* by the interests, anticipations, orientations of our intelligent, reasonable, responsible, loving, desiring consciousness. At this *preconceptual* level, there are already many elements of the experience of *meaning* (as elemental).
>
> > For an example of relatively pure, unpatterned experience, recall times of coming down stairs expecting one more stair that in fact is not there! Or heart spasms that break in as pure experience.

Intersubjectivity is a vital, functional, connection already operative from the beginning, prior to the emergence of any question – thus, prior to any 'conversation.' There is a "prior we" in which we are all involved from the very beginning of our lives. From the beginning, we are in an intersubjective *bonding*

at the very level of our primordial, spontaneous vitality. We are *in* this vital, intersubjective communication with each other at all times.

> Intersubjectivity is very important in I; but Lonergan goes beyond I here to insist that in intersubjectivity itself there is a *communication of meaning*: our intersubjective responses communicate meaning. This isn't just a matter of communicating feeling; it's a communication of preconceptual meaning. This elemental meaning is a *determinant of the situation*; it is not merely a determinant of how I feel about the situation, but is a determinant of what the situation *is*.
>
> > Thus, 'body language' is expression of elemental meaning. Even 'gaps' in a telephone conversation communicate meaning.
>
> Doran sees Jürgen Habermas' distinction of 'interaction' and 'labor' as paralleling Lonergan's dialectic of intersubjectivity and common sense. Habermas' notion of "systematically distorted communication" is concerned with the instrumentalization of existence in modern society. Lonergan's notion of vital intersubjectivity is important precisely as non-instrumentalized living.

Concerning *art*, Lonergan relies heavily on Susanne Langer (especially *Feeling and Form*). His fullest treatment of this question is found in the tenth lecture on the philosophy of education.

> With Northrop Frye, he does posit a 'centripetal' character to art – i.e., withdrawal from social life. However, Lonergan posits a subsequent 'return' to that life enriched by the exploration done in withdrawal. Doran does not see this notion of 'return' in Frye.
>
> Linguistic expression can be 'artistic.' Thus, 'literary expression is written-out-of and speaks-to the imaginative/sensitive dimensions of the human being; as such, it is elemental meaning (as artistic).

What Lonergan says about *symbol* here connects with the treatment of feelings in chapter two:

> > *Values* are apprehended in *feelings*;
> >
> > *Symbol* as image that evokes or is evoked by *feeling*.
>
> Thus, feeling can be seen as the 'middle term' between symbol/image and value. To 'get at' feelings and articulate them linguistically is not easy; it is much easier to 'et at' feelings through the image associated with them. (This is a key insistence of John Dunne.) Further, identification of feelings-through-image can then help in the identification/articulation of the values apprehended in the symbolized feelings.
>
> This is the whole power of the dream and the psychoanalytic process.
>
> Lonergan found the work of existential psychiatrists (e.g., Binswanger) very helpful. Their distinction between "dreams of the night" and "dreams of the morning" enables discussion of dream as the "dawn" rather than the "twilight" of consciousness.

$$\frac{\text{waking of consciousness}}{\text{dream of the morning}}$$

$$\frac{\text{dream of the night}}{\text{dreamless sleep}}$$

> Whereas the 'dream of the night' relates downward to biological vitality, the 'dream of the morning' relates upward to intentional consciousness. And given the fact that the 'censor' is relatively relaxed in the dream, it is possible for elemental meaning to be

quite clear (symbolically) in the dream. Many times in our dreams, images are offered that can give us insight into our feelings, and thus into our orientation to the realm of value. Dream-symbols can be spontaneous expressions of how-it-is with us, since we aren't exercising control over such symbolic expression. The dream can reflect both the tensions and the harmony that may be present in a human psyche.

> *I*, p. 457: "The unconscious neural basis is a upwardly directed dynamism seeking fuller realization, first, on the proximate sensitive level and, secondly, beyond its limitations on higher artistic, dramatic, philosophic, cultural, and religious levels. Hence it is that insight into dream symbols and associated images and affects reveals to the psychologist a grasp of the anticipations and virtualities of higher activities immanent in the underlying unconscious manifold."
>
> *MT, p. 69*: "There is the existential approach that thinks of the dream, not as the twilight of life, but as its dawn, the beginning of the transition from impersonal existence to presence in the world, to constitution of one's self in one's world."

We can understand our affective development by coming to some kind of understanding of our images.

Lonergan's treatment of symbol takes into account most of what has been said in the modern scene about the structure of symbol by people such as Eliade, Jung, Ricoeur. Note, e.g., the parallel of Ricoeur's insistence on the polyvalence of the symbolic with what Lonergan says on page 66 of *MT*: "Symbols obey the laws not of logic but of image and feeling. For the logical class the symbol uses a representative figure. For univocity it substitutes a *wealth of multiple meanings*. It does not prove but it overwhelms with a manifold of images that converge in meaning. It does not bow to the principle of excluded middle but admits the *coincidentia oppositorum*, of love and hate, or courage and fear, and so on. It does not negate but overcomes what it rejects by heaping up all that is opposite to it. It does not move on some single track or on some single level, but condenses into a bizarre unity all its present concerns. The symbol, then, has the power of recognizing and expressing what logical discourse4 abhors: the existence of internal tensions, incompatibilities, conflicts, struggles, destructions."

> In this regard, linguistic meanings (as literary language) can have elemental resonances. This relates, e.g., to the question of 'inclusive' language. The significance of this is often minimized by referring to the fact that "man" means all humanity; while this *may* be accurate at the conceptual level, it fails to recognize the elemental dimensions of that that term *means* symbolically. Further, Doran argues that there is 'archetypal' significance to classic works. Thus, to refer to something as 'Cartesian' communicates far more than purely conceptual meaning; but there is also some kind of elemental significance – Descartes is some king of archetype, with some kind of affective, elemental resonance. There is an archetypal significance to Heidegger, Lonergan, and so on. We keep coming back to the classic because we continue to learn from what the classic has to say, because there is a superabundance of meaning that is not exhausted by the conceptual. Conceptualization is used as an avenue for further exploration of the superabundant elemental meaning.

Linguistic meaning is the greatest liberation of meaning because of the suppleness/flexibility of language that is not present in the materials at the elemental level. Thus, there is a much more limited flexibility in body movements, vocal modulation, etc. Also, language can help us to focus in a way that purely

elemental expressions of meaning do not. E.g., there can be an ambiguity in a smile; you can talk about that in a conversation which can focus attention on the question as to what was truly meant by that smile (presupposing the honesty of the conversation).

He makes a three-fold distinction of language: technical
literary
ordinary

Literary language is something of a combination of elemental meaning and conceptualization.

Incarnate meaning is the fullest of the carriers: the meaning of the person, of someone's way of life.

Cf. Father Crowe's homily at Lonergan's funeral: "More and more, as I discover in neverending study of his writings, as I reflect on his manner of life, especially in these recent years, more and more, it seems to me, it was this realization that guided him as he moved from the noontide of life to its evening. I think of a line that in its simple profundity speaks volumes to me, as I think it will to you. Writing of the good choices and actions that make us what we are, he calls them 'the work of the free and responsible agent producing the first and only edition of himself.'

"The 'first and only edition of himself '' that is a book I and each one of us must write alone as we go through life, producing day by day a new paragraph, to achieve the first and only edition of myself. . . There is only one person who can toil throughout life, who must toil throughout life, under God's grace, of course, to accomplish the work given me at birth to do, and, turning it over to God at the end, say, with my Lord and Master. It is finished."

The meaning of a person's way of life is intersubjective, artistic, symbolic, linguistic – all at once.

The words and deeds of a person, fictional character, or group embody a full, rich spectrum of meaning. "The Word become flesh" is incarnate meaning.

But, note *MT*, p. 73: "As meaning can be incarnate, so too can the meaningless, the vacant, the empty, the vapid, the insipid, the dull."

<u>*Elements* of *Meaning*</u>:

Meaning is the central feature that differentiates human process from all other processes in the world.

- *Sources*: any *intentional act or content* can be a source of meaning.

Transcendentally considered, the sources of meaning lie in the unfolding of the human spirit through the levels of consciousness:

Love
Decision
Judgment
Understanding
Experience

Human consciousness itself is the radical source of meaning as constitutive of human existence and history. Meaning as constitutive of history emerges from the attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and loving capacities of human beings.

But those transcendental sources are always made categorical: we are always asking questions about something. The determinations reached through transcendental intending are always determinations of something.

- *Acts* of Meaning:

Potential/*elemental*: Those acts where there is not yet a distinction between 'meaning' and 'meant,' i.e., between 'act' and 'content.'

Lonergan recalls Aristotle's dictum that "the sensible-in-act is sense-in-act; the intelligible-in-act." At the level of sensation and understanding, there is an identity of content and act, of 'meant' and 'meaning.' He argues that naïve realism in scholasticism has not grasped the meaning of this axiom. In the first two levels of consciousness there is an identity of act and content; the distinction of content/meant and act/meaning comes with the emergence of the concept for the sake of judgment. Judgment is the answer to the question, '*Is* what I have understood true/real/independent-of-me?' With that question and its answer there comes a distinction between intelligible-in-act and intelligence-in-act, between content and act, between 'meant' and 'meaning.'

Thus, potential acts of meaning are all acts of meaning prior to the concept.

Formal: Acts of meaning in conceptualization. The distinction between 'meaning' and 'meant' begins to be made.

Full: Acts of meaning in judgment where one determines the status of the 'meant' as identical-with or distinct-from the act.

Constitutive/Effective: These acts emerge with judgments of value in which we become co-creators with God of the world, agents of praxis.

Constitutive: Acts of meaning through which a social group is what it is; acts of meaning which inform social institutions with direction, orientation, sense of purpose, etc.

Effective: Judgments of value, decisions, commands, acts of persuasion.

Instrumental/*Communicative*: External expressions of acts of meaning (elemental as well as Linguistic.

- *Terms* of Meaning:

Concerning *full* terms of meaning, note *MT*, p. 75: "[An] affirmation is rational because it proceeds from an act of reflective understanding in which is grasped the virtually unconditioned, that is, a conditioned whose conditions are fulfilled."

Lonergan's notion of judgment (elaborated in chapters nine and ten of *I*) sets up the whole distinction of empiricism/idealism/realism.

Realism: Being is what is known in true judgments, and true judgments follow upon experience and understanding.

Empiricism: The real is known by sense experience, and whatever cannot be known by sense experience is 'unreal.'

Idealism: Human knowledge is more than sense experience (i.e., admitting the contribution of understanding), but will not acknowledge that being is the objective of

human understanding. Thus, my understanding does not 'get at' what-is-real; knowledge is pure mental construction.

MT, p. 76: "To transpose to the empiricist position, one disregards the virtually unconditioned and identifies the real with what is exhibited in ostensive gestures. What is a dog? Well, here you are, take a look. To move from empiricism to idealism, one draws attention to the empiricist's failure to note all the structuring elements that are constitutive of human knowing yet not given to sense. However, while the idealist is correct in rejecting the empiricist's account of human knowledge, he is mistaken in accepting the empiricist notion of reality and so in concluding that the object of human knowledge is not the real but the ideal. Accordingly, to move beyond idealism to realism, one has to discover that man's intellectual and rational operations involve a transcendence of the operating subject, that the real is what we come to know through a grasp of a certain type of virtually unconditioned."

Note that no statement 'means' the same thing to a realist, to an empiricist, and to an idealist.

Functions of *Meaning*: The role that meaning plays in human history.

Cognitive: (E.g., Helen Keller). At the point of entering into the world mediated by meaning, we move into this far more expansive world than the world of immediacy; meaning-as-cognitive opens us upon the past, future, possible, probable, imaginal, fantastic, etc. Openness to this world is made possible by acts of understanding and judgment.

Effective: What we make we first intend in acts of meaning; and without that intending the process of making would not occur. Marx, e.g., insisted that the human being is different from other species in being able to work out for themselves quite clearly and concretely what they want to make (*homo faber*). In many ways, these acts of meaning perform the function in us that instinct does in lower animals; this meaning, however, involves a far more elaborate capacity.

Constitutive: Meaning as intrinsic component of social institutions and cultures.

Communicative: Through communication, meaning becomes common and historical.

From the constitutive and communicative functions, Lonergan derives the three notions of history, existence, and community.

Community (cf. chapter seven of *I*, especially pp. 214-218): Real community is an *achievement of common meaning* – and for that there have to be common experiences (or at least the ability to enter into the experiences of the others in the group), attempts at least at common (or at least complementary) understandings, and judgments, and there has to be the effort to realize common values in decisions.

Communities break up and shatter because somewhere along the line of experiences, understandings, judgments, and values, there has become a sharp conflict over what is real or what is good – or perhaps the inability to enter into each other's experiences.

Thus, in attempting to build cross-cultural community, it is essential to be able to enter into each other's experiences without having actually undergone those experiences. (In this sense, John Dunne speaks of "passing over" to the experience and horizon of the other.)

Existence is used by Lonergan here in its 'existentialist' sense: authentic human living.

The authentic human being emerges within the community, and it is only against the background of the community's meanings and values that the person can emerge. It is only in this context that the human person decides what s/he is going to make of her-/himself. This is the importance of *tradition* in the community: it provides the context for the emergence of persons, whose lives then further shape that tradition.

This raises the question of *authenticity*. Recall Kierkegaard's question: Am I an authentic Christian? This question involves the horror of realizing that it is possible to be authentically embodying the inauthenticity of the tradition. The tradition which forms the context for my ongoing decision as to what I am to make of myself may, somewhere along the line, have become distorted; in that case, my life may well be a matter of authentically realizing inauthenticity. With that realization, the existential moment becomes crucial – i.e., the moment of finding out for myself that it is up to myself to decide what I am to make of myself.

Major authenticity: the authenticity of the tradition itself.

Minor authenticity: my self-realization within the tradition.

The decision for major authenticity is first of all a decision for one's own authenticity, but it flows over into a decision to transform the tradition (as it did with Kierkegaard).

History: Meaning is the very fabric of human history; history is a matter of the development and decline of meaning as a constitutive factor of the very fabric of human living.

God has entered human history through revelation and the incarnation of Jesus to take a part in our mediation and constitution of the world by meaning. Theology is to mediate that religious meaning with the developing/declining meanings of the cultural matrix. Thus, theology is a praxis, transforming the constitutive meanings of culture.

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<u>*MT*, pp. 80-81</u>: "*History* differs radically from nature. Nature unfolds in accord with law. But the shape and form of human knowledge, work, social organization, cultural achievement, communication, community, personal development, are *involved in meaning*. Meaning has its invariant structures and elements but the *contents* in the structures are *subject to cumulative development and cumulative decline*. So it is that man stands outside the rest of nature, that he is a historical being, that *each man shapes his own life* but does so only *in interaction with the traditions of the communities* in which he happens to have been born and, in turn, these traditions themselves are but the deposit left him by the lives of his predecessors."

Note the correspondence -- meaning : human : : law : nature

MT, p. 81: "*Meaning enters into the very fabric of human living*."

The theme of authenticity is gradually emerging as key.

<u>*Realms* and *Stages* of Meaning in Terms of *Exigences of Consciousness*</u>:

The sections on the 'realms' and 'stages' of meaning deal with the *variable content* of meaning in the course of history; we are concerned with some way of controlling our understanding of that variable content. We are moving toward some kind of adequate heuristic framework/structure for understanding the cumulative development and decline of meaning in history.

History is radically a process of the development and decline of meaning, and the correlative development and decline of the human good. It is through meaning's constitutive function in society that the human good develops or declines. And so theology is a praxis, in that it is transformative of meaning; through its *transformation of meaning* it is transformative of the process of development/decline in history.

In "Theology in its New Context," *A Second Collection*, Lonergan writes (p. 62): "A divine revelation is God's entry and his taking part in man's making of man. It is God's claim to have a say in the aims and purposes, the direction and development of human lives, human societies, human cultures, human history."

Theology is mediating God's claim to have that say in the meanings and values constitutive of a given way of life. For Christianity, the *Logos*-become-flesh is the *incarnate meaning of God*. Thus, it is Christian theology's objective to mediate the incarnate meaning of God with other meanings in the cumulative and progressive history of meaning. Through that mediation, the cumulative and progressive history of meaning is transformed.

Doran understands *MT* as 'a theological metaphysics of meaning and value."

There are different *exigences* (demands, requirements) in human consciousness that give rise to different modes of conscious intending and different realms of the intended; in the course of history, they unfold in various stages.

The *systematic* exigence promotes consciousness from common sense (first stage/realm) to theory (second stage/realm). [Lonergan acknowledges that he is relying mainly on the Western tradition here, though the systematic exigence has certainly spread far beyond the West – witness the work of Chinese nuclear physicists.]

This exigence was manifest particularly during the "axial period" (Karl Jaspers, *The Origin and Goal of History*) of about 800 to 200 BCE (Greek philosophers, prophets of Israel, the Buddha in India, and Confucious and Lao Tse in China). In all those instances – in one way or another – there is a *movement out of mythic consciousness and magic to realism.*

In the West, that movement takes the form of system, theory, and philosophy; but this Western movement is part of a global development. You have, e.g., Socrates' questions in the early dialogues of Plato – questions demanding universal definition; this exemplifies the movement from ordinary language (common sense) to technical language (theory).

This is a movement *from knowledge of things-in-relation-to-us to a knowledge of things-in-their-relations-to-one-another*. That is the basic movement of common sense to theory.

From description to explanation.

Today, we can recognize that both forms of knowledge are valid; but the question extended for over 2,000 years as to whether it might not be the case that one is valid and the other is not. We can affirm them both as valid forms of knowledge but in different realms of meaning.

This is the problem of Eddington's "two tables:" *MT*, p. 84: "Troubled consciousness emerges when an Eddington contrasts his two tables: the bulky, solid, colored desk at which he worked, and the manifold of colorless 'wavicles'

so minute that the desk was mostly empty space." Those are both valid ways of knowing the desk, but each in a different realm of meaning; the desk remains one thing (or one set of 'things'), known in two different realms. The *context* of theory is different from the context of common sense.

There is a bewildering departure from a familiar world when one moves from common sense into theory. It was so bewildering and strange that it led to the death of Socrates! He had goaded people out of the familiar world in which they lived.

Thus, Plato and Aristotle represent a dividing line in the history of Western civilization, in that with them meaning migrates into a new realm. With them, there is no longer just the everyday realm, but also the realm of theory.

And modern scientists have pushed the systematic/theoretical exigence radically farther, in the intricate correlations of physics, chemistry, and biology.

Despite that development, and despite the fact that this realm has been 'open' for 2,500 years – we have still not come very far in the realm of theory. We don't yet really know 'what' an 'electron' is, or even what a 'water molecule' is or what a 'tree' is in this realm of meaning. And yet we do know enough that this realm has become an extraordinarily powerful factor in human living – to the point where we are faced with ecological crises and the threat of nuclear annihilation.

The necessity of remembering how ignorant we really are is a constant theme in Philip McShane's writings: "*authentic nescience*" as opposed to pride.

Today, this realm is global.

The second stage of meaning emerges with theory and includes "*troubled consciousness*," which wonders about the relationship between common sense and theory. "Is common sense just primitive ignorance?" Or, on the other hand, "is science purely pragmatic and not really genuine knowledge at all?"

Consciousness in the second stage of meaning has 'straddled' these two realms, and it has been troubled by this question of relating common sense and theory. It is important for us as 'Westerners' to realize how long consciousness has been epistemologically troubled in the West. In *I*, Lonergan refers to the period of "problematic metaphysics."

Troubled consciousness extends from the time of Plato saying that there were two real worlds, distinct, and independent from each other: the transcendent world of eternal forms, and the transient world of appearances. It extends all the way down to the reductionistic consequences that are still present in a lot of science (though not in much contemporary physics). Note, e.g., Galileo's primary and secondary qualities.

Troubled consciousness gives rise to another exigence.

The critical exigence promotes one into the realm of *interiority*. This is the third stage of meaning, where meaning becomes controlled by one's appropriation of his/her own conscious activities and states.

In the Western world, this movement is articulated in the *turn to the subject* in modern philosophy.

Kant articulates the movement in the question as to the criteria of genuine knowing: "What are the conditions of the possibility of genuine knowing?" This question is an attempt to remove the 'epistemological trouble.'

But Lonergan insists that the Kantian question is not radical enough; before asking the question of the conditions of the possibility for valid knowing, you have to ask the question of praxis: "What am I *doing* when I am knowing?"

There follow the epistemological question (Why is that or is that not valid knowing?) and the metaphysical question (What do I know when I do that?).

He argues that if you proceed in this way you will arrive at the conclusion that both are valid ways of knowing, but ways that proceed in different ways. The same levels of consciousness – experience, understanding, and judgment – go forward in both common sense and theory; but common sense understands things in relation to me, and theory understands things in their relations to one another.

Common sense is needed for one whole set of problems, and theory is needed for another set of problems: 'You don't cross the street in the theoretical pattern of experience!'

MT, p. 83: "With these questions one turns from the outer realms of common sense and theory to the appropriation of one's own interiority, one's subjectivity, one's operations, their structure, their norms, their potentialities. Such appropriation, in its technical expression, resembles theory. But in itself it is a heightening of intentional consciousness, an attending not merely to objects but also to the intending subject and his acts. And as this heightened consciousness constitutes the evidence for one's account of knowledge, such an account by the proximity of the evidence differs from all other expression."

In the third stage of meaning, meaning becomes controlled by one's appropriation of his/her own interiority. In the second stage, the control of meaning is through theory. Meaning could be controlled with theory when, with Aristotle, theory claimed to grasp the necessary and universal. But modern science does not know what is necessary; it understands what in fact is the case. It is just an ever better approximation, with no claim to have achieved any definitive grasp of truth. [Thus, however improbable, it is theoretically possible that Galileo's law of falling bodies will be superceded.] Because of this, theory becomes problematic as the ultimate foundation or control of meaning. Thus, Lonergan is attempting to achieve a foundation beyond theory – precisely in the turn to interiority.

The *methodical* exigence promotes the *return* from interiority to the worlds of common sense and theory. One does not withdraw to interiority for its own sake; Lonergan is not simply a "Sufi 5" reconstructing the world in thought! His real interest is in reconstructing the world in the concrete.

The methodical exigence is the return of the self-appropriated subject to critique common sense (*I*, chapters 6-7) and to integrate the sciences and their methods (*I*, chapters 14-17).

This represents Lonergan's *return* to make his contribution to the reconstitution of the human world.

In the third stage of meaning, *theology* will be done from the basis of interiorly differentiated consciousness. But the exigences that a contemporary theology will meet are not only these cognitive exigences of common sense and theory and how they are related to one another; rather, through theology's transformation of meaning, theology will meet the problem of the human good. That is, it will take as its ulterior objective the transformation of the human good.

It may have a proximate objective in the theoretical/cognitional realm, but ultimately it aims at socio-cultural transformation.

MT, p. 99: "[Science] is a principle of action, and so it overflows into applied science, engineering, technology, industrialism. It is an acknowledged source of wealth and power, and the power is not merely material. It is the power of the mass media to write for, speak to, be seen by all men. It is the power of an educational system to fashion the nation's youth in the image of the wise man or in the image of a fool, in the image of a free man or in the image prescribed for the Peoples' Democracies."

"In the third stage, then, meaning nor merely differentiates into the realms of common sense, theory, and interiority, but also acquires the universal immediacy of the mass media and the moulding power of universal education. Never has adequately differentiated consciousness been more difficult to achieve. Never has the need to speak effectively to undifferentiated consciousness been greater."

The whole theological enterprise ends in the functional specialty *communications*, which attempts to bring the fruit of the theological mediation to bear on the transformation of the human good. That is where theology becomes praxis I the fullest sense.

The *transcendent* exigence and its satisfaction in religious experience are global realities in human existence.

Human consciousness is *unrestricted* in its demand for intelligibility, for the unconditioned, and for the good. And it can find basic fulfillment, peace, and joy only by some satisfaction of that unrestricted demand for intelligibility, truth, and the good.

MT, p. 83: "So it is that man can reach basic fulfilment, peace, joy, only by moving beyond the realms of common sense, theory, and interiority and *into the realm in which God is known and loved*."

In Christian theological terms, this is the natural desire for the vision of god (Aquinas). It is Augustine's insistence that "the heart is restless until it rests in God." This exigence is universal, not restricted to Christianity, nor is its satisfaction so restricted. An inchoate, initial fulfillment of that transcendent exigence is offered to every person of every time and place. 'Grace is offered to all.'

Chapter FOUR: *Religion*

If it is true to say that there is a transcendent exigence for *unrestricted* intelligibility, *unconditioned* truth, and *unqualified* goodness, then our questioning is always implicitly a *question of God*. If we reflect on those tendencies we can make that implicit questioning explicit. That reflection is philosophy of God. It is in this way that Lonergan accounts for the major forms taken by the explicit question of God in the history of philosophy:

1. Is there a ground for the *intelligibility* of the universe? By asking questions, we presume that the universe in intelligible; philosophically, it is possible to investigate that presumption to see whether it is accurate or not. Could the universe be intelligible without an intelligent ground?
2. We can reflect on our demand for the *unconditioned*. We can find that at times we do in fact grasp the virtually unconditioned; bout would that be possible if there were not a formally unconditioned ground of the universe? Does it make sense to say that

everything-that-is simply 'happens' to have its conditions fulfilled; or is there a reality that necessarily/formally has its conditions fulfilled (i.e., one whose essence = existence)?

3. Questioning our *moral* questioning: Does it make any sense to deliberate about what is good? Is the universe on our side? Are we the only instances of morality in the universe? Does there or does there not exist a primary instance of moral consciousness so that cosmogenesis, biological evolution and historical process are not ultimately indifferent/alien to us but rather are the products of the choice of a moral consciousness?

Thus, the first section of chapter four is further reflection on the transcendent exigence. Cf. also *Philosophy of God and Theology* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1973.)

