THEOLOGY, HUMAN SCIENCE, AND HISTORY

RGT 5572S
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Abbreviations:

- *AD – The Analogy of Dialectic* [A draft of what would be published as *Theology and the Dialectics of History*]
- *I – Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958.
- *MT – Method in Theology*. New York: Herder and Herder, 1972.
- *SP – Subject and Psyche*. Washington: University Press of America, 1979.

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The concern of this course is with foundational issues in human science for the sake of a theory of history, for the sake of a systematic theology that would be a theory of history, that would understand Christian doctrines (i.e., what the theologian affirms to be true) in the light of an understanding of history.

This is in contrast with medieval systematic theology, which was an understanding of Christian doctrine primarily in the light of a metaphysics. Aristotelian metaphysics provided the central general categories for the best of medieval theology (i.e., Thomas).

Metaphysics will function in a contemporary systematic theology, but not in the same central fashion as it did in medieval theology.

What is needed in the contemporary theological scene is the ability to reconcile **system** and **history**; the way to do that is to get a general heuristic on historical process itself, i.e., a theory/

philosophy of history. That philosophy of history will be the primary source of the general categories for systematic theology.

Doran regards history as the general categorical context for contemporary systematic theology.

In the course, Doran is attempting to share a set of insights with regard to foundational issues in human science, for the sake of the general categories of a contemporary systematic theology that

would understand Christian truth in the light of a generalized understanding of the structure of human history.

There are four initial affirmations:

1. Lonergan's work grounds a **reorientation of human science**; the foundations for a reorientation and new integration of human science are given in Lonergan's work.
2. Reoriented human science yields the **heuristic structure of history**.
    - A "heuristic structure" is the structure by which one who is attempting to understand **anticipates** what s/he is attempting to understand.
    - Thus, a reoriented human science yields an anticipation in the knower by which one can move toward ('intend') the structure of historical process.
3. That heuristic structure of historical process is **the context for the derivation of general categories in theology**.
    - By "context," Lonergan means a limited set of interrelated questions and answers.
    - The principal general categories in theology will be the categories through which we understand history.
4. The first of the human sciences to be reoriented is the science of **depth psychology**; a reoriented depth psychology joins Lonergan's foundations.
    - This is because depth psychology is an exploration of interiority; it is an exploration of a different dimension of interiority than those that have been explored by Lonergan, but it is an exploration of the same interiority that for Lonergan is foundational for everything.
    - The first movement that must be made from Lonergan's own work is to the science of depth psychology, because that science is in the same area/arena as the material that Lonergan himself has studied. It studies another dimension of the same human subject that he subjected to ruthless analytic explanation. The same exploration can be done with regard to the sensitive psyche, feelings, symbols, dreams, etc; the same kind of self-appropriating, analytic investigation that Lonergan did with human knowing, moral intending, and religious subjectivity can be carried on in a reoriented depth psychology.

Concerning the centrality of history, it is important to note that the emergence of historical consciousness since the nineteenth century has raised two questions that theology must face: (a) relativism, and (b) praxis.

A theology that is derived in a context that is non-historically conscious presumes that it is the one theology, valid for all times and places (classicism); such a notion prevailed in Catholicism well into the twentieth century. Such a systematics was expressed in the relatively static categories of the 'true metaphysics.' That one systematics is an understanding of Christian truth, but it is not an understanding that is expressly catalytic of **praxis**, or action, of world-constitution.

Marx explicitly raised the issue of making history; in addition to understanding the world, there is responsibility for transforming the world. Human agents are constitutive of the human world, and creative of it. In a theological context, this is the affirmation that human beings are co-creators with God of the being of the world.

Further, historical consciousness gave rise to **relativism**; there emerges a need to find norms within history, to reconcile system and history. This is the key question that acceptance of historical consciousness presents to theology; if you accept historical consciousness, are there any norms at all?

Doran contends that categories can be derived that meet both of these challenges. Lonergan has already gone a long way in meeting both of them, and his work can be pushed further. He has uncovered norms in historicity, with lucidity and power; he has also done much to provide us with an orientation toward praxis. Doran is simply trying to push his insights further in both these directions.

Lonergan divides the theological enterprise into **two phases**:

The **first** phase mediates from the past into the present:

Dialectic
History
Interpretation

Research

This first phase brings the tradition 'up to date,' rendering present the insights and the process of the past.

The **second** phase is mediated by the work of the first phase; in this second phase, the theologian stands in the present and articulates her/his own judgments/insights/convictions. In this phase, one stands in the present and addresses oneself into the future.

Foundations
Doctrines
Systematics

Communications

In this second phase, the Christian theologian assumes personal responsibility for the Christian message and for its future. The theologian makes a set of decisions as to what extent s/he is going to pass on the tradition, to what extent s/he is going to change that tradition, and to what extent s/he is going to reject that tradition and suggest something different. The whole of direct theological discourse is based in that set of personal decisions.

Among the tasks of Foundations is the **derivation of the categories** what you will use to speak what you hold to be true, and how you understand what you hold to be true.

General categories are those that theology shares with other disciplines.

In medieval systematic theology, instances of general categories were act and potency, essence and existence, form and matter. Today, it would be such things as liberation, the unconscious, moral development, economic justice, energy, etc.

For example, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin speaks of "energy" and he means by it just what physicists mean.

Special categories are proper to theology; without them, we could not speak of a distinct discipline of theology. Examples of special categories are redemption, sin, Church, grace, revelation, Trinity, Magisterium, etc.

Around the year 1230, theology was able to move into its own as a distinct science – as Yves Congar emphasizes in A History of Theology (New York: Doubleday, 1968). At that time, after the fruits of at least a good century of very serious speculation, theology discovered its own proper criteria, method, and content. It found its identity. It was around that time that Philip the Chancellor suggested the specifically theological principle of a **supernatural entitative order**.

There was a struggle from Anselm on through this time to try to understand such things as the relationship of grace and freedom; this struggle was leading toward this breakthrough.

The theorem of the supernatural gave theology its own proper (special) categorical content. The distinct object of theological reflection was to understand the mystery of the supernatural entitative order – the order that is beyond nature, and strictly speaking, beyond the capacities of human intelligence/reason and can only be understood by analogy.

It has been emphasized by the best of medieval theologians that the realities of the supernatural entitative order (from grace to the Trinity) could be understood only by analogy with nature. They are, strictly speaking, beyond the capacities of the human mind to probe; we could not know anything about them were they not revealed. But given revelation, we can arrive at some dark, obscure understanding by analogy with what we can understand by using our own native capacities.

The realities of the supernatural entitative order are hidden in the mystery of God.

We understand the supernatural by analogy with nature. And the primary (general) categories for understanding nature at that time were Aristotelian metaphysical categories, supplemented by further differentiations reached in the order of nature by Aquinas himself (e.g., the distinction between existence and essence). Special categories, by and large, were the result of an analogous use of metaphysical terms and relations to mean what lay ultimately hidden in the mystery of God.

Thomas's theology (especially in the *summae*) is a magnificent systematic edifice, constructed of general metaphysical categories through which nature is understood, and of special categories derived by analogy with the general categories. The general and special categories are integrated to understand reality.

The Thomist 'edifice' has broken down; it can no longer control theological meaning. There are too many questions that it does not answer – e.g., questions of history. Lonergan said over and over again that, in a collaborative enterprise, we must do for our day what Aquinas did for his; i.e., we must construct similar systematic expression of a wide-ranging understanding of the truths concerning God and humanity. That is the task of systematic theology, which is one of the functional specialties. Such systematic expression will contain general and special categories, as did Aquinas's theology; the base and content of our systematics, however, will be different – even though, in many instances, they will be intending the same realities that Aquinas intended.

> The **base** of **general** categories today lies in **interiorly** differentiated consciousness, in the self-appropriation of the theologian as a knower and moral agent. The base of the **special** categories is found in **religiously** differentiated consciousness, in the religious self-appropriation of the human subject.
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> > In other words, if you are going to talk about grace, the base of your talking about grace is going to be your appropriation of your experience of grace. That is the foundation. The base of any language about grace is the theologian's own experience of grace, and her/his understanding of that experience. But then you want to mediate that with culture, with other realities that are known by other sciences – and the base of your knowledge of those is going to be yourself as a knower and/or yourself as a moral agent. The data of consciousness are the radical foundation for the derivation of the two sets of categories.
> >
> > In either case, appeal is made to a set of data that certainly were available to Aquinas, but were not thematized by him as foundational.
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> Interiorly differentiated consciousness results from bringing the operations of human consciousness to bear on the operations of human consciousness. Religiously differentiated consciousness results from bringing those same operations to bear on the dimensions of experience that reflect what the medievals meant by the supernatural entitative order: religious experience, religious conversion, the dynamic state of being-in-love in an unrestricted/unqualified/unconditioned manner.
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> > Religious love in a contemporary theology corresponds to the theorem of the supernatural in medieval theology; a differentiated interiority in contemporary theology corresponds to Aristotelian metaphysics in medieval theology.
> >
> > If one were to ask what is meant by 'grace,' 'sin,' 'redemption,' 'God,' the answer will emerge from an appeal to some facet or other of the dialectical process of religious conversion.
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> > *MT*, p. 341: "An orientation to transcendent mystery. . . provides the primary and fundamental meaning of the name, God." Thus, by "God" we primarily mean the objective of the subject's orientation to transcendent mystery.

MT, p. 107: "The gift [of God's love" is sanctifying grace."

And the closer the general categories can be to the self-appropriation of the knower and the moral doer, the more secure they are and the more Transcultural they will be.

I, p. xxviii: "Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding."

The context of the general categories is the set of questions and answers that is alive at any given time, in any historical situation. The base is the foundation from which one asks and answers those questions; thus, the base/foundation is interiorly differentiated consciousness. The context is formed by the questions that are actually asked in history.

Doran is convinced (with other theologians such as David Tracy and Langdon Gilkey) that we have to talk more explicitly than Lonergan does of theological **sources**.

By 'source' is meant **that which produces the data**. Theological sources are the productive agencies of the data on which theologians go to work. The 'source' is what produces the data on which the 'base' (i.e., the subject) operates.

Tracy, e.g., argues that the sources of theology are (a) the classic texts of the tradition, and (b) the contemporary situation. Those are the two loci of data on which theologians reflect.

In general it can be said that the classic texts of the tradition do provide special categories, but always in conjunction with one' own choice of the categories that are offered by the tradition. In other words, the theologian does not simply think up the special categories 'out of nowhere.' The category of 'grace,' e.g., is given in the classic texts of the tradition (from the New Testament on). But such categories are made one's own as a result of the foundations.

In general it can also be said that the contemporary situation will be the source out of which the general categories will come. But there is still need for foundational work on the situation in order to make those categories one's own, and to give them the specific meaning that one wants to give them.

It is, e.g., contemporary Marxist and Freudian thought that have given us such categories as liberation, the unconscious, development, etc. But we make them our own and engage in transformation of them in our foundational work.

This distinction between 'source' and 'foundation' is key. The source is that which produces the data. The foundation is the subject who appropriates the data and makes the data her/his own, who makes the categories her/his own, who defines how they are to be used.

The use of tradition as source is clear in Lonergan's method, even though he may not use those words. The classic texts of the tradition (as sources) are definitely accounted for in his method; the tradition becomes a source for direct theological discourse (second phase) through the first phase.

But the situation as source is not as evident, and Lonergan has been criticized on this point. Doran is convinced, however, that this is also accounted for. Any mediating theology (which is what Lonergan is clearly presenting) is clearly going to have the situation ("cultural matrix") as one of its sources of data.

> The situation becomes a source for direct theological discourse is Communications, when theologians attempt to address particular aspects of the cultural situation, when they are attempting to make those transpositions that will enable the message of the Gospel to be heard and adhered to in a given cultural situation. It is precisely in that task that the situation itself becomes a source of data for theological reflection.
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> In chapter fourteen of *MT*, Lonergan does show how the situation in which the theologian is involved and which s/he addresses becomes a source for theological reflection.

The theologian is involved in what Lonergan means by Communications whenever involves in any of theology's **external relations**.

> *MT*, pp. 132-133: "Communications is concerned with theology in its external relations. These are of three kinds. There are interdisciplinary relations with art, language, literature, and other religions, with the natural and the human sciences, with philosophy and history. Further, there are the transpositions that theological thought has to develop is religion is to retain its identity and yet at the same time find access into the minds and hearts of men of all cultures and classes. Finally, there are the adaptations needed to make full and proper use of the diverse media of communication that are available at any place and time."
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> 1. Interdisciplinary (superstructure)
> 2. Pastoral (infrastructure)
> 3. Media
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> These external relations are either (a) collaborative, or (b) situational. They either constitute the collaborative partners of theology, or the situation which the theology will address with some transformative intention.
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> > Interdisciplinary relations can be either. Thus, theology enters into collaboration, e.g., with psychology; but psychology can also constitute the situation that theology is attempting to speak to and to transform. The pastoral relation of theology will tend to be situational. The relation of theology with the diverse media will tend to be collaborative.
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> > Doran is primarily interested in the situational relations, i.e., with making the situation into a theological source.
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> > > *MT*, p. 142: "Questions for systematics can arise from communications."

Thus, the questions arise not only from reading the classic texts of the tradition, but also from the attempt to communicate the message in the contemporary situation.

MT, p. 135: "Communications produces data in the present and for the future."

What is needed is some methodologically refined way of **anticipating situations**: a heuristic structure for any and every situation.

Doran finds resources in Lonergan for developing a heuristic structure for the use of the situation as a source for theological reflection.

Doran warns against reading chapter fourteen of *MT* conceptualistically – envisioning theology as coming to an end with Communications is way off base.

Lonergan's method is a dynamic system; it is not like 'a new method laundry.' Rather, it is a constantly unfolding circle of interrelated operations. Communications is as much the beginning of theological reflection as it is the fruit. It is every bit as much a beginning as it is an end. Communications is not just a final stage where theological reflection bears fruit; it is also a beginning where new questions arise, that would not arise in reading the texts of the tradition. There are questions that arise only in efforts to communicate the Gospel, questions that arise in the living context of human relationships, questions that are alive in the situation itself.

There are questions that are produced in and by the activity of Communications. That is where the situation becomes a theological source.

MT, p. 358: "Now [in communicating the Gospel], however, our interest is not in dialectic as affecting theological opinions but inn dialectic as **affecting community, action, situation**. It affects **community** for, just as common meaning is constitutive of community, so dialectic divides community into radically opposed groups. It affects **action** for, just as conversion leads to intelligent, reasonable, responsible action, so dialectic adds division, conflict, oppression. It affects the **situation**, for situations are the cumulative produce of previous actions, and, when previous actions have been guided by the light and darkness of dialectic, the resulting situation is not some intelligible whole but rather a set of misshapen, poorly proportioned, and incoherent fragments."

In communicating the Gospel, you find communities either united or divided; and what you find there gives rise to questions that will affect what you say, and that will affect your own theological understanding.

The situation is here becoming a source for theological reflection. The concern here is not with the tradition as affected by dialectic, but with the here-and-now situation as affected by dialectic.

MT, p. 358: "The divided community, their conflicting actions, and the messy situation are headed for disaster. For the messy situation is diagnosed differently by the divided community; action is ever more at cross-purposes; and the situation becomes still messier to provoke still sharper differences in

diagnosis and policy, more radical criticism of one another's actions, and an ever deeper crisis in the situation."

> Communications generates questions in the present and for the future, and those are the questions about communities, about action, about situations.
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> There is a new exercise of dialectic in theology: a dialectic that bears, not on the texts of the tradition, but on the evaluation of the present situation. This exercise of dialectic leads to praxis transformative of the situations; but that praxis should be mediated by reflective understanding of constitutive meaning. And part of the function of the second phase of theology will be to provide the constitutive meaning of the praxis that transforms the situation. The second phase of theology thus becomes a catalyst of praxis; theology becomes an instrument of transformative praxis.
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> > In Mathew Lamb's terms, doctrines and systematics are sublated by authentic praxis.
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> This dialectic is for the sake of addressing the evaluated situation. It begins with the theologian appropriating the situation as source for theological reflection.
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> > Lonergan's understanding of "dialectic" provides a heuristic structure for evaluating situations.
> >
> > > Dialectic is used not only on texts, but on communities.
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> This exercise of dialectic calls for collaboration with other disciplines, especially "human studies" (MT, p. 364), and leads to policy, planning, and execution of plans (*MT*, p. 366). This is theology as catalyst of authentic praxis.
>
> The goal of all this is the promotion of community, and the undoing of alienation and ideology (*MT*, p. 361) on a worldwide scale *MT*, pp. 359-360).

And earlier reflection on community (in *I*) enriches the notion of dialectic which is presented in *MT*. There are aspects of the notion of dialectic presented earlier that are not explicit in the later work. Attention must be paid to the notion of dialectic as it appears in chapter seven of *I*. Doran wants to hold on to this potential enrichment of the notion of dialectic. It is not simply a temporary position, or a coincidental residue in the corpus of Lonergan's writings. The full position on dialectic will emerge from the integration of chapter seven of *I* and chapter ten of *MT*.

> Doran claims that recovery of this earlier notion of dialectic can be done securely if one will accept a fourth conversion, *viz*., psychic conversion. Psychic conversion will enable the affirmation of that earlier notion of dialectic, and its Sublation into the later notion.
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> > Thus, the reorientation of depth psychology is foundational.

Throughout the course of the semester, Doral will be working with the structure of dialectic that is found in chapter seven of *I*, extending it so that it becomes a principle for understanding communities, individual development, and culture.

The three dialectics – of community, individual, and culture – will be related to one another by locating them in the scale of values that is proposed in *MT* (pp. 31-32).

Doran will maintain that the analogy of dialectic and the scale of values provide the **heuristic structure of historical process**. It is in the light of that heuristic structure that the theologian today is to understand the doctrines that s/he holds to be true.

> Those three dialectics, related to each other through the scale of values, gives you the heuristic structure of historical process. Thus, the central issue will be the notion of dialectic.

Readings for January 15:

- *I, chapters 11 and 6*
- *MT, pp. 30-41 and 64-70*
- *AD, chapters 1 and 2*
- *SP, chapter 1*

Questions:

1. *Subjectivity as foundational.*
2. *Steps in the explicitation of foundational subjectivity.*
3. *Relation of the psyche to intentionality.*
4. *Relation of psychic conversion to foundations.*

15 January 1987

Review of previous lecture:

1. The goal of the course is clarity on foundations issues in human science for the sake of deriving the general categories of a systematic that would understand church and theological doctrines in the light of an understanding of history.

2. Today, the **base** of both general and special categories will be different from what it was, e.g., in medieval systematics; at the same time, it will be capable of preserving by transposition whatever is judged permanently valid in Aquinas's achievement or in any other achievement of the theological tradition. Lonergan proposes that the base of the special categories be religiously differentiated consciousness, i.e., consciousness that 'knows its way around' the experience of God's grace, that is differentiated in the area of religious experience, that knows discernment (Ignatius). He proposes that the base of the general categories will be interiorly differentiated consciousness, i.e., a consciousness that 'knows its way around' other areas of human interiority (such as acts of knowing and deciding).

3. Distinct from the base/foundation is the **source**, i.e., what provides the data on which the foundations will operate, the data for theological reflection. In general, the major source of special categories has been and will continue to be the classic texts of the Christian tradition. In general, the source of the general categories is the contemporary situation with which a theology is attempting to mediate the Gospel.

4. The classic texts become sources through the first phase of theology: Research, Interpretation, History, and Dialectic. Those functional specialties render the classic texts as sources for

contemporary theological reflection; they bring the past into the present. The situation becomes a source in Communications, as theology attempts to help the ministry of the church communicate the Gospel. By the questions which it raises, the contemporary situation becomes a source for theological reflection. And so, one way of deriving general categories will be to work out, from the base of interiorly differentiated consciousness, a heuristic structure for any and every situation. Such an anticipatory structure will function in a fashion parallel to the differential equation in physics. The heuristic structure would be a prior set of terms and relations possibly relevant to the data to be understood (i.e., the situation).

5. In the work of Communication, there arises a new use of **Dialectic**. In chapter ten of MT, Dialectic was presented as functioning vis-à-vis the tradition, particularly vis-à-vis conflicts in the tradition, leading to decisions as to where one is going to 'come down' on the various conflicts that have arisen in the course of the tradition; now in Communications, Dialectic has a function of working on the contemporary situation, on the real living conflicts of our time – conflicts that affect community, politics, interpersonal relations, etc. This is a new use of Dialectic, but it does the same kinds of things: it assembles the differences, classifies them, attempts to go to their roots, attempts to push them to extremes by developing what you hold to be positions and reversing what you hold to be counterpositions. It does the same things to the situation as it did earlier to the tradition.

6. Foundations continues **to objectify the horizon of authenticity**, on the basis of which one can make choices among the various possibilities that are conflicting with one another. Foundations objectifies the horizon within which I will make my choice on matters of community, politics, economics, interpersonal relations, etc. Foundations does the same thing that it did with regard to the tradition in chapter eleven of *MT*, but now with regard to the situation. Then, there is a praxis that sublates theological reflection on the basis of the understanding of the situation. In that praxis, the attempt is to transform the situation, to more from one situation to another situation. Corresponding to doctrines, this praxis will set policies that promote an alternative situation. Corresponding to the systematic function that goes to work on transposing the tradition, praxis will establish plans based on the policies. Corresponding to Communications, praxis will execute the plans to bring about the alternative situation. Theology is sublated by praxis, to the extent that it allows the situation to be a source for theological reflection. Theology becomes a mediating factor, a catalyst, for moving from one situation to an alternative situation that will more closely approximate the rule of God in human affairs. We can speak, with Edward Schillebeecks, of "the praxis of the Kingdom of God."

7. The objective of theology-become-praxis is the promotion of community as the ideal base of society; community, rather than such things as social engineering, totalitarian ambition, imperialistic domination, etc. It also promotes the overcoming of alienation and ideology. Today, this must be done on a global/worldwide scale. Human community is now recognizably planetary.

8. Doran wants to 'fill out' that notion of Dialectic, drawing on psychic conversion to ground an expanded notion which is consistent with that found in *MT* but which goes beyond it.

General outline of *The Analogy of Dialectic*

I. Basic Terms and Relations
   1. Bernard Lonergan's Notion of the Subject
   2. The Notion of Psychic Conversion
   3. The Notion of Dialectic
   4. The Integral Scale of Values
   5. The Community of the Servant of God (which is the horizon for special categories in this theology-as-praxis)

II. Social Values and the Dialectic of Community (which is basically an expansion of chapter seven of I, but which attempts to relate Doran's theology to liberation theology)
   → Chapters six through nine

III. Cultural Values and the Dialectic of Culture (in which he argues for a dialectic of culture, analogous to the dialectics of community and the subject mentioned by Lonergan)
   → Chapters ten through twelve

IV. Personal Values and the Dialectic of the Subject (which is a lengthy expansion of the second chapter on psychic conversion)
   → Chapters thirteen through seventeen

V. Hermeneutics and the Ontology of Meaning
   → This may become a separate book.

Foundational Subjectivity:

Concern similar to Lonergan's is evident in this quotation from Edmund **Husserl**, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 14-15: "If we consider the effect of the development of philosophical ideas on (nonphilosophizing) mankind as a whole, we must conclude the following: Only an understanding from within of the movement of modern philosophy from Descartes to the present, which is coherent despite all its contradictions, makes possible an understanding of the present itself. The true struggles of our time, the only ones which are significant, are struggles between humanity which has already collapsed and humanity which still has roots but is struggling to keep them or find new ones. The genuine spiritual

struggles of European humanity as such take the form of struggles between the philosophies, that is, between the skeptical philosophies – or nonphilosophies, which retain the word but not the task – and the actual and still vital philosophies. But the vitality of the latter consists in the fact that they are struggling for their own true and genuine meaning and thus for the meaning of a genuine humanity."

- The philosophical movement 'from Descartes to the present' refers to the turn to the subject.
- The 'collapse' of humanity is evident in imperialism, totalitarianism, deconstructionism, etc.
- The 'vital philosophies' are those that are trying to help humanity to keep or find its roots.

Whereas Husserl speaks of the two options of collapsed humanity and humanity struggling for roots, Doran will consider three options (later in *AD*):

a. A post-historic humanity, moving toward a deterministic, mechanized state.
b. A humanity searching for new roots: "world-cultural humanity."
c. A return to dogmatism/authoritarianism/classicism/fundamentalism: this is a desperate reaction formation against the struggle between (a) and (b); it is a desperate attempt to escape from the struggle for the new. An example of this is the Islamic fundamentalism which has emerged, e.g., in Iran.

Lonergan cites approvingly Karl Jaspers's contention that we are in a new axial/epochal period in which 'scores of centuries are drawing to a close.' What Husserl attempted, and what Doran is attempting, is to understand that shift and the conflict which attends it.

Concerning the phrase "post-historic humanity:" History was released as a form of order for human society by the religious experience of Israel and, to a certain extent, by the Greek advance to the discovery of mind and praxis (especially in Aristotle who posited practical action as changing situations). As Mircea Eliade (e.g., Cosmos and History) has made quite clear, history was not a form of order prior to that point; history was not the form of order for cosmological societies. Prior to the Soteriological experience of Israel and the philosophical experience of the Greeks, humanity had not discovered itself as the source of change. What Doran means by 'post-historic' is humanity's loss of confidence in itself as source of change, in its ability to change the world for the better. It is, thus, a loss of what was given by the Soteriological experience of Israel and the philosophical experience of the Greeks.

> An example of a person explicitly promoting this is found in Alexander Kojève's lectures on Husserl in the 1930s. 'History' is surrendered in exchange for the security given by the homogeneous state. Kojève speaks of it as desirable that history come to an end. In the introduction to Kojève's *A Reading of Hegel*, the Straussian Alan Bloom argues that the only alternative to what Kojève proposes is a return to classical truths and to a classical mindset. Doran proposes that there is a third alternative, *viz*., the search for world-cultural humanity.

The context for reading the first chapter of *AD* on Lonergan's notion of the subject is the context of seeking grounds/foundations for a transformation of our present global situation to a closer approximation of the rule of God in human affairs (theologically), or for helping that proportion of humanity that is searching for roots of the genuinely human (philosophically). The meaning of the

> turn to the subject in modern philosophy is the search for those roots. It is only by understanding the history of that turn to the subject that we can understand the present time.

Husserl also speaks of "the search for something apodictic." Is there any truth about what it is to be human that is not subject of fundamental revision, that will survive no matter how greatly it might be nuanced, qualified, filled-out, supplemented by further analysis? The turn to the subject has been in search of a truth about humanity that is universal (Husserl) and that is not subject to fundamental revision (Lonergan).

> Hegel added to that what seems to be a destruction of that search. He saw that any expression of what we hold to be true is only partial, and in that sense abstract; it abstracts from part of the truth, and does not express the whole of our capacity and desire. Thus, it doesn't deal with the whole situation. It sets up an opposition between what has been abstracted out and the remainder of the truth. For Hegel, that opposition is alienation, and the alienation mediates a new truth that is fuller than the previous truth. But this wheel of abstraction/alienation/mediation/reconciliation keeps turning, and there is no truth that is not subject to fundamental revision. Unless, as Hegel did, you arrive at a totally new viewpoint and see this wheel as itself the becoming of Absolute Spirit – and that becomes your apodictic truth.
>
> Husserl, however, rejects that, as does Lonergan. Husserl presents the following belief in philosophy being able to search for truth in a humble way: "Gradually, at first unnoticed but growing more and more pressing, possibilities for a complete reorientation of view will make themselves felt, pointing to new dimensions. Questions never before asked will arise; fields of endeavor never before entered, correlations never before grasped or radically understood, will show themselves. In the end they will require that the total sense of philosophy be basically and essentially transformed. . . But it will also become apparent that all the philosophy of the past, though unbeknown to itself, was inwardly oriented toward this new sense of philosophy." (*The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, p. 18)

Lonergan shared this belief of Husserl in the possibility of inquiry pushing the turn to the subject for new roots. But for Lonergan, what is foundational and apodictic ultimately is not a proposition. What is foundational is **oneself** as asking questions and requiring answers to those questions. Lonergan's whole effort is an appropriation of that process.

The only apodictic fact is that I am one who raises questions, demands answers, and occasionally finds them! There is an order to the questions, which chapter one of *AD* attempts to introduce. But be very careful not to read this chapter conceptualistically; these questions and their order must be discovered in oneself.

> For Lonergan there is a **normative order** of inquiry, and it is crucial to get it right. In the search of humanity for its roots in the turn to the subject, everything depends on getting this order right and incarnating it through real self-appropriation (and not just notional self-appropriation).

In chapter one of *AD*, Doran attempts to relate several moments in Lonergan's own development in which he differentiated that normative order of inquiry.

1. His disengagement of the basic order of **cognitive** process, presented in *I*, especially the first eleven chapters.
2. Lonergan's own post-*I* discovery of the real distinction of **existential** subjectivity; the subject as deciding and doing is quite distinct from cognitive subjectivity. This discovery quite radically transformed the whole atmosphere of Lonergan's work.
3. His post-*MT* focus on the subject-in-**love** as the subject whose consciousness is really unified.
4. Recognition of **two vectors** to the order of conscious operations: the movement from below upwards, and the movement from above downwards. The movement from above still needs to be spelled out, to be differentiated with the kind of precision with which Lonergan spelled out the movement from below.

CONSCIOUSNESS:

> Lonergan's meaning of the word 'consciousness' is not the meaning generally given to the word in other modern philosophers and depth psychologists.

Consciousness is *not* any form of representation; it is *not* perception; it is *not* knowing, except the purely empirical 'knowing' that is pure experience. It is *not* a knowing of self in any sense articulate self-knowledge or self-understanding.

> Thus I can be conscious and knowing.
>
> But I can also be:
>
> - Conscious and not knowing;
> - Conscious and in error;
> - Conscious and deluded;
> - Conscious and questioning;
> - Conscious and confused.

Consciousness is experience of self, pure **self-presence**. It can take many different patterns, and can unfold on many different levels. It is not identified, however, with any one pattern or level.

'Consciousness,' thus, includes a great deal of what many depth psychologists will call 'the unconscious.' Lonergan's use of the term is much broader that is, e.g., Jung's or Freud's. This is not a criticism of either Lonergan or the psychologists; it is simply to draw attention to difference in their linguistic usage. Jung has a more restricted meaning of consciousness. Much of what the depth psychologists call 'unconsciousness' is, for Lonergan, "**conscious, but not objectified**."

> For example, many psychologists will speak of "unconscious anger." For Lonergan, anger is "conscious;" but one might not be explicitly aware of one's anger. It remains, nonetheless, a conscious feeling; but it may remain conscious, but not known. Such a feeling is part of the person's self-presence, even though it may not be 'known' to be part of one's self-presence.

Consciousness is awareness-of-self without being articulated in any kind of objectification.

Lonergan speaks of three sense of the word '**presence**:'

1. The chairs are present in the room.
2. You are present to me and I am present to you.
3. You could not be present to me unless I were present to myself.

That self-presence (c) is consciousness; you have a self-presence that enables me to be present to you.

Within that field of self-presence, Lonergan speaks of different **patterns** of consciousness, or "patterns of experience." (His listing of patterns in no way attempts to be exhaustive; he is just trying to introduce the notion of 'patterns.') Our consciousness can flow in different patterns, depending on such things as interest and orientation.

- Biological: constant pattern of experience in animals.
- Aesthetic: simply lets go, and rejoices in the beautiful; rejoices in form.
- Intellectual: the scientist intent on understanding.
- Dramatic: in which we live out our everyday lives and work out our relationships with one another.
- Practical: adopting means to ends, to meet the ends that we want.
- Mystical: dropping the constructs of culture "to return to a new, mediated immediacy of his subjectivity reaching for God." (*MT*, p. 29)

That self-presence/consciousness also unfolds (in the different patterns of experience) on **successive levels**; this is the point that the first chapter of *AD* is attempting to spell out. This is the point that Lonergan's whole work Is grounded in, rooted in, and centered it.

In chapter eleven of *I*, Lonergan disengaged at least three of the levels on which consciousness unfolds. These are the levels that constitute human beings as knowers, as cognitive subjects.

His shorthand for those three levels is:



There is a unifying thrust/orientation that is the spirit of inquiry, experiencing.

But those are just the names of the key operations on each of the levels. 'Experience' is a generic term that is used to refer to all kinds of operations like seeing, hearing, tasting, touching, smelling, feeling, imagining; it is the level on which date are presented to us, the level of presentation.

We almost never have just pure, unpatterned experience; this happens only when our experience breaks an anticipated pattern (such as walking down stairs, expecting one more step that isn't there!).

Most of our presentation at this level are within patterns that are governed by higher levels.

We move from experience to understanding by raising questions about our experience, about what is presented: questions for intelligence. What is it? What? Why? How? How often?

If you are listening to a lecture and only hearing noises, you are just at the level of pure experience. But if the question is alive – 'What is s/he talking about?' – then this is intelligent consciousness. This is more than just presentations; one's questioning is ordering the presentations in such a way that s/he can reach an insight. As questioner, one is constructing, putting an order on the presentation – so that one can reach the understanding that s/he wants.

When one thinks that s/he has gotten to understand, a further question can be raised: Is it true? Have I understood correctly? Do I agree? This is the question that promotes my consciousness to judgment.

Our consciousness as knowers ("cognitive consciousness") is a matter of the unfolding of operations on three distinct levels: (1P presentation; (2) insight and conceptualization; and (3) judgment.

The whole first part of *I* works this out, and in chapter eleven, Lonergan invites the reader to affirm that this is in part who s/he is. (Though it is not, by any means, the whole of one's identity.)

Self-affirmation of the knower: I am a conscious unity whose cognitive operations unfold on three levels of experience, understanding, and judgment.

Lonergan holds this to be an irreversible judgment in the sense that if anyone were to try to deny it, s/he would appeal to an experience, would understand in a certain way, and judge that that understanding of that experience was better than Lonergan's. So, the person would be employing the very operations being denied. This is Lonergan's 'retorsion' argument for the irreversibility of the judgment of self-affirmation.

The key is to find these operations in myself as partly constitutive of who I am.

Doran wants to highlight that the self-appropriation of the knower presents a **task** as much as it presents a fact. Lonergan proposes the judgment – "I am a knower" – as a judgment of fact. Doran wants to go beyond this to speak of it as a **self-constitutive judgment**; it proposes a task, every bit as much as it proposes a fact. Lonergan says that the unity of cognitive consciousness is given; however, the consistent, habitual unity of authentic cognitive consciousness is a high achievement. To exist in a steady, consistent, habitual state of self-transcending operations, to allow the spirit of inquiry to unity

consciousness, is a high achievement. It depends on an intellectual/cognitive conversion: allowing the questioning spirit to bring about a cognitive unity in oneself.

> A material unity is given: you are you, and I am I! But that material unity may be extraordinarily fragmented. My consciousness may be broken, divided, fragmented; in such case, it is not formally a unity. But at least one of the factors that can render consciousness a formal unity is fidelity to the spirit of honest inquiry, really wanting to understand, really wanting to know what is true; this can bring a certain habitual unity to consciousness.
>
> Karl Rahner speaks of "gnoseological concupiscence," the tendency of cognitive consciousness to fragmentation/disorientation. This is the tendency of our cognitive operations to Inauthenticity. This is what Lonergan speaks of as the flight from understanding, and as the biases that militate against understanding.
>
> So, there is a material unity to consciousness, but that consciousness can still be fragmented and disoriented; to make one's consciousness formally a unity/identity/whole is a high, habitual achievement of cognitive integrity.

After I, Lonergan's own horizon expanded to questions that were far more existential, practical, constitutive. As that horizon expanded, he disengaged a fourth (existential) level of consciousness, which characterizes the human person not so much as knowers but as doers, agents. This is the existential level where I ask and answer a different kind of question: the **question for the good**. I move beyond the questions for meaning and truth, to the question of 'what is good?', 'what is worthwhile?'

> This is the level where I face the fact that it is up to me to decide for myself what I am going to make of myself. (Cf. "Existenz and Aggiornamento," *Collection*.)
>
> It is the level of self-constitution and world constitution. Through my decisions and actions I contribute to the making of a good or evil world for other people, and in that process I also constitute myself as a good or evil person.
>
> > This is a basic realization, a 'fundamental option.'

In Lonergan's framework, it is at this fourth level of existential consciousness that the psychic becomes extremely important; it is here that you can begin to disengage a notion of the sensitive psyche. For while feelings are present on every level of consciousness, feelings become constitutive of existential consciousness. It is in feelings that we apprehend value; feelings are responses to value.

> Lonergan adopts this notion of feeling from Scheler, but it is also very much Jung's view of the feeling function as response to value.

In Being and Time (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), Martin Heidegger speaks of two equiprimordial ways of being *Dasein*, of being the place where being gets lighted up in consciousness. Those two equiprimordial ways of being Dasein are "Understanding" (*Verstehen* and "State-of-mind" (*Befindlichkeit*).

[In *Being and Time*: on *Befindlichkeit*, cf. pp. 172-182; on *Verstehen*, cf. pp. 182-195.]

Verstehen refers to cognitive consciousness.

Befindlichkeit is disposition, mood, state-of-mind; it is 'the way I find myself.'

Heidegger contends that very few in the philosophical tradition (aside from Augustine and Pascal) have acknowledged the importance of *Befindlichkeit*, of disposition, as a way in which being reaches illumination. Being reaches illumination not only through understanding, but also in feeling and disposition. Heidegger says that one of the few who have focused on the importance of *Befindlichkeit* is Max **Scheler**, who is Lonergan's source for feeling as response to value. It is to Scheler that Lonergan turns for linking feeling to values and orientations.

Luther and Kierkegaard would also be in this tradition. Jung also clearly linked feeling with judgment of value, placing it on the same level as thinking; what Jung does in this regard is analogous to Heidegger's placing *Verstehen* and *Befindlichkeit* on the same level.

There may also be some connection between this and Aquinas's notion of connaturality – though the notion is certainly not as central in Aquinas.