For Lonergan, the basic meaning of religion is the fulfillment of our unrestricted stretching-forward, our unrestricted intending. It is not the kind of fulfillment that would understand everything-about-everything or that possesses unqualified goodness in its every aspect; those fulfillments are eschatological. Rather, he means the fulfillment that is the *habitual actuation of our capacity for self-transcendence*. We become self-transcendent as a way-of-life when we fall in love; and to the extent that our love is unrestricted, self-transcendence becomes being in love with God.

An unrestricted falling in love, without conditions or qualifications, will be the habitual actuation of our capacity for self-transcendence.

There is a dynamic state of falling in love with God that is the basic fulfillment of our unrestricted intentionality. It can be heightened, deepened, and enriched – but never surpassed.

It is a gift offered to all, even if they do not use that kind of language to talk about it. Lonergan's language is obviously Christian, but the reality is not just Christian. There is offered to all this habitual state of being in love with the ground and unsurpassable limit of all-that-is. That is religion. There is an experience within the reach of all because offered to all.

God is the Ultimate Limit in the process of 'going beyond,' i.e., in the process of self-transcendence; we can fall in love with that Ultimate Limit, and c an abide in that dynamic state of being in love. For Lonergan, that is the basic and radical meaning of "religion."

MT, p. 105: "Being in love with God is the basic fulfilment of our conscious intentionality. That fulfilment brings a deep-set joy that can remain despite humiliation, failure, privation, pain, betrayal, desertion. That fulfilment brings a radical peace, the peace that the world cannot give. That fulfilment bears fruit in a love of one's neighbor that strives mightily to bring about the kingdom of God on this earth. On the other hand, the absence of that fulfilment opens the way to the trivialization of human life in the pursuit of fun, to the harshness of human life arising from the ruthless exercise of power, to despair about human welfare springing from the conviction that the universe is absurd."

We do not reach that dynamic state by our own knowledge and choice, i.e., 'from below upwards.' Rather, it is a gift offered to us 'from above downwards,' and penetrates our consciousness.

Judgment
Understanding

Experience

It begins by transforming our world of values and our vision of reality – it 'opens our eyes' to the worthwhileness of what we were not able to apprehend or value before.

However, Lonergan did not explicitly specify the 'operators' of this downward movement (as he had specified the questions that 'operate' from below). But it does penetrate consciousness from above downwards first of all transforming our vision of values, and then influencing our knowledge of what-is through beliefs, our understanding of the world through those beliefs, and penetrating our sensitivity by releasing religious symbols, and by bringing the peace and harmony that religious love can bring.

For the penetration of this experience-as-gift even to the physiological level, note the experiences of saints – e.g., visions, bodily experiences, etc.

MT, p. 106: "It dismantles and abolishes the horizon in which our knowing and choosing went on and it sets up a new horizon in which the love of God will transvalue our values and the eyes of that love will transform our knowing."

It establishes us in a conscious dynamic state of love, joy, peace, that manifests itself in acts of kindness, goodness, fidelity, gentleness, and self-control.

[Note that in both Lonergan's lists of the gifts of the spirit, he omits patience!]

This experience can be *conscious without being known*. It is a true experience of fourth level consciousness (deliberation, decision, judgments of value, action) – but it need not be explicitly, thematically known. And as experienced, this gift is not confined to any one religious tradition; thus, note the common areas between religious traditions taken from Heiler (*MT*, p. 109).

When one begins to articulate the question as to what is the nature of this experience, there arises the fourth form of the question of God. Thus, *MT*, p. 116: "The experienced fulfilment of that thrust in its unrestrictedness may be objectified as a clouded revelation of absolute intelligence and intelligibility, absolute truth and reality, absolute goodness and holiness. With that objectification there recurs the question of God in a new form. For *now it is primarily a question of decision. Will I love him in return, or will I refuse? Will I live out the gift of his love, or will I hold back, turn away, withdraw?"*

Note, e.g., that Einstein would have no problem with this language of "a clouded revelation of absolute intelligence and intelligibility."

Religious development is *dialectical* at any stage; it is never a secure achievement, but always involves withdrawal from unauthenticity.

The WORD:

Religion is an instance of meaning, and thus has its carriers (intersubjectivity, art, symbol, language, persons). This section ('6. The Word') relates chapter four to chapters two and three.

> Thus, *MT*, p. 112: "By its word, religion enters the world mediated by meaning and regulated by value. It endows that world with its deepest meanings and its highest value. It sets itself in a context of other meanings and other values. Within that context it comes to understand itself, to relate itself to the object of ultimate concern, to draw on the power of ultimate concern to pursue the objectives of proximate concern all the more fairly and all the more efficaciously."

The 'word' of religion is both *inner* and *outer*. As inner word, it is not a word that we speak, but that God speaks: it is the prior Word of love that God speaks in our hearts in the world of *immediacy*. This is what is meant by saying that it can be experienced without being known; it is not yet mediated by any cultural superstructure.

> But religion also unfolds in the outer word; this is how it enters the world *mediated* by meaning. That outer word is important; it plays a constitutive role, e.g., in two human persons being in love.
>
> > *MT*, pp. 112-113: "When a man and a woman love each other but do not avow their love, they are not yet in love. Their very silence means that their love has not reached the point of self-surrender and self-donation. It is the love that each freely and fully *reveals* to the other that brings about the radically new situation of being in love and that begins the unfolding of its life-long implications."
> >
> > Thus, the outer word is a constitutive element of the love situation. Religiously, e.g., it is a constitutive element of any community which shares an articulation of religious experience.
> >
> > There is a drive toward articulation in the experience of the inner word. Note that even if it is not expressed linguistically, it will be expressed incarnately in the life of the person.
>
> The word is developed as historical and social; it moves – like every other word – through stages of meaning. And theology has contributed to that development of the word, by bringing it into a theoretical stage of meaning; today, it must bring it into the stage of meaning established by interiority. Its meaning is outwardly expressed, and has to find its place in the context of other meanings.
>
> > Thus, the word moves-through and speaks-to the realms of common sense, theory, and interiority. Its expression must not remain confined simply to common sense; as consciousness becomes differentiated, there is need for an understanding that is more than common sense understanding.

The gift grounds *Faith*, which is the knowledge born of religious love. As there is a knowledge born of love between two human beings, so there is a knowledge born of God's love. Pascal: *Le Coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connait pas.*

Elements of this knowledge will be common to various religious traditions, because faith is present in various religious traditions:

- A clouded revelation of absolute intelligence and intelligibility, truth and reality, goodness and holiness.

- A transvaluation of values, placing all other values in the light and shadow of transcendent value.

  MT, p. 116: "In the shadow, for transcendent value is supreme and incomparable. In the light, for transcendent value links itself to all other values to transform, magnify, glorify them. Without faith the originating value is man and the terminal value is the human good man brings about. But in the light of faith, originating value is divine light and love, while terminal value is the whole universe. So the human good becomes absorbed in an all-encompassing good."

  Thus, this related to chapter two, and to theology's mediation of religion and culture. "Where before an account of the human good related men to one another and to nature, now human concern reaches beyond man's world to God and to God's world. Men meet not only to be together and to settle human affairs but also to worship. Human development is not only in skills and virtues but also in holiness. The power of God's love brings forth a new energy and efficacy in all goodness, and the limit of human expectation ceases to be the grave."

- There is a new vision of creation: God as self-transcending and the world as the fruit of God's self-transcendence.
- There is a redemptive function; i.e., faith is redemptive of history, because "faith has the power of undoing decline" (*MT*, p. 117).

These characteristics are not specific to any tradition, but are common to all realizations of religious love.

BELIEFS:

But in addition to faith, there are beliefs that are *specific* to given traditions. The basis of these beliefs is faith, but the beliefs are further *judgments of fact and value* made by different religious communities in history. These beliefs are what the community would call its *doctrines*. [Lonergan will later distinguish 'dogmas' as doctrines which the community holds to be permanent and unrevisable.]

Buch beliefs/doctrines are of various kinds: imperative
narrative
ascetical/mystical

theoretical

MT, p. 119: "There is a personal entrance of God himself into history, a communication of God to his people, the advent of God's word into the world of religious expression. Such was the religion of Israel. Such has been Christianity. Then not only the inner word that is God's gift of his love but also the outer word of the religious tradition comes from God."

Charles Davis, e.g., criticizes Lonergan for here positing the superiority/exclusivism of Christianity.

Lonergan is certainly insisting that some *outer* words may be *God's* words. But Doran raises the question of the possibility that there may well be outer words from God in other traditions.

And in a situation of dialogue, one would certainly have the right to articulate one's own process of coming to the belief in God's gift of outer words to his/her own tradition and to ask for the judgment of the authenticity of that process of coming to belief.

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Methodological Positions emerging from chapters two through four:

[For previous 'positions, cf. p. 17 above.]

7. The cultural matrix between which and religion a theology mediates is an elaborate *context of questions and answers that regard the concrete pursuit of the human good*, where the good is to be understood as some specific [historical] realization of the invariant structure discussed in Chapter Two.

By 'context' is meant a limited nest of questions and answers.

8. The specific realization constituting the context of the cultural matrix entails some *combination of the realms and stages of meaning*, which differentiate and integrate the invariant structures of meaning discussed on pp. 57-81 of *MT*.

Thus, at any time, the concrete pursuit of the human good will be within the context of some combination of the realms and stages of meaning. In our time, this goes beyond common sense and the artistic/religious differentiations, to include scholarship, science, and perhaps interiority, as well.

The realms/stages of meaning *differentiate* the invariant structures in the sense that one age differs from another depending on the realms/stages of meaning that have been achieved in a given cultural matrix.

The realms/stages of meaning *integrate* those invariant structures in that each age/culture has its own integration of the realms and stages of meaning.

9. Always operative within such a context, by virtue of the transcendent exigence, are certain forms of the *question of God*, and by virtue of the gift of *grace*, some *expressions* of the religious experience in which the transcendent exigence finds an inchoate fulfillment.

Within any cultural context, in some form or other – because of the transcendent exigence – there are operative certain forms of the question of God, the experience of grace, and the expression of that experience in some form or other.

10. Theology is thus to mediate between the word of religion and the context of other questions and answers regarding the good.

11. A *contemporary* theology is to ground its mediation, not in common sense or theory, but in interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness, and so is to be a mediation in the "third stage of meaning."

Remember that 'stages of meaning' are ideal constructs.

Lonergan clearly asserts that the Gospel contains no imp0erative for all to achieve differentiation of consciousness. However, effective preaching of the Gospel in our time does demand that there be some who do achieve that differentiation. In this sense, theology is a true ministry. Today, we can't simply preach to fourth century Antioch, or even to nineteenth century Europe; as a matter of fact, they weren't preaching to nineteenth century Europe in the nineteenth century which is precisely why they lost a great percentage of the Church!

12. Authentic Christianity is not the sole expression of genuine religious meaning and value. On many points it presents a common front with other religious traditions. *Interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness will discover and affirm these common areas*.

William Johnston notes that Christian dialogue with Zen monks involves movement into interiorly and religious differentiated consciousness, sharing that basic experience, and finding what they do have in common.

13. But Christianity need/[must] not surrender a claim to *distinctness*. Its distinctness lies in the explicit beliefs that would claim that certain dimensions of its outer word represent not only a human objectification of religious experience, but *God's personal entrance into history* in Israelite and Christian revelation.

There is some dimension of the outer word of Christianity (though not necessarily its precise formulation) that represents God's personal entrance into history – and is not simply objectification of human religious experience.

14. This, of course, is a *doctrine* (sixth functional specialty), and so reflects not a methodological but a *theological* position. (Doran: Nor does it foreclose the possibility of personal divine revelation and specific divine meaning in other traditions.)

Doran thinks that Lonergan was moving toward recognition of possible such 'personal entrances of God into history' in other religious traditions in "Prolegomena to the Study of the Emerging Religious Consciousness of Our Time," *A Third Collection*.

15. The primary point to the distinction of *faith* (common) and *belief* (specific) is not polemical but ecumenical: all religious with a basis in religious experience have a unity deeper than their differing beliefs, and from this basis can collaborate in mediating religious meaning and value with the contemporary global context constituting our cultural matrix. This basis also enables an open dialogue concerning the points of belief on which the religions may differ.

There is an emerging world consciousness, which is our cultural context.

16. Implicit in the position is the contention that Christian theologians must be prepared *to ground their specific beliefs in the same religiously and interiorly differentiated consciousness* that enables the dialogue of world religions. *No doctrines are self-grounding*. (Doran: Thus a personal revelation of God specific to Christianity must be correlated with a unique differentiation of consciousness which is, as it were, its human side. This specific differentiation will entail a *disclosive precision* on the "always already" gift of divine love, and especially on the its *redemptive* function [see p. 117]. Christian revelation is correlated, then, with what we will call a soteriological differentiation of consciousness.)

The theologian must be prepared to say that 'it is on these *bases in Christian experience* that I will affirm a doctrine with regard to Christianity.' Those bases will have to be articulated in foundations. Here, the theologian will have to articulate what is disclosed in the 'the Christian fact' in the mode of interiorly/religiously differentiated consciousness in order to ground that doctrine.

If there is a specific revelation that is unique to Christianity, the theologian maintaining that is going to have to point to a specific differentiation of consciousness as the human side of that revelation. You never have revelation without someone to whom it has been revealed! And there has to be something that occurs on the side of the recipient that is the human side of the

revelation, which must be articulated as ground for the doctrine that there is a specific divine entrance into history in Christianity.

Doran would bring to inter-religious dialogue the hypothesis that there is a soteriological disclosure in Christianity (in the cross and resurrection) that is characterized by a unique *clarity*; this clear disclosure sums up whatever soteriological significance may be achieved in the consciousness of other religious traditions – and sums it up with a clarity that may not be present in the other traditions. That hypothesis would need to be tested in the dialogue, because I may in fact find that there is clarity with regard to that dimension in other traditions as well.

The initial hypothesis is that redemptive grace is universally present, but its disclosure comes to privileged clarity in the word of and about Jesus of Nazareth. This is to posit a soteriological differentiation of consciousness.

Lonergan also posits personal divine revelation in Israel; this would relate to what the early-Voegelin saw in the Suffering Servant of Israel, as a unique disclosure in Israel.

There is no *a priori* limit to the number of differentiations of consciousness that are possible

Chapter FIVE: *Functional Specialties*

From 1953-1965, Lonergan was vexed with the problem of the relationship between 'positive' and 'systematic' theology: how to posit the validity of both enterprises and to understand how they are integrated.

This chapter presents the differentiated structure of theological mediation: *a series of interdependent sets of recurrent and related operations cumulatively heading toward an ideal goal*. That goal is the theological understanding of meaning in human history.

This can be understood as a 'system,' but only if understood as a system that never ceases; it is a method that goes forward in an ever further mediation of religion and culture.

Hegel is a major dialogue partner of Lonergan, lurking in the background of Lonergan's notion of mediation in history (chapter 17 of *I*). For Lonergan, the mediation of the totality of meaning in history remains an ideal goal that keeps theological intelligence alive by keeping the questions coming. There is a certain sense in which Hegel would maintain that the mediation of totality can be reached in a system. Thus, Hegel is the end of 'system' as control og meaning; it is the most ambitious attempt to make system the control of meaning. It is a brilliant attempt, but very quickly broke down in the face of Kierkegaard and Marx. There are concrete events in the lives of persons and historical societies that simply are not accounted for in the system. Thus, it is with Hegel that we have switched definitively to the need for another control. Lonergan's approach is different from this Hegelian ambition for total system.

Note Sebastian Moore's Lonergan-influenced article, "Unity, Continuity, and the Church: The 'Infallible' Temptation," Commonweal (October 10, 1986): He argues that Catholicism contributes universal unity not as an already-achieved reality but as an always to-be-sought reality. He notes that this has profound implications for understanding the papacy.

Lonergan's approach is also distinct from any division of theology into 'positive' and 'systematic' theology; those categories are simply too compact. It was Lonergan's wrestling with the compactness of those categories that led him to functional specialties.

Positive theology is what he refers to as field specialization, in which you divide and further subdivide the data – so that you end up with more and more people knowing more and more about less and less.

Systematic theology is what he refers to as subject specialization; systematic theologians were the ones who 'put the results of positive theology together.' But positive theologians would object that the results presented were often not really based in the data, especially since there are new data continually being uncovered.

If you've ever seen 'positive' and 'systematic' theologians together on a faculty, you know the difficulty of getting them together.

Theology is the *ongoing*, *cumulative*, *process from data to results*; the functional specialties are distinct moments in the process. It is an ongoing process that never ends; and the important thing is to understand what you are doing in the process. What contribution are you making at this time in this work, in this process from data to results?

The *data* can be any and all embodiments of meaning and value ever found in history. The *results* consist in a unified vision of what is presently known, and the communication of that vision to various mentalities, classes, needs, groups, etc. The *steps* are stages in an ongoing process that will never end until all have the vision of God; these steps are interdependent, insofar as each one is understood only in its relationships to the others – "functional interdependence."

Thus, this is an explanatory (rather than a descriptive) notion.

Each specialty is itself a set of related and recurrent operations, but with a distinct *goal*. Thus, one engages all the operations of each of the four levels of consciousness in research; but the goal of research is the objective proper to experience: data.

Note that reference is to special*ties*, not special*ists*.

1. *RESEARCH*: Making the relevant data available.

   Research can be special (e.g., What did 'x' say about 'y'?), or general (e.g., archaeological excavation of cities).

   Doran notes that he is presently working in the archives of the Lonergan Research Institute. He remarks: "If you've seen Lonergan's handwriting, you know that making the relevant data available isn't easy!"

   E.g., he has come across a handwritten set of notes in which Lonergan has written "We preach perpetual revolution, not in the Trotskyite sense, but in. . . " (there follow three words that Doran hasn't been able to decipher)!

2. *INTERPRETATION*: The data for theology are carriers of meaning and thus need to be understood/ interpreted.

   This understanding means *understanding what other human beings meant*. Interpretation is a set of procedures that grasps what another human being or group of human beings meant in their own historical, social, cultural context – and that is not an easy task.

   The meaning is encoded somehow in the data; interpretation must grasp that meaning and express it in a way that will communicate it to one's contemporaries. Thus, even in preaching we don't just repeat the words; we have to express it in a way that will embody the meaning for

one's own contemporaries. That expression can be simple, reflective, or scientific (cf. *I*, chapter 17, on canons of interpretation).

The hermeneutical task is complicated today by problems in cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics.

3. *HISTORY*: Concerned with the going-forward of meaning.

   Meaning is subject to cumulative *development and decline*; it is always in process; it always occurs in some ongoing context.

   History (in theology) is concerned with the going-forward of meaning; not just with when and where did who do what! But with human movements – specific movements – cultural, institutional, doctrinal movements.

   Basic history: who did what, where, when, with what success?

   Special history: particular cultural/institutional/doctrinal movements. Doctrinal history concerns the formal and full acts and terms of meaning of Christian theologians in their own cultural and institutional contexts.

   General history: The ideal goal is the reconstruction of all the movements of human history.

   Thus, in theology, the primary concern is with what was going forward in the history of the church – but not in abstraction from general history.

   The epistemology of history presented here was not done in *I*.

   History is also quite involved in the problems of cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics.

   The movements in history are involved in conflicts; and the accounts of historians are also in conflict. 'Historians go to conventions and call each other names!'

4. DIALECTIC: Deals with *conflict*; its objective is to sort out conflicts in a way that is 'ecumenical' – i.e., in order to get beyond the conflicts, by determining which ones are truly irreconcilable/irreducible and which are not, and also by determining which ones we can 'live with.'

   Many viewpoints are expressed in the course of history and in contemporary scholarship/ theology; dialectic deals with the diversity, the oppositions, the relations of these many viewpoints.

   The ideal goal of dialectic is a *comprehensive viewpoint* that would understand why any other viewpoint could ever arise. In *I*, he called this the "universal viewpoint." It is a *potential* totality of viewpoints.

   > The attempt is to penetrate beneath the differences, to arrive at some kind of understanding of why any viewpoint would ever arise. Which differences are irreconcilable/irreducible? And among those that are irreconcilable, which ones can we live with and which ones can we not live with?

   MT, p. 130: "By dialectic, then, is understood a generalized apologetic conducted in an ecumenical spirit, aiming ultimately at a comprehensive viewpoint, and proceeding towards that goal by acknowledging differences, seeking their grounds real and apparent, and eliminating superfluous oppositions."

This is a new theological specialty; not many of us have really engaged in dialectic as understood here. We do what McShane calls 'random dialectic;' but dialectic in this comprehensive, methodical sense has hardly 'gotten off the ground.'

It is evident that Lonergan believed that there are a lot of superfluous oppositions in theology today.

The real grounds of serious, irreducible differences come to light in dialectic as consisting in contradictory, mutually exclusive orientations with regard to religion, fundamental moral option, and cognitional theory. Later, he will speak of this in terms of the presence or absence of religious, moral, and intellectual conversion. These are the differences that should really concern us.

> This pulls us beyond confessional differences, to a transcendental base. Dialectic tries to get people to reach beneath their more superficial differences to fundamental issues.
>
> E.g., differences in discussing miracles will often lie in some underlying intellectual presupposition (such as nineteenth century mechanist determinism).

5. *FOUNDATIONS*: Each theologian says shat s/he thinks with regard to these fundamental issues.

It is in foundations that I objectify what I think it is to be religiously/morally/intellectually converted. In foundations, I present my position with regard to conversion; this will be a detailed, systematic, explanatory position. (RD: "Not just a lot of poetry – which is fine, but it isn't what he means by foundations!") This is a matter of a detailed position in interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness, as to what constitutes the converted person.

Also in foundations, you ground and derive the *categories* that you will use in your own statement of what you hold to be the truth. Doran is convinced that you don't derive categories in some sort of vacuum; rather, categories are derived in the context of problems that arise in doctrines, systematics, and communications.

> E.g., if I am trying to write a systematic theology of sin, I am faced with the question, "How am I going to talk about it?" Then I go back to foundations, and derive the categories in ongoing interchange with the tradition, with other people.

The categories are valid to the extent that they are grounded in the transcendental realities of religious, moral, and intellectual conversion. The closer the categories are to the basic terms and relations of consciousness, the greater permanence they will have.

It is important to note that the conversion doesn't take place in theology! It occurs in the dramatic pattern of experience; it is a religious, not a theological event. But it is objectified in theological language. And it is the objectification of conversion that enables a theologian to stand on her/his own and to say what s/he will say in terms of what is true and how s/he will understand that.

> One will be able to stand on one's own in relation to a communal and historical tradition, and say "I hold 'this'."

6. *DOCTRINES*: Statements of the theologian's own judgments of fact and value.

Any judgments of fact and value in theology are made within and because of one's horizon – and one's horizon is radically a matter of where one stands on the three issues of religious, moral and intellectual authenticity. You can, in fact, trace what anyone says with regard to what s/he holds

to that person's horizon, and ground the person's statements of fact or value in her/his horizon and push it back to that foundational question.

Anyone's doctrines – correct or incorrect – are a function of the person's horizon. Thus, foundations will be the horizon of the doctrinal statements.

"Church doctrines" are studied in history; the doctrines meant here are *my* positions. I might accept Church doctrines; but I am stating them now because I hold them.

In the second phase of theology, I am in *direct* discourse; when I say what the Church holds, I am in indirect discourse.

7. *SYSTEMATICS*: Attempts to meet the questions that arise as to how doctrines are integrated.

   These are questions for understanding. It is the promotion of the systematic meaning of Christian truth.

8. *COMMUNICATIONS*: Theology returns to the concrete mediations with other sciences, with people of different cultures/classes, and a mediation through the diverse media of communication.

   But that doesn't end the process; it just keeps it going. Communications provides further data for more theology to go forward. As the message is communicated, the *ongoing self-constitution of the* church continues. Communications provides more data for interpretation, history, etc.

Lonergan argues that theology – structured by these eight specialties – operates in *two phases*. This is not something new; rather, theology has always operated in these phases. What Lonergan is proposing is a clarity and control over that operating.

Dialectic	Foundations
History	Doctrines
Interpretation	Systematics
Research	Communications

MT, p. 133: "If one is to harken to the word, one must also bear witness to it. If one engages in *lectio divina*, there comes to mind quaestiones. If one assimilates tradition, one learns that one should pass it on. If one *encounters the past*, one also has to *take one's stand toward the future*. In brief, there is a theology *in oratione obliqua* that tells what Paul and John, Augustine and Aquinas, and anyone else had to say about God and the economy of salvation. But there is also a theology *in oratione recta* in which the theologian, enlightened by the past, confronts the problems of his own day."

Thus, there have always been these two different movements.

Also, there are four distinct levels of conscious/intentional operations: experience, understanding, judgment, decision. Each level has its own proper achievement and its own proper end.

First phase:

- 1. apprehension of data;
- 2. insight into it;
- 3. ongoing development of it;
- 4. the conflicts that come to light.

Second phase:

- 4. the values of where one really stands;

- 3. truths in the context of that stance;
- 2. understanding of those truths;
- 1. communication of that to everyday experience.

MT, p. 134: "The ends proper to particular levels. . . become the objective sought by the operations on all four levels. . . Functional specializations arise, then, inasmuch as one operates on all four levels to achieve the end proper to some particular level."

> For example, in research one operates on all four levels of consciousness; the researcher has to make a lot of decisions. But the objective of research is that proper to the first level: data. You use all the levels of consciousness to achieve the objective of one level; in research, that objective is making the data available.

Why *this* division?