Reference to "intuition" (e.g., in feminist literature) may be an attempt to stress the centrality of *Befindlichkeit* in consciousness. Though Lonergan does not use the term "intuition" (largely because of its possible association with the myth of knowing as 'taking a look'), what he means by insight clearly embraces what many are expressing as 'intuition.' For Lonergan, insight is not simply a 'heady' thing; despite the intellectuality of his own work, he clearly posits insight as the operation by which we do all kinds of things – such as 'sizing up situation,' which is what is frequently meant by the word intuition.

In Jung, the 'intuitive' person is one who, e.g., can go into a part and immediately sense what the 'atmosphere' is; a 'sensate' person will be able to tell you how many people are dressed in which and where the bar is! Lonergan would include both under the term 'insight.' In Doran's interpretation, the difference between 'intuitive' and 'sensate' is the kind of data that is processed most easily.

For Lonergan, feeling as 'lighting up of value' (*Befindlichkeit*) is the beginning of the existential level of consciousness. But that must be followed by a process of discernment, a process of deliberation. That process focuses on the question: Is it really good? Thus, the feeling is a primordial apprehension of possible value. If it does not lead to a process of discernment/deliberation, it can easily lead to dogmatism.

Doran distinguishes different relationships of feeling to value.

There are some moments in which feeling stands to apprehension of value, as grasp of the unconditioned stands to apprehension of fact. There are certain moments in a person's life where you just know, and there are no further questions.

These are not frequent, but they do occur. In a workshop, Tad Dunne once asked a group how many of them had at least one moment in life at which what they needed to do was just known, clearly and instantaneously; almost everyone indicated that they had had at least one such experience.

In the *Spiritual Exercises*, Ignatius speaks of such moments as "consolation without a cause." As examples, he gives the conversion of Paul and the calling of Matthew. Such experiences are pure grace. Such moments are precious, and one can't expect to have them whenever one is confronting a decision. Ignatius insists that this moment be distinguished from anything that comes after. It is possible that I might latch on to such a moment so as to cling to it; doing this is limiting it and opening myself to the danger of dogmatism.

> Note the Transfiguration story, in which Peter wanted to erect tents; he wanted to cling to the moment of illumination. This may also relate to the born-again experience. Such an experience may truly be an experience of authentic "consolation without a cause;" but clinging to the experience can give rise to fundamentalism.

The more common situation is that in which feeling stands to value, as insight stands to judgment.

> Thus, insight is a grasp of what is **possibly** true; but there must be the whole process of reflection, of checking and verification.
>
> So too, a feeling can be an apprehension of what is **possibly** good; but that apprehension has to be followed by a process of **discernment**.

Feelings are the beginning of the fourth level of consciousness, but there are questions which follow on them; they are the questions that dispose us for and lead us to **commitment** as existential subjects. In the bulk of Lonergan's work, we have a subject whose consciousness unfolds on four distinct levels:



These are the levels that are covered in the first two major sections of chapter one of *AD*.

But in Lonergan's later work, there is emphasis on the **dynamic state of being in love** that enables one to be consistently authentic, consistently self-transcending. The self-transcendence of authentic cognitive and existential subjectivity becomes a way of life to the extent that the subject is in love. Lonergan speaks of a threefold love: the lover of intimacy (primarily realized in the family), love in the community (loyalty and devotion to the welfare of humankind0, and religious love (which God pours forth into our hearts by the Holy Spirit that is given to us – Rom 5.5). This is the threefold dimension of the love that makes self-transcendent orientation to being and value a way of life.

Later on in Lonergan's work, there emerges an emphasis on the movement **from above downwards** in consciousness, as well as the movement from below upwards. The subject who falls in love is the subject whose values change precisely because s/he is in love; thus, the first and primary influence of falling in love is on fourth level consciousness. But when one's values change, one judges and understands things differently. So there is a movement from above downwards, and that movement affects one's empirical consciousness as well; there is a dissolving of the biases and blockages at the level of empirical consciousness – a dissolving of what Jung would call the negative complexes that prevent us from operating authentically.

> But neither in Lonergan's work nor anyone else's to this point is there anywhere near the precision in spelling out the movement from above downward, as Lonergan achieved in spelling out the movement from below upward.

What Doran wants to do through the notion of **psychic conversion** is to provide a framework so that the same thing can be done with *Befindlichkeit* that Lonergan did with *Verstehen* – so that there can be the same kind of clarification of mood, disposition, state-of-mind, the way one finds oneself, as there has been clarification of understanding and judgment in cognitive consciousness.

> Heidegger highlighted the fact that in our everyday lives *Verstehen* and *Befindlichkeit* are equiprimordial; Doran wants to highlight the fact that self-appropriation of *Befindlichkeit* is equally foundational with self-appropriation of *Verstehen*.

Readings for January 22:

- *I, chapter 7*
- *MT, chapter 10*
- *AD, chapter 3*

Questions:

1. *What does Lonergan mean by "Dialectic" in MT, chapter 10?*
2. *Are there other nuances on Dialectic in I, chapter seven?*
3. *Does AD integrate the thrust of MT and I?*

22 January 1987

In presenting his notion of **psychic conversion**, Doran is making a claim for something that is **foundational** in the same way as Lonergan's delineation of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion; it is foundational in the sense of establishing one's **horizon**.

> Last evening, Rosemary Haughton lectured at Regis College on the emerging forms of lay ministry and their relationship to the church's tradition. A hostile questioner accused Haughton of having said nothing about the tradition in the course of her lecture. At which point, Haughton enumerated a number of positive things that she had, in fact, said about the tradition in the course of her lecture. The questioner said "Well, I didn't hear any of that." Haughton responded instantaneously, "You didn't hear it because you were listening for something else!"

‘You didn’t **hear** it.’ It did not enter your consciousness in the first place. Your conscious orientation was patterned in such a way that you literally did not hear it; it did not get into consciousness.

Doran is speaking about that censorship that will allow or not allow certain things in to consciousness in the first place. He is talking about a transformation of that censorship. That is different from religious, moral, or intellectual conversion; it is a different kind of transformation of the subject.

My dramatic pattern is oriented in such a way that there are certain things that cannot get into consciousness, that simply do not come in. Psychic conversion is a **transformation of the censorship**; it is an opening of the censorship to a willingness to allow data in where otherwise it would screen it out. That influences one’s horizon, it influences what one will allow to enter into consciousness.

In the previous lecture, the notion was introduced in terms of Heidegger’s analyses of *Verstehen* and *Befindlichkeit* as two equiprimordial constitutive ways of being *Dasein*, of being the ‘there’ of being, of being luminosity. Heidegger speaks of *Dasein* as the place where being is lighted-up, where it is disclosed, where it appears in its *aletheia* (Gk., unveiling). There are two equipromordial ways of being *Dasein*: *Verstehen*/understanding and *Befindlichkeit*/feeling (or mood, state-of-mind).

In introducing the notion of *Befindlichkeit* in *Being and Time* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), Heidegger refers to Max **Scheler** (p. 139) as one thinker who did focus on the importance of feeling as a place where being is disclosed. Being is disclosed in feeling, equiprimordially to the way in which being is disclosed in understanding.

Lonergan (*MT*, pp. 31-33) also relies on Scheler for his use of feelings, because Scheler emphasized that what is disclosed in feelings is the potential or real goodness, excellence of reality, i.e., value. Feelings are the disclosure of potential or real value, possible or real goodness – just as understanding is the disclosure of possible or real truth, fact.

Feeling is the place of the disclosure of the luminosity of goodness.

- MT, p. 65: “Feelings are related to their subject; they are the mass and momentum and power of his conscious living.”
- MT, p. 30: “Feelings give intentional consciousness its mass, momentum, drive, power.”

Those are deliberate **energic** phrases, when Lonergan uses them: ‘mass’ and ‘momentum.’ They are taken from physics; Lonergan is not using them simply as metaphors. He is using them to way that **feelings are where energy becomes conscious** – energy precisely as it is understood by physicists. Energy becomes conscious in the sensitive psyche.

Scheler uncovered feelings as relevant to what Lonergan would call a fourth level of consciousness, the level where we deliberate-about and decide-about value. Feelings generally reveal values at

first only as possible values, just as understanding reveals truth at first only as possible truth. As we have to figure out whether our insights are correct or not, so too after the apprehension of possible value we raise the question, 'is it truly or only apparently good?' In answering that question, feelings are part of the evidence for the answer; the feeling has to be right if we are genuinely going to give a real assent in a judgment of value. There has to be an affective component in a judgment of value to which one gives real assent.

> Thus feeling functions not only in the apprehension of value, but also in the evidence for the judgment of value.

Doran highlights the primacy of the **dramatic pattern** of experience. Human experience/consciousness can be patterned in different ways, depending on one's interest or orientation.

E.g., the scientist is in an intellectual pattern of experience. When Newton was working out his theory of gravitation, the story is that he spent all his time for two weeks in his room, eating and sleeping as little as he had to stay alive, because he was in the grip of a series of discoveries; he was in the intellectual pattern of experience. If he had not been in that pattern, the theory of gravitation would not have been worked out.

But we don't live our lives in the intellectual pattern of experience. We move into it for the solution of theoretical questions.

But what is it that moves us into this intellectual pattern, or into the pattern of prayer, or into the practical pattern? What governs that?

> Doran maintains that there is a dramatic pattern which overrides the whole set of patterns. There is a dramatic pattern which is the basic pattern, which is the existential subject, in community with others constituting self and world.
>
> In *I*, chapter six, Lonergan speaks of a dramatic pattern of experience, but just lists it as one among many. In that context, all he is trying to do is list several patterns of experience.
>
> But for Doran's argument for the primacy of this pattern, cf. "Dramatic Artistry in the Third Stage of Meaning," *Lonergan Workshop* II, pp. 147-199. The dramatic pattern is the one in which basically we live our lives; from that pattern, from the drama of our lives and on the basis of what must be done in the dramatic constitution of ourselves we will move ourselves into other patterns of experience. The dramatic subject will hove her-/himself into an intellectual pattern of experience if there is a theoretical question to be resolved; or into a religious pattern of experience to move into prayer. But the dramatic pattern is basic; the basic issue is the drama of self-constitution and world-constitution. It is within that emphasis that Doran discusses psychic conversion.
>
> > Lonergan acknowledged that he was in agreement with the position presented in this paper. Lonergan's own wording speaks of "dramatic artistry," of the fact that we want to make a work of art out of our existence. Our first work of art is our own life.

> *I*, p. 287: "Not only, then, is man capable of aesthetic liberation and artistic creativity, but his first work of art is his own living. The fair, the beautiful, the admirable is embodied by man in his own body and actions before it is given a still freer realization in painting and sculpture, in music and poetry. Style is in the man before it appears in the artistic product."

Such an artistic notion of praxis moves us away from a purely instrumental notion; within the dramatic pattern we choose 'ends,' and in pursuit of those ends we move into instrumental consciousness to select 'means' to meet those ends.

In *Religion and Self-Acceptance* (New York: Paulist Press, 1976), John Haught makes a similar point, arguing that the choice of a scientific career is itself not a scientific choice; it is, rather, a choice made from within what he terms the "narrative pattern" of living, which is what Lonergan and Doran refer to as the "dramatic pattern." Haught writes (p. 40): "Professional thinkers, intellectuals, often make a great deal of the control over our lives that the advance to theory has made possible. At times there is even the aspiration to eliminate spontaneities altogether, to gain complete mastery over ourselves, and to eliminate altogether the antiquated, ambivalent 'impulses' of the primal fields. Such an aspiration, of course, is itself rooted in a story emanating from the thinker's own primal, instinctive manner of being in the world."

The basic question which emerged for Doran is this: "How do we integrate the resources of depth psychology with the position that Lonergan presented on the subject?'

In the history of Doran's own questioning, he was influenced by Lonergan first for five years (1967-1972) before he started exploring other dimensions of his own interiority besides the ones that Lonergan opens up. Lonergan opens up the dimensions of our own intelligence and rationality in *I*. In 1972, Doran began to become aware of the extreme significance of such things as dreams; he began to recognize this as another element of interiority other than cognitive operation. The question emerged as to how these dimensions of interiority, which were becoming important for him, to be integrated with the dimensions that Lonergan had disclosed. It took three years to answer that question, and to provide some kind of heuristic structure for it. It 'fell into place' in 1972, when he was in Zurich at the Jung Institute finishing his thesis. Actually, he had gone away to relax and the answer came! He had 'twenty introduction' to the thesis written and nothing else; at which time he decided it was time to go on vacation. It was on vacation that it 'came to him;' when he got back he was able to put the whole thing together in a short period of time.

This is the way it 'came' to Doran:

1. Accept the **irreversibility** of what is presented in chapter eleven of *I*, i.e., the irreversibility of consciousness unfolding on the empirical, intelligent, and rational levels. Accept, in addition, the 'fourth' level of consciousness that Lonergan adds later.

2. If there is a **set of basic terms and relations**, start with that and **complement** it with what depth psychology has to offer. Doran's insistence is that what Lonergan has presented is correct but not complete with regard to interiority; it needs to be complemented by what, e.g., Jung and Progoff offer. Depth psychology studies other dimensions of the same interiority; they are 'other,' and they are not accounted for by the disclosure of cognitive operations or the operations by which we move to value judgments and decisions.

   In other words, start with what you really think is established, and from there examine and understand the rest. The basic argument for that whole approach is given in chapter one of *SP*. Chapter one of *AD* gives what Doran judges to be established; chapter two adds another moment, *viz*., psychic conversion, to what he thinks is the heuristic structure of the foundational subject.

   If there were four moments in Lonergan's development of the notion of the foundational subject, Doran is suggesting that psychic conversion provides a fifth.

   The data of depth psychology – sensations, images, emotions, conations/impulses, spontaneous Intersubjective responses, dreams – let's try to understand such data within the contest of this established structure of human consciousness:



   Use that structure as a framework, and then complement it with an understanding of the data of depth psychology.

Another argument for this approach could be given from out of the theory of **meaning**. A dream, e.g., is only potential meaning until it is taken up into consciousness: interpreted, and interpreted as fully and correctly as possible, and acted on. The dream, in itself, is only 'elemental meaning;' but if it is brought into waking consciousness through memory, and if it is interpreted (which is an act of understanding), if it is interpreted as fully and as accurately and as honestly as possible, and if it is acted on (at the existential level) it becomes more than just elemental/potential meaning. At the highest (existential) level – i.e., when acted upon – it becomes part of the incarnate meaning of the subject. When its truth is appropriated and acted upon, it becomes part of the incarnate meaning of me as a person.

All the data of depth psychology are elemental meanings that can become formal, full and constitutive meaning in terms of how human consciousness 'negotiates' them.

Constitutive	Decision
Full	Judgment
Formal	Understanding

Elemental Experience

In “The Gospel and Culture” [*Jesus and Man’s Hope*, ed. D.C. Miller and D.Y Hadidian (Pittsburg: Pittsburg Theological Seminary, 1971), pp. 59-101], Eric **Voegelin** writes: “Life is experienced as a movement with a direction that can be found or missed.” For Voegelin, that is a basic, primordial experience of life; it is the experience behind the *Angst* of a Heidegger or a Kierkegaard. Through Voegelin’s paper, he gives examples of how what seems to be the way to life can really be the way to death, and how what seems to be the way to death can really be the way to life, and how difficult it is to really find the direction of the movement of life. The paper draws both on the Gospel and on Voegelin’s rich knowledge of the Greek philosophers.

> The experience of this ‘movement’ – “the pulsing flow of life” – is what Doran means by the “sensitive psyche.” The sensitive psyche is that experience of the movement of life, and we find the direction in that movement by the questions of conscious interiority – i.e., our questions for intelligence, rationality, and decision.
>
> Interiority and psyche are two dimensions of human interiority that can never be separated, but they are distinct. (If there are such things as angels, however, they do not experience such a ‘movement of life’ in the same kind of way.”
>
> The psyche is that pulsing flow/movement of life, and the human spirit is the set of questions by which we find direction in that movement. But that set of questions is for the sake of the movement, and as the questions are answered the movement of life changes.

In two unpublished papers – “The Beginning of the Beyond” and “The Beginning of the Beginning” – Voegelin speaks of consciousness as **luminosity** and as **intentionality**. The luminosity of consciousness is in primordial symbols; the intentionality of consciousness is in our questions. These are the two primordial disclosures of reality, and the question is to find how they are related to one another.

> Doran’s suggestion is that there is an ‘elemental luminosity’ in the productions of the sensitive psyche, and it becomes an ever clearer luminosity as it comes to be understood, known, and acted-upon.
>
> > It is precisely in primordial symbols that consciousness is luminosity; the symbolic experience is a lighting process on reality. It is very sudden, and almost seems gifted/graced. But there is also a way of speaking of the light even increasing further, as one begins to inquire, interpret, and find ever fuller meanings.
> >
> > > In Paul Ricoeur’s terms, the symbol gives rise to thought; but thought always returns to, and is informed by symbol. Cf., e.g., the “conclusion” (pp. 347-357) of The Symbolism of Evil (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967). Ricoeur insists that a primordial, elemental symbol is never exhausted; the luminosity is never exhausted by intentionality; the mystery is never completely wrapped up in a concept.

For example, I can have a dream symbol at one point in my life; five years later, without denying the meaning I saw initially, I can see an ever fuller meaning – precisely because of the life that I have lived in between, and my intervening questions/pondering/meditation (i.e., my intentionality).

Aquinas, e.g., speaks of "light" as not a factor only of the psyche but also of the human spirit. He speaks of the "light of human intelligence."

Doran is convinced that one of the things that has been missing form a great deal of depth psychology is a position on health, on what constitutes a flourishing human being. Freud particularly is marvelous on displaying sickness, but there remains the question 'what makes for a fully flourishing human being?' A depth psychologist must take a position on this.

Displacement of the tension "between 'spirit' and 'matter') can go **in either direction**. The Christian tradition has tended to emphasize the danger of displacement in the direction of matter; thus, St. Paul speaks of the "members warring against the spirit." But there is an equally pernicious displacement that can go in the other direction. In a situation, for example, when a person blushes while deliberately telling a lie – which is on the side of truth: spirit or body?

Rahner has retrieved this in his notion of concupiscence. We had tended to speak of concupiscence in terms of the displacement toward the flesh. Rahner insists that **the genuine meaning of concupiscence is the tendency to displace**, and the displacement is a distortion of the tension of matter and spirit which the human subject is. We are to life in that tension, rather than displace it in either direction. [Cf. "Theology as Engaged in an Interdisciplinary Dialogue with the Sciences," in *Theological Investigations* XIII (New York: Seabury, 1975), pp. 90-91.]

Besides the displacement toward matter, there is also the possibility of a proud, disdainful neglect of the fact that we are embodied.

Vertical finality is the orientation toward realization of an end that is higher than the end commensurate with the nature of a thing.

"Finality, Love, Marriage," *Collection* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), p.19: "Attention must be drawn to a third type of finality, that of any lower level of appetition and process to any higher level. This we term vertical finality. Pp. 21-22: "Vertical finality is of the very idea of our hierarchic universe, al the ordination of things devised and exploited by the divine Artisan. For the cosmos is not an aggregate of isolated objects hierarchically arranged on isolated levels, but a dynamic whole in which instrumentally, dispositively, materially, obedientially, one level of being or activity subserves another. The interconnections are endless and manifest."

"Mission and the Spirit, *A Third Collection* (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), p. 24: "Vertical finality is to an end higher than the proportionate end. It supposes a hierarchy of entities and ends. It supposes a subordination of the lower to the higher. Such subordination may be merely

> instrumental, or participative, or both, inasmuch as the lower merely serves the higher, or enters into its being and functioning, or under one aspect serves and under another participates."

Thus, in Christian doctrine, the human being has a natural desire for the vision of God; but the realization of that desire is beyond the capacity of the human person. That natural desire can only be realized by the super-natural gift of God, not by our own nature. We are constituted by a vertical finality, an orientation to an end that is higher than can be reached through the resources of our own nature. That is one example of vertical finality.

> Contrasted with this is 'horizontal finality,' i.e., the finality that is commensurate with a thing's nature.

Doran suggests that the sensitive **psyche's horizontal finality** is to sensitive experience as a higher integration of underlying, unconscious neural manifolds of energy. There is an excess of energy beyond what is necessary merely to sustain biological existence; that excess of neural energy is integrated in sense experience, in sensitive consciousness. Such energy is merely coincidental at the purely physiological level, and receives its integration at the level of the sensitive psyche; such integration is the psyche's horizontal finality. Thus, sensitive experience is the psyche's commensurate finality.

The **psyche's vertical finality** is:

→ The *sensitive experience* of a person who **understands**;
→ The *sensitive experience* of a person who **knows what is true**;
→ The *sensitive experience* of a person who **values what is good**;
→ The *sensitive experience* of a person who **is in love**.

> These are higher integrations of sensitivity itself. In other words, your sensitive experience changes as you come to understand, moving from a sense of confusion to clarity. It changes again as you move to the assurance of a good judgment based on evidence; you have a different experience at the sensitive level, not just a judgment made by a disincarnate spirit. There is a change at the level of bodily participation in consciousness. And if you are trying to make a difficult decision, choosing, e.g., between two goods that are incompatible with one another 00 when the decision is made responsibly, there is a sensitive participation in the making of the decision, there is a serenity that was not there when you were torn by the conflicting possibilities.
>
> The psyche has a vertical finality in the life of intentionality; there is a bodily participation in the unfolding of the questions of the human spirit. That bodily participation is sensed; there is a series of changes that go on as the questions through which we find direction in the movement of life unfold. Thus, the very movement of life changes as the various questions raised and answered unfold. That sensed movement of the pulsing flow of life changes.

Sublation is Lonergan's technical term for the relationship among the levels of consciousness.

> > *MT*, p. 241: "I would use this notion [Sublation] in Karl Rahner's sense rather than Hegel's to mean that what sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and

> distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context."

> Sensitive experience is not left behind as we come to understand; it is taken up and changed. The same is true with judgment and decision.

> Sublation is used in the sense that we cake up its fullness into a higher integration; as that Sublation takes place, the lower levels are further enriched and enhanced, not left behind.

The **reciprocity** of psyche and intentionality must also be stressed: it's a two-way street! Doran starts with the intentional operations because he believes that a position on those has been presented that seems to be accurate and well established; from there, he wants to understand the psyche within this established framework of intentional consciousness and to complement that framework. But he also wants to emphasize the importance of the reciprocal/reverse influence of the psyche on the spirit. Not only does the psyche change as the operations of the spirit unfold, but the healthier the psyche is the freer the person is to face the responsibilities of life, the questions that need to be settled if one is going to find direction in the movement of life. And the more obstructed the psyche is, the more it becomes impossible for the very questions to be raised that will give rise to discovery of direction in the movement of life.

> Spirit and psyche are equiprimordial ways of being *Dasein*. Psyche is influential in the unfolding life of the human spirit; just as the spirit is influential in the changing life of the psyche.

> To the extent that the human psyche is free from what we have come to know as neurotic and psychotic disturbances, to that extent the person can engage in the adventure and drama of existence without the inhibiting obstacles. At the same time, to the extent that the psyche is wounded by experiences that have led to neurotic reaction formations, etc., to that extent engagement in the drama of search for direction in the meaning of life is inhibited and there is a healing that has to take place precisely in the psyche itself.

> Jung's notion of complexes is very helpful in this. 'Complexes' are distributions/compositions of psychic energy that can be either positive or negative; the whole of the psyche is constituted by these compositions of energy. They can be either furthering of the adventure of existence, or distorting/disturbing of that adventure. Precisely what psychotherapy is is a dissolution of the obstacles, and the redistribution of that energy in directions that will sustain one's participation in the drama of existence. To dissolve the energies that are wrapped up in the complexes that are preventing one from living life to the fullest, and redistribute that energy is what psychotherapy is all about; it is the transformation and redistribution of energy.

The issue of 'reorienting Freud' involves the notion of c**ensorship** over the unconscious. The reorientation concerns understanding the 'point' of the censorship. Lonergan's understanding is that when the censorship is repressive it blocks out what one does not want at the level of insight and judgment; it blocks out the sensations and images that would lead to insights and judgments that one

does not want. The reason these are not wanted is that because if they were allowed in they would lead to a change in one's orientation: in one's understanding, one's judgments, and might force reevaluation of one's decisions.

Doran argues that the position of consciousness/intentionality offers some help in understanding the censorship that Freud himself correctly posited.

What is **un**conscious are the **neural** configurations that come to expression, e.g., in a dream; the dream itself is 'conscious.' The processes in one's nervous system are the unconscious. There are bodily processes that might not become conscious until something goes wrong with them.

In Jung's position, e.g., the archetypal images are conscious; there are, however, unconscious neural configurations which are the archetypes themselves.

In Lonergan's (and Doran's) use of language, all images are 'conscious.

There are at least **two consequences for theology** from Doran's position on psychic conversion:

1. The first is developed in chapter six of SP, namely, that categories that are **symbolic** can be used in systematic theology without any loss of methodical precision. If one has grounded their use in interiorly differentiated consciousness, then /she has a foundation that is methodically valid for using symbolic categories in systematic theology itself.

   Thus, a methodically systematic theology does not have to be metaphysical, using abstract, scientific categories. You can have a theology that is both systematic and written in symbols, if the person writing it knows what s/he is doing. And you know what you're doing if you have appropriated the psychic, symbolic dimensions of your own consciousness, in a way analogous to the kind of appropriation of intentionality that Lonergan offers.

   You can continue, in the second phase of theology, to be symbolic; and this is not merely a common sense use of symbol, in that it can be grounded in interiorly differentiated consciousness. If I can point to what it is in my own experience that gives rise to my use of this symbolic category, then I can communicate to others what I mean by it; I can appeal to whether or not there is something analogous in your experience that would enable you to understand my use of this symbolic category.

      There is a differentiated way of being symbolic. This is not clear in Lonergan's early writings, in which symbolic expression is identified with common sense.

2. The notion of **dialectic** grounds the general categories of the systematic theology that Doran would like to propose and develop.

   There are grounds in the writings of Lonergan himself for the notion of dialectic being employed here. [There are, however, students of Lonergan who question this usage.]

The basic text appears in *I*, p. 217: "A dialectic is a concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of change. Thus, there will be a dialectic, if

1. There is an aggregate of events of a determinate character,
2. The events may be traded to either or both of two principles,
3. The principles are opposed yet bound together, and
4. They are modified by the changes that successively result from them."

> Thus, (4) the psyche is modified by the changes that take place in the spirit, and the spirit is modified by changes that take place in the psyche.

In Lonergan's writings, those are the structural elements that constitute a dialectic. Doran argues that these structural elements give rise to two basic types of dialectic: **contraries** and **contradictories**.

> [Doran realizes that he has been concerned for about twenty years with the question of how we are to understand conflict and tension. Can we get a heuristic for dealing with conflict and tension?]

A **dialectic of contraries** characterizes a series of events that result from two principles that are linked and opposed, but reconcilable.

> Examples of a dialectic of contraries are most of the processes leading toward integration that Jung speaks about: consciousness and the unconscious, the 'masculine' and 'feminine' dimensions of the psyche. In these, there is linkage and opposition, but both can be integrated by the person in a higher synthesis. In Lonergan's work, an example of a dialectic of contraries is the dialectic of Intersubjectivity and practical intelligence, presented in chapter seven of *I*. We are not to choose between those two, even though they can frequently come into opposition with each other; e.g., an Intersubjective group can sense a resistance to practical changes that have to take place in the structure of a society if that society is going to overcome some of its difficulties. In such a case, conflict between one's spontaneous Intersubjectivity and the exercise of instrumental intelligence necessary to meet the full problems of the community is experienced. But a community is the result of both of these dimensions in some kind of working relationship with one another. If one principle is chosen over the other, you have a distorted community. A community of integrity is a community that is a realization of both principles in **creative tension** with each other. The tension will always be there.

A **dialectic of contradictories** characterizes a series of events that result from two principles that are linked and opposed, but not reconcilable; a choice must be made between the principles.

The prime instance of a dialectic of contradictories has to do with the various transcendental notions of human consciousness:

True	:	False
Good	:	Evil
Beautiful	:	Ugly
Intelligent	:	Absurd

You cannot have both; there is a choice that has to be made.

And the choice for good is a choice of tense unity of the dialectic of contraries. The good choice (in the dialectic of contradictories) is a choice that would preserve and strengthen the tension of the dialectic of contraries. And the choice for evil is a choice that would distort the dialectic of contraries by choosing one principle over the other.

In personal life, e.g., choosing the suppression of the unconscious for the sake of the conscious ego is a choice of distortion. Whereas choosing the tense unity of consciousness and the unconscious is a choice for integrity. On the other hand, choosing to abandon the demands of conscious development and to just go with nothing but the rhythms and the processes of nature as these come to expression in the psyche is another choice for distortion.

There is an achievement that can be reached – by God's grace only – of **integrity**.

The term "integrity" has traditionally been used in theology, e.g., to refer to Adam and Eve's life "before the 'Fall'." Doran suggests that we can understand such "integrity" as a function of the creative tension of a dialectic of contraries, i.e., of the compound of matter and spirit that is the human person. Human integrity is being poised in a creative, tense equilibrium in-between the contraries which constitute the human person.

Concupiscence, then, is the tendency of our being to break that tension, to break that unity-in-duality, to distort the dialectic by emphasizing one pole at the expense of the other.

Thus, Paul speaks of "the law of the members fighting against the law of the spirit" (Rom 7.23). But the spirit can also be emphasized to the proud neglect of the bodily character of our person.

We depend on the body for the very images that give rise to intentionality; we could understand nothing if we were not embodied human beings, because human beings depend on images to understand anything and images arise out of neural processes. Thus, for us to go in the direction of emphasizing spirit to the exclusion of body is *hybris*, as opposed to humility (which is etymologically connected with *humus*, earth). We must recognize that we are connected with the earth; we are earthly, bodily beings.

Thus, this basic structure of dialectic will help us to understand a number of basic theological terms.

> **Sin** – as a personal act – would be the actual choice of a distortion. And the basic context for understanding **grace** would be the restoration of human integrity in the tension of existence.

This is not merely a matter of the individual. Our contemporary theological scene has made this very clear. This structure does apply to the individual. But today we are also speaking of 'social sin,' and the same structure of dialectic can be applied to **society**. Coral also suggests that the same structure can be applied to meaning, and accordingly to **culture**.

> Culture, community, and person are dialectical realities that can be understood according to this structure of dialectic.

The basic choice – which is itself an **either/or** choice – is a choice **of both principles** (integrally) **or of one pole** (distorted) of the unfolding series of events. At this level, there is a dialectic of contradictories; the either/or is **either** both principles operating in harmony with one another, **or** the distortion of the dialectic by emphasizing one principle to the deprivation of the other.

> The choice of evil always involves a distortion of the integral dialectics, in one direction or the other. Sin occurs at the level of choice where we are dealing with contradictories. But the contradictories are integrity and distortion.

The embodiment/objectification of sin in sinful social structures is an objectification of a distortion of the integral dialectics. In our society, such structures tend to a distortion toward an emphasis on instrumental intelligence to a neglect of Intersubjectivity.

> The point to be emphasized is that the dialectic of contradictories regards the integrity/distortion of the dialectic of contraries. Thus, the 'contradictory' and the 'contrary' are not utterly disparate categories; they are related.

The human person is **incarnate spirit**: there is a dialectic of contraries that constitutes the human person, and the integrity of the human person is an integrity of a creative tension of these contraries principles. The contrariness is a function of distinct schemes of recurrence.

We all have some experience of 'matter' and 'spirit' being contrary orientations, and yet capable of some kind of creative tension in a higher integration.

> In the decisions in which a person makes her-/himself what s/he is to be at the fundamental level of basic option, it can be recognized that constitutive of such decisions is a choice either for (a) the creative tension of being incarnate spirit and all that this means, or for (b) displacement toward matter or displacement toward spirit.

Such choices are presented to me in very concrete form, they are concrete decisions that I have to make. But when they are at this fundamental level, they involve my settling my identity. And my settling my identity integrally is precisely my option to be a creative tension of matter and spirit in their unfolding. I am distorting my development if I am opting for either one at the expense of the other.

Readings for January 29:

- *AD, chapters 4 and 5*
- *i, chapter 20*
- *MT, chapter 4*
- *"Suffering Servanthood and the Scale of Values," Lonergan Workshop IV, pp. 41-67*

29 January 1987

Review of PSYCHIC CONVERSION:

Speaking of the situation as source leads to a new employment of Dialectic as a functional specialty in theology; it now operates on the situation, rather than on the classic texts of the tradition. The foundations that Lonergan has proposed remain the same; they are to be preserved and brought forward in their fullness. But they are also to be complemented by psychic conversion, which is an additional dimension to the foundational subject beyond the dimensions that Lonergan has clarified in speaking of religious, moral, and intellectual conversion as foundation for theology.

"Psychic conversion" is *defined* (*strictu sensu*) as a **transformation of the censorship** (Freud) **that is exercised by our orientation in life over the unconscious, *from a repressive to a constructive functioning in one's development***.

By defining is meant 'capturing the immanent intelligibility' of psychic conversion

The censorship is the function of one's conscious orientation determining what will be allowed into consciousness from the underlying neural manifold.

We have to exercise some censorship. In *The Denial of Death* (New York: The Free Press, 1973), Ernest **Becker** insisted that we cannot deal with everything that could possibly come into our experience. He understands the schizophrenic's problem as lying in the fact that s/he does not have the defenses to screen out certain things, so that the whole of experience becomes overwhelming and the psyche 'cracks' under the burden.

The question is: 'What do you screen out?' and 'What do you allow in?'

Freud is the one who developed the notion of a censor that screens out certain things that should be attended to. There are many different elements of Freudian psychology that are connected with the notion of censorship: his interpretation of dreams, slips of the tongue, screening memories, forgetfulness of things that happened in clear consciousness, etc. All that is connected with Freud's notion of the censor.

When Lonergan does his own Sublation of Freudian psychology in chapter six of I, he understands the censor as screening out images that would be proximate material for insight into the situations

> of one's life, into oneself and other persons, into the needs of other persons, etc. And insight, of course, is one of the things that is necessary ultimately for decision. So, his understanding of the censor is that it blocks out the images for insight; and the ulterior finality of insight is for the decision-making through which we constitute ourselves as authentic or inauthentic persons. The repressive censor, then, screens out the images that, if they were allowed in, would give rise to insights that a person doesn't want. A person's dramatic pattern is oriented against wanting certain types of insights. A repressive censor is one that would screen out images that would be material for the kinds of insights that a person doesn't want, but perhaps needs if one is to constitute oneself as a genuine person.
>
> > Psychic conversion is the transformation of that censor from that kind of repressive exercise to a **constructive exercise** where what it screens out are irrelevant images, that are not necessary for the development of oneself as an authentic person.

Also in Lonergan's understanding – and this too is closely connected with Freud – **images** and **feelings** are concomitant, but feelings are much harder to repress from consciousness than are images. What happens when certain images are repressed is that the feelings originally connected with them become disassociated from those images, and attached to other images. Thus, you have feelings connected with **incongruous images**; you have emotional cathexis in certain object relations that simply are incongruous, irrational, senseless. Fetishes would be an extreme, but clear, example of this. In such a situation, the psyche – under the exercise of repressive censorship – becomes ever more fragmented and unintelligible.

Doran regards this structure as an important element of what he is proposing. The notion of **finality** of the psyche for insight/judgment/decision is a very important element to Doran's attempted reorientation of depth psychology.

> But it must be remembered that to speak of insight is not to speak of something utterly theoretical and abstract. Most of the insights that we are talking about are practical and dramatic. Thus, insights occur – not only in the intellectual pattern of experience – but in all the patterns. Insights are involved in one's everyday living; for the human being, they are what instinct is for a lower animal. It is through the way that we understand ourselves, our world, and others that we make ourselves what we are to be.
>
> > Insight is into different kinds of data, depending on what 'kind' of person (Jung) one is – feeling, thinking, sensation, intuition. Different types of persons process different types of data more easily; but all persons have insights.

The **reciprocal** relationship between psyche and spirit (levels of consciousness) must be remembered clearly.

Definitions:

Psyche: The sensitive stream of sensations, memories, images, emotions, impulses, spontaneous responses to other persons/objects/situations, conscious bodily movements ('body language').

Spirit: Everything that occurs in consciousness from the emergence of the question on. From the point at which a person wants to understand, from the point at which the spirit of inquiry is awakened in any form whatsoever, the subsequent operations constitute spirit.



Psyche and spirit have a reciprocal relationship with each other. As one performs 'spiritual' operations, the experience at the psychic level changes: you feel differently after you understand something than you did before you understand it; and you feel differently when you are convinced that you have made a good judgment, as a certain assurance sets in; and you feel differently after having made a decision than you did when you were struggling to decide what to do. That is one direction of the relationship, i.e., the effect that the operations of spirit have on the psyche. And this is a cumulative effect. The more authentic one is in the performance of those 'spiritual' operations, the more healthy is the development of the psyche; thus, psychic health will be a sign of the integrity of spiritual development. But the influence also operates in the other direction. The freer the psyche is from, e.g., neurotic anxieties/fears/impulses and tendencies to breakdown of one kind or another, the freer one is to pursue the 'spiritual' questions through which we constitute ourselves as persons. And the more the psyche has been traumatized/wounded, the more difficult it is to perform the operations of the human spirit.

> Thus, Doran is suggesting that there is another source of what Lonergan calls "moral impotence" (*I*, pp. 627-630). Lonergan speaks of moral impotence in terms of the incompleteness of our intellectual and volitional development – in other words, in terms of the incompleteness of our development as spirit. But Doran adds that there is also an incompleteness of psychic development; psychic woundedness/traumatization can render a person incapable of performing certain kinds of operations in any sustained fashion. That has to be healed before the spirit can be released. Thus, there is a **psychic source of moral impotence,** as well as the 'spiritual' sources which Lonergan emphasizes.