> First of all, there are different tasks and we have to distinguish them; we have to prevent them from being confused. One of the great confusions today, e.g., is that some people think that everything is hermeneutics. Doran's judgment is that Tracy reduces systematics to interpretation (of classics).
>
> Secondly, these distinct tasks do exist when theology reaches a certain stage of development. His derivation of functions is not simply a priori – 'there are two phases and four levels of consciousness, and two times four gives you eight!' Rather, it is a fact that distinct tasks do exist in our age; there are in fact these eight ends in theology. A key question to be asking myself as I read the book is 'Does this account for all the objectives of theology or doesn't it?'
>
> Thirdly, there is a need to curb one-sided totalitarian ambitions.
>
> > *MT*, p. 137: "The man with the blind-spot is fond of concluding that his specialty is to be pursued because of its excellence and the other seven are to be derided because by themselves they are insufficient. From such one-sidedness theology has suffered gravely from the middle ages to the present day. Only a well-reasoned total view can guard against its continuance in the present and its recurrence in the future."
> >
> > Doran recalls, e.g., being in a theology department whose chairperson thought that, in fact, theology consisted solely in research, interpretation, and history!
>
> Fourthly, there is need to resist excessive demands on oneself or on others.
>
> > *MT*, p. 137: "A serious contribution to one of the eight is as much as can be demanded of a single piece of work."
> >
> > > A key thing is to state clearly what you are doing, and to be aware of what remains to be done.

Doran interprets Lonergan to be arguing that there have been two major differentiations in the history of theology:

a. The differentiation of *theology from religion*.

> At first, there was no clear differentiation of the two. But through the ages, theology came to be distinct from ordinary, everyday Christian living.
>
> *MT*, p. 138: "So initially the Christian religion and Christian theology were not distinguished. Tradition was assimilated. Efforts were made to penetrate its meaning and recast it for apostolic or apologetic ends. Not all were happy. Innovators formed

schools that splintered off in various directions and by their very separation and diversity emphasized a main, unchanging tradition. The main tradition itself was confronted with ever deeper issues. Painfully it learnt from Nicea the necessity of going beyond scriptural language to formulate what was considered scriptural truth. Painfully it learnt from Chalcedon the necessity of employing terms in senses unknown both to scripture and to the earlier patristic tradition. But it is in reflection on such developments, as in Byzantine Scholasticism, and in the extension of such reflective consideration to the whole of Christian thought, as in medieval Scholasticism, that theology became an academic subject, at once intimately connected with the Christian religion and manifestly distinct from it."

This is *die Wendung zur Idee* of Georg Simmel ('the shift toward system'). Cf. *MT*, p. 139.

Theology completed this shift toward system (which it had been undergoing for 1200 years) in the Middle Ages. Elsewhere (especially in *Grace and Freedom*), Lonergan points to the theorem of a supernatural entitative order (Philip the Chancellor, 1230) as the final element needed for theology to become fully systematic.

This is the differentiation of theory from common sense within Christianity.

b. *Historical consciousness* has emerged in the modern period as a distinct problem.

Thus Aquinas, e.g., wrote his commentaries on Scripture (and on Lombard's *Sentences*) but they did/could not follow critical, historical method.

The problem of critical history and hermeneutics have raised the crucial question of whether there is any bridge from the first phase of theology to the second. Is there any way, e.g., of moving from Scripture to Systematics? What is the relationship between them?

Thus, the second major differentiation is attempting to come to grips with the problems raised by historical methods. This is the basic problem Lonergan was wrestling with that resulted in his proposal of functional specialization.

This is a differentiation of an interrelated set of tasks that we perform in the light of historical consciousness that will enable an integrated unity of the historical and systematic dimensions of the enterprise.

<u>30 October 1986</u>

<u>*Interdependence* among the Functional Specialties</u>

The differentiation of theology from religion (over the course of 1200 years) moved to systematic theology, reaching its first major achievement in Aquinas. But this could not have been achieved without Philip the Chancellor's development of the theorem of the supernatural. (Imagine an administrator coming up with an idea that changes a whole discipline!) This is the differentiation in Christian theology of theory from common sense.

Soon after this differentiation, there occurred the major cultural shift toward *modernity* that arrived with modern science and historical scholarship. These are the developments that gradually forced the major differentiation resultant from attempting to treat the problem that arises from historical scholarship: how to relate history and system; how to relate the findings of history to the systematic exigence in theology. This is a problem that has plagued any modern theologian.

> The problem arises in such questions as, "What use can you make of Scripture in making your own theological statements?" The manualist tradition simply quoted Scripture as 'proof texts.' Now the question has to regard the use of Scripture once we have historical, hermeneutical methods which are able to discover things about the Scriptures that we didn't know before.
>
> It is the problem of 'bridging' the phases of theology: the phase which studies the past, and the phase which stands in the present and speaks toward the future.

With this development of historical consciousness, there have *de facto* emerged quite differentiated sets of operations that Lonergan has explicitly differentiated into research/interpretation/history/

Dialectic in that first phase. The rise of historical consciousness over the centuries has led to these operations going on; Lonergan is attempting to thematize some way in which they are *distinct* from each other and some way in which they are *related* to each other. As he articulates in chapter five, there is an *interdependence* among the functional specialties in the first phase.

> Interpretation obviously depends on research: you are going to have to have a critical text if you are going to determine what an author meant. History obviously depends on research and interpretation. And the questions of dialectic arise out of those three. But there is a *reciprocal* dependence. Thus, to do research you must have some idea of what the document meant; e.g., you might need some help from interpreters in helping to decide what the critical text might have been. Also, the more history you know, the more liable you are to properly interpret a text out of a given period. And the more you have already sorted out the various fundamental options (dialectic), the more likely you are to do history and interpretation with some expertise.
>
> The same thing is true in phase two. But whereas in phase one you are moving from a multiplicity (of data) to a unified view that comes down to the question of basic options – i.e., to a hermeneutical unity in interpretation, a narrative unity in history, and then a dialectical unity – in phase two, you move to *ever more determinate contexts* in your statements of what you hold to be true, culminating in the concreteness of communications (which involves particular statements addressed to particular audiences at particular places and times). Foundations states a general horizon; doctrines specifies that horizon with truth that makes sense within that horizon; systematics articulates that truth in an intelligible fashion; communications is speaking what one holds to be true to a particular audience. But also in phase two there is a dependence in the other direction. Questions can arise for systematics out of communications; systematic terms can be used as you formulate your doctrines; and there will be some doctrinal positions used in one's expression of foundations.

The major question is that of the relationship between the two phases. Obviously the second phase depends on the first; the more I know what others have said and why, the better I can state my position. We start today with an entire tradition behind us, and we speak out of that tradition. We are in what Gadamer calls a *Wirkungsgeschichte*, an 'effective history' that has patterned our own horizon. But the big question is whether one can allow his/her own positions (second phase) to influence what s/he does in the first phase.

> *MT*, p. 143: "The greatest care must be taken that this influence from the second phase does not destroy either the proper openness of the first phase to all relevant data or its proper function of reaching its results by an appeal to the data. . . A second phase which interferes with the proper functioning of the first, by that very fact is cutting itself off from its own proper source and ground and blocking the way to its own vital development."

Prior, e.g., to *Divino Afflante Spiritu*, scripture scholars were told what they could find from the standpoint of doctrines.

But while the greatest care must be taken that second phase positions do not destroy the autonomy and integrity of first phase operations, there is some functional interdependence.

E.g., you can't write the history of a doctrine unless you know what the doctrine is; you can't write the history of mathematics unless you know what mathematics is. If you don't know the matter, you'll have an uncanny flair for picking out the most inessential things and overlooking the essential. The other obvious interrelationship is between foundations and dialectic; when I get to sorting out what I hold to be authentic in dialectic, I am obviously being influenced by my foundational positions with regard to conversion.

The whole method hinges on authenticity and how to appeal to it; thus, dialectic/foundations are the pivot of the method. Thus, note how important it was that the fourth level of consciousness became disengaged from the third in Lonergan's thought between *I* and *MT*. The question of authenticity cannot be escaped – in the human sciences as well as in theology: "The age of innocence is over."

Chapter SIX: *Research*

[The METHODOLOGICAL POSITIONS given here follow upon those of the previous lecture; cf. pp. 43-44 above.]

Lonergan has very little to say about research here, though in a later letter he did write that he 'could have said more.' Part of the reason for saying this little is that you discover the methods of research only in the self-correcting process of learning; it is a 'practical' discovery. The best way to become a researcher is to study under someone who has just spent a long time 'in the field.' The only way, e.g., to learn archaeology is to start doing archaeology; it's a matter of the practical, hit-and-miss self-correcting process of learning.

17. The data relevant to theological research can be divided into sources pertinent to *general* categories and sources pertinent to *special* categories.

This is Doran's interpretation of Lonergan's distinction between Christian/Catholic studies and human/religious studies (cf. *MT*, pp. 149-150).

There are two kinds of data:

a. That proper to a given 'denomination;' this is relevant to the derivation of special categories, those proper to theology.

b. Sources proper to the derivation of general categories are the concern of communications – in which theology enters into dialogue with the other sciences.

18. Christian theologians differ on the data relevant to special categories – *sola scriptura*, scripture and tradition, tradition to a certain date, tradition forever. The answer to such a question emerges in doctrines, but one may state where one is in collaboration with others; the differences will emerge and their grounds be uncovered.

The question at this point becomes that of determining the data relevant to the derivation of special categories. Christians are divided with regard to this: Is it Scripture along? Scripture and tradition up to a certain point? Or tradition forever? The last is obviously Lonergan's option. But his advice is to 'start where you are!' From that starting point, if you remain in dialogue with

others your differences will get out into the open eventually. Then, suggestions can be made as to how those differences can be resolved.

This parallels what Lonergan says in *I* with regard to metaphysics: 'start where you are!'

19. Some grounds of difference will be eliminated by further research, interpretation, and history. Some are a function of cultural differences and varying differentiations of consciousness, and can be bridged by the appropriate transpositions. Some, finally, are a function of the presence or absence of religious, moral, and intellectual conversion, and will be elucidated in Dialectic and foundations.

The differences have various grounds; some of them will be eliminated simply by doing further research, interpretation, and history. Some differences result from cultural variations or different differentiations of consciousness; these can be bridged as people work-with and learn-from each other. But some differences are a function of the presence/absence of conversion, and dialectic will enable those differences to come out into the open.

The key thing is to keep working, and you'll find out what the grounds of the differences are. Don't get stopped at the level of research in collaboration; keep working and keep talking.

Chapter SEVEN: *Interpretation*

Interpretation grasps *what was meant* by the person or community responsible for the data that research has made available; it is a matter of grasping the data in its own historical context, in terms of the level of thought/expression, sources of meaning in the writer, the writer's circumstances and intention.

Distinguish between 'learning' and 'interpretation.' You go to some books (a) primarily to 'learn;' you go to others (b) primarily to understand what another person/community meant.

a. Learning about objects;

b. Learning what another person thought about objects (i.e., the 'intention' of the other).

Interpretation primarily wants to get at, not the object itself, but the meaning of the author intending the object.

20. The more a text is written in a commonsense mode different from one's own, the more it is embodied in a linguistic carrier that includes intersubjective, artistic, and symbolic embodiments, and the more it performs not only the cognitive and communicative functions of meaning but also the effective and especially constitutive functions, the more acute becomes the problem of interpreting it.

E.g., you have to learn geometry in order to understand Euclid's *Elements*; but once you do learn geometry, there is little problem interpreting Euclid. If you are in the systematic world of the author, you will have little problem interpreting her/him. This is because there is something about systematic meaning that is univocal and clear – once you are in the systematic horizon.

If you aren't in that horizon, however, the task of interpretation remains highly problematic. Thus, unless one knows higher mathematics, s/he will have a hard time interpreting this statement from a book entitled Functional Analysis: "In order that the closed symmetric transformation 's' be maximal, it is necessary and sufficient that one or the other of its deficiency indices be equal to 0." !!!

If my mathematical learning was extensive, the meaning of that statement would be clear. But no matter how extensive my religious learning, the task of interpreting Paul, John, Luke, etc., goes on. No matter how extensive one's literar5y learning, the task of interpreting Joyce's *Wake* continues. The less systematic the text, the more the problem of interpretation emerges.

21. In general, the more a text entails the *constitutive* function, the more the task of understanding it involves a foundational stance on the part of the interpreter.

The more the 'object' includes the *subject* – calling me-the-reader into question, whether systematically or not – the greater becomes the problem of interpretation.

Hegel, e.g., is a highly systematic thinker; but there are real problems in interpreting Hegel because his thought calls the reader into a whole world-constitutive stance, and puts before her/him the question as to whether s/he will accept that stance or not. So, it is not just the text of Hegel that one is interpreting but the whole world-in-front-of that text.

There are real conflicts between interpreters of Jung; this is due to the fact that reading Jung involves the question of the self-constitution of the reader. It is a matter of entering into the horizon of another where self-constitution becomes an issue. For example, some Jungians reject Doran's interpretation of Jung on 'good and evil;' this results, not from muddled thinking/expression on Jung's part, but from the self-constitution of the reader that gets into play.

To understand some texts you have to undergo a conversion first. Interpreting such texts raises foundational questions.

22. Other problems that can and do emerge in interpretation – especially foundational issues, the question of the truth of what the author meant, and the application of the meaning of the text to contemporary living – are treated in distinct functional specialties.

One of the benefits of Lonergan's clarification over that of Gadamer is the emergence of Dialectic and Foundations, which enables critique of possible inauthenticity in the tradition. Habermas criticizes Gadamer for being unable to deal with such a need for criticism. Lonergan insists that the task of interpretation raises questions that can only be met in dialectic and foundations.

Doran argues that virtually everything Gadamer treats of in *Truth and Method* is treated by Lonergan; but Lonergan insists that it is not all a matter of hermeneutics/ interpretation. Thus, e.g., Gadamer highlights the importance of "application" to contemporary living; Lonergan also emphasizes this, but insists that it is the proper task of communications, not interpretation.

23. There are three sets of basic exegetical operations: (a) understanding the text [sections 2-5; positions 24-33]; (b) judging the correctness of one's understanding of the text [sections 6-7; positions 34-41]; (c) stating what one judges to be the correct understanding of the text [section 8; position 42]. Distinct methodological problems emerge with each set.

24. The task of understanding the text has as its objective "to know what happened to be the objects, real or imaginary, intended by the author of the text" (*MT*, p. 156).

25. "*Intended*" is used here in the sense of "intentionality," not in the sense of "the intentional fallacy." The intentional fallacy regards the "mind of the author" as something to be reached as independent-of and extrinsic-to the text rather than embodied-in or encoded-in the text as its main intrinsic

determinant. There comes to expression in the singular configuration of the text a world mediated and constituted by the acts, sources, and terms of meaning responsible for the text. The configuration of the text is an index to those sources, acts, and terms of meaning. The text reflects a deliberateness on the part of the author, but the deliberateness has molded materials that have emerged in the flow of the author's imaginative, intelligent, and reflective consciousness. The text represents a delicate balance of spontaneity and deliberateness, both of which *intend* the world mediated by the meaning of the text.

"Intentionality" involves subject-object correlatives: the subject intends the object.

Lonergan is not saying that one can get to the mind 'behind' the text (and independent of it); rather, he holds that one can get at the author's 'orientation' precisely as embodied-*in* the text.

> What one wants to come to know is the 'world' that comes to expression in the singular configuration of the text. The 'intention' of the author is embedded in the configuration in which the author expresses that world mediated by meaning.

To get at what an author 'intended,' is not to bet at some kind of obscure thing behind or above the text; rather, it is to get at the intentionality that comes to expression *in* the text. That expressed intention involves both deliberate decision and spontaneities on her/his part; it involves the whole orientation of the author embodied in the singular configuration of the text.

N. Frye is very good on this balance – in a great author – between (a) deliberateness and discipline and (b) spontaneity. Both are 'intended.'

26. There are four conditions relevant to understanding what happened to be the objects intended by the author of the text. Their relative importance varies from one instance to another. They are: (a) a preunderstanding of the object to which the text refers [section 2; position 27]; (b) a grasp of the structural unity of the text as an intentional order of words [section 3; positions 28-29]; (c) a scholarly understanding of the author in terms of his/her time and place, culture and language, way of life and cast of mind [section 4; position 30]; (d) one's own horizon [section 5; positions 31-33].

27. Some understanding of the object is a precondition for understanding the text. An interpreter, as distinct from a learner, approaches a text, not primarily to learn about the objects to which the text refers, but, already endowed with at least a general and potential knowledge of those objects, to understand what happened to be "the objects. . . intended by the author." The more one already knows about the objects, the more likely it will be that one will interpret the text correctly. There is to be rejected, then, the naïve intuitionism of the "principle of the empty head." One is to silence one's personal wishes about the outcome of the interpretation, but not one's preunderstanding of the objects to which the text refers.

On this issue, Lonergan is sympathetic with Gadamer and Bultmann.

As long as all you do is look at the text, all that will happen is that you will see black marks on white paper.

MT, p. 157: "Anything over and above a re-issue of the same signs in the same order will be mediated by the experience, intelligence, and judgment of the interpreter. The less that experience, the less cultivated that intelligence, the less formed that judgment, the greater the likelihood that the interpreter will impute to the author an opinion that the author never entertained. On the other hand, the wider the interpreter's experience, the deeper and fuller the development of his understanding, the better balanced his judgment, the greater the likelihood that he will discover just what the author meant."

The task is to proceed from one's general habitual knowledge to the particular knowledge of what this particular author meant about objects that you hold in common.

> You have to begin with some *preunderstanding* of what the author is talking about if you are to understand what s/he is saying.

28. One's understanding of the object would be sufficient for understanding the text if both author and interpreter understood the same objects in the same way. But the chances of this being the case decrease to the extent that the text is (a) nonsystematic, and (b) involved in the constitutive function of meaning. Then further exercises are necessary. The first of these, which Lonergan calls "understanding the words," involves grasping the structural unity of the text as an intentional order of words.

This is why systematic texts generally are not problematic.

The notion of a text as an "order of words" is Frye's. Every text should be understood in terms of the order of words – i.e., grasping the text in its structured intentional order.

By and large, this entails a process of reading and rereading over and over again, catching a glimpse here and there. It is a matter of entering into the hermeneutical circle of whole and parts, and through which things start to 'fall into place.'

> *MT*, p. 159: "It is a self-correcting process of learning that spirals into the meaning of the whole by using each new part to fill out and qualify and correct the understanding reached in reading the earlier parts."

Exegetical methods and techniques are helpful; e.g., structural techniques can be helpful in entering into the meaning of the text as a structured order of words. But such 'rules of hermeneutics' are not ends in themselves; you use them as long as they are helpful in understanding the text. Doran judges that a good deal of structural exegesis goes beyond this, and allows the techniques of structural analysis become ends in themselves.

29. The unity of the text as an intentional entity can be grasped only by entering the hermeneutic circle of whole and parts and surmounting the circle through the self-correcting process of learning. Lower-blade rules, techniques, and methods are to be employed in this process to the extent they are helpful in bringing one to understand what happened to be the objects intended by the one responsible for the text (cf. Ricoeur's understanding-explanation-understanding).

These sections on (a) preunderstanding of objects, and (b) exegetical techniques parallel Ricoeur's breakdown of the hermeneutical process into stages: understanding/explanation/understanding.

For Lonergan, the big thing is that you sustain your reading and re-reading until you eliminate your failures in understanding what the author was talking about; i.e., maintain your awareness of the further relevant questions.

30. Further difficulties may arise that cannot be resolved by one's understanding of the object or by the sustained rereading and inventiveness through which one comes to grasp the structural unity of an order of the words. They demand in addition the scholarly acquisition of the common sense of another age and culture. Only then can one understand what another might say or do in the situations that arose in his/her place and time.

Scholarship, for Lonergan, is the scholarly acquisition of the common sense of another age and culture. Later he will refer to this as "the scholarly differentiation of consciousness."

It is at this point that *historical-critical methods* come into play in understanding the text. Such methods are pertinent when interpreting the text demands the ability to enter into the common sense of another age and culture.

31. Even the combination of a preunderstanding of the object, diligent rereading and careful observance of various exegetical techniques, and scholarly understanding of another's mentality may be insufficient. Major texts especially may call for a new horizon, a revolution in one's own outlook, a *conversion*, a rethinking of everything on the basis of this radical change, before one can understand what happened to be the objects intended by the author.

I may have to change radically before I have a clue as to what another person is talking about.

32. This conversion may entail as well a reorientation of the tradition that molded one's former preunderstanding (Gadamer's *Wirkungsgeschichte* of the classics being interpreted). Then one not only understands history; one also *makes* it.

Wirkungsgeschichte refers to the fact that any classic text has a subsequent tradition that affects the way subsequent generations interpret the text. But the tradition itself may be inauthentic, and Gadamer is not very helpful in getting at that. The conversion might mean that the tradition must be changed so that the great text can be properly interpreted.

33. The existential aspect of interpretation moves one to the functional specialties of Dialectic and Foundations. The task of making history moves one to the further specialties of the second phase.

34. One knows one's interpretation is probable or correct to the extent that in fact it meets all relevant questions. The relevant questions are those which arise as one moves out of one's own initial context and into the context of the author (the ec-static aspect of interpretation).

By the 'ecstatic' dimension is meant that the more one enters into a context different from her/his own, there will be different questions that emerge; the relevant questions are those that emerge as one moves into the context of the author.

35. A *context* is the *interweaving of questions and answers in a limited group*. The group is limited in the sense that all the questions and answers converge on a single topic and so lead to a point where no further relevant questions arise. But determining what that "single topic" is, is difficult, and can be done only in the self-correcting process of interpreting itself. Heuristically the single topic is the higher limited unity that will embrace the interrelated multiplicity of questions and answers in a single and unified, however complex, understanding. (More of this in "History.")

The fact is that the interpreter does *experience* a gradual drying-up of the flow of further relevant questions: that is the criterion for Lonergan with regard to any judgment of truth. As one is moving towards that drying-up of the flow of further relevant questions, one is moving towards and knows that s/he is moving towards a more and more probable interpretation.

The only criterion we have is our own minds.

But any actual judgment of one's interpretation is best kept quite cautious/modest, because there may well be further relevant questions to which one has not adverted.

36. Entering the author's interweaving of questions and answers in a limited group entails a reconstruction of the process that moved the author forward. The reconstruction ideally is an explanatory and scientific grasp of the interrelations of steps and operators (factors advancing or retarding a development).

'Operators' are the questions that move the process along.

To speak of 'explanatory' reconstruction means to consider these operators and steps in their relationships to one another.

37. To the extent it is explanatory and scientific, the reconstruction will involve understanding something the author may not have clearly grasped. But this does not mean the interpreter understands the text itself better than did the author (Schleiermacher), since many accidental sources and circumstances, clear to the author, will remain obscure to the interpreter. Nor is the reconstruction a reenactment (Collingwood), since the interpreter "rarely achieves and never needs an understanding of every detail" (166).

To the extent that you are able to reconstruct an author's process of development in explanatory fashion – understanding one question in relation to another question, one answer in relation to another answer, and answers in relation to question – it will involve understanding something that the author may not have clearly grasped.

What is necessary is to reconstruct the major steps of questions and answers. One will not be able to reenact the entire process, and this is not necessary; but what is necessary is reconstructing the major steps.

Cf. Lonergan's "Foreword" to David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), p. xii: "For his task Professor Tracy is notable qualified. He has read my books, followed the various courses I gave when he was a student in Rome, studied my notes and unpublished papers, and wrote his doctoral dissertation on the development of my thought on theological method up to 1965. In our many conversations he has let me experience Schleiermacher's paradox, namely, that na intelligent interpreter will know the process of a writer's development better than the writer himself."

Thus, Tracy found relationships that Lonergan had not before clearly grasped in the development of his own thought.

38. The sources of explanatory and scientific reconstruction are specified in *Insight*'s discussion of the "upper blade" of the notion of being and the "canons for a methodical hermeneutics." To these can be added *Method*'s discussion of the notion of value and the discussion of the transcendent exigence. One's grasp of the "upper blade" is a potential totality of genetically and dialectically related viewpoints that enables one to reconstruct a viewpoint with explanatory scientific precision. But this potential totality is treated in the functional specialty, Dialectic.

In *I*, Lonergan holds that the more you understand how different kinds of questions are related to one another, the better chance it is that you will be able to give an explanatory understanding of the interrelationship of questions and answers on the part of another. And that is precisely what 'the notion of being' is, i.e., the pure question that wants being.

Thus, there is an upper blade and a lower blade in hermeneutics. The lower blade is formed of the various techniques: form criticism, redaction criticism, structural analysis, etc. The upper blade is formed of the transcendental notions. Accordingly, the better hold I have on the transcendental notions, the better my use of lower blade techniques will converge on the limit of a correct interpretation.

The source of my being able to interrelate questions and answers is my grasp of the structure of the pure question that is my own consciousness. The better I know myself as a questioning being, the better chance I have og being able to grasp the interrelationships of the questions and answers of another.

MT adds 'the notion of *value*' and the discussion of the transcendent exigence to the upper blade as presented in *I*.

Upper blade: notion of being
notion of value

transcendent pure question for God

The more you are clear on that whole thrust of human intentionality, the better chance you have of being able to use the other (lower blade) techniques in such a way that you will converge on a correct interpretation of what another intended.

39. To the extent the text contains intersubjective, artistic, symbolic, and incarnate meanings, it is involved in more than one carrier of meaning. Then adequate understanding of the objects intended by the author demands a capacity to feel what the author felt and to respect the values the author respected. Again, however, this is not a reenactment of the author's psychic process, but a matter of fellow-feeling.

Sean McEvenue, e.g., uses a passage from Ezekiel to demonstrate how the *rhythm* of a passage can be a carrier of meaning every bit as important as the language; the rhythm is an artistic carrier of meaning. [Cf. his paper from the Montreal hermeneutics conference, October, 1086.]

Cf. also Justus George Lawler, Celestial Pantomime: Poetic Structures of Transcendence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).

There can well be more than one carrier of meaning in a given text; adequate interpretation of that text must attend to and understand all of them. This involves the capacity to *feel* as an author felt, and to respect the values that an author held; this fellow-feeling and respect for another's values enable more adequate interpretation of what that other meant.

But that is not a reenactment of another's psychic process – getting inside someone's psyche.