The dramatic pattern in which one is truly free to make a work of art out of one's life is a matter of abiding in the creative, taut balance/tension of matter/limitation and spirit/transcendence. And the

psyche **feels** that tension; there is a 'felt equilibrium,' in the sense – not of a static homeostasis – but of a dynamic orientation, a creative tension of matter and spirit. One of the effects of psychic conversion is to enable one to abide in that empirical freedom that "allows the inevitability of form to emerge from the materials of one's own life."

For Ignatius of Loyola, it was feeling that kind of equilibrium that he means by the state in which you are free to make a distinction. If you are not abiding in that tension, then you have to decide for whatever will bring you to it; you go in the direction that will bring you to that creative tension.

He posits two ways of making a decision: you either are or are not in this creative tension. If you are not ("the second mode of election") you go with what will bring you to it; you test the inclinations and feelings, and basically follow the ones that lead you to this. Those may be difficult to discern; as Voegelin points out, it is like 'a golden cord' that tugs very gently – while there are all kinds of other things that tug violently. Voegelin speaks of finding that golden cord what will lead you to that dynamic tension. (Cf. also Bede Griffiths, *The Golden String* [New York: P.J. Kenedy & Sons, 1954]). For Ignatius, if you are already abiding in this creative tension, then yow you make your decision is to line up the 'pros' and 'cons' and go with what appears positive. If you are in the creative tension, you are free to do this; you are not free if you are being pulled in all kinds of directions. Thus, what mode you use for decision depends on what state you are in.

Lonergan speaks of the genuine person as a taut balance between limitation and transcendence. The ontological roots of that tension/balance are matter and spirit.

This is quite consonant with Jung's essay "On the Nature of the Psyche" (in volume eight of *The Collected Works*), which Doran judges to be the most important theoretical paper that Jung wrote.

Jung speaks of the human person as a triple compound:



Psyche participates in both matter/body and spirit.

The person is a tension of body and spirit, and the psyche's images constellate that tension; it is by coming into contact with the symbols of the psyche that one learns to live in that tension.

Psyche is rooted in the rhythms/processes of the body, but at the same time it participates in the life of the spirit, so that, e.g., when you understand something you also feel it.

There is a special relevance of psychic conversion to the (fourth) existential level of consciousness, where we make decisions and carry out our decisions. This is because of the relationship between **FEELINGS** and **values**, and the relationship between **FEELINGS** and **symbols**.

To appropriate one's feelings is to appropriate oneself as an orientation to value, because it is in one's feelings that one apprehends potential value.

Lonergan follows Suzanne **Langer**'s *Feeling and Form* in defining **symbol** as the image of a real or imaginary object that awakens a feeling or is awakened by a feeling (cf. *MT*, p. 64). A living symbol is an image, but not 'just' an image; it is an image that is fraught with feeling. There is a reciprocal relationship between feeling and symbol; the symbol awakens feelings or is awakened by feelings.

Feeling is, accordingly, the common denominator (or 'middle term') related to both values and symbols. Thus, one's symbol system is also an indication of one's orientation in the realm of values. One' dreams, e.g., in which one's spontaneous symbolic system is released, can also have an existential meaning.

It is acknowledged that dreams are extraordinarily complex, and not all of our dreams are existential; some of them are just saying that 'you ate too many pickles!'

But there are what Ludwig Binswanger (cf. *MT*, p. 69) called "dreams of the morning" that anticipate waking life, and that have elemental meaning for one's existential self-constitution. Lonergan expressed sympathy with this existential approach to dreams, and this was clearly shared by Jung.

The notion of dialectic is enriched by the development of this position on psychic conversion.

<u>Review of the Notion of DIALECTIC</u>:

Doran insists that his understanding of the notion of dialectic is grounded in Lonergan's *I* and *MT*.

The notion of dialectic appears explicitly for the first time in chapter seven (p. 217) of *I*; but there he says that he had used the notion without talking about it in chapter six. He introduces dialectic as an element of **generalized empirical method**. In chapters one through five (of *I*), Lonergan set forth his notions of 'empirical method' as it is found in the 'hard' sciences (such as physics, chemistry, and biology). Then in chapters six and seven, he generalizes that method by bringing it to bear on **data of consciousness**, whereas the hard sciences bring it to bear on data of sense.

The recognition that there are data of consciousness and that they can be studied scientifically is the foundation of human science. Any science that will try to understand humanity without taking the data of consciousness into consideration – or even denying its existence (e.g., behaviourism) – will not have an adequate foundation.

By data of consciousness is meant that there are certain experiences (e.g., insight, grasping the sufficiency of evidence) that are not visible, tangible, audible; they are experiences of interiority.

Generalized empirical method will bring what we have learned about what it is to be scientific (from physics, chemistry, and biology) to bear, but with the recognition that we are dealing with a new range of data that have to be studied in their own right.

Chapter one of *AD* deals with Lonergan's use of generalized method with regard to the data within a single consciousness; Lonergan asks me to recognize that I perform operations of inquiry, insight, further questions for judgment, and further questions for decision that are operations that go on within my own individual, unique conscious being.

But there is more to human science than just a bunch of single consciousnesses having insights, making judgments, and making decisions; there is also the relation between different subjects, interpersonal relations; there is the relationship between a community of subjects and their natural milieu/environment; and there is the relationship between consciousness and its unconscious neural base. These are all dimensions of human science. And it is in understanding these types of relationships are where the notion of dialectic proves to be helpful (cf. *I*, pp. 243-244). Relationships:

→ Between persons;
→ Between communities of persons and the natural environment;

→ Between consciousness and the unconscious.

Dialectic stands to generalized empirical method in the same way in which a differential equation (cf. I, pp. 28-29) stands to the method of the physicist. A differential equation is part of the 'equipment' that the physicist brings to the study of the data of sense; in many instances, the physicist knows ahead of time that the solution to her/his problem will be the solution to a differential equation. In that sense, it is part of the heuristic structure that you have as you come to the study of the data. You don't know what the solution is, but you know that it will take this form. Thus, Lonergan writes that "dialectic is a **pure form** with general implications" *(I*, p. 244).

> Thus, human science – when it studies such things as interpersonal relations, the relations between consciousness and the unconscious, the relationships among communities and between communities and their natural environment – if equipped with a pure form of dialectic, will be able to understand these types of phenomena as some realization of this pure form of dialectic.
>
> Just as the physicist anticipates that the correlation that will explain the relations between sense data will be the solution to a differential equation, so the human scientist can anticipate that the relations between consciousness and the unconscious, between different conscious subjects, between different communities of subjects, and between communities and their environment, will be – in many instances, at least – some realization of this pure form of dialectic.
>
> Thus, the question is: what is the pure form of dialectic?

There have been at least three different interpretations in the Lonergan community as to what Lonergan meant by 'dialectic.' Doran's thesis is that there is **one notion of dialectic**, not several, in Lonergan's work.

> This is in contrast to the position put forth by Ronald McKinney, "Lonergan's Notion of Dialectic," *The Thomist* 46 (1982), pp. 221-241.

But there are also Lonergan 'purists' who deny the complexity of the one notion of dialectic.

Thus, *contra* McKinney, Doran insists that there is one notion of dialectic; but *contra* the 'purists,' he insists that that one notion is very complex. The complexity can be brought under some kind of control on the basis of the distinction between 'consciousness' and 'knowledge.'

What establishes it as a single notion is that it is a notion for dealing with **tension/conflict/opposition**; it is the pure form, the heuristic structure, for understanding tension, conflict, opposition. But that pure form is not simplistic, and if you make it simplistic you make human situations worse.

RD: "The Ayatollah Khomeini has a simplistic notion of dialectic, and so do people who repress their shadows." -- If you don't like it, get rid of it! That's simplistic and stupid.

Dialectic, in Lonergan's own presentation, is a much more complex anticipation of tension, conflict, and opposition.

<u>Principle texts</u>:

I, p. 244 (cf. also *AD*, p. 47): "Dialectic is a pure form with general implications; it is applicable to **any** concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles that are modified cumulatively by the unfolding; it can envisage at once the conscious and the non-conscious either in a single subject or in an aggregate and succession of subjects; it is adjustable to **any** course of events, **from an ideal line of pure progress resulting from the harmonious working** of the opposed principles, to any degree of conflict, aberration, break-down, and disintegration; it constitutes a principle of integration for specialized studies that concentrate on this or that aspect of human living and it can integrate not only theoretical work but also factual reports; finally, by its distinction between insight and bias, progress and decline, it contains in a general form the combination of the empirical and the critical attitudes essential to human science."

I, p. 233 (cf. also *AD*, p. 54): "The essential logic of the distorted dialectic is a reversal. For **dialectic rests on the concrete unity of opposed principles;** the dominance of either principle results in a distortion, and the distortion both weakens the dominance and strengthens the opposed principle to restore an equilibrium."

An example would be the repression of anger. The dominance of a consciousness that will not allow certain things to be dealt with. This results in a distortion; but the distortion weakens the dominance, strengthens the opposed principle, and the person either 'erupts' or there is some kind of equilibrium established in which things that were not paid attention to before are paid attention to.

I, p. 478 (cf. also *AD*, p. 60): "To fail in genuineness is not to escape but only to displace the tension between limitation and transcendence. Such a displacement is the root of the dialectical phenomena of Scotosis in the individual, of the bias of common sense, of basic philosophical differences, and of their prolongation in natural and human science, in morals and religion, in educational theory and history."

Here again he speaks of the displacement of a tension that is meant to be preserved, but the term 'dialectical' is used more in the sense of contradictories. But the notion of dialectic is still related to that notion of preserving a creative tension of opposites.

MT, p. 111: "It [religious development] is not a struggle between any two opposites whatever the very precise opposition between authenticity and unauthenticity, between the self as transcending and the self as transcended."

Here he is definitely using the term 'dialectic' in the sense of contradictories that cannot be integrated with one another. So there is clearly a use of dialectic that has to do with opposites that cannot be simply reconciled with one another, but rather with opposites between which one must make a choice.

Doran, accordingly, argues that this complex notion of dialectic which deals with tension/conflict/ opposition, has several different realizations. There are certain kinds of oppositions that have to be dealt with by keeping the creative tension among the opposites. There are certain other types of oppositions that the Western philosophical tradition has disengaged in the principle of non-contradiction; thus, a given statement that preserves the same meaning cannot be both true and false.

Good	:	Evil
True	:	False
Intelligible	:	Absurd

The same elements of a phenomenon under the same aspect cannot be both intelligible and absurd. There are certain types of opposites among which a choice must be made. This is the dialectic of contradictories, as opposed to the dialectic of contraries.

Thus, in Doran's interpretations, there are two realizations of the one complex notion of dialectic:

1. The dialectic of **contraries**;
2. The dialectic of **contradictories**.

From the above-given texts (from *I* and *MT*) it is clear that Lonergan envisages the possibility of 'a concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of change' that occurs along a line of pure progress when these principles are working harmoniously with one another. For instance, the development of the individual human subject will be along a line of pure progress to the extent that the opposites of consciousness and the unconscious, and ultimately of spirit and matter, are working harmoniously with each other. In other words, to the extent that a person is in a state of what theologians call 'integrity,' there is pure progress. By integrity is meant a state in which the oppositions which tend to go off in different directions – splitting from each other – are working harmoniously with each other.

Lonergan does definitely envisage that kind of unfolding of linked but opposed principles. There is definitely an opposition: the human spirit is open to the whole universe of being; but the human being as an animal lives in an environment, a habitat, which has its own interests and concerns that

must be paid attention to if the person is going to stay alive. If a person breaks off from that habitat and is only in the universe of being, then the person is not establishing a line of pure progress.

> Doran tells of a friend who has a terrible tendency to live only in the universe of being; and not in a habitat – at all: "Of the world, but not in it!" He had a dream one night, in which he was driving down a dark country road, all by himself in a lonely part of the country side. While he was driving along he suffered a heart attack, which was not fatal. He was picked up and taken to a hospital. In the dream, he starts expounding his theories to those in the hospital who were working on him. The dream was trying to tell him that he was paying insufficient attention to his body; there is a whole dimension of his existence erupting, crying out for attention.
>
> The line of pure progress will be derailed if one of the principles becomes dominant over the other. If you are too much in the environment/habitat and not free from it, you are too much in the direction of limitation; you are not living the fullness of your human possibility.

Ernest Becker (following Kierkegaard) speaks of:

- → Too little possibility;
- → Too much possibility.

> We experience a tension between these tendencies. The **depressive** moves in the direction of too little possibility, to the point where the catatonic depressive sleeps in the same form that s/he was in in the womb; their whole body contracts into that position and cannot move out of it. That is the extreme displacement in the direction of limitation; too little possibility, living only in a habitat. Too much possibility is the person who is not in a habitat at all, who goes soaring off into the stratosphere; the extreme of this is perhaps the **schizophrenic**.
>
> The difficulty is to establish that creative tension. Becker says that most people are just a little in the direction of too little possibility; most people surround themselves with too many defenses, and do not realize what they could realize with their lives. His whole book (*The Denial of Death*) attempts to cut away, to expose the defenses that we use, embedding ourselves too much in the institutions of culture, relying on them for our security and our self-esteem. He is calling us to establish the tension in our lives.

The two instances of the dialectic of contraries that Lonergan gives are:

1. The relationship between the unconscious neural manifold and conscious orientation (chapter six of *I*); and
2. The relationship between primordial Intersubjectivity (the basic interrelatedness that is part of our psyche) and practical intelligence (chapter seven of *I*).

> In a community, primordial Intersubjectivity and practical intelligence have to be working in creative tension with one another – or else the community will suffer derailment. To the extent

that these opposing principles are working harmoniously with each other, so that the institutions of the society and Intersubjectivity are in balance, the community is progressing.

In the subject, in addition to the dialectic between unconscious neural manifold and consciousness, there is also a dialectic **within consciousness**, between psyche and spirit. Thus, there are two related realizations of a dialectic of contraries within the subject. It is important to grasp the fact that within our consciousness itself, we experience an opposition between the demands of the human spirit for authenticity, and sometimes the movement of the psyche against it; or, in a given person, there could be an orientation of spirit against authenticity, and a psychic orientation toward an authentic life even when the spirit is denying that orientation by false living.

The ontological base of this dialectic within consciousness is the dialectic of the unconscious with conscious orientation. In other words, the psyche itself has its roots in unconscious neural manifolds. The base of experienced conflict is conflict between what is not experienced and what is experienced; but we only understand that through the operations of spirit, moving from the conflict that we do experience to its underlying root.

But it is also clear from those texts that there are other instances where you do not have pure progress; there is no progress coming out of affirming a true statement and a false statement, or from cultivating both your tendencies toward authenticity and your tendencies toward Inauthenticity.

The foundations of the distinction between contraries and contradictories can be brought under some control by grasping the **distinction between consciousness and knowledge**. Thus, consciousness and knowledge are distinct.

You can be:

→ Conscious and confused;
→ Conscious and not-knowing;
→ Conscious and in error.

Knowledge is impossible without consciousness; but consciousness itself is no guarantee of knowledge. Consciousness is the pure self-presence; it is not 'knowing,' in any fully human sense of that term. It is just a pure self-presence that enables you to experience yourself in your operations of knowing and deciding and feeling, etc. But you can be conscious and not-knowing, and you reflect that whey you say "I don't know."

Both consciousness and knowledge are a **duality** in the human person but the duality is to be negotiated differently in each case. The way of dealing with the duality of knowing is to 'break it' (cf. *I*, pp. xivv and xxii; cf. also *AD*, p. 55-56).

". . . in each of us there exist two different kinds of knowledge. They are juxtaposed in Cartesian dualism with its rational '*Cogito*, *ergo sum*' and with its unquestioning extroversion to substantial extension. They are separated and alienated in the subsequent rationalist and empiricist philosophies. They are brought together again to cancel each other in Kantian criticism. If these

statements approximate the facts, then the question of human knowledge is not whether it exists but what precisely are its two diverse forms and what are the relations between them. If that is the relevant question, then any departure from it is, in the same measure, the misfortune of missing the point. But whether or not that is the relevant question, can be settled only by undertaking an arduous journey through the many fields in which men succeed in knowing or attempt the task but fail."

". . . the hard fact is that. . . there exist in man two diverse kinds of knowing, that they exist without differentiation and in an ambivalent confusion, until they are distinguished explicitly and the implications of the distinction are drawn explicitly."

- The first kind of knowing can be basically understood as "taking a look;" it is an **unquestioning extroversion**, which Santayana referred to as "animal faith."

  This is part of our experience, and sometimes it is a very useful part of our experience. It can be a necessary form of knowing for the preservation of biological existence. "Miami Vice is all animal faith! They get out of all the fixes they get into because they have a very highly developed animal faith."

  But animal faith can also be subject to all types of illusion; thus, a stick placed in water appears bent, but it isn't. there is no criterion at this level for distinguishing the real and the illusory. Yet, at the same time, there are instances in which 'animal faith' can save your life – if you happen to be right!

  Lonergan's point is that we must not put the criterion of the real at that level, for there is no criterion of the real at that level.

  > His point is not to deny the existence of this kind of knowing; it functions, and sometimes it can function in a quite helpful way. But if you look for the criterion of the real at this level – "it's already-out-there-now and I know it by taking a good look' – that just won't do it; you can, e.g., take a good look at a stick in the water and it will be bent – on the criterion of taking a good look.

  This is the kind of knowing that occurs exclusively in the higher animals.

- There is also a **fully human knowing**, which is the only kind of knowing that contains some criteria of the real. Fully human knowing is the kind of knowing that Lonergan works out in the first ten chapters of *I*, and that he asks you to affirm in chapter eleven.

  Consciousness proceeds on three cognitive levels:



1	Sense / Imagination

Consciousness begins with the presentation of sense, imagination, and internal consciousness; by inquiry it moves to an understanding of what has been experienced through sense and imagination; that understanding gets conceptualized/formulated; on the basis of that formulation, the question emerges as to whether I have understood correctly or not; then I grasp that there either is or is not sufficient evidence to make a judgment.

> Consciousness is bound together and unified by the process of inquiry. You ask questions, and as a result of asking questions and only as a result of asking questions, you come to some degree of understanding. Sometimes, insight is a very dramatic event (cf. I, p. 3, for the story of Archimedes' 'Eureka!'); more often, it is a more prosaic event. In either case it is an understanding of what has been experienced.
>
> But we don't stop with understanding. "There are a lot of intelligent people who aren't very reasonable, and they're dangerous! And the right-wing in the church today is filled with people who have all kinds of intelligent insights that are just goofy!" You have to raise further questions: Is it correct of not? Is it on target or off base? You proceed from such questions to the grasp of the evidence. And there is a whole gradation of evidence, and a parallel gradation of judgments: certainly, probably, possibly, possibly not, probably not, certainly not. What Lonergan means by being reasonable is to keep your judgments in accord with the status of the evidence that you have grasped.

Clearly distinguish the two kinds of knowing and accept the implications of the distinction. By breaking the duality, he does not mean that you forget 'animal faith' completely; but don't put the criteria of the real at the level of animal faith. Strive for full human knowing, and in your philosophical attempt to say what it is to know, place the criterion of the real in the grasp of the evidence by reasonable consciousness.