40. Doran: To this may be added, by reason of the principle of correspondence between spiritual and psychic operators, a position on embodiments of elemental meaning as expressing a sensitive appropriation of differentiations of the transcendental notions.

The symbols of Scripture, e.g., express the author's sensitive appropriation of the differentiations of the transcendent exigence that the author has achieved.

Cf. *I* on "Mystery," p. 531-534, 546-549, 689, 692, 723-724.

Cf. also Glenn Hughes, "The Discussion of Mystery in Insight," *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 4/1 (March 1986): 6017.

Thus, in Doran's reading, Paul 'argues' only once! The rest of the time he piles up symbol upon symbol, expressing his sensitive appropriation of the grace he has been given.

41. Actual judgment (167) "depends on many factors. . . If there really are no further questions, [one's] interpretation will be certain. But there may be further relevant questions that [one] has overlooked and, on this account, [one] will speak modestly. Again, there may be further relevant questions to which [one] adverts, but [one] is unable to uncover the evidence that would lead to a solution. Such further questions may be many or few, or major or minor importance. It is this range of possibilities

that leads exegetes to speak with greater or less confidence or diffidence and with careful distinctions between the more probable and the less probable elements in their interpretations."

42. The expression of the exegete qua exegete varies according to whether one is speaking to one's exegetical colleagues, one's pupils, or the wider theological community. Expression for one's colleagues will be technical (170) and for one's pupils pedagogical (170-171). Expression to the wider theological community may be either basic and general or supplementary and explanatory. Basic and general expression will convey as accurately as possible the mentality of the original author and audience. Supplementary and explanatory expression will be in terms of categories derived from interiorly differentiated consciousness: elements of meaning, sources and levels of expression, stages of differentiation of the transcendental notions, etc. Only such explanatory expression will circumvent the difficulties caused by ill-founded attempts to explain in terms of such occult entities as "the Hebrew mind," "Hellenism," and "the spirit of scholasticism."

Expressions such as "the Hebrew mind" may have some descriptive value to get things started, but they have no9 explanatory value whatsoever. When Doran hears someone speak of "the Hebrew mind" he immediately asks the question, "Which Hebrew?"!

6 November 19986

Chapter EIGHT: *History*

"History" is a difficult functional specialty to get hold of, and the cognitional theory expressed here is subtle. But it also may well be as good an indication of Lonergan's cognitional theory as one will find anywhere; you can make sharp distinctions – on the basis of what he says in these chapters – between critical realism and, on the one hand, positivism/empiricism, and idealism on the other hand.

Doran realizes that one of the reasons why these chapters are difficult for him to 'get hold of' is that he has less experience in actually *doing* history than in the other specialties. Further, Lonergan indicates at the beginning of chapter nine that the underlying procedures are very intimate, spontaneous, and elusive. It is difficult to objectify them, and most historians are at a loss when asked to objectify the procedures that de facto they employ.

Charles Hefling ("On understanding Salvation History," from volume one of the proceedings of the Montreal Conference Lonerganian Hermeneutics: Development and Application) distinguishes three kinds of history, each of which can involve a critical element:

Factual
Evaluative

Salvational

Chapters eight and nine of *MT* are about factual history, i.e., 'what actually happened?' Evaluative history will be discussed in the chapter on dialectic: 'Is what happened good?' 'Is this what should have happened?' But before you can ask/answer that question, you have to know what in fact happened – and that is what the functional specialty history is concerned with. Salvation history is a further category, which is only mentioned once or twice in *MT*.

Hefling develops a position on a critical history of the process of salvation.

That Lonergan's concern here is with factual history is why he correlates History with *judgment* – because what one is after in doing the functional specialty History are the *facts*. The objective is to determine what actually happened.

The major question, then, is: What constitutes a historical fact? And on this question Lonergan adopts a position that he calls critical realism, as contrasted with positivism/empiricism and idealism. For a critical realist, a historical fact is known at the end of an elaborate process.

Basic Positions: [H = Historian / F = Historical Fact]

a. Empiricism/positivism:

H F

The historian knows historical facts by doing something analogous to 'taking a good look,' thus identifying historical fact with what – for Lonergan – is data. Anything else that the historian does beyond simply collecting the facts, such as interconnection by the use of his/her own mind, is supplementary and questionable. Historical facts are gotten at by some kind of process of immediate observation; historical facts are isolated, fragmented events that can be known by something analogous to taking a good look.

b. Idealism:

The idealist recognizes that the positivist position is nonsensical; however, there is a block that prevents the idealist historian from ever getting to historical fact.

H F

constructing

The idealist recognizes that the historian does a good deal of constructing; the historian's mind is a constructive mind. But the constructions prevent the idealist from getting to the historical fact; what the idealist ends up knowing are the constructions of her/his own mind.

c. Critical Realism:

What is given for observation is, not fact, but data; the critical realist begins the process by doing a certain assembly of data. The data are 'given.' The data are converted to facts in a twofold process. The first phase regards the facts about the sources. There is constructive activity that goes on in the movement from data to facts, but the constructive activity comes to term in judgments about facts with regard to one's sources – e.g., how reliable they are as actual evidence. Then those facts become data for a further process of construction with regard to what really happened. That further process of construction is what results in historical facts. Thus, historical facts are known at the term of a quite elaborate constructive process.

H data

facts/sources data (experience)

construction (understanding)

F (judgment)

> The critical realist is in agreement with the idealist that doing history involves constructions on the part of the mind of the historian; but for the critical realist the constructions of mind do not impede arriving at knowledge of historical facts (*pace* idealists), but are rather necessary in order to arrive at such knowledge. The historical fact is a quite complex unity that cannot be known by observation, but that can be known by affirmation of correct judgment.
>
> A historical fact is something like, e.g., the Second Vatican Council. It cannot be known by taking a good look at anything. You start with all the data that are available, and you establish the facts with regard to those data; those are your sources, and you use those sources as data for further constructive activity and end up with a history of the Second Vatican Council. That is your set of historical facts. That is a complex unity that cannot be known simply by observation; rather it is known by the combination of the experience of data, the understanding that goes on in the constructive activity of mind, and the judgments that are arrived at at the term. Historical facts are complex realities like battles, wars, elections, etc.
>
> *MT*, p. 202: "As an investigation proceeds, insights accumulate and oversights diminish. This ongoing process, while it does not affect data inasmuch as they are or may be given, does affect enormously data inasmuch as they are sought out, attended to, combined now this way and now that in ever larger and more complex structures. On the other hand, it is only as the structures take definite shape, as the process of asking further questions begins to dry up, that there commence to emerge the facts. For *the facts emerge, not before the data are understood, but only after they have been understood satisfactorily and thoroughly*."
>
> *MT*, p. 199: "The facts of history resemble, not a text, but the *meaning* of a text."
>
> > The meaning of a text cannot be known by taking a good look at the text! It can only be known through the constructive, hypothetical, surmising activity of the interpreter. So, too, the facts of history are complex unities that result from manifold actions and interactions of individuals; they extend over space and over time, and cannot be singled-out and observed in some single act of perception. They have to be put together by assembling a manifold of particular events into a single interpretative unity.

Historical facts generally are not known by contemporaries; there is a sense in which we experience what is going-forward today, but we don't know what is going-forward in the sense of critical history. Archbishop Rembert Weakland, e.g., has recently said that it will take at least one hundred years before it is known what really happened at the Second Vatican Council. At this point, we have a fairly decent sense of what led to Vatican II, but we don't yet have much of a sense of where it stands in history. There is the whole thing that Gadamer speaks of as the *Wirkungsgeschichte* of an event that is part of the meaning of the event. Vatican II has a whole *Wirkungsgeschichte* following it. Good historians are still very much divided about even the construction of the facts about the debates that led to production of the documents.

> Another example is William Shirer's *Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*. No contemporary of Nazism could have written that book. But now that book itself is dated.
>
> Contexts remain open, and one index of the importance of an event is how long its context remains open. Note *MT*, pp. 192-193: "while Nero will always be Nero, we cannot as yet say the same for Luther."

The context is not closed on Luther; questions are still being asked about what he was up to, and why, and what was going forward, etc. And as long as questions are still being raised, the context that will establish/locate the historical facts is still open.

The measure is: Are there *further questions*? As long as human beings are still raising questions, they are not satisfied that the facts are established.

You get different histories, e.g., of Luther's period; they can be compatible or incompatible.

- Different perspectives ground compatible differences.
- Different horizons ground incompatible differences.

Only in encounter can be determine whether our differences are compatible or not. It is better to begin with the presumption that they are compatible than to presume incompatibility. St. Ignatius, e.g., advises that it is better to be ready to accept than to reject out of hand the statement of another. Go as far as you can to establish compatibility first.

Difference of horizons introduces the need for radical conversion.

[The METHODOLOGICAL POSITIONS given here follow upon those of the previous lecture; cf. pp. 53-61 above.]

43. The field of historical investigation is the meaningful speech and actions occurring in time, where "time" is not the time studied in physics, but the time-span constituted by the *psychological present* of subjects and the tradition of groups.

The 'speech and action' of human beings occur in that psychological present where we are reaching into our past by memories and into our future by anticipations; that is what constitutes the field for historical investigation. Historians are engaged in understanding meaningful speech and action in time, where time is human time as experienced.

For an application of this notion of psychological present, cf. Philip McShane, "The Psychological Present of the Academic Community," *Lonergan Workshop* I, pp. 27-68.

44. The objective of such investigation is to grasp what was going forward in particular groups at particular places and times.

45. "What was going forward" names something that in general contemporaries do not know.

'What was going forward' can be *known* (in the sense of critical historical knowledge) only from the perspective of time itself.

An author knows what s/he means when writing a book, and so there is not this same discrepancy between interpretation and the original text, as there is between history and the people that a historian is studying. There is a great deal of discrepancy between a historian's knowledge of the facts and what people knew in the time that is being studied.

'What is going forward' is beyond the comprehension of any one of us in our own time; we would hardly be able to recognize the histories that will be written of our time in centuries to come.

Also, 'what is going forward' is a function not only of what people consciously intend, but also of oversights, mistakes, failures, etc. We don't know the consequences of important human decisions for decades after they have occurred; yet those consequences are part of what is going forward in the events themselves.

Further, the writing of history is not just a matter of gathering and testing all available evidence; we could come close to doing that for our own time. But also involved is a set of interlocking discoveries that will show a significance to the evidence that contemporaries could not know.

From the (9th and 10th) *Lectures on the Philosophy of Education*: "The decisions of individuals are interdependent. One will foresee what others might decide, and use this foresight to guide a present decision. But quite apart from each individual's thinking, foreseeing, and understanding of others, the set of decisions of the participants is not the decision of any one of them, and it is a set of decisions that leads from one situation to the next. Destiny is that linking of the set of situations. There is something in the succession of human choices that is outside the range of human choice. Though everything is a product of decision, though the decisions can be made with full consciousness of what others are likely to do in response, still there cannot be any individual decision that constitutes the situation and the way one situation heads into the next. Human history is the result of free actions, that such-and-such an intelligibility should be realized is a product of human freedom; the catch is that there is a multiplicity of different individuals, each exercising her/his freedom. There is an element of historical inevitability in the interdependence of different exercises of freedom."

46. Historical results are expressed in descriptive *narratives* regarding particular persons, places and times.

Such results are expressed in descriptive narratives rather than in systems expressing laws.

47. Verification of historical discoveries is a function of the self-correcting process of learning heading to the point where there are *no further relevant questions*.

Thus, it is not like the verification of a scientific law, which is universal and is verified to the extent that all instances correspond with it. The verification of historical discoveries is, rather, like interpretation, a function of the self-correcting process of learning heading to the point where there are no further relevant questions. It is a common-sense type of verification, because we are dealing with the concrete and particular.

48. History approaches *explanation* to the extent it is expressed in terms of the changes (a) that affect the manner in which the carriers of meaning are employed, the elements of meaning are combined, the functions of meaning are distinguished and developed, the realms of meaning are extended, the stages of meaning blossom forth, meet resistance, compromise, collapse [p. 178]; and (b) that affect common meaning precisely as common [p. 178].

MT, p. 178: "There are the further vicissitudes of meaning as common meaning. For meaning is common in the measure that community exists and functions, in the measure that there is a common field of experience, common and complementary understanding, common judgments or at least an agreement to disagree, common and complementary commitments. But people can get out of touch, misunderstand one another, hold radically opposed views, commit themselves to conflicting goals. The common meaning contracts, becomes confined to banalities, moves towards ideological warfare."

The more one is able to express one's narrative in terms that arise from *interiorly differentiated consciousness*, the more one's history is approaching something like explanation.

This relates to what he says about the "universal viewpoint" in I (e.g., pp. 564-568; 738-739).

49. Historical *experience* is the *history that is written about*; historical knowledge is the history that is written. Historical experience *builds on the psychological present* of the individual reaching into the past by memories, stories, and one's present knowledge of history, and into the future by anticipations, estimates, and forecasts, *to yield a living tradition* that gives *identity* to the group and enables individuals to locate themselves and their several contributions to that tradition. It is lived, not methodically known.

Lonergan is talking about the knowing of the critical historian. Thus, to say that contemporaries don't know 'what is going forward' means that they don't know it in the sense of the knowing of the critical historian. Someone may, e.g., have a certain 'prophetic' knowing, an ability 'to read the signs of the times;' but this is not the knowing of critical history.

'What is going forward' is experience for contemporaries. There may be a kind of knowing in that experience, but it is not the knowing of critical history.

To be a Jesuit, e.g., is to be in a living tradition; this is what Lonergan means by historical experience. An individual Jesuit may not know that tradition in the sense of a critical historian's knowledge, but he lives in it, accepts much of the meaning of his life from it, and is enabled to locate himself in the group whose identity is formed by the tradition. By historical experience, Lonergan means that I am in a living tradition that gives identity to the group to which I belong; it builds on my psychological present to locate me in a group that has a past and is anticipating a future.

50. Making it scientifically and methodically known is a process of *objectification* analogous to that responsible for producing an autobiography or biography: in all three instances there is the assembly of data, the reorganization and reconstruction rendered possible by the retrospect of time, and the building up of contexts bearing on multifaceted but determinate topics.

Rereading an old diary can give a sense of what is meant here by the reorganization/reconstruction made possible by time; certain things may well have moved out of the significance that they once seemed to have, and other things that were very subliminal then may well have emerged into considerable significance.

51. In history, however, the relative place of "life" and "times" shifts, since history studies a *common field of social and cultural process* that is not just a sum of individual words, deeds, and lives, but a developing and/or deteriorating unity constituted by cooperations, institutions, personal relations, a functioning and/or malfunctioning good of order and a communal realization or originating and terminal values and disvalues.

This is getting at the meaning of a historical fact.

52. Several factors are required if the objectification is to be *critical*. The first is that the process must be oriented to *judging matters of fact*.

In critical history your main purpose is not explaining to the group what its identity is; rather, your main purpose is simply to judge what was going forward. That may well be used to help the group gain a greater sense of its identity, but that is not the main purpose. Rather, the primary focus of the critical historian is to judge matters of fact.

53. The second is that the data are accepted not as more or less credible testimonies but as *potential* evidence.

Grasping the difference between 'testimony' and 'evidence' is key. The critical historian does not just take the data and simply determine whether or not the witnesses are credible and then

string together the credible witnesses; all that would give you is a reediting of the testimonies of people of that time. To accept the data as potential evidence is to accept is as *possibly* relevant to my judgment as to what was going forward. But at this point I withhold judgment.

54. Third, *formal* and *actual* evidence have to be discovered: the evidence that would be understood as evidence in some framework and that would ground a reasonable judgment.

Potential, formal, and actual evidence are all the same data, but its status as evidence shifts. Formal and actual evidence have to be discovered in the process of critical history.

Actual	Judgment	Act
Formal	Understanding	Form
Potential	Experience	Potency

The same data that were accepted as potential evidence become formal data to the extent that, as the historian is raising her/his own questions, they seem to be taking on more and more probability as relevant to the judgment; they become actual evidence when they ground a judgment.

A great deal of what was potential evidence at the beginning is eliminated as not relevant; but that has to be discovered.

Some potential evidence gets transformed to the status of formal evidence, and some formal evidence to the status of actual evidence as the process proceeds.

55. This discovery of evidence constitutes the process of arriving at historical knowledge as heuristic. One begins from some historical knowledge 9the more, the better) and puts to some defined situation, some particular set of data, the question for historical intelligence, 'What was going forward?' One's insights are expressed in surmises, one's surmises are represented imaginatively, one's images lead to further related questions, the process recurs, and if one's surmises approximate further data, the data cease to be merely potential evidence and become formal evidence, i.e., what the evidence might really be.

Heuristic: a process anticipating the goal.

To the extent that your questions keep recurring and leading you progressively onward, you're on the right track and the evidence is shifting its status from potential to formal evidence, what the actual evidence really might be.

56. Fourth, critical history is *ecstatic*: one's questions start to come more and more from the data rather than from one's own images based on surmises.

By 'ecstasy' here is meant standing outside oneself, self-transcendence.

You have to start with surmises, but the more you are on the right track the more you find that the source of your questions shifts over to the data itself and you begin to move outside the framework of your own assumptions and your own presuppositions, taking on the assumptions and presuppositions that are dictated more and more by the data.

57. Fifth, the process is *selective*: not all the date are promoted to formal evidence.

58. Sixth, the process is *constructive*: selected data are related to one another through the *historian's* interconnected set of questions and answers eventually coalescing into a single view of the whole.

At this point and for several more points, Lonergan is in agreement with idealism in insisting on the constructive function of mind.

59. Seventh, one finds oneself *criticizing* one's previous assumptions and shifting items from previous to more appropriate contexts.

60. Eighth, this heuristic, ecstatic, selective, critical, constructive process occurs twice. In historical criticism one establishes one's sources. In historical reconstruction one comes to know the object to which the sources are relevant: what was going forward in the community. The two developments are interdependent.

The more you know about what was going forward in the community, the better able you are to locate your sources; the better able you are to locate your sources, the more you will be able to know what was going forward in the community.

61. Historical discovery is constituted by the culminating insight in each cumulative series of insights in the process: discovery of new evidence, of a new perspective, of a different selection or critical rejection, of ever more complex structures.

Every time you come to a judgment with regard to any one of these aspects there is a historical discovery.

62. The narrative in which the discoveries are expressed undergoes an *ever more differentiated organization* in terms of dominant and subordinate themes, dominant and subordinate topics within the themes, greater differentiation of topics themselves, shifts of the whole structure.

There is an ongoing process of reorganization of the narrative.

63. Nonetheless the investigation comes to term: there comes a moment when the historian says that *as far as s/he knows* the question is closed. Then (and only then) the evidence has become actual; it grounds a reasonable judgment.

64. The judgment is almost always *tentative*: New sources of information can be uncovered to affect subsequent understanding and judgment; later events will place earlier events in a new perspective by enlarging the context and shifting the questions; contexts tend to remain open on important issues for a long time. The importance of an issue (its *Wirkungsgeschichte*) is in direct proportion to the duration of the contexts to which it gives rise.

The context remains open as long as human beings are raising questions about it.

Note, e.g., that the two philosophers about whom the most dissertations are still being written are Plato and Aristotle! The context is still open on both of them; what they did was to consolidate the movement into the second stage of meaning. By doing so they initiated the context of our own period; thus we continue to go back to try to understand. There is, accordingly, some truth to Whitehead's remark that all of Western philosophy is a set of footnotes to Plato.

65. The prior historical knowledge with which one begins is a function of critical history of the second degree: a heuristic, ecstatic, selective, critical, constructive, judicial process that enables one to make an intelligent and discriminating use of other historians.

You begin with whatever you're able to pick up from the use that you've made of other historians.

66. The techniques of critical history as such are unequal to the task of the total elimination of historical relativisms. Some problems call for the use of the methods of Dialectic and Foundations.

It is only by an appeal to horizons that some problems of historical *relativism* will be solved.

67. Nonetheless, critical history itself makes a partial contribution insofar as in its ecstatic aspect it eliminates previously entertained perspectives and replaces them with perspectives emergent from the data-becoming-evidence. So it is that different historians operating from the same standpoint arrive at compatible conclusions. Thus *there do exist procedures that*, other things being equal, *lead to objective historical knowledge*. The "other things" – views of what is possible, value-judgments, worldview, standpoint, state of the question – are treated in Dialectic and Foundations.

To the extent that previously entertained perspectives are in fact being eliminated and replaced with perspectives emergent from the data-becoming-evidence, one is moving beyond any historical relativism that sees everyone's perspective as the ultimate determination.

Different historians, operating from the same fundamental standpoint, do arrive at compatible conclusions precisely insofar as they do eliminate their previously entertained perspectives and enter into the perspectives that emerge from the data-becoming-evidence.

Chapter NINE: *History and Historians*

68. The question of the relations of facts and their interconnections – 'Is one first to determine the facts and then discover their interconnections, or do facts and interconnections form a single whole? – is answered by *distinguishing data from facts*. Historical knowledge is a twofold process *from data through reconstruction to facts*. Historical criticism establishes facts regarding sources. There facts become data for historical construction, which uses them to establish the facts of what was going forward.

If you get this you've got Lonergan's cognitional theory.

The *empiricist* position is that one first determines the facts and then discovers their interconnections; but then the question arises as to why discover the interconnections if you already know the facts. *Idealists* would grant that the mind has to make the interconnections, but would deny that this enables us to actually get to the facts. *Critical realism* insists that the facts and interconnections form a single whole.

69. The position of idealists on this issue is thus to be preferred to that of positivists and empiricists. But the position on *judgment* distinguishes a critical realism also from idealism.

The position on judgment holds that if there are in fact no further questions, then the case is established. In almost all cases there in fact are further questions; nonetheless, we do experience ourselves moving towards facts as the stream of further questions dries up.

70. The advance of reflection on *Verstehen* from the German historical school to Heidegger (and Gadamer) represents a break from empiricism and positivism, in that it recognizes the *centrality of meaning* both in the data and in historical knowledge itself. It reflects an ever deeper appropriation of the task of human studies as the *interpretative reconstruction of the constructions of the human spirit*.

The whole German tradition from the historical school of von Ranke through Dilthey and Husserl down to Gadamer and Heidegger has been an increasing appreciation of the central role of meaning in human life and in our knowledge of human life. By the time you get to Heidegger, this process culminates in his positing a universal heuristic structure; i.e., everything in the life of

Dasein (consciousness) is constituted by acts of meaning. Thus, the history of German thought on understanding (*Verstehen*) for the last century has reflected an ever deeper appreciation of the role and centrality of meaning in everything human. For Heidegger, hermeneutics is not simply a matter of our understanding a text from the past; rather, our own living is a hermeneutical process, a process constituted by our acts of meaning. We are constituting a world by our acts of meaning.

This is a clean break from positivism/empiricism.

71. Nonetheless: (1) understanding can be understood more precisely and its range conceived more broadly than has been the case in German reflections on *Verstehen* [see pp. 212-213]; (2) judgment is to be distinguished from understanding, thus enabling an equally clean break from idealism; (3) idealism thus becomes the halfway house between empiricism and critical realism.

Lonergan wants to go beyond the Germans, asserting that understanding occurs in mathematics and natural science, as well as in common sense, philosophy, history, etc. Thus, understanding is even more universal than, e.g., Gadamer had held; Gadamer held a negative view of natural science, because he thought of it as a Cartesian type of control over nature, focused on certitude rather than understanding. Lonergan understands natural science to be concerned with understanding, not certitude and domination.

He also wants to add to the Germans an emphasis on judgment, which in fact they do not have. Kant and the subsequent German tradition tends to collapse judgment into a function of understanding, rather than recognizing it as a distinct act of the mind. Because of their failure to make this distinction, the Germans are still at least bordering on idealism.

72. The fact of different histories of the same "what was going forward" can be met only by a complex process. The first step in the process is to distinguish perspectives from horizons.

73. *Perspectives*: ". . . the historical process itself and, within it, the personal development of the historian give rise to a series of different standpoints. The different standpoints give rise to different selective processes. The different selective processes give rise to different histories that are (1) not contradictory, (2) not complete information and not complete explanation, but (3) *incomplete and approximate portrayals of an enormously complex reality*" [218-219]. Again, "the past is fixed and its intelligible structures are unequivocal; but the past that is so fixed and unequivocal is the enormously complex past that historians know only incompletely and approximately. It is incomplete and approximate knowledge of the past that gives rise to perspectivism" [220].

74. *Horizons*: The historian's development is in part a *function of basic options*. They can be involved in historical investigation. They may result in different methods of historical investigations, *incompatible* standpoints, *irreconcilable* histories. The methods that meet such problems pertain to Dialectic and Foundations.

Thus, it is extremely important to know when you are dealing with perspectival differences and when you are dealing with horizontal differences. Perspectival differences can be worked out by further work in the functional specialty of critical history itself; horizontal differences can be resolved only in Dialectic and Foundations.

No one who believes that miracles are impossible will ever be able to write a history is acknowledged as having occurred. That would be a horizontal question.

13 November 1986

The correlation of History with judgment has to do with the *affirmation* of the *occurrence* of events.

Cf. *I* on 'occurrence' and 'events:' 82-83, 97, 98-99, 124, 654.

> *I*, p. 82: "Events stand to conjugates as questions for reflection stand to questions for intelligence."
>
> *I*, p. 125: "An event is what is to be known by answering 'Yes' to such questions as: Did it happen? Is it occurring? Will it occur?"

Judgment pronounces the 'yes' on the occurrence of events, the intelligibility of which has been grasped in understanding. Thus the objective of the functional specialty 'History' is the *objective* of the third level of consciousness: the affirmation/negation of the actual occurrence of events.

> 'What' occurred is grasped by understanding; *that* it did, in fact, occur is affirmed in judgment.

It must, of course, be remembered that all four levels of consciousness function in each functional specialty; but the objective of History is the affirmation/negation of judgment.

Chapter TEN: Dialectic

For supplementary reading, cf. "Dimensions of Meaning," *Collection* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1967), 252-267. In this essay, Lonergan sets up the problem that, for him, theology has to face in today's world: the radical foundational problem of a basis for the control of meaning, once classicist control has broken down.