The **duality of consciousness** is the duality of the 'sensitive stream' and the 'questioning spirit.' If you break this duality, you're in trouble! Because the sensitive stream is the start of your knowing, and it is always the source of your evidence for judgments; i.e., you will appeal to data in the sensitive stream and in your feelings for evidence for judgment. Thus, the duality in consciousness of psyche and spirit is to be strengthened and preserved – even for the sake of authentic, genuine human knowing. Because genuine human knowing begins with sensitive psychic experience and returns to sensitive psychic experience when it appeals to evidence for judgments. So if you have broken that duality of consciousness and are just a pure spirit or if you are just psyche, you are not a human knower.

Philosophically, if you break the duality of consciousness, that is the way you end up with empiricism or idealism – which, for Lonergan, are the two basic forms of the philosophical counter-positions. The **empiricist** has broken the duality of consciousness by neglecting spirit, as

contribution constitutively to what we know; to the empiricist, spirit is purely subjective; understanding might occur, but it is purely subjective and cannot possibly be objective in the sense of having anything to do with the real. On the other hand, the **idealist** does not regard the sensitive as being the source of evidence for judgments. Thus, the idealist stays at the second level of consciousness and says that s/he knows only her/his ideas, and doesn't recognize that there is a further level on which those ideas are questioned and that this questioning is a return to sensation for evidence for a judgment that pronounces on an idea as true or false.

Thus, it is important to preserve the duality of consciousness even for the whole position on knowing, let alone for one's living. The duality of consciousness is not to be broken; rather, it is to be strengthened and preserved. That preservation will even enable you to break the duality of knowing, and to opt for fully human knowing – because fully human knowing is a matter of the duality of consciousness, i.e., of the sensitive stream and the spirit raising and answering questions.

That distinction – between the duality of consciousness and the duality of knowing – and the different ways of dealing with it, is the foundation **in the subject** of the distinction of the two kinds of dialectic. The **dialectic of contradictories** – at least in the philosophical form of the irreconcilable positions and counter-positions – is a matter of not breaking the duality of knowing, or a matter of breaking the duality of consciousness. And the duality of consciousness is the basis of the **dialectic of contraries**: sense and spirit are contraries, having different tendencies and easily splitting off from one another. And theologically, 'concupiscence' is the tendency toward their splitting; there is a tendency in our nature toward a fragmentation of our potential unity. But that duality is to be preserved and strengthened in its concrete tension; and it is precisely preserving and strengthening that duality in its concrete tension that enables fully human knowing to go forward, and that enables one to choose fully human knowing, breaking the duality of knowing in favor of fully human knowing.

The foundations of the distinction between the dialectics of contradictories and contraries in the subject lie in the distinction between the duality of knowing and the duality of consciousness, and you have to deal with those dualities in very different ways.

Fred Crowe speaks of four steps of the differentiation of consciousness in the West, which, in fact, are the differentiations of the four different levels of consciousness:

1. Prior to the Greek philosopher, intelligence was operative, but it was not differentiated as being distinct from sense.
2. It is Plato particularly who differentiates a distinct level of intelligence from the sense level, making it so distinct that he posits 'two worlds.' The basic differentiation operative here is the differentiation of idea from sense.
3. In Aquinas, you have the differentiation of judgment from idea, and of existence from essence.
4. In Kierkegaard, you have the differentiation of the fourth level of consciousness, the differentiation of decision from knowing. Even though in performance that has been going on all along, the sharp differentiation of the distinctness of decision from knowing occurred in Kierkegaard's battles with Hegel; he recognized that there was something in Hegel's fantastic

scientific system that was not accounted for, namely, the decisions that we make as subjects, which are quite distinct from conceptualizing and scientific knowing.

In his Lectures on the Philosophy of Education, Lonergan mentions that in science, revolutionary breakthroughs are fought at first (e.g., by people who don't want to give up their professorial chairs!), but eventually – and sooner rather than later – the whole scientific community comes around, so that today to pay no attention to Einstein's theory of relativity means that one simply is not a physicist, you're not a member of that community. But in philosophy and human science, these conflicts are perennial; there can be breakthroughs, but there will be a large portion of the philosophical community that will not accept the breakthroughs. This is because we (as human beings) are so involved in the philosophical positions, in a way that we are not in the scientific positions.

Applications:

a. To this point, we have been talking about the **individual subject as dialectical**, as a dialectic of contraries. Radically this is the dialectic of consciousness and the unconscious; proximately it is the dialectic of psyche and spirit.
b. Lonergan himself speaks of an analogous dialectic of contraries in the **community** between primordial Intersubjectivity and practical intelligence which tries to organize things. If you have a practical intelligence in charge of a community that is not sensitive to the Intersubjective 'vibes' of that community, then the organizations proposed are going to wreck havoc.
c. Doran posits an analogous dialectic of **culture**, where the dialectical opposites that are meant to be held in tense unity with one another are anthropological and cosmological constitutive meanings.

This is the first step of what Doran means by "the analogy of dialectic;" those three dialectics of contraries constitute three of the levels of the scale of values. The combination of dialectics of subject/culture/community with the scale of values, and the relationships in that scale (from-below-upwards and from-above-downwards) will give you the heuristic structure of history.



Any historical situation can be understood as **some** realization of that complex pure form: the dialectics and their relationships with one another, which is determined by where they stand in the scale/hierarchy of values.

Doran is moving towards a **pure form of history** – which is why the initial chapters are called 'basic terms and relations.'

This structure is 'very useful as something to have at hand when you're trying to understand what's going on in a concrete historical set of events.'

Readings for February 15:

- *AD, chapters 5 and 6*
- *MT, chapters 4 and 2*
- *I, chapters 20 and 7, and the Epilogue*

5 February 1987

From dialectic, we now move to the **scale of values** for our next set of categories for understanding historical process; the attempt is to
assemble a set of categories that can be used to understand historical process, and that can function in a systematic theology as general categories allowing the reinterpretation of doctrines and, perhaps, the creation of new theological doctrines – in the light of an understanding of human history.

Thus, the two major sets of general categories will be dialectic and the full expansion of that into an analogy of dialectic, and the scale of values. In the light of those categories, Doran proposes to first interpret the doctrine of sin and grace (redemption), and from that point on the rest of the doctrines that a systematic theology should concentrate on.

It is in terms of the scale of values that Doran wants to understand the relationships among the three dialectics of the subject, culture, and community. The scale of values provides us with out 'grid' for understanding how those dialectical processes are related to one another. Accordingly, the three dialectics are not separate; they are distinct, but not separate. They combine in one historical process, and the argument is that the scale of values enables us to understand how they work together to constitute the process of human history.

The **basic text** is MT, pp. 31-32: "Not only do **feelings respond to values**. They do so in accord with some **scale of preference**. So we may distinguish vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious values in an **ascending order**. **Vital** values, such as health and strength, grace and vigor, normally are preferred to avoiding the work, privations, pains involved in acquiring, maintaining, restoring them. **Social** values, such as the good of order which conditions the vital values of the whole community, have to be preferred to the vital values of individual members of the community. **Cultural** values do not exist without the underpinning of vital and social values, but none the less they rank higher. Not on bread alone doth man live. Over and above mere living and operating, men have to find a meaning and value to their living an operating. It is the function of culture to discover, express, validate, criticize, correct, develop, improve such meaning and value. **Personal** value is the person in his self-transcendence, as loving and being loved, as originator of values in himself and in his milieu, as an inspiration and invitation to others to do likewise. **Religious** values, finally, are at the heart of the meaning and value of man's living and man's world."

Thus, in each person there is some scale of preference in accord with which that person's feelings respond to values. Lonergan is here stating his scale of preference.

Lonergan's criterion in establishing this scale is **self-transcendence**; we are carried to a greater degree of transcendence as we respond to value at the different levels:

- Vital values involve a certain self-transcendence; as he states it, we endure the work and the privations that are essential, e.g., to maintain our health.
- There is a greater self-transcendence if we consider not only our own vital values but the vital values of other members of the community, and make our contribution to the kind of social order that will, in fact, guarantee the vital values of the whole community. Thus, such things as egoism and group bias are ruled out at this point, in the preference of social values to vital values.
- There is a greater degree of self-transcendence involved if one is going to take the time and expend the energy to contribute to the constitutive meaning of the society: to develop, to criticize, to qualify, to correct the meanings and values that inform the life of the society.
- If one is going to attempt to be authentic in all of one's personal life, there is yet a greater degree of self-transcendence involved.
- And finally, our relation to the absolutely transcendent Mystery of God calls for the highest degree of self-transcendence.

Also, each level of the scale has a certain correspondence to the various levels of consciousness:

Religious	-	Love	
Personal	-	Decision	Dialectic of the subject
Cultural	-	Reflection	Dialectic of culture
Social	-	Intelligence	Dialectic of community
Vital	-	Experience	

Lonergan does not explicitly spell this correspondence out, but it seems evident.

Thus, personal value is a matter of the integral dialectic of the subject; the authentic person is one who abides in the creative tension limitation and transcendence. Cultural value is constituted by the integral dialectic of culture, especially in our time; Doran's contention is that this dialectic of culture does not presently exist, but needs to be 'evoked.' Calling authentic culture into being is part of the ministry of the church. An integral dialectic of community is what will establish a just social order, in which there is a creative tension between Intersubjectivity, on the one hand, and technological/economic/political structures on the other.

Doran regards personal, cultural, and social values as being a matter of **creative tension of limitation and transcendence**.

The basic **dialectic of the subject** is between the neural manifold and conscious orientation.

In the **dialectic of culture**, the basic terms are 'cosmological' and 'anthropological' constitutive meaning.

- **Cosmological** sets of meanings are the types of meanings that inform, e.g., the aboriginal peoples of North America; our technological society has broken too sharply from the truth that is contained in the constitutive meanings of those cultures. We must retrieve the truth of their basic insight into the necessity of a harmony with the rhythms and processes of non-human nature; that is a lasting and permanent contribution of cosmological societies.

  In cosmological societies, the 'measure' of integrity is the **cosmos**, and its rhythms and processes. The basic movement in establishing integrity is from the cosmos to the society, and from the society to the individual: the cosmos sets the measure for the society, and the society sets the measure for the individual. [To a large extent, this is drawn from Doran's reading of Eliade and Voegelin. It is in the rituals and myths of the society that it becomes attuned to the cosmos.]

  Cosmos ⇒ Society ⇒ Individual

- The **anthropological** constitutive meaning is the basic kinds of sets of meanings that emerge once 'history,' historical consciousness in some form or another, becomes operative. In Western society, this was largely through the differentiation of intelligence and reason in Greek culture; that was the main breakthrough to the anthropological in the West. There were analogous breakthroughs in the "axial period" (Jaspers) all around the world: in India, with the Buddha; in China, with Confucius and Lao Tze; and in Israel with the prophets. But our Western mentality has been largely formed as a result of the development of philosophical and scientific mentality in Greece.

  In authentic anthropological constitutive meaning, the basic 'measure' of integrity is **world-transcendent**, i.e., it is beyond the cosmos – whether it be conceived of as the divinity (*to theon*) as it was in Greek philosophy, or however it is conceived in Buddhism, etc.). It is not anything in the world; it is a world-transcendent measure of integrity. The movement of integrity is from that to the individual; it is the individual who is called to achieve attunement with the world-transcendent measure, which is why it is called 'anthropological:' through prayer, through philosophy, through meditation or whatever exercises are developed by the carriers of this breakthrough to the anthropological. Basically, **individuation** emerges. And it is the individual of integrity who sets the measure for society.

  World-transcendent measure ⇒ individual ⇒ society

This is the basic structure of what Jaspers calls the axial breakthrough, wherever it occurs.

This coincides with a basic Platonic political insight that cannot be lost in political philosophy, even though our own political philosophy has to go beyond classicism. Plato put it this way. Society is a complex of psychic forces, and psychic forces are a complex of social forces; but the psyche sets the standard for the society, and God sets the standard for the psyche.

Jung drew attention to the fact that one of the dangers of mass society today is that it is causing a loss of individuation.

The key to this dialectic is to maintain the truth that is in both of these, in a dynamic tension with each other. Doran judges our society to be 'off' in the direction of the anthropological meaning, having lost contact with the cosmological truth and needs to be returned to it.

Yet, when the gospel is preached to a cosmological society, one of its effects always is individuation; it calls forth people to take responsibility for their own history. This is exactly what Paolo Freire, e.g., is doing with peasant mentalities in Latin America. Without destroying their culture, he is calling them to realize that they are not fatalistically bound to deterministic patterns. 'You can take responsibility for your own way of life.'

The two poles of the **dialectic of community** are spontaneous Intersubjectivity in creative tension with practicality, "instrumental intelligence" (Habermas) which sets us technological, economic and political structures.

'Spontaneous intersubjectivity' is a very primordial thing; we are not talking about developed interpersonal relations. Rather, this is primal, it is the 'prior we' before the emergence of the 'I' in our psyche. And it is still in us no matter how callous we may have become through our own personal development. Thus, if you are walking down the street and a total stranger trips and starts to fall, you spontaneously reach out to help.

In an integral dialectic, the technological/economic/political structures created by practical/instrumental intelligence cannot overreach the limitations placed by the needs that are ours because we are Intersubjective. On the other hand, Intersubjectivity cannot become so pronounced that the community cannot move ahead with the development of its structures.

For example, during the cultural revolution in China, families were split up – the father going to one commune, the mother to another, and the children to still another. This is one of the reasons why the Chinese still hate so strongly what happened at that time. This was a violation of the Intersubjective dimension of society, all in the interests of greater productivity.

Haight-Ashbury in the 1960s may well have been an example of a withdrawal from the social fabric into Intersubjectivity. The withdrawal was because people were 'fed up' with instrumental reason; but the community could not survive without the presence of such reason providing needed solutions to problems that arose.

The structure of society and the heuristics of history (in 8 points):

1. In a healthy society developing along a line of progress, what makes the society healthy and progressive would be the fact that technology, the economic system, and the legal/political stratum of the society – all of which are products of practical intelligence – function always in dialectic interrelation with the spontaneous Intersubjective component of social relations. This is the integral dialectic of community: keeping technology/economics/politics in dynamic, creative tension with the Intersubjective bond of the human community.

2. That dialectical integrity in social order is a function of the everyday level of culture. Thus, at the level of culture, we need to distinguish two dimensions: (a) the everyday set of meanings and values that inform the living of the group spontaneously; and (b) a reflective, 'superstructural' dimension in the culture that reflects on the everyday, trying to understand it, and, perhaps, to change it.

Culture

Everyday/infrastructure	Superstructure
Interpersonal relations	sociology
business transactions	economics
prayer	theology

Lonergan develops this in "The Absence of God in Modern Culture," *A Second Collection*, pp. 101-116. There are two dimensions of culture: the everyday culture, and the reflective, objectifying, perhaps scientific of philosophical culture.

The harmony of the dialectic of community is proximately a function of the everyday level of community, i.e., the *de facto* meanings and values informing a society's way of life as that society spontaneously moves forward.

3. The infrastructure consists of:
    - The everyday level of culture;
    - Technological, economic, political systems;
    - The vital Intersubjectivity of the community.

These are always in some kind of relation with each other. This will be important for entering into discussion with Marx, because Marx considers the infrastructure to consist only in the technological and economic systems ("the forces and relations of production"). Beyond this, Doran insists that politics, everyday culture, and Intersubjectivity are all part of the **spontaneous going-forward of a society**, which is what Doran means by infrastructure. It is an abstraction on Marx's part to disengage the technological and economic orders from this.

4. In a healthy society, the **superstructure** develops and criticizes in a reflexive, meditative, perhaps scientific fashion, the meanings and values of the society. It creates institutions, -- schools, academies, organizations – for the sake of critical reflection. It is basically an attitude, but it is an

attitude that is responsible for setting up institutions for the sake of critical examination of the meanings and values that the society is embodying.

5. There are reciprocal relationships between the various levels of value.

   There are two sets of relations **from below**:

   a. A certain functioning of more basic levels is necessary if there is to be functioning at the higher levels; people have to be eating and housed and clothed if they are going to have time and energy to make some kind of contribution to the well-being of others. Thus, the higher do build on the lower. There has to be some kind of order in a society and freedom in a society if people are going to be able to devote themselves to the development of culture. And there has to be some provision of culture if persons are going to develop, because we develop on the basis of, e.g., education and art. And finally, 'grace builds on nature.'

      There is a basic tendency throughout political philosophy to create a chasm between the upper and lower reaches of the scale of values:

      Religious
      Personal
      Cultural

      Social

      Vital

      Marx criticizes those who create the chasm for the sake of religious, personal, cultural values. But what happens in both Marxism and in liberal bourgeois society is that the whole scale is reduced to vital and social values. The higher values are relegated to illusion by ideology in Marxism; in the United States, it tends to be simply neglected.

      Thus, in ancient Greece there was great flowering of the higher values, but there was also slavery; in our society, the scale is collapsed into the lower levels. Both represent a chasm.

      One of Doran's key motives is to bridge that chasm.

   b. Problems at lower levels set up the need for changes in the higher levels. When there is a breakdown of schemes of recurrence, e.g., at the level of vital values such that the problem cannot be met at that level, there is need for change in social order in order to meet the problem set at the level of vital values.

      Sometimes in human history, the breakdown of schemes of recurrence at more basic levels can be met only by changes at higher levels, and the change has to be

proportionate to the problem. Thus, if the breakdown in the distribution of vital values is of global proportions, the problem cannot be met at the level of vital values; it has to be met at the level of social values and the change at that level will have to be global, i.e., proportionate to the problem.

The change at the level of social institutions will have to be proportionate to the problems at the vital level. Thus, the South African government claims to be making changes; those changes, however, are nowhere near proportionate to the enormity of the problem.

Changes in social structure can be brought about in two ways: (1) violent revolution; and (2) a massive change in culture, a major development in cultural meanings and values. Doran will argue that there are times when violent revolution is justified; however, it is not the function of theology or of the church to promote such revolution. What theology and the church should be doing is to call forth a culture that can facilitate the development of the needed social institutions.

There must be a recognition that such a cultural shift can occur only if people are changed, converted – religiously, morally, intellectually, and/or affectively. There must be a change in persons, and that can only take place through the grace of God.

There is also development **from above**:

- The grace of God is the condition for the development of converted persons;
- Converted persons are the condition for authentic meanings and values in the culture; you won't have them unless they are promoted by authentic human beings.
- Authentic meanings and values in the culture are the condition for a just social order.
- A just social order is the condition for the equitable distribution of vital goods.

The movements 'from below' and 'from above' are reciprocal all the way, just as the levels of consciousness are reciprocal with one another.

Concerning culture, Voegelin also speaks of **soteriological** meaning as a function of revelation, in addition to cosmological and anthropological meanings. Soteriological constitutive meaning can enter into a society whether or not that society has undergone the anthropological transformation. Israel – as a culture – did not undergo individuation until the late prophets and the wisdom literature; but Soteriological meaning, which moved them out of nature and into history, affected Israel at least from the time of the Sinaitic revelation. In other words, God meets people where they are; God's revelation doesn't demand that you move through anthropological meaning. Revelation moves a people into history, and moves history into the consciousness of the people, even prior to the development of individuated consciousness..

Thus, cultures in which individuation is not a prime value can become Christian. Through preaching the gospel frequently results in individuation, in preaching the gospel you preach salvation to people as they are and where they are.

6. The superstructure is very important for the functioning of the infrastructure. In theological terms, there is a very important intellectual ministry/apostolate.

   > If there is not the development of human science in the society that is genuinely human, if there is not a development of economics that is in tune with the total scale of values, then the infrastructural level itself becomes distorted.
   >
   > Concerning the impact of the superstructure, Lonergan liked to recall that Karl Marx spent a great deal of time in the British Museum working out a theory of economics that has transformed the face of the earth.
   >
   > If the superstructure is conceived correctly and put in its proper place in the total scale of values, it is not simply 'ivory tower idealism.'

7. The breakdown of infrastructural integrity frequently calls for developments at the superstructural level. In "Healing and Creating in History," *A Third Collection*, p. 109, Lonergan writes: "When the system that is needed for our collective survival does not exist, then it is futile to excoriate what does exist while blissfully ignoring the task of constructing a technically viable economic system that can be put in its place." He obviously felt the need for developing an economic theory that works – thus, his work in macroeconomics.

8. Personal and religious values are, in a sense, dealing with questions of order that transcend just the structure of the society, but they are essential nonetheless. How those questions are answered is essential to the structure of the society. How people make choices for themselves and how they relate to the world-transcendent are extremely important.

There are **global proportions** involved in the contemporary functioning of that scale of values. The maldistribution of **vital** goods is today global, and recognizably global; perhaps it has always been global, but today it is in our consciousness. There is a global maldistribution of food, economic resources, work, housing, etc.; we start at that basic, vital level, for that is what sets the proportions of the problem that we are dealing with. Since the maldistribution of vital goods is global in proportion, so the proportions of the higher changes have to be on a global scale. The change in **technological**, **economic**, and **political** structures must be worldwide. As John Paul I once remarked, we need a new global economic order. Tor that to happen, there has to be a development of **culture** so that we can understand the meanings and values of other cultures, and appreciate them. There has to be the development, at the cultural level, of what Doran calls a "world-cultural mentality." That does not mean one culture; rather, it means respect for the values that are inherent in other cultures and the willingness to learn from all other cultures. At the **personal** level, this means that people have to come into contact with the universal human in themselves – what all men and women share in common across cultures. Thus, we all share this basic structure of consciousness that has been disengaged by Lonergan; wherever human beings have existed, they have had experiences which they have tried to understand, have tried to understand them correctly, and have tried to make their decisions on the basis of their understanding of their experience. Also, Jung has developed a 'psychic universal' in the archetypes of the collective unconscious; he has made available to us, in a scientific manner, certain symbols that can appeal to people across all cultures.

And if God is working in the world, then **religion** has to call all of this into existence; religious values have to be attuned to all this. The dialogue of world religions will be key in this; cf. Wilfred Cantwell Smith's *Toward a World Theology*. Smith is convinced that the human race will not survive without the dialogue of religions.

Revelation will not be exclusively Soteriological. That would be fundamentalism, without general categories. Rather, the Soteriological message will be addressed to a culture that is constituted in some way by cosmological and/or anthropological meanings. When the gospel is effectively preached to a cosmological or anthropological culture, it should create the dynamic tension of the integral dialectic of culture.



> As the gospel is being preached to cosmological mentalities, it is also freeing them to take responsibility for their own history. And if it is being preached effectively to us in our anthropological culture, it calls us back to the humility that recognizes our dependence on the forces of nature. God's message to us is addressed in the culture which we actually exist in.
>
> But there is also the parallel mistake of collapsing revelation to cultural categories – e.g., saying that sin is 'nothing but' x, y, or z, which are understood in cosmological and/or anthropological terms. Dorn insists that 'sin' is a reality in its own right and that the best word for it is 'sin.'

Doran very much wants to engage in a deprivatizing of religious values; from what has been said, it should be clear that he sees religious and personal values in a very definite cultural and social context.

The source for Doran's reflections on the infrastructure is chapter seven of *I*, where Lonergan speaks of the emergence of the technological, economic, and political – one 'evoking' the other. Vital needs at the level of **vital** values evoke **technological** developments, even in the most 'primitive' setting; e.g., if you make nets to catch fish you have more time and energy to do other things instead of going out fishing everyday for the next fish needed to eat. So, the recurrence of vital needs leads to developments at the technological level that will meet those needs in a way that frees energy for other things. The **economic** system is evoked by the development of technology; the economic system is some system that sets the priorities of what capital goods are to be produced to meet what needs, and how those capital goods are to be produced to meet what needs, and how those capital goods and vital values are to be distributed among the members of the community. Because all kinds of disagreements arise when questions like that are raised, there is evoked the **polity** – the structure of conversation in the society, the structure of intelligent interchange that enables people to make the kinds of decisions that the development of economic systems calls for.

technology ‘evoking’
vital goods

Authentic development of politics in a culture is proximately responsible for the vital connection of intersubjectivity with the economic system.



This relates to Plato’s development of what an authentic statesperson would be. Doran argues that the authentic political leader would be one who, through rational persuasion and symbolic example, can lead the community to establish that vital bond of Intersubjectivity and economic system. That is the function of the ‘political.’

Further, **culture** is differentiated into a **superstructural** and an **infrastructural** level, and frequently the superstructure has a tremendous impact on the infrastructure. The function of politics is to mediate from genuine/authentic culture to social structure, which is the creative dialectic of Intersubjectivity and economic system. The mediation from the superstructure to the infrastructure is what is meant by “**cosmopolis**:” a mentality that promotes genuine cultural values through reflection and communicates them to the everyday life of the society.



Doran posits four differences between his own position and Marxist analysis:

1. The place of **vital intersubjectivity** as constitutive of one pole of the infrastructure of the society.

   For Marx, the infrastructure is the forces and relations the production – which translates ‘roughly’ (though not exactly) to the ’technological’ and ‘economic.’ For Marx, the dialectic is between the ‘forces of production’ (technological) and the ‘relations of

production' (economic). The forces of production are fettered/held by the relations of production; but as they have a certain momentum to develop, an d they eventually develop to a point where they cannot be held in control by the economic system. At that point, revolution becomes possible. Re3volution is not possible if the forces of production have not caused this strain in the social system. But if they are developed to a point where they can no longer be rationally held in control by the economic system, then the forces are ripe for a revolution to overthrow the economic system.

If this is a dialectic, it is a dialectic **within practicality**, since technology and the economic system are both functions of practical intelligence. Doran insists that more basic than that is a dialectic **between** (a) the totality of practicality and (b) Intersubjectivity.

2. The subordination of practicality to **artistry**: we are primarily artists. We can create the human world as a work of art. This artistry is a matter of the delicate balance between the opposites in every instance – here, between practicality and Intersubjectivity.

   There is a place for instrumental reason, but it is subordinate to the development of the human world as a work of art.

3. The recognition of **cultural integrity** as possible, and as responsible for the social infrastructure.

   For Marx, the only legitimate superstructural work is that which is done under Marxist ideological auspices; the rest is held to be illegitimate and mendacious, a cover-up underlying economic interests.

   Doran posits the reality of a pure desire to know, to understand; human beings are capable, with God's grace, of exercising that, and the exercise of that has a terrific impact on the social infrastructure. It need not be 'ivory tower intellectualism.'

4. Doran includes **politics** in the **infra**structure, rather than the superstructure of the society (Marx).

   If politics starts to usurp the function of culture, a great imbalance results. Politics can easily become the slave of an economic force; if it does that, it starts setting the meanings and values of the society, at which point it has elevated itself into the place of culture in a purely instrumental fashion. It is instrumental for the promotion of the economic advantages of one group in the society.

   Politics' authentic function is to mediate the meanings and values of the culture, and to maintain the dialectic of Intersubjectivity and economics. Politics, accordingly, is to keep Intersubjectivity and economics in relation to one another on the basis of genuine culture.

Doran holds that the primary responsibilities before the superstructure today are the **reorientation of philosophy and human science.** This reorientation is of utmost importance for the functioning of the entire structure.

Christian Ministry:

Theology today is addressing a situation of **global distortion** of the three dialectics, and consequently of the whole scale of values. "Imperialism" is understood as a function of the imbalance all in the direction of the 'transcendence' side of the dialectics; it is a pursuit of power without the balance of the psychic, the intersubjective, and the cosmological.

Theology **evokes** remotely a transformed situation in the whole world, but proximately it evokes the church(es) as catalytic agent of a global network of communities living in accord with the scale of values. Thus, the vocation of theology is the vocation of 'the servant' in the symbolic songs of deutero-Isaiah, whose mission is to continue until the law of God has reached the furthest corners of the earth; that is still going on. The task is to evoke the kingdom/rule of God, which is understood in terms of the analysis of society and culture.

The **proximate** task of theology is to evoke the church as agent and minister of the global network of communities that live in accord with the scale of values. Within the church there is an intellectual ministry that assumes some responsibility for both levels of culture. Theology provides the grounds of much of the constitutive meaning of that intellectual ministry in the church. Theology also calls forth the whole church as catalyst for a transformed world.

If the **mission** of the church in the world is to be a catalytic agent of a world that will be transformed in the direction of integrity in the dialectics, the question arises as to what is the best set of symbols for understanding the church? Out of personal experience as well as theological reflection, Doran concludes that it is the image of the servant in deutero-Isaiah as that is made incarnate in the cross and resurrection of Jesus: the servant who promotes – through prophetic witness, through sacramental worship, through pastoral and social service – the integral scale of values as 'a new law on earth,' and who does so in face of the forces of destruction, i.e., the imperialistic forces of imbalance that will cause the kind of suffering represented in the servant songs.

> To a large extent, Doran's reflections on this are fuelled by Eric Voegelin's understanding of the Servant Songs, presented at the end of *Israel and Revelation*. Voegelin sees the Servant Songs as the high point of the Israelite development of its consciousness of the revelation that was given to them.
>
> Throughout the book, Voegelin is talking about the Soteriological as it effected the freeing of people from the fetters of cosmological mentality, while maintaining the values of that cosmological mentality. He sees the Servant as the culmination of that.
>
> Doran recognizes chapter five of *AD* as being 'kerygma' as well as 'theology,' but it does attempt to put forth an argument for the servant symbol as constituting the intelligibility of an ecclesial ministry that would evoke the needed alternative situation in the world. Thus, for Doran, the Servant-symbol underlies all other understandings of the church. For example, the church is a genuine sacrament of God's revelation and salvation and an eschatological sacrament of what the world Is meant to be, precisely by the church itself living in fidelity to the scale of values and

promoting that fidelity to the world through the ministry and witness. Institutions within the church are to be understood as themselves subservient to the mission of the servant; but they have a point in serving that mission. If, however, they become ends in themselves, then the church ceases making sense.

The distinction between the **two forms of suffering** is important. It is essential to recognize that – in speaking of the community of the suffering servant of God – Doran is proposing no masochistic glorification of suffering.

> John Dunne's distinction (in The *Way of All the Earth* [University of Notre Dame Press, 1978], pp. 49-62) is powerful: 'the hell of private suffering and isolation,' and 'the suffering of compassion and forgiveness.'
>
> Doran clearly is not talking about the first form of suffering; 'the hell of private suffering' is not redemptive, and people have to be freed from that. But they have to be freed precisely into the capacity for 'the suffering of compassion and forgiveness.' This is a suffering that can endure the forces of evil without being destroyed, and can return good for evil. This is completely different from 'the hell of the night of private suffering.'
>
> As Dunne says, in between those two forms of suffering there is a 'day' in a person's life, whose light communicates a bliss that cannot be taken away. The 'day' overcomes the 'first night,' and is not overcome by the 'second night.' It thus frees a person for the kind of service that is able to stand up to the distortions of history.

In this regard, Doran regards the ulterior finality of psychotherapy as freeing people from 'the night of the hell of private suffering,' and the development which takes place through that can lead to the point where people become capable of the agapic love that can endure suffering.

> One thing that is very important in that transformation is that one has reached the 'day' in between the two 'nights' when one can undergo the same form of victimization which had caused one's private suffering, and not be destroyed by it. When the person can undergo the same structure of victimization and live through it and rebound without being traumatized by it, one has reached the 'day' between the two 'nights.'
>
> > Sometimes one's dreams can reveal this. A dream can take a person back to a traumatic scene, and 'replay' it without the trauma. It's possible to reverse the roles, to reverse what happens in that scene. The 'scene' is redone, but it is transformed; that is a transformation of all the energy that was bound up by the traumatization. A dream can put one back in a scene of rejection, and rather than being rejected one is received; such a dream is healing, it is the catalytic transformer of the destructiveness of what had happened.

In chapter eleven of *MT* ("Foundations") Lonergan writes of five sets of categories to be derived. The first are derived from religious experience and are, thus, the most proximate to interiority; these will be categories for understanding, e.g., 'grace,' and 'sin.' It is the second set that regards what Doran is going

in chapter five of *AD*. Lonergan writes: "From the subject one moves to subjects, their togetherness in community, service, and witness, the history of salvation that is rooted in a being-in-love, and the function of this history in promoting the kingdom of God amongst men" (*MT*, p. 291). The second set of categories is ecclesiological.

Doran starts in the realm of the , thus, the 'symbol' of the Servant. Theology will move to explanatory categories, but it starts with the elemental meaning of "mystery," which is symbolic. In chapter five of *AD*, Doran is not giving a theology of the church; rather, he is proposing elemental meaning out of which a theology of the church could be developed. In theology, explanatory categories will be developed, but they should never be divorced from the symbolic – because theology is an attempt to understand mystery.

Voegelin places all this in a 'political' context; in other words, what is developing in Israel is a political consciousness, and it is a consciousness that is beyond empire. What happened in the course of the history of Israel was its gradual freeing from regarding itself as an empire among other empires. It came to be conscious that that is not its vocation in the world. As Israel is being purified, it is being called to a 'transimperial' self-understanding. This transimperial self-understanding is reflected predominantly in the Servant Songs; the Servant's mission is 'too big' to be confined to any empire. The Servant is to be a light to the nations; thus, Israel's whole self-understanding is not to be in imperialistic terms.

Readings for February 12:

- *AD, chapters 6 and 7*
  [Note: these are to a large extent a commentary on Chapter 7 of I. Also relevant is "The Absence of God in Modern Culture" in A Second Collection.]

Questions:

1. *What is cosmopolis? How does it assume responsibility For historical process?*
2. *What is authentic praxis? How is praxis distorted by general bias?*
3. *What is the place of Intellectual ministry in ecclesial praxis?*
4. *How does the position offered in these readings differ from Marxist analysis?*

12 February 1987

The situation addressed by a contemporary systematic theology – a theology for which the situation is a source for theological reflection – is a **global distortion** of the dialectics of community, culture, and subject; it is a situation affected by the global distortion of these dialectics, and the concomitant collapse of the scale of values (into the first and second levels, i.e., vital and social values). That distortion and collapse is characteristic of a world that can be descriptively understood as the victim of **imperialism**, of conflicting and escalating forms of imperialism: the Soviet military and the American economic imperialism.

> The situation evoked by a contemporary systematic theology would remotely be a global network of alternative communities living in accord with the scale of values and the integral dialectics. Thus, as Doran understands it, theology is very much counter-cultural; it is a dimension of the prophetic ministry of the church, it is a dimension of the ministry of the Word (which in our time must be primarily prophetic – denouncing the present situation, and evoking an alternative).

Concerning his use of the word "imperialism," Doran notes Hannah Arendt's insistence on the need to be very cautious in using the word "totalitarianism" (cf. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*). She writes that definitely Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia, and possibly Mao's China were totalitarian regimes; she identified the rest of the world's regimes as imperialistic.

She has three main sections in the book: (1) anti-Semitism; (2) imperialism; (3) totalitarianism. Voegelin has disagreed with her insistence that Anti-Semitism is central in the rise of totalitarianism.

Joseph Schumpeter defines imperialism as follows: **the objectless disposition on the part of a State to unlimited forcible expansion**.

Arendt adds economic macrosystems to the State.

Proximately, the church calls into being (evokes) the church as one catalytic agent for a communitarian alternative in the world. Thus, Schillebeeckx refers to ministry as the praxis of the kingdom of God, the praxis that catalyzes the rule of God in human affairs. Doran wants to conceive that praxis strictly as fidelity to the scale of values, thus 'fleshing out' the challenge which Schillebeecks presents. The attempt is to give a heuristic outline to that praxis, in terms of fidelity to the scale of values and the integral dialectics of the subject, culture, and community. That fidelity automatically entails the church's participation in the pattern of the Suffering Servant; this is an inevitable consequence. In face of the laws of empire/expansion and the forces of domination, to stand firm in fidelity to an alternative automatically entails participation in the pattern of the Law of the Cross.

In contrast with Avery Dulles (*Models of the Church*) Doran is speaking of the Church as the deutero-Isaian servant of God in the world, not simply as humanitarian servant to the world. Rather, it is informed by a stance before God, taking responsibility for the world.

Lonergan calls the Law of the Cross "a just and mysterious law."

It is **just** in the context of world-order. The cross entails innocent suffering, i.e., being victims of 'injustice.' But in the context of world-order, the love that returns food for evil sets things right; in that sense, the law of the cross can be called just. In the context of the overarching order, to return good for evil and not to return injury for injury is – in one very definite sense – to stop the evil. The violence stops here; it cannot go any further if the circle is not kept up.

It is **mysterious** in the very definite sense of "mystery" that Lonergan uses in chapter seventeen of *I*. The crucified Jesus is an incarnate symbol of a truth that will never adequately be grasped in human concepts. (Cf. Sebastian Moore, *The Crucified Jesus Is No Stranger* [New York: Seabury, 1977]). There is a superabundance of meaning. For Lonergan, mystery is an always-elemental meaning; because it is 'too much' it will never become exhausted by formal and full meaning, in conceptualization and affirmation of clear and distinct ideas. Yet because of its symbolic power, it can still be constitutive of human living.

Thus, some elemental meanings will always remain elemental because of the power of the mystery that they embody. In general, systematic theology is concerned with the

realm of mystery; it can always achieve only a very imperfect understanding of that realm of mystery. But if the theologian has undergone a kind of psychic self-appropriation, systematic theology can continue to speak in symbolic language without being just common sense. There can be a genuinely "systematic symbolic" (Ray Hart in *Unfinished Man and the Imagination*, quoted by Doran in *Subject in Psyche*).

The Christian knows the mystery of redemptive suffering; s/he knows it and has experienced it in and through her/his prayer. Through encountering God I know that they mystery of the cross is my salvation; but if I ever try to put that into explanatory, conceptual language I know right away that it (the language) is all straw; in many ways, it is better to simply circumambulate the symbol – to continue 'walking around it' and pointing to it.

In our own lives, if violence stops with us, then stopping the violence is redemptive – not only for ourselves, but also for the one who is exercising the violence and for the whole human situation. 'It was our iniquity that he bore, and by his wounds we are healed. . .' To acknowledge that as my salvation and then to accept the invitation to be an instrument of the same love 'until the islands have rejoiced in God's law, until the thing has been accomplished.' And that, of course, is an eschatological reality.