> This is extremely pertinent to contemporary conflicts in the Catholic church.
>
> Authority does not and cannot play the same role that it did in classicist culture. (Cf., e.g., pp. 265-266.)

The chapter on Dialectic gives indication of the kind of atmosphere that Lonergan would like to establish so that conflicts can be placed out on the table, so that oppositions can be confronted, so that people can be called forth to state quite openly wherever they need to come to terms, and so that there can be an honest discussion of root differences in an ecumenical atmosphere that respects differences, without prejudging irreconcilable conflicts before all the evidence of authenticity is in.

In the previous chapter (9.6), Lonergan distinguished horizons from perspectives, and introduced the problems connected with preconceptions, standpoints, basic options. There is a *prior understanding* that the historian derives, not from historical study, but from her/his life – i.e., from existential sources; there is a prior understanding of what is possible, of what is worthwhile, and of religion itself. That prior understanding can influence what one will say about facts in history, about meanings and interpretations, and about data that are significant for research. This is the fundamental existential stance of the subject. That is the problem to be met in the functional specialty, Dialectic – not the problem of perspective, which is a function of complementary or developmental differences. Dialectic is concerned with the problem of radically opposed options on basic issues. Such problems are not resolved by finding new data, nor by adopting a new method – i.e., not by raising questions at the same level – but only by clarifying horizons and changing them.

> *MT*, p. 224: "We have to seek methods that will help historians from the start to avoid incoherent assumptions and procedures, and we have to develop further methods that will serve to iron out differences once incompatible histories have been written. . . For any notable change of horizon is done, not on the basis of that horizon, but by envisaging a quite different and, at first sight, incomprehensible alternative and then undergoing a conversion."

75. Dialectic emerges as a functional specialty when one recognizes the need to develop methods (1) by which investigators can avoid incoherent assumptions and procedures, and (2) by which differences can be ironed out once incompatible results have been assimilated. These problems have to do with horizons, not with perspectives.

Dialectic deals with the *existential*; when one is dealing with these matters, one is doing dialectic. At this point one is not doing interpretation or history, but moves into dialectic.

MT, p. 235: "Not all opposition is dialectical. There are differences that will be eliminated by uncovering fresh data. There are differences we have named perspectival, and they merely witness to the complexity of historical reality. But beyond these there are fundamental conflicts stemming from an explicit or implicit cognitional theory, an ethical stance, a religious outlook. They profoundly modify one's mentality. There are to be overcome only through an intellectual, moral, religious conversion. The function of dialectic will be to bring such conflicts to light, and to provide a technique that objectifies subjective differences and promotes conversion."

MT, p. 254: "The theologian's strategy will be, not to prove his own position, not to refute counter-positions, but *to exhibit diversity and to point to the evidence for its roots*. In this manner he will be attractive to those that appreciate full human authenticity and he will convince those that attain it. Indeed, the basic idea of the method we are trying to develop takes its stand on *discovering what human authenticity is and showing how to appeal to it*. It is not an infallible method, for men easily are unauthentic, but it is a powerful method, for man's deepest need and most prized achievement is authenticity."

The strategy in dialectic is a *strategy of witness*; it is a strategy of incarnate meaning as much as it is of linguistic carrying of meaning. This is where the theologian emerges as incarnate/existential subject, and gets out on the table the questions as to what an authentic existential subject is.

Dialectic is not a polemical matter. It involves inviting decision.

76. "incoherence" here means "in conflict with the basic orientation of transcendental method uncovered in intentionality analysis and with the religious orientation disclosed by religiously differentiated consciousness." This is basic incoherence. Fundamental conflicts stem from an explicit or implicit cognitional theory, an ethical stance, a religious outlook. These three areas are specified as fundamental by reason of the levels of consciousness.

'Basically incoherent' statements are statements in conflict with the basic thrust of the human spirit to be intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and in love.

Cognitional theory is a matter of understanding the first three levels of consciousness and of authentic performance at those levels; ethical stance regards the fourth level; religious outlook perhaps regards a 'fifth' level (though Lonergan does not use that language in *MT*). it is the correlation of these matters with the levels of consciousness that makes them 'basic.'

77. Overcoming such conflicts is a function, not of uncovering fresh data nor of raising new questions or developing new methods at the same level, but only by a change in horizon constituting a conversion.

The aim of Dialectic is positive; it is not teaching people how to debate! The aim is a *comprehensive viewpoint*, a viewpoint of viewpoints: some single base or some single set of related bases from which one can proceed to understand the relations of the many viewpoints exhibited in different movements, different histories, different interpretations.

The aim is to bring to light both where differences are irreducible, and where they are complementary and genetic; if they are complementary they can be brought together in a larger whole. And even among irreducible differences, it can be recognized that some are more serious than others.

78. The comprehensive viewpoint at which dialectic aims is thus a clarification of the relations among basic horizons, not only structurally but also historically: a potential totality of genetically and dialectically related viewpoints.

I, p. 564: "By a universal viewpoint will be meant a *potential totality of genetically and dialectically ordered viewpoints*."

A *horizon* is the limit of one's vision, the boundary of the questions that one can or will ask.

In chapter seventeen of *I*, Lonergan refers to the three categories of 'the known,' 'the known unknown,' and 'the unknown unknown' (pp. 531-533). The 'known' is comprised of one's knowledge, i.e., of the questions that one is able to *answer*; 'the known unknown' goes beyond this to include what one does not know in terms of answers, but which one can nonetheless ask about; the 'known unknown' is comprised of those dimensions of reality which, at any given time, transcend one's ability to even ask about.

KNOWN		Questions I can answer
KNOWN UNKNOWN	**Horizon**	Questions I can ask
UNKNOWN UNKNOWN		Questions I can/will not ask

MT, p. 236: "What lies beyond one's horizon is simply outside the range of one's knowledge and interests: one neither knows nor cares. But what lies within one's horizon is in some measure, great or small, an object of interest and of knowledge."

The question for Dialectic is horizon, i.e., of the questions that one can or will ask. To say that something is outside one's horizon and unintelligible to her/him is not simply to say that s/he does not, in fact, understand it; rather, it is to say that s/he denies the very possibility of intelligibility.

> *MT*, pp. 236-237: "Horizons may be opposed dialectically. What in one is found intelligible, in another is unintelligible. What for one is true, for another is false. What for one is good, for another is evil. Each may have some awareness of the other and so each in a manner may include the other. But such inclusion is also negation and rejection. For the other's horizon, at least in part, is attributed to wishful thinking, to an acceptance of myth, to ignorance of fallacy, to blindness or illusion, to backwardness or immaturity, to infidelity, to bad will, to a refusal of God's grace."
>
> > When people start making statements like that, the chances are that you're talking about dialectically opposed horizons.

But different horizons are not necessarily related dialectically; they may also be complementary. Thus, I live in a different 'world' from a computer scientist, but I recognize the need for the computer scientist and her/his 'world.' Our horizons are complementary.

> Horizons might also be related genetically; thus, if I were to learn computer science my post-learning horizon would be genetically related to my pre-learning horizon.

79. A horizon is the boundary of the questions that one can ask, the line of demarcation between the known and unknown. Horizons are both the structured resultant of past achievements and the condition and limitation of further development: the context of contexts.

Horizons are *in time*; they have a temporal dimension to them. There are possibilities in this issue for exploring the relationships of Heidegger and Lonergan. The notion of dialectic may well be able to add something to Heidegger's thought with regard to time and meaning.

Horizons provide the basic *context* of all out intentions, statements, and meanings.

MT, p. 237: "Horizons are the sweep of our interests and of our knowledge; they are the fertile source of further knowledge and care; but they also are the boundaries that limit our capacities for assimilating more than we already have attained."

A context is the limited nest of questions and answers heading toward the point where there are not further questions.

80. The relations among horizons may be complementary, genetic, or dialectical. Complementary horizons are the condition of possibility of the collaboration needed for the functioning of a communal world. Genetically related horizons are parts of a single biography or history. Dialectically related horizons are irreconcilable short of conversion.

It is in terms of horizons that we are to understand conversions.

81. The exercise of freedom may be either horizontal or vertical, and the exercise of vertical freedom, by which one moves to a new horizon, may or may not involve a radical about-face. Conversion entails the exercise of freedom that involves an about-face, a repudiation of a previous fundamental orientation and the assumption of a new orientation releasing the possibility of new contexts, new limited nests of questions and answers previously not possible. Conversion is the radical structuring principle of one's horizons and their development.

Horizontal liberty is exercised within a horizon; vertical liberty is the movement from one horizon to another. Conversion is an exercise of vertical freedom; but not every exercise of vertical freedom is a conversion.

Conversion can be a temporally concentrated occurrence; for most of us, however, it is a *process* that takes place over a long period of time. Sometimes it is discerned only in retrospect; during the course of that process, nevertheless, we do ordinarily have at least some sense that some change is going forward.

In the case of Augustine, for instance, there seems to have been a lengthy process that led up to a sudden event. The whole process leading up to that event was a developing conversion.

Further, Doran has become more and more convinced that God deals with each individual in a highly unique fashion; there is no one sequence in religious conversion. Also, it is important to recall the wisdom of the traditional doctrine that the radical state of anyone's orientation is known only to God. Thus, not only must we withhold judgment of others; we must realize that we do not ultimately know if we ourselves are righteous or not. The saint seems to know this better than the rest of us.

Conversion does not occur within the theological context; it occurs in the dramatic pattern of one's own life. Conversion may, however, be promoted by theology.

82. On the position of Method in Theology there are three types of conversion: intellectual, moral, and religious.

Each of the three conversions is related to the other two in several ways; but, also, each of them is a different type of event, and has to be considered in itself before being related to the others.

Later in life, Lonergan himself spoke of an 'affective' conversion and accepted Doran's notion of 'psychic' conversion; but in *MT*, these are the three conversions considered: intellectual, moral, and religious.

83. *Intellectual* conversion is a turn from the criteria of objectivity in the world of immediacy to the *criteria of objectivity in the world mediated by meaning*. It is a conversion to being as mediated by the true, where the true is known, not by sense, but by the grasp of the fulfillment of conditions for a prospective judgment. As such it moves one beyond naïve realism, empiricism, and idealism to critical realism. It is a conversion because by it one *means* a world totally different from the worlds envisioned in these other horizons. It is a transformation of the very sources, acts, and terms of meaning at the first three levels of consciousness.

The phrase "intellectual" conversion does not appear in *I*; but what he terms "intellectual conversion" in *MT* is, in fact, what the whole of *I* is attempting to promote.

In *I* (p. xxviii), Lonergan notes the "startling strangeness" of the discovery "that there are two quite different realisms, that there is an incoherent realism, half animal and half human, that poses as a half-way house between materialism and idealism, and on the other hand, that there is an intelligent and reasonable realism between which and materialism the half-way house is idealism."

Critical realism accepts as the criterion of objectivity the fulfillment of conditions for the affirmation of something that one has understood.

Intellectual conversion is the movement from naïve realism to critical realism.

In this context, what Lonergan means by naïve realism is to the whole Gilsonian school of neo-Thomism.

Critical realism involves recognition of the fact that we do know by understanding; but contrary to idealism, it affirms that what we know by understanding *is* the *real* world if the conditions for affirming our understanding are fulfilled.

Intellectual conversion is the discovery that the world in which we live is mediated and constituted by meaning, and that the criteria for objectivity in such a world are distinct from those in the world of immediacy. The real cannot be known by taking a good look at the already-out-there-now! The real is what is affirmed when the conditions for affirmation are fulfilled. The world mediated by meaning is known, not just by sense, but by experience, understanding, judgment, and belief. Human knowing is not just seeing, nor is it even analogous to seeing; it is the process of experiencing, understanding, judging, and believing.

For Lonergan, that discovery is the overcoming of the myth that places the criteria for knowing/objectivity at the level of sense. This is a myth that most people entertain.

The basic types of these counter-positions are naïve realism, empiricism, and idealism.

The *naïve realist* knows the world mediated by meaning, but thinks that that world is known by looking. Gilson, e.g., would not, of course, deny the reality of things that cannot be seen. But when he presents his theory of knowledge, he presents it as

analogous to taking a good look. The realities in Gilson's world include many of the same realities in Lonergan's world, but the account of how they are known is different.

The *empiricist* restricts objective knowledge to what can be sensed; if it cannot be sensed it cannot be known. All understanding, judging, and believing is called merely subjective activity. The empiricist does not know what the realist knows; the empiricist knows only the world of immediacy.

The *idealist* insists that human knowing includes understanding, and so includes the world mediated by meaning. But the world mediated by meaning is just ideal, not real.

The *critical realist* acknowledges that knowledge is through understanding, but insists that understanding can be verified and, if it is verified, then one has come to know the real world. In other words, the process that moves through understanding can transcend self in judgment: if an when one grasps the fulfillment of conditions for affirming one's understanding, one knows reality.

Lonergan insists that this self-affirmation of the knower is a real conversion because "Empiricism, idealism and realism name three totally different horizons with no common identical objects. An idealist never means what an empiricist means, and a realist never means what either of them means." (*MT*, p. 239)

When you go to academic conventions and listen to people argue, it can become quite clear that they simply do not mean the same thing. You have to push back to basic presuppositions about what knowing is, what is involved in knowing, what can be known, etc., before you can make any sense at all of some conversations.

They can even say the same thing without *meaning* the thing, with regard to the sources, acts, and terms of meaning. Lonergan is talking about a transformation of the very sources, acts, and terms of meaning in the subject at the first three levels of consciousness.

But it must also be remembered that Lonergan grants that intellectual conversion is in no way demanded by the gospel; it is not the radical type of exigence that religious and moral conversion can be. At the same time, intellectual conversion may well be a radical cultural exigence in our time.

Again, Lonergan says that for most people intellectual conversion is moving away from the assumption that knowing is something like looking; some form of naïve realism seems unquestionable to very many people. In his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Education*, Lonergan presents at least one reason for this in terms of how the child develops the notion of space. The child does develop the notion of space through some kind of correlation of 'real' with what is 'out there.' This becomes a 'habit' in one's early development, a habit that stays with us even as we move into the world mediated by meaning – even into very sophisticated development in the world mediated by meaning. We can keep an infantile criterion for the real as what is 'out there,' known by something like 'taking a good look.'

MT, pp. 239-240: "To be liberated from that blunder, to discover the self-transcendence proper to the human process of coming to know, is to break often long-ingrained habits of thought and speech. It is to acquire the mastery in one's own house that is to be had only when one knows precisely what one is doing when one is knowing. It is a conversion, a new beginning, a fresh start. It opens the way to ever further clarifications and developments."

84. As intellectual conversion is a shift in the criteria of the true and the real, and so of one's affirmations of fact, so *moral* conversion is a shift in the *criteria of the good*, and so of one's judgments of value, one's decisions, commitments, and actions. The criteria shift from satisfactions to values.

Moral conversions in what Lonergan calls the "existential moments" of our lives when we discover for ourselves that it is up to ourselves to decide for ourselves what we are to make of ourselves.

Moral conversion consists in opting for the truly good, even for value against satisfaction should they conflict with one another. Moral conversion is not moral perfection, no more than intellectual conversion means that one can write a book like *Insight*! These are developmental processes; even after one has opted for the good, one still must throughout her/his life uncover one's biases, keeping open to criticism of one's orientation, remaining ready to learn from others, scrutinizing one's responses to values, etc.

85. *Religious* conversion is conversion to the dynamic state of being in love with God, a principle whence flow one's subsequent acts.

MT, p. 240: "Religious conversion is being grasped by ultimate concern. It is other-worldly falling in love. It is total and permanent self-surrender without conditions, qualifications, reservations. But it is such a surrender, not as an act, but as a dynamic state that is prior to and principle of subsequent acts. It is revealed in retrospect as an under-tow of a existential consciousness, as a fated acceptance of a vocation to holiness, as perhaps an increasing simplicity and passivity in prayer. It is interpreted differently in the context of different religious traditions. For Christians it is God's love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit given to us. It is the gift of grace."

In *Markings*, Dag Hammarksjøld writes of the moment when he said 'Yes!,' and the whole world changed. But he didn't realize that right away; it was in retrospect.

> Entry for Whitsunday, 1961: "I don't know Who – or what – put the question, I don't know when it was put. I don't even remember answering. But as some moment I did answer 'Yes' to Someone – of Something – and from that hour I was certain that existence is meaningful and that, therefore, my life, in self-surrender, had a goal." [*Markings* (London: Faber and Faber, 1964), p. 169.]

All the distinctions of grace made in our 2,000 year tradition are talking about the reality of religious conversion, and movement towards it and from it.

Religious conversion is to being-in-love from *lovelessness*.

> *MT*, pp. 242-243: "Sinfulness similarly is distinct from moral evil; it is the privation of total loving; it is a radical dimension of lovelessness. That dimension can be hidden by sustained superficiality, by evading ultimate questions, by absorption in all that the world offers to challenge our resourcefulness, to relax our bodies, to distract our minds. But escape may not be permanent and then the absence of fulfilment reveals itself in unrest, the absence of joy in the pursuit of fun, the absence of peace in disgust – a depressive disgust with oneself or a manic, hostile, even violent disgust with mankind."

86. All three conversions are attainments of self-transcendence: to truth, to values, to a total being-in-love.

87. As occurring within a single consciousness, the three conversions are related (1) *causally*: normally religious conversion evokes moral conversion, and these two evoke intellectual conversion; (2) in

reverse order, by *sublation*: moral orientation sublates intellectual devotion to truth into the context of dedication to values as such, and religious conversion sublates both by the power of love. [Doran: To the extent that intellectual conversion entails *explanatory self-appropriation*, it is to be sublated by a moral and religious conversion that have been submitted to *analogous explanatory objectification*.]

MT, p. 243: "First there is the gift of his love. Next, the eye of this love reveals values in their splendor, while the strength of this love brings about their realization, and that is moral conversion. Finally, among the values discerned by the eye of love is the value of believing the truths taught by the religious tradition, and in such tradition and belief are the seeds of intellectual conversion."

On this notion of 'dogmatic realism' as the seed of intellectual conversion, cf. "The Origins of Christian Realism," A Second Collection (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1974), pp. 239-261. The word spoken and heard proceeds from and penetrates through all four levels of intentional consciousness, not just the first level of experience. And its content is a content of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. This paper was written and re-written by Lonergan over a period of some fifteen years. In it, he is trying to show how the word of the gospel led to intellectual conversion in the church.

Thus the general causal relationship is as follows:

Religious ⟶ Moral ⟶ Intellectual

The relationship can also be understood in reverse, in terms of "*sublation*." By sublation he means this: when *y* sublates *x*, *y* goes beyond *x* and introduces something new and distinct, putting everything on a new basis; *y* does not, however, interfere with the functioning of *x*, in fact *y* needs *x* and so preserves all its proper features, but carries them forward to a new realization in a richer context.

Thus, understanding sublates experience, and judgment sublates understanding and experience. Chemical conjugates sublate physical, and biological conjugates sublate chemical and physical.

Lonergan says that intellectual conversion is sublated by moral conversion; i.e., the value of truth is sublated into a concern for all value, without interfering with one's dedication to the value of truth. Religious conversion sublates both intellectual and moral conversion, transforming one's concern for value into love and transforming one's self as concerned with value into a subject-in-love.

Doran suggests, further, that *once one has become intellectually critical, intellectual conversion can only be sublated by moral and religious conversion if they themselves are critical*. Thus, a pre-critical moral and religious orientation will not effectively sublate critical intellectual operation. There has to take place a moral and religious self-appropriation that is every bit as detailed as what *Insight* does for intellectual self-appropriation. It is a demand of the subject that when one finds radical clarification in one area, s/he must find it in the others as well. Thus, once intellectual conversion has taken place, it re-sets the context and demands radical clarification in the moral and religious dimensions of subjectivity.

88. Nonetheless religious conversion has a *distinctness* of its own, the *otherworldly orientation to mystery* that was intended in the medieval theorem of the supernatural entitative order.

Religious conversion is more than a new ground for intellectual and moral pursuits, though it is that. It has a distinct dimension of its own: other-worldly fulfillment, joy, peace, bliss. There is the distinct dimension of Otto's *mysterium tremendum et fascinans*, awe and trembling at the mystery of reality.

89. The contradictory course of radical transformation is perhaps less uniform in structure. As social and cultural it destroys some genuine part of the beliefs that consolidate achievement, mutilates a previous whole, upsets a balance, and distorts the remainder by compensation. The mutilation is mistaken for progress, and the dissolution screened by self-deception and prolonged by consistency. The occurrence of different dissolutions in different classes, nations, age-groups promotes increasing division, incomprehension, suspicion, distrust, hostility, hatred, violence – a Babel of competing voices, a mutilation of the body social.

Opposite to conversions are breakdowns, radical movements in an opposite direction; breakdown involves abandoning cognitional search for truth, moral response to value, genuine religion.

> Conversion is ever precarious; authenticity is ever a withdrawal from unauthenticity, and is never secure.

Lonergan is borrowing from Newman in asserting that breakdown involve the destruction of some part of cultural achievement; there follows some mutilation of the whole because you try to compensate for what has been destroyed. Lonergan treats this question in "The Absence of God in Modern Culture," *A Second Collection*, pp. 101-116. The process of disintegration can be ongoing and cumulative, "screened by self-deception and perpetuated by consistency" (*MT*, p. 244).

> *MT*, p. 55: "A civilization in decline digs its own grave with a relentless consistency."

And as opposed to the normal process of the conversions, breakdown does not seem to follow some single, uniform course; you can't say that it occurs in one way more than in another. Different nations, different classes, different groups select different parts of past achievement for elimination, for different mutilations, different distortions.

> Increasing dissolution is matched by increasing division as some people will choose to eliminate *x*, and others *y*; then they become at odds not only with converted persons, but also with each other. You have a kind of vision of hell on earth.
>
> *MT*, p. 244: "Increasing dissolution will then be matched by increasing division, incomprehension, suspicion, distrust, hostility, hatred, violence. The body social is torn apart in many ways, and its cultural soul has been rendered incapable of reasonable convictions and responsible commitments."

90. In confronting such issues Dialectic has two interrelated tasks: evaluation and encounter. *Evaluation* completes interpretation and history by adding to them appreciation and discernment. *Encounter* allows one's living to be challenged at its roots by the words and deeds of those one studies.

The s*ubject* is called into question in a way that gets out into the open dialectic. It was lurking there in interpretation and history, but is made *the issue* in dialectic.

91. The way in which one confronts these tasks will affect one's performance and results in research, interpretation, and history.

The self that you are determines what you can understand and accept.

92. The conflict of dialectical differences issues in a situation that can be resolved only by *horizontal analysis*. This analysis will reveal eight radically differing types of basic horizon affecting every investigation in theology. A theology can be methodical only if it can meet these issues head-on.

1. unconverted
2. religiously converted, but nor morally or intellectually
3. morally converted, but not religiously or intellectually
4. intellectually converted, but not morally or religiously
5. religiously and morally converted, but not intellectually
6. religiously and intellectually converted, but not morally
7. morally and intellectually converted, but not religiously
8. religiously, morally, and intellectually converted.

If a theology does not meet these issues head-on it is leaving something out.

93. A theology meets these issues by bringing operators of an upper blade of dialectical method to bear on materials presented by lower blade methods.

94. The upper blade consists of the precepts, 'Develop positions,' 'Reverse counter-positions,' where *positions* are statements compatible with intellectual, moral, and religious conversion, and *counter-positions* are statements incompatible with the conversions.

That sounds simple, but the whole book *Insight* is really about how you determine positions and reverse counter-positions.

95. Positions are *developed* by being integrated with fresh data and further discovery. Counterpositions are *reversed* by removing the elements incompatible with the conversions.

An example of what Lonergan means by developing positions would be what he has done with Newman. He read Newman's *Grammar of Assent* eight times as a young man studying philosophy at Heythrop College. What Newman called the "illative sense" is Lonergan's reflective understanding leading to judgment; Lonergan's work in this regard is simply a development of what he found in Newman. Whereas Newman's context was descriptive, Lonergan places this in an explanatory context. Developing the position, here, meant placing it in an explanatory rather than a descriptive framework.

Concerning reversal of counter-positions, Doran notes his own work on Jung. There is much in Jung that is positional and should be developed by being related to a fuller position on the subject; but there are several things in Jung that are counter-positional (e.g., idealism, moral relativism) that have to be removed.

96. Lower blade methods: (a) *assemble*: gather the data [researches, interpretations, histories, and the events, statements, movements to which they refer]; (b) *complete*: add evaluation to interpretation and factual history; (c) *compare*: seek out affinities and oppositions in the assembled and evaluated materials; (d) *reduce*: find the roots of the affinities and oppositions; (e) *classify*: determine which roots stem from dialectically opposed horizons and which do not; (f) *select*: pick out the affinities and oppositions grounded in dialectically opposed horizons and dismiss the rest from further consideration in Dialectic.

97. As investigators operate in Dialectic from within their own different horizons, the sources of their differences will be made manifest as each selects what s/he regards as positions and counter-positions and indicates the view that results from advancing positions and reversing counter-positions. As this work goes forward, the views of the investigators themselves are becoming

materials to be assembled, completed, compared, reduced, classified, selected; investigators are encountering one another; theology is moving into the second phase.

> Fred Crowe makes the point that the academy is not set up to engage in this; but if it could be, this is how methodical mediation of the past into the present, and the present into the future would occur.
>
> But unfortunately, the academy seems to be structured in such a way as to prevent that kind of encounter. Thus, what Lonergan is calling for here is radical. It means something like moving the atmosphere of the retreat house into the academy, so that there can really be this king of personal encounter with one another.

98. Dialectic is a method in that its related and recurrent operations yield the cumulative and progressive results of (1) light on the dialectical oppositions that existed in the past; and (2) cumulative formal and actual evidence on *one's own* achievement of self-transcendence.

99. There exist at least eight quite different manners of doing dialectic. To the extent that Dialectic is done by people who have undergone intellectual, moral, and religious conversion, results will agree and be supported in part by investigators who have undergone one or other but not all three conversions. The view of a past whose positions are developed and counter-positions reversed will present the past as better than it was. But to the extent that positions are reversed and counter-positions developed, the past is presented as worse than it was. And because this can happen in any of seven different ways, the results of counter-positional dialecticians will conflict, not only with those of positional dialecticians, but also with one another. As theology moves to direct discourse, theologians encounter one another on the theme or topic of the basic conversions that ground that direct discourse. Conversion becomes the foundational topic, and questions are raised that can be answered, not in theology itself but only in the existential domain of one's own living. Theology *promotes* conversion, but conversion is *effected only in the existential domain* of foundational reality itself.

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There were questions during the last lecture with regard to Lonergan's usage of the terms 'perspective' and 'horizon' in chapters nine and ten. At times it seemed as though 'perspective' referred to complementary positions and 'horizon' to dialectically related positions; yet in other places, Lonergan speaks of complementary horizons (e.g., genetically related ones).

This may stem from the fact that the entirety of chapter nine is devoted to Lonergan's comments on themes raised by other historians when they comment about doing history. Thus, the comments about the problem that arose concerning the relationship between facts and interpretation, *Verstehen* in the German historical school – these are issues raised by historians commenting about their work. In section five of chapter nine, he is dealing basically with the comment of Karl Heussi to the effect that (a) similar structures are reached when investigations proceed form the same standpoint, but also that (b) historical reality is too complicated for an exhaustively complete description ever to occur; thus, maintained Heussi, history must be rewritten for each new generation. Lonergan basically agrees with those comments and refers to this position as "perspectivism."

> *MT*, p. 217: "Perspectivism stresses the complexity of what the historian is writing about and, as well, the specific difference of historical from mathematical, scientific, and philosophic knowledge. It does not lock historians up in their backgrounds, confine them to their biases, deny them access to development and openness. But it does point out that historians with different backgrounds will rid themselves of biases, undergo conversions, come to understand

the quite different mentalities of other places and times, and even move towards understanding one another, each in his own distinctive fashion. They may investigate the same area, but they ask different questions."

In the section (six) on "horizons," Lonergan speaks about a further complexity in historical investigations that arises – not from the complexity of the data, nor from the more-or-less authentic development of the historians – but, rather, from "other sources." Lonergan calls attention to this as a further complement to what Heussi had said.

When he moves in to the chapter (ten) on Dialectic, he begins that with a further discussion of "horizons." It seems that he is moving the consideration of both 'perspectives' and 'horizons' from chapter nine into this section on 'horizons' in chapter ten. Thus, some of the things that arise in perspectivism are a matter of genetically-related or complementary 'horizons;' also discussed in this section are matters pertaining to the "other sources" which ground dialectically-related horizons.

The elliptical nature of Lonergan's expression here calls for some clarification.

Chapter ELEVEN: F*oundations*

Dialectic leaves theology with a coincidental manifold (cf. *I*, 49-50, 451-4543): different theologians of different persuasions and different horizons, each advancing what s/he thinks are positions and reversing what s/he thinks are counter-positions. This is a coincidental manifold for the emergence of direct discourse in theology. The whole first phase has been indirect discourse, concerned with interpreting, judging, evaluating what others have said and done. But the conflicts in those interpretations, judgments, and evaluations are provoking – teasing out – the emergence of direct discourse, where the theologian has to state what s/he holds to be true.

The emergence of direct discourse is in 'proximate potency' when the views of investigators themselves become the materials that are assembled, completed, compared, reduced, classified, and selected in Dialectic. At that point, theological investigators are emerging into the full personhood that takes a stand, and declares itself for what-is-so. As that is happening, theology is becoming praxis.

100. The *foundational reality* required for theology to move to direct discourse is *conversion*: intellectual, moral, religious. The first task of Foundations is to *objectify* these grounds of direct theological discourse.

Direct discourse is grounded in the same realities that constituted the radical dialectical pluralism, which he discussed in the chapter on Dialectic; the same realities that are the radical sources of that dialectical pluralism, are the grounds of direct discourse in theology: i.e., intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. Those three conversions constitute what he calls "foundational reality;" the *objectification* of those three conversions constitutes the first task of the functional specialty, Foundations.

> Foundational reality is the converted subject in her/his operations as converted subject; Foundations (as a functional specialty) has, as its first task, the objectification of that foundational reality.

The second task of Foundations is the *derivation of theological categories*.

Whenever one is stating one's position with regard to (a) what it is to know, (b) authentic intention of value, and (c) authentic religion, one is doing Foundations in theology; in stating those positions, one is *de facto* disclosing the grounds of one's other positions. The grounds of

all the other positions that one holds are located in what one thinks about knowing, what one holds about morality, and what one judges to be the case with regard to religious authenticity.

> When one is stating one's position on those issues, one is *disclosing the self* that did research, interpretation, history, and dialectic. But now that self is taking a stand, not on what others said/did, but on what one holds oneself.
>
> Those foundational positions with regard to the conversions *ground the second phase* of theology. They are operative in the first phase but, strictly speaking, are not foundational there. In the first phase, one's status as relatively converted or unconverted subject, affects the *results* that one arrives at, but not the method. In the second phase, not only the results but also the *method* itself depends on who one is as a subject and what one holds on basic issues.
>
> > The method of Interpretation is the same, whether one is intellectually/morally/religiously converted or not; the method of History is the same; the method of Dialectic – lining up what one holds to be positions and counter-positions – is the same. The results in each of those will be different, depending on who one is; but the method is the same for all.
> >
> > In the second phase, not only the results, but also the method itself depends on who one is as a subject and what one holds with regard to those basic issues. One cannot methodically perform Doctrines, Systematics, and Communications without ho9lding certain positions on those basic issues.
>
> The conversions are not the sole foundation of the second phase; the second phase also depends on Research, Interpretation, History, and Dialectic. When he speaks of the "sufficiency" of foundational reality (11.2), he means sufficient in the sense that they are sufficient to effect the transition into the second phase; they are the sufficient 'catalyst' for movement from indirect into direct discourse.
>
> > *MT*, p. 257: "We are seeking not the whole foundation of these specialties – for they obviously will depend on research, interpretation, history, and dialectic – but just the *added foundation needed to move from the indirect discourse that sets forth the convictions and opinions of others to the direct discourse that states what is so*."
>
> They are sufficient because it is precisely in those areas – knowing, morality, and religion – that the problems have emerged that have forced theologians to take basic positions, i.e., to begin speaking about what they themselves hold.

Lonergan draws a distinction between "foundational reality" (*infrastructure*) and "Foundations" (*superstructure*). For the sense in which he uses the terms "infrastructure" and "superstructure," cf. "The Absence of God in Modern Culture," *A Second Collection*, pp. 101-116. "Infrastructure" is the spontaneous, everyday reality; the "superstructure" is the objectification of the spontaneous and everyday. Foundational reality is the subject in her/his operations; Foundations is the self-appropriation and objectification of the subject.

Foundational reality is a set of fourth level acts, a set of decisions, about whom you are for and whom you are against, a decision illuminated by the manifold possibilities of the first phase; a fully conscious decision about one's horizon, outlook, world-view. Foundations is the objectification of that set of decisions. This adds to *I* the fact that the self-appropriation is not sufficient if it is just self-affirmation (third level, judgment); here he speaks about a decision with

regard to what one has come to regard to be true about oneself. Self-appropriation involves deciding to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible.

> If one's decisions are authentic and clear-headed, they will entail the total surrender of oneself to the demands of the human spirit; and they will do so explicitly in the context of a community that one has chosen and accepted as a responsibility. This will be a fully conscious decision, not arbitrary, and not easily attained.

The theologian cannot escape adverting to the multiplicity of horizons, and stating clearly which one is hers/his. David Tracy has made the point quite clearly (*Blessed Rage for Order* [NY: Seabury Press, 1975]) that it is incumbent on every theologian to state formally, explicitly and at great length, where s/he is 'coming from' on the most basic issues. This cannot be avoided; it is forced out into the open in theology. One cannot proceed methodically in theology without doing this, without coming out into the open on the way in which one has clarified these issues.

> In the second phase of theology, one's person is on the line at every step of the way – in a way that is not the case in the first phase. One's very personhood is at stake, for one is assuming responsibility for what is true; judgment entails responsibility. One is assuming a responsibility not only for what s/he holds to be true, but for her/his community, its tradition, and its future. This is a decisively personal, responsible act. The grounds for that act are what the functional specialty, Foundations, articulates.

Conversion provides "the immanent and operative set of norms that guides each forward step in the process (*MT*, p. 270). That immanent and operative set of norms is provided – not by tradition, not by authority, not by a set of logically first propositions – but by who you are and what you hold on basic issues. That alone controls the process of the second phase of theology. If one is right on those basic issues, s/he will come down on the positions, and not the counter-positions, on every other issue.

> To this Doran adds the need for psychic conversion to prevent the disturbance of dramatic bias (cf. *I*, 191-203), and to help one distinguish positions from counter-positions in the realm of elemental carriers of meaning (intersubjectivity, art, symbol, the lives/deeds of persons).
>
> The method is not infallible, because *we* are not infallible; authenticity is ever precarious, and ever a withdrawal from unauthenticity. But to the extent that I am on the positions on basic issues, and to the extent that I remain authentic, I will remain on the positions on other issues.
>
> > The method takes its stand on authenticity.

The conversions are foundational – not by providing a set of propositions – but because they provide a fundamental and momentous change in the reality a theologian is; they ground the incarnate meaning of the theologian.

101. The presence or absence of *differentiations* of consciousness results in a twofold legitimate *pluralism*: of religion, i.e., of the spontaneous expression of the same fundamental stance; and of theology as reflective mediation of faith and culture.

Sections three and four of chapter eleven deal with the problem of pluralism. There is a *radical* pluralism, grounded in the presence or absence of conversion. There is also a *legitimate and permanent* pluralism, which is a function of cultural differences at the level of common sense and from various possibilities of the differentiation of consciousness.

Making conversion – rather than propositions, tradition, or authority – foundational frees theology and the church to admit legitimate pluralism. There is a twofold legitimate pluralism: (a) a pluralism in the *spontaneous*, everyday expression of the same fundamental stance (e.g., in prayer, worship, community living); and (b) a pluralism of *theologies* expressing the same faith. Thus, there are legitimate pluralisms of both infrastructure and superstructure.

102. If one recognized five differentiations of consciousness beyond common sense, there result thirty-two possibilities of varieties or relatively differentiated consciousness. The five differentiations are: theory, interiority, transcendence, scholarship, and art. Each can be incipient, mature, or receding. The complexity increases exponentially when one grants the myriad varieties of common sense, and the modifications of common sense that enable educated persons to employ categories first worked out by differentiated consciousness.

1. common sense [undifferentiated consciousness]
2. theoretically [differentiated consciousness]
3. interiorly
4. religiously
5. scholarly
6. artistically
7. theoretically / interiorly
8. theoretically / religiously
9. theoretically / scholarly
10. theoretically / artistically
11. interiorly / religiously
12. interiorly / scholarly
13. interiorly / artistically
14. religiously / scholarly
15. religiously / artistically
16. scholarly / artistically
17. theoretically / interiorly / religiously
18. theoretically / interiorly / scholarly
19. theoretically / interiorly / artistically
20. theoretically / religiously / scholarly
21. theoretically / religiously / artistically
22. theoretically / scholarly / artistically
23. interiorly / religiously / artistically
24. interiorly / religiously / artistically
25. interiorly / scholarly / artistically
26. religiously / scholarly / artistically
27. theoretically / interiorly / religiously / scholarly
28. theoretically / interiorly / religiously / artistically
29. theoretically / interiorly / scholarly / artistically
30. theoretically / religiously / scholarly / artistically

31. interiorly / religiously / scholarly / artistically
32. theoretically / interiorly / religiously / scholarly / artistically

The point is to note the diversity, which is a potential richness. The five identified differentiations are in no way intended to be exhaustive; Doran argues, e.g. that today we need an ecological differentiation of consciousness.

Nicea's use of *homoousion* was an example of educated persons of common sense using a term derived from the world of theory. It's something like my use of the word "megabyte!" I can use the word and know that it makes a lot of difference whether you've got twenty of them or ten, without really knowing what a megabyte is.

103. The recognition of this plurality of differentiations, however, which is a function of historical consciousness, entails/demands the reconstruction of theology in the mode of interiorly differentiated consciousness familiar with the various differentiations and capable of elaborating a method that would integrate the scholarly investigation of sources with the direct discourse of doctrines and the theoretic constructions of systematics. A contemporary theologian must strive to attain a fivefold differentiation of consciousness.

A contemporary theologian should be at home in the realm of theory, interiority, transcendence, scholarship, and art, as well as being at home as much as possible in te different cultures that one is in contact with. All of this is leading to the possibility of a theology that has a *global significance* to it.

104. The second task of Foundations is the *derivation of categories*. Theological categories are either general or special, either shared with other disciplines or proper to theology. The source of general categories is *interiorly differentiated consciousness*; the source of *special* categories, *religiously differentiated consciousness*. Both sets of categories are employed to understand both religion and culture. Religion and culture, then, are mediated, not by correlation, but by methodical and, where necessary, dialectical *integration*.

In an age of historical consciousness, a reconstructed theology must take its stand on interiority; that is the only way it will be able to avoid relativism, while still acknowledging legitimate pluralism of differentiations. Basic theological categories cannot be derived from a philosophy that is only implicitly grounded in interiority (as was the case in medieval scholasticism). In his studies of Aquinas, Lonergan has shows that there was in fact a great deal of sophistication on the part of both Aristotle and Aquinas with respect to their self-knowledge, and that that knowledge was quite operative in their philosophy; but it was not explicitly the ground for their categories. Their primary, basic categories were metaphysical (potency, form, act). A theology that takes its stand in interiority – as it must do in an age of historical consciousness – will not have metaphysically derived categories as its basic, foundational categories. Rather, its categories will be derived from self-knowledge, the clarification of one's own interiority. Thus, the second task of Foundations is the derivation of categories.

> *MT*, p. 293: "The functional specialty, foundations, will be concerned largely with the origins, the genesis, the present state, the possible developments and adaptations of the categories in which Christians understand themselves, communicate with one another, and preach the gospel to all nations."

Whenever one is struggling to derive categories for one's direct theological discourse, one is moving back to foundational issues. In struggling to find appropriate categories with which to express a systematic insight, you move back to Foundations.

If you can find norms *in* human consciousness, you can avoid being doomed to relativism and, in the end, nihilism (Rorty). It is because of this possibility for finding norms in conscious interiority that Lonergan argues that categories ought to be derived from interiority. If you can find, in the intending of the human spirit, norms for authentic humanity, then you can abandon classicist culture without being left to a total relativism.

The task of deriving the categories is intimately related to the first task, i.e., objectifying conversion, because religiously and interiorly differentiated consciousness are intimately related to two of the conversions. *Intellectual conversion*, in its formal and explicit sense, is what enables *interiorly differentiated* consciousness; *religious conversion* is the beginning of *religiously differentiated* consciousness and promotes it. So, to objectify the conversions is also to illumine what are the basic source of clarification for everything else.

> *MT*, pp. 282-282: "On the method we are proposing the source of basic clarification will be interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness."
>
> *Interiorly* differentiated consciousness is a source because it objectifies the transcendental notions constituting our capacity for recognizing the intelligible, the true, the real and the good. These notions are relevant to every object we come to know by raising and answering questions. Thus, to clarify those notions will be a source of clarification of one's knowledge about anything.
>
> *Religiously* differentiated consciousness is a source in theology because it objectifies the inchoate satisfaction of the transcendental notions in the gift of religious love. The transcendental notions are a yearning, and the gift of religious love is the inchoate satisfaction of that yearning, objectified by a consciousness that is differentiated in the realm of religion.

These two sources will ground the derivation of the categories in theology. They are capable of grounding in theological categories a *transcultural* quality.

105. The basic terms and relations of theology are provided by transcendental method and the objectification of the gift of religious love. These sources ground the possibility of categories that are transcultural in the realities to which they refer, and, precisely as such, valid for mediating with any culture the message of a religion with a universal mission. Further categories will have at least the utility of models. Whether they are descriptions or explanatory hypotheses about reality is a further question to be answered, not by method, but by theology itself.

To the extent that the categories are proximate to interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness, they will have a transcultural quality about them. For Lonergan, it is very desirable for theology to operate as much as possible with categories that are transcultural. This relates to his doctrine that Christianity is a religion with a universal mission to preach to all men and women in all cultures.

At their inner core, interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness are transcultural: not in the formulation, but in the reality to which the formulation refers. Wherever there have been human beings, they have had experiences that they have attempted to understand, they have attempted to understand as accurately and correctly as they could, and they have tried to make

responsible decisions on the basis of their understanding of their experience. And it is also universally true that God's grace is offered to all; this is a doctrine that works its way into Foundations. God's grace is not conditioned by prior knowledge; it is the cause of our seeking knowledge of God. It is not restricted to any stage or sector of culture, but introduces a new other-worldly, supernatural dimension into any culture.

> Theological categories will be valid to the extent that they are grounded in the basic terms and relations of transcendental method and religiously differentiated consciousness.

Categories will be generated first as models, which "purport to be, not descriptions of reality, not hypotheses about reality, but simply interlocking sets of terms and relations" (*MT*, p. 284), useful for guiding investigations, framing hypotheses, writing descriptions.

It is up to a theologian in any case to decide if a model is to become a hypotheses or a description that refers directly to reality. But even if it is merely a model, if it is grounded in these transcultural components in human living it will be extremely useful.

> Lonergan maintains that what he is offering are not merely models.
>
> *MT*, p. xii: "I do not think I am offering merely models. On the contrary, I hope readers will find more than mere models in what I shall say. But it is up to them to find it."

Doran is presently attempting to derive categories for a theological understanding of history, using the five levels of the scale of value, and a development on the notion of dialectic at the level of the subject, culture, and community; he keeps coming back to the foundations in the subject as basis for understanding culture and community. The basic dialectic is in the subject. Thus, the derivation of categories for a theological understanding must attempt to derive categories that are proximate to the transcultural realities of transcendental method and the gift of God's love. Doran sees this as more than a model; as an hypothesis with regard to the intelligible structure of history. He judges that history *is* a multiple dialectical process that can be understood in terms of the scale of values.



106. Initial general categories constitute the position on the subject. Some elements and consequences of that position have already been elaborated: the operations and structure of human intending, patterns of experience, qualitatively different levels of intending, realms of meaning and correlative worlds, diverse heuristic structures, differentiations of consciousness, conversions, the structure of dialectical oppositions. One can then go on to the positions on the human good, a theory of meaning, of science, of history, a metaphysics of proportionate being, an articulation of the transcendent exigence. Foundational reflection heads cumulatively and progressively towar4d the ideal goal of a full position on the subject as basic reality for the generation of all other general categories.

The general categories are derived *from the basic nest of terms and relations* built up from the theologian's own self-appropriation. That base – the attending, inquiring, reflecting, deliberating

subject – is not a purely private base; in fact, it is the most *public* reality of all. This is what enables the categories derived from that base to have a transcultural root. It is the real base of all knowledge, the source of any transcultural communication and of any human unity that extends over historical periods.

Accordingly, the first set of general categories is a developing position on the subject, which will be further developed by new differentiations of that basic nest.

MT, p. 287: "From such a broadened basis one can go on to a developed account of the human good, values, beliefs, to the carriers, elements, functions, realms, and stages of meaning, to the question of God, of religious experience, its expressions, its dialectical development."

> The he goes on to mention other possibilities, taken mainly from *I*: an understanding of development, rooted in the foundational understanding of the subject: a world-view of emergent probability; a dialectical method for understanding history; the developing question of religion; hermeneutics grounded in the potential, comprehensive viewpoint.
>
> Thus, Lonergan is suggesting the reconstruction of human science as well as of theology.

These are the basic structural steps taken thus far in working out the general categories:

1. Chapter eleven of *I*;
2. The notion of value as a distinct level of consciousness;
3. The fifth level of consciousness (religious love);
4. Two vectors in consciousness: from below / from above;
5. Psychic conversion and its implications.

107. The base of *special* categories is distinct: religious love as a dynamic state whence proceed inner and outer acts in the supernatural order. These acts have traditionally been understood as (a) purgative: withdrawing from sin and overcoming temptation; (b) illuminative: refining one's discernment of values and strengthening one's commitment to them; (c) unitive: a process of conversion and development in the realm of love.

The unassailable fact in the realm of religious experience is the fact of love.

MT, p. 290: "It is as though a room were filled with music though one can have no sure knowledge of its source. There is in the world, as it were, a charged field of love and meaning; here and there it reaches a notable intensity; but it is ever unobtrusive, there it reaches a notable intensity; but it is ever unobtrusive, hidden, inviting each of us to join. And join we must if we are to perceive it, for our perceiving is through our own loving."

> Ignatius of Loyola: 'consolation without a cause.'

108. There are five sets of special categories, treating: (a) religious experience itself, as expressed in explanatory terms and relations ("the way down" with the same precision as Lonergan devoted to "the way up"); (b) the togetherness of subjects in community, service, and witness, and their history as a history of salvation rooted in being in love and promoting the kingdom of God on earth; (c) the God who is the source of this love, understood by Christians as triune, as willing the incarnation of the Word, as sanctifying subjects by the gift of the Spirit; (d) the discrimination of authentic from inauthentic Christianity, and the understanding of a specifically religious dialectic; (e) progress, decline, and redemption, a theological theory of history.

a. You start with description, e.g., with narrative; but you have to move beyond that to explanation. This would give the first set of special categories for theology, and would constitute a theology of grace in the mode of interiorly differentiated consciousness.

b. These would be categories for ecclesiology. Cf. Joseph Komonchak, "Lonergan and the Tasks of Ecclesiology," *Creativity and Method*, edited by Matthew Lamb (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1981), pp. 265-273.

c. Categories for Trinitarian theology, Christology, and Pneumatology.

d. These categories must be worked out before ecumenism reaches its term in Christian unity.

e. Categories for a theology of history.

The categories (especially general) will, in fact, be used in all eight functional specialties. The self doing Interpretation and History, e.g., will be using categories such as the ones he speaks of derived from self-appropriation.

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Chapter TWLEVE: *Doctrines*

Initially, three things should be made clear with regard to the functional specialty, Doctrines:

a. It is a functional specialty *within theology*; Lonergan is not speaking of the function of doctrine within 'religion' here.

A position on the function of doctrine within religion would itself be a doctrine.

b. It is a functional specialty within the *second phase* of theology; thus, it is a matter of contemporary direct discourse, not a repetition of what others have said. It is the theologian's own 'saying,' in a contemporary mode to her/his contemporaries.

c. In Lonergan's methodical theology, it is *consequent upon Dialectic and Foundations*.

In fact, there is no direct transposition from a knowledge of what others have said through the course of the church's history to the contemporary statement of what I myself say; there is no way to that contemporary personal statement except through the differentiations/clarifications that emerge in the functional specialties of Dialectic and Foundations.

De facto, no one moves from indirect to direct discourse without – advertently or inadvertently – passing through the dynamics that Lonergan has tried to make advertent and differentiated by speaking of the functional specialties of Dialectic and Foundations. I cannot move from 'what the church says' to 'what I say' without some kind of exercise of those clarifications and differentiations. That has always been the case.

Dialectic		Foundations
History	::::::::::::::::	Doctrines
Interpretation		Systematics
Research		Communications

Nicea, e.g., was one of the major moments of transposition in the history of the church. The whole problem of that period was precisely the fact that there was no direct movement from Scripture to answering the questions that were raised by Arius. Simply

repeating what had been said in the Scriptural context wasn't adequate. There was, in fact, a movement that spontaneously involved some of the dynamics that Lonergan has tried to make explicit by differentiating the functional specialties of Dialectic and Foundations

Dialectic and Foundations represent a fundamental clarification of the issues that enable a contemporary theology to state Christian truth (Doctrines) in terms appropriate to a contemporary context. It is in those areas that are sorted out the differentiations and conversions that enable one to speak to one's own time. For Lonergan, those are the crucial clarifications needed for the statement of theological doctrine in a pluralistic, dynamic context such as ours.

The *Functional Specialty, Doctrines* (positions 109-114)

109. Theology in direct discourse proposes *theological doctrines* that are distinct from church doctrines but that can provide the background and at times even parts of the content of subsequent church doctrines. Theological doctrines include transpositions of church doctrines, transpositions of theological doctrines offered in another context, and new theological doctrines offered in response to contemporary exigencies.

To distinguish theological doctrines from church doctrines means that when theologians state what they hold to be the truth, they are moving far beyond simply repeating church doctrine. They are dealing with questions that are not dealt with in church doctrine; they are transposing what is given in church doctrine into language that perhaps will make that truth eventually communicable to contemporaries.

They are transposing church doctrines and theological doctrines out of other contexts and into the contemporary context.

110. Theological and church doctrines differ primarily by reason of *context*. Church doctrines are the content of the church's witness to Christ. Theological doctrines are part of an academic discipline concerned to know and understand the Christian tradition and to further its development.

Church doctrines are the normatively constitutive content of the church's witness to Christ. Theological doctrines are part of an autonomous academic discipline which wants to understand to promote the development of the Christian tradition.

Theology wants to both understand (*intelligere*) and to further the development (*augere et perficere*) of the Christian tradition.

Today, the context for theology is set by the various complexities of contemporary development spoken of in section seven (pp. 314-318) of this chapter. That context demands that the criteria of authentic performance in this functional specialty, Doctrines, be precisely the criteria that were worked out in Foundations: criteria of the authenticity of the theologian.

"This is far from a foolproof method" (*MT*, p. 331); but it is the only method we have! And in the final analysis it will tend to create a solid front that will enable the advance of Christian constitutive meaning to occur; that is what is going on in the whole second phase of theology.

111. Theology is thus an *autonomous* academic discipline with its own contribution to make and its own proper criteria, responsibilities, and set of methods.

To speak of the autonomy of the functional specialty, Doctrines, does not mean that theology is a source of revelation, an addition to Scripture, an authority that teaches church doctrine in an authoritative fashion; to speak of it as autonomous does not set it up against church authority.

Lonergan clearly holds that the authentic theologian will accept revelation, Scripture, and church doctrine; that was a very clear commitment in Lonergan's life. "But these premises do not lead to the conclusion that a theologian is just a parrot with nothing to do but repeat what has already been said." (*MT*, p. 331)

The theologian has to face matters that are in front of her/his contemporaries, matters which church doctrines do not treat. In addition, theologians may very well be the first persons in the church to propose content that may later on become part of the content of church doctrines – precisely because of confronting the questions that are in front of their contemporaries.

Theology has a contribution of its own to make to the ongoing constitutive meaning of the church; but it *makes that contribution as an autonomous academic discipline*, exploring issues creatively and exercising its contribution both (a) with acceptance of revelation, Scripture, and church doctrine, and (b) with complete openness to the questions that are raised by their contemporaries.

112. Theology's contribution, responsibility, and need of method come to light in a pronounced fashion in theological doctrines. In a methodical theology, the theologian working in the functional specialty, Doctrines, selects what s/he holds to be true from the enormous array of choices presented by Dialectic, on the basis of the personal transformations objectified in Foundations.

The decision confronting the theologian in the whole second phase of theology concerns the extent to which s/he will take responsibility for promoting the development of Christian constitutive meaning. There is, accordingly, a very personal commitment involved in the second phase. To what extent am I willing to accept the responsibility for both being faithful to and promoting the advance of the constitutive meaning of Christian living.

Lonergan distinguishes between 'doctrinal' and 'dogmatic' theology.

> *MT*, p. 333: "*Dogmatic* theology is classicist. It tends to take it for granted that on each issue there is one and only one true proposition. It is out to determine which are the unique propositions that are true."
>
> > That one-and-only correct proposition would be the one defined by the church. But in a methodical theology, that is first phase – finding out what others said. Part of the problem for the second phase is the transposition of that into the ongoing contemporary context.
>
> *MT*, cont'd: "In contrast, *doctrinal* theology is historically-minded. It knows that the meaning of a proposition becomes determinate only within a context. I knows that contexts vary with the varying brands of common sense, with the evolution of cultures, with the differentiations of human consciousness, and with the presence or absence of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion."
>
> > It distinguishes (a) the religious apprehension of a doctrine from (b) the theological apprehension of the same doctrine through a transposition. That is one of the tasks of the functional specialty, Doctrines: to transpose the same doctrine into contemporary terminology.

One is engaged in the functional specialty, Doctrines, when one "uses the functional specialty, Foundations, to select doctrines from among the multiple choices presented by the functional specialty, Dialectic." (*MT*, p. 298).

> By the time you get to Doctrines, what you are doing is stating what you hold to be true in the terms of interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness.
>
> The field from which the theologian selects is enormous; it includes not just past texts and movements studied in Interpretation and History, but also includes the various positions of contemporary theologians as they are advancing what they think to be positions and reversing what they think to be counterpositions. Thus, in the limit, the field includes everything that might be available on a given issue – including what I myself have said in doing Dialectic.
>
> > All of those are the multiple choices out of which one selects on the basis of the foundational conversions. The criterion that governs one's selection and articulation is provided by Foundations, by interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness.

There is a monumental task of transposition that is needed in the contemporary world; if the theological statement is to be in terms that will address contemporary development it must be in terms of categories derived from interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness.

Such theological transposed doctrines will consist of three categories:

a. Transposed church doctrines.

b. Transposed theological doctrines.

> E.g., I may thing that Aquinas was right on a given issue, but I don't want to express it directly in terms of Aristotelian metaphysics; so I transpose what I think was correct in Aquinas into the categories derived from interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness.

c. New theological doctrines, arrived at by facing contemporary questions, which may (or may not) contribute to the development of future church doctrines.

In Doran's reading, Schillebeeckx's *Jesus* and *Christ* are successful attempts to transpose the meaning of Christological doctrine into a contemporary context. Only a classicist is afraid of that kind of work.

> Similarly, Karl Rahner insisted that Chalcedon be considered to be a beginning, rather than an end. John Courtney Murray insisted that 'having come this far, we've got to move on.'
>
> The two principles that Lonergan is operating on in this chapter are these: (a) the permanence of meaning of a dogma that was formulated in another context; and (b) no one need be afraid of the kind of work that would transpose that meaning into language that would be intelligible to contemporaries with different questions and different differentiations of consciousness.

113. Such theological doctrines are distinct, not only from church doctrines, but also from the original message, from doctrines about the original message, from theological doctrines enunciated in a different context, and from the methodological doctrine that specifies how theologians should operate.

114. The complexities of contemporary developments demand that these doctrines be articulated in categories derived from interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness.

The contemporary developments which require this are primarily these: (a) modern science; (b) historical scholarship; and (c) the turn to the subject in modern philosophy.

This is Lonergan's vision of an enormous task that remains to be done. Even the task of transposing church doctrines into the contemporary context remains to be done, let alone the task of proposing new theological doctrines in response to some of the questions that are arising in our time.

Doctrine as Meaning (positions 115-116)

115. Doctrines of any variety perform the effective, cognitive, and communicative *functions of meaning*. But because they are held as doctrines, they will exercise as well a normative function.

Doctrines are correlated with *judgment*; the objective of the functional specialty, Doctrines, is the objective of judgment – i.e., statement of what-is-true. Judgment is a *full* act of meaning, with a full term. A full term of meaning is a term one holds to be true independently of oneself as judging subject. This is the kind of activity a theologian is engaged-in in doing Doctrines.

In treating the act of judgment in *I*, Lonergan emphasizes the personal *commitment* and personal responsibility entailed in judgment (cf. I, pp. 272-273); this is a commitment/ responsibility far beyond that involved when one is just thinking.

> There is always a personal commitment involved when one says 'this is the case.' In saying that, one is claiming self-transcendence – i.e., claiming that the content of what one is saying is independent of her/his thinking, even though it is only through one's thinking that s/he has arrived at that content.

Anything that is held by a community as a doctrine fulfills in a full sense the four functions of meaning: effective, cognitive, constitutive, and communicative.

> Doctrines, as meaning, are *effective*; directly or indirectly, they involve counsel and persuasion with regard to a way of living. They are *cognitive*, in that they are the source of that community's knowledge of ultimates. They are *constitutive*: (a) of the individual, informing her/his way of life; and (b) of the community's institutions by providing a common set of meanings and values, shared by people in contact with one another in the community. They are *communicative*, passing from one age and generation to another; that communicative function goes through various contexts, various nests of questions and answers.
>
> In addition to those four functions, what makes doctrine doctrine, is that the doctrine is granted a *normative* status by the community; it is regarded as being normatively constitutive of the community.
>
> > Theological doctrines are what the theologian is proposing to be the normatively constitutive statement of the religion which s/he is attempting to mediate with a culture.
> >
> > Lonergan wants that normative constitution to derive from the conversions that have been objectified in Foundations.

116. The normative status of methodologically derived doctrines derives from the conversions that constitute authenticity.

MT, p. 299: "The normativeness of any theological conclusion is distinct from and dependent on the normativeness attributed to divine revelation, inspired scripture, or church doctrine."

> But note that the normativeness which I attribute to revelation, scripture, and church doctrine, is itself one of my theological doctrines.

Variations & Development, Permanence & History, Pluralism & Unity (positions 117-120)

Lonergan's conception of theological doctrines means that their expression today will be very different from the expression of theological or church doctrines in the past. Sections three to eleven of chapter twelve address that problem.

> Variations of doctrinal expression occur throughout the history of the whole church and f theology; we need not fear that. We are not initiating anything new by saying that we need to express the truth in different forms.

117. Further transpositions will be required as theology assumes responsibility for the communication of Christian constitutive meaning to the myriad instances of common sense, to other academic disciplines, and to different religious traditions, and for its development within these contexts. But these transpositions and developments, too, are envisioned by Doctrines, which attempts to ensure that they are congruent with the foundational conversions. It does this by enunciating theological doctrines in the pure formulations of interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness, formulations that refer to transcultural components in human living.

The variation in expression of doctrines is largely due to development, at least when it is authentic. And the uniqueness of Lonergan's position is his understanding *development* to be a function of the *ongoing differentiation of human consciousness*.

> Development of doctrine is not a matter of making explicit what was implicit in the Scriptures; it is a function of questions that are raised in the context of new differentiations of consciousness.

That variation of expression is a function of historicity; historicity of expression need not threaten permanence of meaning. Unity of faith is consonant with a widespread and far-ranging pluralism.

Variations are a function of cultural differences; the Gospel is to be preached to all, but not in the same manner to all. The people who preach the Gospel have to creatively use the resources of the culture to which they are preaching.

> For centuries, this principle was fought in the church – because of the dominant classicist mentality. Recall the suppression of the creative missionary work of Matteo Ricci in China.

Moreover, once the Gospel has been introduced into a culture, doctrine will be developed in that culture on the basis of that culture's resources.

> It is interesting to speculate about 'what might have been' had Ricci's China initiatives been allowed to continue; how different contemporary China might be!
>
> Variations in doctrinal expression testify, not to breakdown of the unity of the faith, but to the vitality of faith within the culture. Such variation indicates that the faith has been truly assimilated in more than a perfunctory manner.

Lonergan also speaks of the variations that have to take place in our own culture because of the series of fundamental changes that have occurred in the last four and a half centuries: modern science, modern history, modern philosophy. These are three basic differentiations that have made the modern world, and have made its horizon radically different from the horizon of medieval Europe. Because of this, there will be variations even as we preach to our own culture – as we speak what we hold to be true to our own culture. Such variations do not destroy the permanence of the truth, nor do they deny something common to all people; but they do involve accepting the fact that people do differ in their mentalities, their ways of life, their character, their differentiations of consciousness.

Doctrines, as a functional specialty, is related not only to the specialties which are previous to it but also to those which 'follow,' especially to Communications. Generally, it is the theologian working in Communications who is concerned with preaching the Gospel to people of all places and times. Doctrines anticipates Communications in that it specifies how the normatively constitutive meaning of Christian living that will be communicated through the church's preaching is promoted by doctrinal transposition and development. The transposition/ development that occurs in Doctrines promotes the preaching that the theologian is concerned to help in exercising the functional specialty, Communications.

> But to move to Communications, there will be yet further transpositions, beyond the transpositions that took place in Doctrines. At the point of Doctrines, what you have done is to transpose into categories derived from interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness – into "pure formulations" (cf. *I*, p. 580). These are formulations expressed in categories that refer to transcultural realities.
>
> You cannot go into a parish church and preach in the categories used by the theologian in doctrines; there is a further transposition that has to be made into the common sense cultural mentality of ordinary people, into the mentalities of other academic disciplines, and into the mentalities of other religious communities. Those are the further transpositions which are facilitated in Communications.
>
> Lonergan's insistence is that you will be better able to make these transpositions if you have 'touched down' on the transcultural realities, on what all human beings share in common. Stating the Christian truth in those terms is the effort of Doctrines. But at that point the final objective of theology is not yet done; there is a further transposition to 'the people' to whom the Gospel is to be preached; and that is what the theologian promotes, helps, facilitates, advances when s/he is exercising Communications.

118. Such theological doctrines will represent a development of doctrine within theology. This development may or may not lead to a development of doctrine within the church. Development of doctrine, whether theological or church, is possible because of the differentiation of consciousness that constitutes in effect the ongoing discovery of mind. It occurs also at times through dialectic, and in church doctrines at times through formal recognition of what was already believed and taught at a less official level. Theological doctrinal statement of developments of church doctrine will be in terms of interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness.

The point to be emphasized is that Lonergan's theory of the development of doctrine is in terms of the differentiation of consciousness.

The question is posed as follows (*MT*, p. 302): "How is it that mortal man can develop what he would not know unless God had revealed it?"

For Lonergan, the answer to that question is in terms of the ongoing discovery of mind through the differentiations of consciousness. The differentiations of consciousness give rise to new, diverse, and ongoing contexts – successive and interacting stages in cultural development; it is by reason of those differentiations of consciousness that, in fact, the developments which have taken place have taken place, and that further developments of doctrine can be expected to take place in the future as consciousness differentiates further.

In section four of this chapter, Lonergan adds a few differentiations to those he had previously delineated: post-systematic, post-scientific, post-scholarly. These refer to meaning that is expressed at the common sense level, but as the result of the 'osmosis' that has hit the common sense level from the systematic, scientific, scholarly realm. These are refinements of common sense in a culture where developments have gone on at the systematic, scientific, and scholarly levels.

> E.g., I can speak of 'relativity,' but I surely do not have a differentiated understanding of it. Similarly, the bishops at Nicea used term *homoousion* without having a theoretically differentiated understanding of it.

Section five attempts to show how this kind of development has occurred in the church's history. Differentiations of consciousness have, in fact, been responsible for the development of doctrine up to this point. He speaks of five steps that have, in fact, taken place in the last 2,000 years:

i. In Scripture itself, there is a reinterpretation of symbolic apprehensions. Using the resources of Canaanite, Palestinian, Greek culture, but using it for one's own ends.

ii. Philosophic purifications of biblical anthropomorphisms. Clement of Alexandria, e.g., insisted that biblical anthropomorphisms are very dangerous if they are taken literally. This purification occurs through a differentiation of consciousness.

iii. The occasional use of systematic meaning in the Greek councils. The use of *homousion* at Nicea and the Chalcedonian definition of Christ is 'a tincture of systematic meaning.'

iv. The fully developed systematic theological doctrine of the Middle Ages (especially Thomas Aquinas). This is expressed in a systematically/theoretically differentiated consciousness.

v. Subsequent church doctrine right up to Vatican II was dependent on systematic theological doctrine, using categories developed in the systematic differentiation. E.g., the notion of "transubstantiation" uses the category "substance" from the theoretically differentiated metaphysics of the Middle Ages.

In section seven, Lonergan considers the complexities of contemporary developments: modern science, modern historical scholarship, modern philosophy. These complexities demand a new differentiation of consciousness if they are to be appropriated properly. That differentiation will mean further development of theological doctrine, and possibly of church doctrine.

Lonergan understands the modern shift to the subject as having undergone two stages. The *cognitive* phase extends from Descartes to Kant's first critique (of pure reason). The *existential* phase begins with Kant's second critique (of practical reason) and extends through existentialism and critical theory.

The existential shift has reverberated back upon the cognitive, and has placed cognitional theory and epistemology in a whole new light. In his later work, Lonergan tries to develop his cognitional theory and epistemology in light of existential concerns. Thus, what Matthew Lamb terms Lonergan's concern with "*noetic praxis*" (cf. *Solidarity With Victims*, pp. 13-21).

Throughout the church's entire history, ongoing contexts of church and theology have interacted with one another, with mutual derivation resulting: theological doctrines being derived from church doctrines, and church doctrines also being influenced by theological doctrines.

'Church' and 'theology' are two different contexts (nests of questions and answers) influencing each other through mutual interaction and derivation.



Note the intriguing suggestion, MT, p. 320: "Perhaps I might suggest that human psychology and specifically the refinement of human feelings is the area to be explored in coming to understand the development of Marian doctrines."

This indicates Lonergan's conviction that the theological understanding of any doctrine has to be in terms of interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness.

Recall the great psychological significance which Jung saw in the Marian doctrines.

119. The *permanence* of those doctrines called *dogmas* is not in conflict with their evident historicity. The *permanence of dogma is a permanence of meaning in the context in which the dogma was defined*. That meaning attaches to mysteries that transcend human intelligence. Its permanence is a function of divine transcendence. Historicity means that any statement (including dogmas) has meaning only within contexts, that contexts are ongoing, and that ongoing contexts are related by derivation and interaction. A mystery can be revealed in the fashion of one differentiation (e.g., the symbolic mode), defined by the church in the fashion of another (e.g., post-systematic meaning), understood by theologians in another (contemporary methodologically derived theological doctrines and systematics), and stated to each class and culture in the terms of its own mentality. These multiple transpositions need not deny the meaning of the dogma in the context in which it was defined. That alone is permanent.

Some of the church doctrines whose context is interaction with theology are taught by the church as dogmas; there are, of course, other church doctrines that have never been given dogmatic status.

Section nine is Lonergan's interpretation of Vatican I with regard to the permanence of dogma. Dogmas are to be held as permanent. This permanence means: (a) a permanence of *meaning*, not of formulation; (b) a permanence of precisely and only that meaning declared by the church in enunciating them *in a particular context*, (c) the permanence of meaning that pertains to the dogmas because they are mysteries that transcend human intelligence and could not be known unless they were revealed.

Even permanent dogmas are invested with historicity, and thus have meaning only within a context; and since contexts are ongoing, the permanent meaning of a dogma

will remain through ongoing contexts that5 may very well change their formulation and shift their place in the appropriated total truth of Christianity.

Avery Dulles makes a strong case in arguing that revelation primarily occurs in the symbolic mode; cf. *Models of Revelation* (New York: Doubleday, 1983), especially chapter nine "Symbolic Mediation," pp. 131-154.

120. Pluralism arises from (a) different brands of common sense in different social and linguistic groups; (b) differentiations of consciousness; (c) the presence or absence, and diverse developments, of the conversions. The root and ground of unity is the gift of God's love effecting the conversions. The first two sources of pluralism are not menace to unity except for the unconverted and undifferentiated. The absence of conversion, whether is those who govern the church and teach in its name (the "shabby shell"), or in those who would make the transition from classicist to contemporary cultures, or in those who would assume their partial differentiations as complete, is what alone threatens the unity of faith.

MT, pp. 326-327: "There are two ways in which the unity of the faith may be conceived. On classicist assumptions there is just one normative culture. That one culture is not attained by the simple faithful, the people, the natives, the barbarians. None the less, career is always open to talent. One enters upon such a career by diligent study of the ancient Latin and Greek authors. One pursues such a career by learning Scholastic philosophy and theology. One aims at high office be becoming proficient in canon law. One succeeds by winning the approbation and favor of the right personages. Within this set-up the unity of faith is a matter of everyone subscribing to the correct formulae."

"Such classicism, however, was never more than the shabby shell of Catholicism. The real root and ground of unity is being in love with God – the fact that God's love has flooded our hearts through the Holy Spirit he has given us (Rom 5.5). The acceptance of this gift both constitutes religious conversion and leads to moral and even intellectual conversion."

4 December 1986

To clarify a point from the previous lecture, it may be helpful to consider further the relationship between the ongoing contexts of church doctrines and theological doctrines.

Church doctrines were announced at some point in history in response to some kind of problem, and are now known by the theologian through the functional specialty, History; theological doctrines are the theologian's contemporary statement at the level of her/his own time of shat s/he holds to be the truth of Christian faith, the constitutive meaning of Christian living.

They are clearly two different contexts: the context of church doctrines is the community's witness to Christ at a given point in history; the context of theological doctrines is the academic pursuit of a knowledge of the tradition and a promotion of the tradition, and a statement of the truth in dialogue with contemporary science, scholarship, and philosophy.

Though the contexts are different, they are related by mutual interaction and mutual derivation.



Mutual *interaction*: Theology is a fruit of reflection on the religion that came to expression in a certain way in a certain pint in history (church doctrine); but that very reflection acts upon the ongoing tradition, and on the ongoing interpretation of the past and on the ongoing life of the church. All superstructural reflection has an impact on the infrastructure of life; thus, theology has an impact on religion and on the ongoing life of religious communities.

Mutual *derivation*: Theological doctrines are in part a derivation of church doctrines for contemporary men and women; but also church doctrines may depend on theological doctrines for their formulation and for part of their content. What a theologian says today may become part of what the church says in doctrinal form in the future.

But church doctrines and theological doctrines do differ. Theological doctrines have a much wider range than simply transposed church doctrines, particularly in that they deal with all kinds of problems that are not covered by church doctrines.

Question: Does the theologian exercise a role in establishing the constitutive meaning of Christian living?

The answer to this question is: 'Unquestionably, yes!' That is the whole point to the second phase of theology, *viz*., to make a contribution to the constitutive meaning of Christian living. When a theologian stands on her/his own two feet and says what s/he holds to be true in language that is meant to be communicated to her/his contemporaries, s/he is precisely assuming responsibility for the constitutive meaning of (a) the church, and also of (b) culture.

By mediating what s/he holds to be the constitutive meaning of Christian faith with the culture, s/he contributes to the constitutive meaning of culture.

The second phase of theology evokes the church (proximately) – but precisely as a catalytic agent (remotely) of transformation in culture. In all the specialties of the second phase, the theologian is assuming responsibility for the constitutive meaning of the Christian community in a culture. The theologian surely does not exercise the sole responsibility in this regard, nor is her/his responsibility exercised independently-of or opposed-to the responsibility of church authorities, but it is a real responsibility. Theology is an intellectual ministry in the church, and its function is precisely with regard to constitutive meaning. The most immediate operation of that function is in Communications, where the theologian is trying to help pastors, preachers, missionaries address their particular constituencies in a way that will make sense to them. But Foundations, Doctrines, Systematics are all heading toward Communications.

The fact of theology's constitutive role can be seen clearly from history. Gadamer speaks of *Wirkungsgeschichte* – the effect that the contribution of major moments in the development of meaning have had on history. Think of the *Wirkungsgeschichte* of Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Newman, Barth. Theology does, in fact, for better or worse, a constitutive role in Christian living. How it does that is a very complex question, the answers to which depends, in part, on differentiating the various people who are the 'publics' of theology.

Question: Does the theologian share in the magisterium of the church?

[It should be noted that this question was not expressly formulated at the time that Lonergan was writing *MT*.]

Insofar as church doctrines can derive from theological doctrines, the answer is 'yes.'

Doran would go further to note that the normativeness of theological doctrines lies in the conversions objectified in Foundations. Any normativity that theological doctrines have is a function of their being derived from the converted subjectivity of the theologian. This normativeness (of theological doctrines) is distinct from and dependent on the normativeness attributed to divine revelation, inspired scripture, and church doctrines. But to attribute normativeness to revelation, scripture, and church doctrines is itself a theological doctrine. And the normativity of that attribution derives from Foundations, and ultimately from the conversions.

Insofar as any theologian accepts church doctrine or scripture or some view of revelation as normative, that normativeness is dependent on the normativeness of theological doctrines, and that normativeness is the reality of the conversion objectified in Foundations.

> Why will a theologian grant normativeness to a given church doctrine or Scripture? If it is an authentic theological act, it must be on the basis of theological Foundations. Concretely, this means that no theologian – as theologian – may grant a normativeness to any position, unless s/he can show that position to be in harmony with intellectual, moral, and religious conversion.
>
> In his own work, Lonergan has demonstrated that the Christological and Trinitarian doctrines (Nicea and Chalcedon) are in harmony with religious, moral and intellectual conversion. He even goes so far as to say that the church reached a kind of spontaneous intellectual conversion at Nicea, from which the doctrine flows. Lonergan has derived his own acceptance of those doctrines from religious, moral and intellectual conversion.
>
> The question arises as to whether this can be done with other dogmas/doctrines. On each issue, a theologian must work it out and see where s/he comes down – on each issue. It would seem to follow that a theologian must keep open the possibility that, on a given issue, s/he may need to assume responsibility for taking issue with what varying authoritative bodies have declared.

Concerning the question of magisterium, Doran proposes that we speak of "*authority*," which, as a theological category, can be derived quite proximately from Foundations.

> Cf. "Dialectic of Authority," *A Third Collection* (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), pp. 5-12. "*Authority* is legitimate power" (p. 5), and "*authenticity* makes power legitimate" (p. 7).

It is possible that "magisterium" – as a category – may not be a theological category in the stage of meaning derived from interiorly differentiated consciousness. But authority is a category in 'the third stage of meaning.' Doran is convinced that they problem of authority that we are dealing with in the church today has to be worked out on this basis, i.e., on the basis of interiority and authenticity, however painful that may be.

> By working out the notion of authority in this sense, the theologian is contributing to an authentic exercise of authority.
>
> Note that, rightly or wrongly, Luther had appealed to his notion of religious conversion, e.g., to question the role of "the letter of James" in the canon.

Perhaps Lonergan's comment is pertinent, *MT*, p. 353: "Just as the Alexandrian school refused to take literally the anthropomorphisms of the bible to bring about a philosophically based demythologization, so it may be asked whether modern scholarship may not bring about further

demythologizations on exegetical of historical grounds. Such questions, of course, are very large indeed."

Margaret O'Gara notes that Thomas Aquinas speaks of two magisterial, two chairs of teaching: that of 'office,' and that of 'competence.' He quite firmly locates teaching in both of those. She further notes that the category "authority" is acceptable and useful in ecumenical dialogue.

A further clarification is to emphasize the fact that "*Dogma*" has a very *restrictive* meaning for Lonergan; in this restrictiveness, Lonergan judges his position to be convergent with that of Vatican I. Dogmas are revealed *mysteries* that lie beyond the competence of reason; thus, they do not include truths that are within the competence of human reason, and that are able to be known more accurately with the advance of human knowledge. Dogmas can be accepted by the theologian working in Doctrines if the theologian can show that they are consonant with the conversions, which is exactly what Lonergan did in his own Trinitarian and Christological theology.

MT, pp. 322-323: "It is only the mysteries that transcend the intelligence of the human mind, that stand beyond created intellect, that are accepted simply on God's authority, that could not be known unless they were revealed, that can admit no more than an analogous and imperfect understanding by human reason and then only when illumined by faith, that accordingly can claim to stand beyond the status of the products of human history."

The permanence of these dogmas attaches to their meaning in the contexts in which they were formulated, and nothing more.

Lonergan is clearly placing restrictions on what can claim to be dogmas. Each theologian must answer for her-/himself the question as to what statements fit that meaning of dogma and what statements do not.

To appeal to "mystery" when what is at stake is within the competence of human reason is obscurantism, and obscurantism is incompatible with any possible conversion.

Chapter THIRTEEN: *Systematics*

[RD: "I have the feeling that Lonergan was very tired when he wrote the chapter on Systematics!"]

121. One is doing Systematics when one is attempting a synthetic *understanding*, on the level of one's own time, of what one has pronounced true in Doctrines.

Doctrines judges what-is Christian constitutive meaning and formulates that judgment in categories derived from Foundations; Systematics *understands* what Doctrines has judged to be true, and it formulates its understanding again in categories derived from Foundations.

Included in the doctrines judged to be true are the mysteries called 'dogmas.' *MT*, p. 336: "The promotion of such an understanding of the mysteries we conceive to be the principal function of systematics." That understanding (of mysteries) will be imperfect, analogous, subject to revision and development, but also synthetic and fruitful.

This 'fruitfulness' is primarily the advancement of people's understanding of reality; but it is also possible to speak of a fruitfulness insofar as Systematics mediates praxis.

The synthetic character of Systematics, especially as it bears on the mysteries of God, is twofold: (a) the interconnection of those mysteries among themselves (sin, grace, Trinity, Incarnation); (b) the interconnection of the mysteries with what we can and do know through the use of human reason.

Systematics represents in quite singular fashion theology's unique contribution to an integrated, interdisciplinary understanding of reality. Bringing our understanding of God to bear on what we can know through the use of our own reason.

The centrality of *understanding* in theology was prominent in Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas, but it was largely lost between the thirteenth and nineteenth centuries; in the manualist tradition, theology was not understood as a matter of understanding. The centrality of understanding is retrieved in Vatican I's notion of what theology is; though Vatican I considered systematics to be the whole of theology. Lonergan develops the role of understanding in theology perhaps more than any contemporary theologian. For Lonergan, theology is clearly a matter of *fides quaerens intellectum*.

We can understand mystery only by analogy with what we understand by human reason. This is evident in the 'psychological analogies' of the Trinity, proposed by Augustine, Aquinas, Lonergan; in Lonergan's later work he moved toward an analogy of love for understanding the Trinity.

122. Systematics is more than a matter of conclusions drawn from what one holds to be true, in response to contemporary problems. It includes such work, as Systematics *in fieri*, but in its full form it employs such conclusions in order to understand more deeply the very positions from which they were derived.

In pre-MT writings, Lonergan distinguished theology into two 'ways:' (a) *via analytica* (*inventionis*), and (b) *via synthetica* (*doctrinae*).

The analytic path does attempt to understand what Christian doctrines might mean in response to contemporary problems. When confronted with a contemporary issue that raises a problem for the meaning of what Christians hold to be true, the theologian attempts to address the problem from the standpoint of what s/he holds to be true and arrives at certain conclusions in response to the problem. All of that is what is meant by the analytic way. That is a step in Systematics.

But then, those conclusions – arrived at in response to contemporary problems – help the theologian understand better the very truths from which s/he proceeded in drawing certain conclusion. That is the *full* moment in systematics, when one returns from one's addressing of contemporary problems enriched so that one understands what one holds to be true in a deeper way.

The dialogue of Christian theologians and Marxists, e.g., is a matter of trying to face contemporary problems which raise issues for the meaning of Christian doctrines. Theologians who engage in dialogue and interchange with the problems raised by Marxists arrive at certain conclusions which are theological; those conclusions can then enrich one's understanding of Christian truth itself. Understanding of "sin," e.g., comes to include the notion of sin as embodied in social structures. The insights were gained in response to contemporary problems, but actually feed back on the understanding of Christian doctrinal truth.

Similarly, we can understand the doctrines of sin and grace more profoundly if we take seriously the questions that are raised by depth psychologists. Those questions must be addressed from a theological standpoint; then we must allow that whole process to feed back on our understanding of what we hold to be true in the first place.

There are, accordingly, two moments in Systematics; the full moment is the feedback moment, where the meaning of the doctrine itself is understood more profoundly and more thoroughly.

Thus, there is a movement in theology that proceeds from what one holds to be true to theological conclusions that lie beyond the realm of the doctrines; in the Middle Ages, this was represented by Aquinas' confrontation with Aristotle. Then out of that work of Communications, which provides the problems which give rise to developments in Systematics, there is feedback so that the doctrines are understood more profoundly than they were before. Systematics is that *whole* process.

MT, p. 345: "Now problems are so numerous that many do not know what to believe. They are not unwilling to believe. They know what church doctrines are. But they want to know what church doctrines could possibly mean. Their question is the question to be met by systematic theology."

"The answer to that question is a gradual increase of understanding. A clue is spotted that throws some light on the matter in hand. But that partial light gives rise to further questions, the further questions to still further answers. The illuminated area keeps expanding for some time but eventually still further questions begin to yield diminishing returns. The vein of ore seems played out. But successive thinkers may tackle the whole matter over again. Each may make a notable contribution. Eventually perhaps there arrives on the scene a master capable of envisaging all the issues and of treating them in their proper order"

123. The order of fully systematic exposition (rarely achieved) is the reverse of the order of the course of discovery. The order of the course of discovery is the hit-and-miss self-correcting process of learning, in attempting to confront the problems of one's own time.

The order of fully systematic exposition is fully distinct from that order of discovery; it may, in fact, start from the last insight discovered. Fully synthetic Systematics is rare.

For example, Doran sees his own work in the dialogue between Jung and theology as an engagement in the *via analytica*. Such efforts may, however, make a contribution to someone else doing the *via synthetica*. Theology is, accordingly, a thoroughly collaborative enterprise.

124. The Systematics of a methodical theology will be a philosophical theology. It will be marked by a relationship of philosophical and strictly theological components analogous to that found in the work of Aquinas: unity in differentiation, distinction without separation. But now the philosophical component will be at its roots intentionality analysis rather than metaphysics.

Lonergan is calling for a renewed *integration* of philosophy and theology in Systematics. They have been split from each other by Descartes and the Enlightenment, but also by Christian theologians, and this split is unfortunate. There results a natural theology which seems to have no religious significance, and a systematic theology deprived of the enrichment philosophy can provide.

The called-for integration will show itself in the interplay of the general and special categories, just as it did in Aquinas where the general categories were metaphysical (potency, form, act); now the ground of the general categories will be interiorly differentiated consciousness, not metaphysics.

125. The specifically theological component in Systematics, and so the ground of special categories, lies in the orientation to transcendent mystery and its basic fulfillment in the gift of God's love. This orientation provides the primary meaning of the name, God. As Foundations explicates the orientation, so Systematics understands the mysteries that are its objective, but in an imperfect and analogous fashion.

"God" is the objective of the unrestricted desire for intelligibility, truth, and goodness.

126. God can be an object, can enter into the world mediated by meaning, (a) insofar as mystics speak of their experiences; (b) insofar as we question our questioning and arrive at and answer the question of God; and (c) insofar as we question the tradition of a historical religion.

The question is, 'in what ways is language about God possible?'

127. *Metaphysics* does not disappear from a methodical Systematics. But it is no longer basic. It is however, now *critically grounded*, and provides a basic semantics of what is known by all other departments of knowing, a heuristic structure that develops with our knowledge of consciousness and that integrates the various methods through which general categories are derived.

"Various methods:" classical, statistical, genetic, dialectical, and scholarly.

This critically-grounded metaphysics continues to play a significant role in the derivation of general categories.

128. Systematics seeks an understanding, not of data, but of *facts*. The understanding of data is expressed in hypotheses, and the verification of hypotheses leads to probable or certain judgments. The understanding of facts is more complicated. The facts that have been arrived at by a prior process of experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding, believing, now provide the data for a second process of experiencing, understanding, judging. The truth of the facts arrived at in the first process is different from the truth of the account reached in Systematics, which is commonly no more than *probable*.

There are two instances of 'truth' here: (a) the truth which one holds to be doctrinal, constitutive meaning, and (b) the analogous understanding of that.

> Both Doctrines and Systematics aim at truth in an intelligent fashion, but is different and is approached in different manners. Doctrines is concerned primarily with the truth that is the constitutive meaning of Christian living, and its concern to understand is basically a matter of the understanding that arises out of the first six functional specialties and expresses itself clearly in Doctrines. But Systematics puts a premium on further understanding; that further understanding will go back through pervious specialties, but goes beyond them. Systematics wants its understanding to be true, but knows that it will be imperfect (i.e., no more than probable). The goal of Systematics is a further understanding on the level of one's own time; thus, today that understanding will be in terms of modern science, scholarship, and philosophy.
>
> Integrated synthetic understanding of the religious realities in which one believes on the level of one's time is the supreme achievement of theology.

There is a special nature to the understanding achieved in Systematics, in that what is understood is Divine Transcendence, which will not be 'known' before the beatific vision. In other words, the incomprehensibility of God is the starting point of Systematics.

We have to do on the level of our times what Aquinas did on the level of his time.

Dialectic	Foundations
History	Doctrines **[a]**
Interpretation	Systematics **[b]**
Research	Communications **[c]**

[d]

a. Aquinas' theology is based on judgments of what he held to be true – based on his knowledge that stemmed from the kinds of operations Lonergan has identified as 'first phase' through Foundations.

b. His theology itself is a fuller understanding of what he holds to be true.

c. That theology is expressed and becomes 'public property.'

d. That very theology becomes data for further theology.

A contemporary theology of grace, e.g., will not be expressed in Aquinas' metaphysical categories; but if we miss the meaning of his theology in that metaphysical context, our theology will be poorer for it.

129. There will be continuity from one systematic achievement to another by reason of the structure of intentionality, the gift of God's love, the permanence of those doctrines called dogmas, and the perduring value of genuine theological achievements. There is also development, and its ground is the same normative structure of intentionality meeting the exigencies of new differentiations, different cultures, and the contemporary dialectic of meaning in history. Finally, there will be revisions, whether the cultural revisions that today will arise from modern science, human studies, philosophy, cultural change, or the theological revisions that these entail. The method is designed to meet these exigences, but what they entail concretely is a question not for method but for theology itself.

11 December 1986

Chapter FOURTEEN: *Communications*

Theology is a mediation of religion and culture. In the functional specialty, Communications, the cultural matrix ("situation") becomes a theological source. It is through the efforts of theologians working in this functional specialty that the church is helped to make the ultimate transpositions needed for the concrete communication of the gospel to concrete situations.

Communications is not preaching, it is theology; but one of the things that theologians do in this specialty is to help people who are preachers communicate the gospel concretely to the situation they are addressing.

Whenever a theologian is trying to help the church's ministry of communicating Christian constitutive and cognitive meaning to a concrete situation, s/he is involved in the functional specialty, Communications.

In that task, the present concrete situation becomes a theological source because there are questions and categories that arise out of the situation that will themselves feed theological reflection.

Accordingly, this chapter 'fills out' the opening sentence of the book: "A theology mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of a religion in that matrix." (*MT*, p. xi)

One of the criticisms made of *MT* is that it seems to be too exclusively concerned with 'texts' as a source. Doran judges that not to have been Lonergan's intention. This chapter brings out that dialectic arises not only out of theological opinions from the interpretation of texts and the history constructed from the reading of texts, but dialectic also arises out of concrete situations in the present. Communities are divided for various reasons, and the task is one of mediating

community on a cross-cultural basis. So, not only texts, but also situations, are theological sources.

In this, Lonergan is clearly very much in line with Tracy, Ogden, Gilkey, *et al*., who emphasize texts and situations as sources for theology. Where Lonergan differs from these theologians is that he does not 'correlate' texts and situations; rather, he roots the interpretation both of texts and of situations in his own foundations, which are reflection on conversion.

> General and special categories are both used in reflection on both texts and situations; theology is to construct an integrated worldview employing both general and special categories in that reflection on the texts of the tradition and the situation of the present.

Earlier (*MT*, 132-133), Lonergan had spoken of three types of final transpositions to be made to the concrete: Communications is concerned with theology in its external relations. These are of three kinds. There are *interdisciplinary relations* with art, language, literature, and other religions, with the natural and the human sciences, with philosophy and history. Further, there are the transpositions that theological thought has to develop if religion is to retain its identity and yet at the same time find access into the minds and hearts of men of *all cultures and classes*. Finally, there are the adaptations needed to make full and proper use of the *diverse media of communication* that are available at any place and time."

The interdisciplinary transpositions are at the superstructural level of culture; the transpositions into the various forms of common sense is on the infrastructural level.

Communications involves the kinds of transpositions that will enable the gospel to make sense in at least these three concrete contexts: the academic environment of other disciplines, the pastoral environment of all cultures and classes, and the particular adaptations of expression needed to use the media properly.

In chapter fourteen, Lonergan is basically presenting his own ideas as to what the *church* is. In the first three sections, he is giving a *general heuristic for Christian ministry*; in the last two sections, he is applying that heuristic to the present situation.

130. The ultimate transpositions to be made in the contemporary situation highlight the importance of transcultural foundations expressed in the language of interiority. For these transpositions are to various differentiations of consciousness and diverse cultures and religions, and require the use of the resources of contemporary media of communication.

From the types of transpositions he has mentioned, it is clear that there is a *pastoral motivation* governing his specification of Foundations as located in transcultural and interior terms. Those types of transpositions – to different differentiations of consciousness and to different cultures – demand the types of foundations he has insisted on.

Those transpositions are the objective of the whole theological enterprise; the fruit of the whole enterprise is in Communications. If you are going to transpose the gospel to different differentiations of consciousness and to people of different cultures, you have to have a transcultural base, articulated in terms of interiority.

131. Heuristic directives for church ministry, for the communication of the gospel, are derived from reflection on *meaning*. For: (a) the Christian message is cognitive, constitutive, and effective meaning; (b) meaning is the form and actuation of community; (c) Christian ministry would promote community as the base of society – community that takes its stand on the *moral* basis

of individual and collective responsibility, the *religious* basis of God's love, and the *Christian* basis of revelation in Christ Jesus. All three bases constitute Christian ministry as *dialogical*.

Thus, Lonergan presents his heuristic of Christian ministry in terms of meaning. The ministry is to promote community as the base of human society; it is to promote community of moral, religious, and Christian grounds. The moral ground is the basis for dialogue with all persons; the religious ground is the basis for dialogue with other religious traditions; the Christian ground is the basis for ecumenical dialogue and collaboration.

From the perspective of Christian ministry, all dialogue is for the sake of promoting the Kingdom of God, which is presented by Lonergan in terms of community as the base of social relations.

The positive promotion of community is through *care for meaning*. [Note the title of a book of interviews with Lonergan: *Caring About Meaning: Patterns in the Life of Bernard Lonergan* (Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1982)]. The means for caring for meaning are through the foundations of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. And so the church will labor to promote those conversions in the world, for the sake of the meaning that constitutes Christian community – and that constitutes human community beyond the church.

> Community is the achievement of common meaning; it is not a number of individuals living in geographical proximity. This common meaning is based on common experiences, common understanding, common judgments, and common values.
>
> The Christian church is one community within the worldwide human society that labors *to persuade people to the authenticity that will undo alienation and ideology* in the world. The principal means that the Church has for this end is the communication of the gospel, of the Christian message. That message is cognitive, constitutive, and effective meaning. Thus, the church has something particular and specific to bring to the meaning that can be constitutive of human community; what it has that is specific is the gospel. The gospel is cognitive meaning, in the sense that it communicates something that can be believed; it is constitutive meaning in that it provides formal and actual bonds of community qua community; it is effective meaning in that it directs Christian service in the world.
>
> For Lonergan, "alienation" is the basic estrangement of the human subject from her/his true self; "ideology" is any justification of that estrangement. What the church has to overcome such alienation and ideology is the cognitive, constitutive and effective meaning of the gospel.

These types of meaning give very specific sense to witness, fellowship, and service. Witness/*martyria* is correlated with cognitive meaning; fellowship/*koinonia* is correlated with constitutive meaning; service/*diakonia* is correlated with effective meaning. Thus, when we speak of witness, fellowship, and service, we are speaking of three of the functions of meaning.

132. Meaning is *ontological*. As cognitive it not only means the real, but is a higher integration in the universe of being. In meaning being comes to itself in the being of being meant. As constitutive it informs the reality of the individual or community that means: as understanding it is a formal constituent, as judgment an actual constituent of horizons, powers of assimilation, knowledge, values, character; as common understanding and judgment it is the form and act of the group precisely as a community. As experience, it is the potential and elemental constituent of the individual's character, and through intersubjective spontaneity, of the group's fellowship. Finally, as expressed in values, goals, policies, even procedures, it is the effective and constitutive being

of individual and community, and as communicative it induces in others a share in the formal and actual constituents (understandings and judgments) of the communicator.

Doran thinks that as history comes to understand and judge Lonergan's achievement, his work will be understood as a historical ontology of meaning; in this context, it will be fruitful to study his work in relation, e.g., to Hegel and Heidegger.

In *I*, Lonergan speaks of being as a series of "higher integrations" (p. 452): "There is the principle of development itself. It is the linked sequence of dynamic higher integrations. An initial coincidental manifold is systematized and modified by a higher integration so as to call forth a second; the second leads to a third; the third to a fourth; and so on, until the possibilities of development along a given life are exhausted and the relative stability of maturity is reached."

He traces the series of higher integrations of the universe of being as follows:



> Meaning is human consciousness in act, as such, it is a higher integration of the whole universe – precisely in human understanding and judgment. The being of the universe 'comes to itself,' becomes self-reflective in the being of meaning in the being of being-meant, being-understood, being-known.

Meaning is a *form*, in the metaphysical sense of 'immanent intelligibility,' of the individual and of the community. Thus, at the level of understanding, it is 'form;' at the level of judgment, it is '*act*.' Meaning is, thus, the form and act of the group as a community; it is the immanent intelligibility (form) and the very existence (act) of the group as community. But even at the first level of consciousness, experience, there is 'potency' for community.

In terms of the scholastic maxim *agere sequitur esse* (action follows upon being), it must be remembered that hi human-being, *esse* involves constitutive meaning; accordingly, one's action will follow upon the potential, formal, actual, and especially the full meaning that constitutes one's character.

As meaning becomes values and goals that determine policies and procedures, it becomes the effective orientation of the individual or group; it becomes *agere*.

Thus, at the level of elemental meaning, there is potential for the individual's character and for community. At the level of understanding, there is the immanent intelligibility of the individual's character and of community. At the level of judgment, there is the actual constitution of the individual's character and of the community. At the level of decision, there is the effective full realization of both individual and community in values that promote action.

133. The absence of community is a function of: (a) divergent meanings, especially stemming from the presence and absence of the conversions; (b) the *ressentiment* that accuses self-

transcendence of being alienation, and the justification of self-transcendence of being ideology; (c) the confusion of holiness with evil and of evil with good.

On *ressentiment* as aberration of feeling, note *MT*, p. 33: "As there is a development of feelings, so too there are aberrations. Perhaps the most notable is what has been named *ressentiment*, a loan-word from the French that was introduced into philosophy by Friedrich Nietzsche and later in a revised form employed by Max Scheler. According to Scheler, *ressentiment* is a re-feeling of a specific clash with someone else's value-qualities. The someone else is one's superior physically or intellectual or morally or spiritually. The re-feeling is not active or aggressive but extends over time, even a life-time. It is a feeling of hostility, anger, indignation that is neither repudiated nor directly expressed. What it attacks is the value-quality that the superior person possessed and the inferior not only lacked but also feels unequal to acquiring. The attack amounts to a continuous belittling of the value in question, and it can extend to hatred and even violence against those that possess that value-quality. But perhaps its worst feature is that its rejection of one value involves a distortion of the whole scale of values and that this distortion can spread through a whole social class, a whole people, a whole epoch."

> Cf. Mk 15.10: "[Pilate] knew that it was out of *jealousy* that they had brought Jesus before him."

The confusion of holiness with evil is Kierkegaard's notion of the demonic. When Jesus speaks of the 'sin against the Holy Spirit,' it is response to those who claimed that he was possessed by the devil – thus, against those who identified goodness as evil.

These sources of the absence of community set the context for the exercise of community in promoting conversion/authenticity by communicating Christian meaning. These realities are what the church is to help human society transcend.

134. Here we find dialectic as affecting, not just the conflict of theological opinions, but also *community*, *action*, *situation*. Such dialectic is another source from which positions are selected on the basis of foundations.

Dialectic thus not only affects the various theological opinions that come out of interpreting texts, but also the various theological positions that arise out of the questions raised by the situati8on. The situation is a very definite source for second-phase theology. The situation gives rise to dialectical oppositions; the contemporary theologian selects what s/he affirms to be true out of those oppositions.

135. The *dialectic of history* sets the stage for the communication of the Christian message.

The dialectic of history is the dialectic of community-and-ideology, community-and-alienation. Ideology and alienation are constituents of the situation which the church is to address.

MT, p. 358: "[Dialectic] affects *community* for, just as common meaning is constitutive of community, so dialectic divides community, so dialectic divides community into radically opposed groups. It affects *action* for, just as conversion leads to intelligent, reasonable, responsible action, so dialectic adds division, conflict, oppression. It affects the *situation*, for situations are the cumulative product of previous actions and, when previous actions have been guided by the light and darkness of dialectic, the resulting situation is not some intelligible whole but rather a set of misshapen, poorly proportioned, and incoherent fragments."

"Finally, the divided community, their conflicting actions, and the messy situation are headed for disaster. For the messy situation is diagnosed differently by the divided community;

action is ever more at cross-purposes; and the situation becomes still messier to provoke still sharper differences in diagnosis and policy, more radical criticism of one another's actions, and an ever deeper crisis in the situation."

That is the stage for the exercise of church ministry.

136. The communication generates community, which constitutes and perfects itself in further communication. Thus, the church is a *process of self-constitution* (*Selbstvollzug*) within the worldwide human society. The process is structured, outgoing, redemptive, constructive. It follows the path of the functional specialties, but it demands the integration of theology with other relevant branches of human studies.

Regarding the statement that 'the church is generated in communicating the message,' the real import is that the church *should be* generated in this way. Doran recalls when he first read the documents of Vatican II that it seemed as though all the statements which read "the church is. . . ." really ought to have read "the church should be. . . ."

In traditional scholastic theology, the church and state were each considered to be a societas perfecta, ultimate in their own realm and self-contained; that is a classicist way of conceiving any group.

For Lonergan, society is a global phenomenon, within which there are various groups; the church is a particular communion within that society which constitutes itself through the communication of its own meaning.

That process of self-constitution is *structured*; thus, the removal of a classicist mentality is not the removal of all structure. For any effective collaboration, structure is required. That process is *outgoing*; the church does not exist for its own sake, but rather exists in order to bring about the Kingdom of God in the world. It is a *redemptive* process that attempts to meet alienation and ideology at their roots and to overcome them. It is a *constructive* process; it doesn't just tear down what is evil, but proposes an alternative that is good.

The communication of the message follows the path of the functional specialties, especially as it moves from Dialectics to Foundations and through the second phase.



Dialectic is constituted in part by the tensions felt and lived in the present situation. Out of those tensions, you select what you hold to be true (Doctrines) on the basis of Foundations, and attempt to understand and communicate that.

The very communication of the message starts with dialectical problems in the situation and follows the part of the functional specialties to the communication of the message. The praxis of the ministry of the church is constituted in a manner analogous to the method proposed for theology in this book. But the communication of the message demands more than theology; it demands the integration of theology with other relevant branches of human studies.

The source of the general categories lies in the tensions which exist in the community, in the world, in the situation, in the sciences that are attempting to diagnose the situation.

137. As praxis, the process generates not only positions and systematics, but policies and planning as well.

Policies	----------	Doctrines
Planning	----------	Systematics
	Communication	

Policies are to meet the problems set by the dialectic and unraveled by Foundations; planning is for the organization of the policies and values/goals; communication is the actual implementation of all that.

Communication of the message is praxis, establishing and generating communities.

138. All of these fruits of integrated human studies should be grounded in theological foundations.

This is a radical statement, and if you know anything about university departments of human studies, you know just how radical it is!

Derivation of the general categories in human science itself should be function of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion; thus, they should be grounded in theological foundations. There has to be a theological component in generating the categories for human science – because human science studies human beings in the concrete, and in the concrete there is no way of abstracting from sin and grace. At the very heart of the human situation is the question of the conversions that constitute authenticity.

Theology has a constitutive contribution to make to the human sciences.

I, p. 236: "Human science cannot be merely empirical; it has to be critical; to reach a critical standpoint, it has to be normative. This is a tall order for human science as it has existed. But people looking for easy tasks had best renounce any ambition to be scientists."

The foundations of human science are correct positions on what a human person is.

139. As *constructive*, the process proposes alternatives to the alienation and ideology it would offset. To be effective, the alternatives must flow from theological foundations, and those who propose them must embody the conviction that *integrity can be effective even without the backing of power*.

Genuine Christian praxis must generate conversion. The proposed alternatives will only be effective if they glow from a grasp of converted living.

The last sentence of this position is the meaning of 'the law of the cross;' cf. thesis 17 of *De Verbo Incarnato*. The church is the community of the suffering servant; it is marked by the law of the cross.

This notion is developed in I in the discussion of "cosmopolis;" cf. *I*, pp. 238-242. The pursuit of integrity is itself an effective force in the world.

140. As *ecumenical*, the process can take its stand even now on the constitutive and effective meanings of the Christian message, and must continue to work patiently and openly toward agreement on cognitive meaning.

By and large, there is considerable agreement between churches which can be seen in their collaboration on issues of peace and social justice. Various bilateral and multilateral ecumenical dialogues are moving toward considerable consensus on cognitive meaning; the Lutheran-Catholic dialogue in the United States is an excellent example of this.

Given our divisions, the church itself needs to generate community in its own midst.

Two final thoughts:

- The ground of any system is the systematizer.
- Lonergan doesn't want people to become 'Lonerganians;' he wants them to become themselves!