That is the way that Doran understands the mystery of the church. It is a mystery, and is best expressed in symbolic terms; thus, there will always be an elemental meaning that will never be able to be conceptualized in full systematic terms. Some of these meanings are best left symbolic.

The first part of chapter six (of *AD*) applies this notion of the church to the vocation of theology: to the church's intellectual ministry in general, and to theology in particular. It also introduces the notion of cosmopolis.

Theology is a **ministry**, and as such it stands under the law of the cross. Including theology, but beyond it, there is, has always been, and will continue to be an intellectual ministry in the church – which is part of the prophetic dimension of the church's ministry, at the superstructural level).

But as theological ministry calls the church to be servant and as it exercises its own Servanthood in the world in the face of, e.g., positivist and materialist ideologies, it will stand under the law of the cross.

Doran sees theology as foundational of a reorientation of the superstructure, especially the **human sciences**. The foundations of physics are not theological, though they do include at least a spontaneous intellectual conversion; no one is going to be a successful physicist unless s/he has learned, albeit spontaneously, to cut the umbilical cord to imagination and to move into the realm of mathematics. Thus there is a spontaneous intellectual conversion in physics, but religious and moral conversions are not foundational at all. But these conversions must be foundational in human science, if we are to consider human beings as they are. Concretely, as they are, human

beings are under the laws of sin and grace; any human science that would prescind from that is an abstraction, it is not considering human beings in the concrete. Thus, theology has to take responsibility-for and profound interest-in the methods of the human sciences, and, in many instances, call them to some type of critical reorientation.

Cosmopolis is a set of intellectual habits that is informed by a critical, dialectical, and normative understanding of oneself; it is a mentality whose function is to mediate between superstructure and infrastructure. It works to reorient the superstructure by making human science critical, dialectical, and introducing a genuine normative element into it, and then mediates between the genuine achievements of the superstructure and the everyday level of culture (the realm of common sense). Thus, the meanings and values that are developed at the superstructural level don't remain just there; they are somehow communicated to the common sense mentality of what will always be a majority of the people in the culture.

Thus, Lonergan lists the following things as the kind of things with which cosmopolis is concerned: art, literature, theatre, broadcasting, journalism, history, schools and universities, personal depth and public opinion. Note that this involves both superstructural and infrastructural aspects.

Cosmopolis is a mentality that takes responsibility for culture, at both levels of culture: superstructure and infrastructure. But it takes as its central concern the meanings and values by which human beings are living, the meanings and values that inform the way of life of the society.

The remote concern of cosmopolis is the infrastructural dialectic of community; this dialectic is the immediate concern of politics. Thus, the remote concern of cosmopolis is everyday living – the dialectic of Intersubjectivity and practicality. But it does not address it directly at that level, which is the role of politics. The mentality of cosmopolis (which can also inform the politician) takes culture as its primary focus.

Cosmopolis is not 'a group;' it is a dimension of consciousness that can cut across all kinds of groups. It is a horizon, a sensitivity to meanings and values as being extremely important for the ways in which people live. Its concern is culture for the sake of everyday living in the society. It involves the conviction that culture need not (*contra* Marx) be merely a reflex of economic interests; it is convinced that culture will become that if authentic persons do not take responsibility for culture.

The end/purpose of culture is the development and criticism of meanings and values that could inform the everyday living of an integral society. These meanings and values must be proportionate to the dimensions of the social infrastructure; thus, today these meanings and values must have some kind of global import. Meanings and values must be developed which enable us to understand people who are of other cultures. This will not be a leveling down of culture; rather, it will enable individuals of one culture to learn from and appreciate the cultures of others.

Doran notes the following process of development in his own thought regarding the structure of society. The initial analysis emerges from David Tracy's *The Analogical Imagination* (New York: Seabury, 1981).

Tracy (pp. 6-7) distinguishes three "realms" of society: the techno-economic, the polity, and culture. Reading Marxist thinkers led to the realization of the importance of distinguishing the technological from the economic. Then, reading chapter seven of Lonergan's *I* led to a further realization of the rad-ical importance of Intersubjectivity. Thus, there emerged Doran's analysis of five elements of society:

Culture
Polity
Economy
Technology

Intersubjectivity

The importance of the dimension of Intersubjectivity then provided a significant point of contrast with Marx. Primordial Intersubjectivity, for Lonergan, is the base of human community, such that when any social order breaks down this Intersubjectivity is not lost; it just starts to take other forms, perhaps quite less organized forms. This primordial Intersubjectivity is so close to our vital functions that it simply cannot disappear. Lonergan notes that it is precisely because it is so close to the vital that we tend to overlook it; it is part of our being incarnate, part of the vital sensitivity of our being.

Once the five elements of society had emerged in Doran's understanding, it was relatively easy to put together the structure mainly by developing the implications of Intersubjectivity in the structure of society – especially in contrast with Marxist theory. Thus, as in the following diagrams, Doran attempts a clarification by contrast.





Having arrived at the five elements of society, the realization followed as to how important is the manner in which one conceives the relationships between the elements.

> For Marx, the entire superstructure is nothing but a reflex of the economic interests; thus, in the diagram, the arrow goes up from the relations-of-production to politics and law, which are considered to be in the superstructure. Ideology is built on that and goes on to form social consciousness.
>
> Doran insists that the infrastructure contains a good deal more than Marx allows. It involves Intersubjectivity in dialectical relationship to technology and the economic system. Politics are needed to keep the different groups in communication with each other and to keep the underlying dialectic in tension. In order to keep the dialectic in tension, politics mediate from culture – which has its own autonomy.

Doran is convinced that the reorientation needed at the superstructural level will be a function of the discovery of cognitional and existential interiority; without that, the foundations will not be sufficient for doing the work that needs to be done at the superstructural level. But whenever there has been a superstructural development in the course of history, there has also been a reflection of that development at the common sense level. This does not incorporate the entire superstructural development; nevertheless, the superstructural development has an impact on the infrastructural mentality. Thus, we can speak of a post-scientific mentality that informs common sense today. I don't know nuclear physics; yet there is a very real way in which relativity and quantum mechanics are part of my world, in the sense that they are within my horizon as questions that I could be interested in pursuing. There is a change in common sense mentality. Relativity and quantum theory have broken down the world-view of mechanist determinism in the sciences; and just as determinism had a significant impact on common sense, so too will the subsequent breakthrough to indeterminism have an impact on common sense. Thus, the post-scientific level is the common sense reflection of what has gone on in a highly sophisticated fashion in the superstructure.

In this way, Doran speaks of evoking a **post-interiority mentality** at the level of common sense. That would be the infrastructural reflection of the interiorly differentiated consciousness achieved in the superstructure. Not everyone (indeed, not many) will go through the extremely involved and lengthy specialized process that some persons go through because they are interested in those questions which lead in the direction of interi9orly differentiated consciousness; there could be no reasonable proposal to the effect that the whole entire culture has to become self-appropriating in an explanatory fashion, undergoing the most rigid intellectual and psychic conversion. But there is a reflection of that that can happen at the level of common sense: post-interiority.

> An example of this is the sensitivity to the meaning of dreams which has developed in the twentieth century. Initially, this is the work of interiorly differentiated consciousness, the work of scientists. But the whole culture does not have to undergo years of psychoanalysis in order to profit from this. Rather, a sensitivity to the reality, significance, and meaning of dreams can be communicated to the infrastructure at a common sense level. In that way, we can help people become sensitive to interiority as a monitor of reality, without demanding that everyone read *Insight*. Thus, Doran understands part of the role of contemporary cosmopolis to be mediating to the infrastructure a

sensitivity to interiority; this sensitivity would be an attentiveness to interiority that is not itself scientific, but that is the fruit of quite rigorous scientific labor.

One medium of this cosmopolitan communication may well be fiction. Science fiction, e.g., can communicate scientific breakthroughs to common sense. Similarly, fiction can communicate the attentiveness to interiority. For example, Thomas Mann's *Joseph and His Brothers* is a wonderful communication of the world of interiority, and the importance of dreams in that world.

Another dimension of increased attentiveness to interiority is recognition of the centrality of insight. Lonergan contends that the act of insight (*intelligere*) was central in Thomas, but that it was utterly ignored by seven centuries of Thomist commentators. This inattentiveness to insight at the superstructural level may well have contributed to an inattentiveness to insight at the infrastructural level. Accordingly, post-interiority would involve an awakened awareness of the importance of insight at the common sense level.

The criterion of what constitutes a healthy relationship among the elements of society is, to a large extent, this: to what extent does the society facilitate the emergence of the intelligent grasp of possibilities, and free, responsible choice on the part of dramatic subjects? To what extent does the society have, as part of its infrastructure, a mechanism set up so that you don't have to fight to develop your powers of intelligence and freedom? This would essentially be a mechanism to encourage rational discourse on the possibilities that are confronting the community.

From this emerges the appearance of a 'vicious circle:' a society is good that encourages the emergence of dramatic subjects; but you have to have authentic dramatic subjects in order to bring about that kind of society. And obviously societies can get into this vicious circle, actually a downwardly moving spiral.



But, as Lonergan points out, every vicious circle is just a logical entity, and insight is a non-logical operation. Thus, insight is not caught in the logic of vicious circle. It can lead to the creation of **creative minorities** who grasp what is going on, who grasp what the vicious circle is, and who break that circle by proposing another alternative.

> Insight is not the result of a syllogism; it is the result of a spirit of inquiry that wants to understand.

> Needed, then, is the formation of a creative minority within a culture who grasp clearly what is happening, and who work hard to develop an alternative and to propose that alternative, and to persuade people to it.

Culture is a higher synthesis for the dialectic of community. This introduces another element to the analogy of dialectic; Doran has been assembling the elements gradually:

- The dialectic of contraries between the principles of limitation and transcendence at the levels of society, culture, and subject. In that sense, there is an analogy of dialectic at those three levels.

- Another dimension of this analogy of dialectic is that at each of those levels, the integrity of the dialectic is not a function of either of the principles taken singly. Thus, at the level of society, the integrity of the dialectic of community is not a function of Intersubjectivity by itself, not of practical intelligence by itself; rather, it is a function of some higher synthesis that holds both principles in creative tension. With regard to the social dialectic, culture (in the sense of meanings and values informing a way of life) provides that higher synthesis. Thus, it is in the realm of meanings and values that a higher synthesis emerges which enables the integrity of the underlying dialectic. If the higher synthesis is eliminated, then the underlying dialectic immediately will become dislocated in one direction or the other. Without this cultural synthesis, the society will go either: (a) in the direction of the formation of Intersubjective groups that 'drop out;' or (b) in the direction of the formation of the power trips of the planners, programmers, social engineers, and managers, etc.

- At this higher synthesis, there comes into play a dialectic of contradictories: either/or. **Either** the promotion of a culture that is able to recognize the legitimate place of both Intersubjectivity and practicality, **or** false cultural values which do not recognize the place of both poles in the underlying social dialectic.

'**Criteria**' for evaluating culture:

- Is there sufficient 'aesthetic distance' from practicality, so that the underlying dialectic is enabled to go on?

- Are the meanings and values proportionate to the problems in the underlying social reality? A culture that is not proportionate to social problems is not fulfilling its rightful, real responsibility as culture. Thus, today, a culture that would encourage a social group to withdraw into isolation from the global human community would not be exercising the appropriate role of culture. Today, culture has to draw forth sensitivity to people of other cultures – precisely because problems in the social dialectic are of global proportions.

> Thus, what are adequate cultural values will change throughout history, because culture does have the responsibility for mediating the social dialectic. This, of course, is in

opposition to any classicism that would simply return to the values of a previous period in an uncritical fashion. Doran insists that this cannot meet the needs of our situation. Classicism may be understandable; people are disgusted with modernity because of what has happened in the modern world, 'the bloodbath of the twentieth century.' And we can indeed return to Plato and Aristotle for the sake of learning certain things that we need in order to bring them forward into our own time. But we can't simply go back.

- A more 'pure' criterion for evaluating culture would be in terms of the transcendental objectives of the human spirit. In any and all circumstances, authentic culture promotes the pursuit of the beautiful, the intelligible, the true, the good. But then, of course, the real argument concerns criteria as to what constitutes the good, the true, the intelligible, and the beautiful!

The signs of **decline** are the diminishing of possibilities for intelligent grasp and free, responsible choice; as more and more people in a society are, in fact, determined, as there is an overwhelming impact of the forces of society on more and more people such that they feel and judge themselves to be fatalistically determined, there is clear indication of decline. A society in decline does not encourage in people the ability to intelligently grasp the possibilities that do exist and to freely discuss and choose among them.

What constitutes decline is breakdown at each of the levels of the scale of values. At the vital level, this would be continued or worsened maldistribution of vital goods on a worldwide scale. At the social level, continued fragmentation rather than integration. Hannah Arendt is referring to the breakdown of cultural values in writing that "everything is without human purpose." Deconstruction proposes the collapse of the subject: "the death of the self and the end of history."

Is a given society encouraging the development of subjects who grasp possibilities and are free to realize them, and who are free to speak about meanings and values and to promote meanings and values that might go against the stream supported by the institution – or to propose alternative technological, economic, political institutions?

Unless that is happening, the society is manifesting some decline – perhaps along with some progress. Thus, Doran would acknowledge that there has been clear progress at the level of vital values from the 1950s to the 1980s in Cuba. There remain serious questions, however, as to whether there has been progress at other levels of the scale of values.

There can be tremendous progress working along with decline. Thus, there has been tremendous scientific progress in modern times; at the same time, there have been all kinds of horrors.

Encountering MARX:

Contra Marx, Doran does not believe that culture has to be a reflex of economic interests; rather, culture can be promoted as an autonomous dimension within a society.

As background, Doran attempts to present a **generalized argument against REDUCTIONISM**.

There is a paradoxical quality to reductionistic theories: they want to reduce everything to some kind of base, which is frequently conceived mechanistically or deterministically; but in order to conceive the base mechanistically/deterministically, they have to impoverish the base by leaving dimensions out it that, in fact, belong to it. Thus, they want to emphasize the base; yet they end up, not enriching it, but impoverishing it.

> In **psychology**, this is what Freud has done in speaking of "primary process" the way he speaks of it. In *Freud and Philosophy*, Paul Ricoeur emphasizes that in 1895 ("Project for a Scientific Psychology") Freud set up the ideal of explaining all human conscious phenomena in **quantitative** terms; he never departed from that ideal even though he was never able to succeed. Ricoeur says that the reason he wasn't able to succeed was because the content (human experience) exceeds the frame (of quantitative measurement). The quantities in question were quantities of 'energy,' understood as libido (with sexual orientation and objective); everything humanly conscious was explained in terms of the dynamics and placements of displacements of that aboriginally and inescapably sexual energy. For Freud, that energy and its placements/displacements are "primary process."
>
> Doran insists that form the beginning of human living, primary process includes this energy (which may or may not have as much sexual connotation as Freud thought), but it als includes **wonder** and the capacity to receive and to communicate human emotions such as love and joy in a spontaneous kind of way that cannot be explained simply in terms of the displacement of an aboriginal energy, no matter what the objective of that aboriginal energy is. That same wonder feeds over into the place of insight, in the primary process of human beings. Insight, and the desire for insight, and the desire to know is not obsessive displacement of an energy that is aboriginally directed elsewhere; it just isn't! It is a distinct dimension of the primary process, understood as what we do spontaneously, without having to displace anything. It is part of the spontaneous orientation of our being (infrastructure).
>
> The desire to know is left out of the psychological infrastructure by reductionists like Freud. It is explained as a false, mendacious reflex – at a psychological superstructure – of libidinal energy. Thus, a person who is concerned with understanding is called obsessive. A former student of Doran's, e.g., is presently doing a residency in psychiatry at the Menninger Clinic in Topeka, Kansas. Members of the psychiatric staff there are telling him that his constant raising of questions is nothing but an obsession that is a mendacious reflex of this energy that is to be explained in some kind of other way. That is totalitarianism!

This is a generalized structure of reductionistic theories. The base is impoverished of dimensions that really belong to it; e.g., the curiosity of the human being is actually part of the base, but Freudian reductionism removes it from the infrastructure and explains it as a superstructural reflex of something that the person is not coming to terms with.

> What happens is that this, in a sense, is a self-fulfilling prophecy. If you take insight and curiosity out of the infrastructure, in fact after awhile there is going to be less and less of it in the infrastructure. The more it becomes culturally accepted that this is 'just an obsession,' the more the

culture is going to denigrate the desire to understand. It then becomes a totalitarian mechanism, shutting off further questions.

Thus, a psychological theory has a profound impact on psychological living. And if this theory makes its way into the culture in such a way that it is accepted post-theoretically at the infrastructural level, then the statistical probability of people, in fact, having good insights and good ideas is diminished.

> Insight is statistical; there are conditions for its emergence. Some of those conditions are social and cultural; as those are diminished, the probability that people will in fact come up with decent ideas is diminished. Then, in fact, you are heading toward a society that might be – in some people's terms – "post-historic;" "more like a colony of ants than a community of human beings." (Lewis Mumford)

Readings for February 26:

- *AD, chapters 8 and 9*
- *From A Third Collection: "Theology and Praxis;" "Natural Right and Histor-Ical Mindedness;" and "A Post-Hegelian Philosophy of Religion"*

Note: "Natural Right and Histor-cal Mindedness" attempts a dialogue with the Straussians (especially at Boston College). In it, Lonergan affirms that norms can be found, even though one affirms historical consciousness. This is in response to the Straussian tendency to reject historical con-sciousness outright because of their fear that it necessitates normlessness.

There is an analogous reductionism in Marx. When the infrastructure is deprived of the political, which is foisted off into the superstructure and everything in the superstructure is considered to be false and mendacious reflex of infrastructural dynamics – the same thing happens in the infrastructure. Namely, this is a prophecy that will become true; politics will enter the superstructure, and culture in its autonomous function will, in fact, vanish.

> As this culture-denying theory is propagated, culture as authentic promotion of meanings and values for the sake of meanings and values will vanish as an autonomous operation within a society.

So, there is a generalized structure to reductionism:

1. Impoverish the infrastructure;
2. Relegate to a mendacious superstructure what you have taken out of its rightful place in the infrastructure; and
3. The impact of this theory will be such that the impoverishment that the theory proposes happens in praxis as a result of the communication of the theory.

26 February 1987

The principal focus of Doran's debate with Marx (in chapter seven of AD) is over the **role and possibilities of culture**; today's lecture focuses on the significance of culture for the structure of the human good – for the structure of history and the structure of society. The question of the possibilities

of culture is the most crucial question raised by Marxist analysis. Doran takes issue with the Marxist answer and raises the question in this way: is there another possibility for culture than that posed by Marx? If there is not, then Doran's entire analysis falls through. If culture is necessarily a mendacious reflex of economic interests or any other form of bias, then Doran's argument 'falls to pieces' and one must go with a hermeneutic of suspicion of some kind or other (e.g., Marxist of Freudian). But this stands as a question: Must culture be a reflex of economic interests (Marx) or of sexual frustration (Freud)?

Doran grants that *de facto* culture frequently is a reflex of economic inte3rests; Marxist analysis is a valuable critique of culture when culture takes this form. But is there not another possibility available? For Lonergan, there clearly is; Doran's own reflections over the last fifteen years have led him to say that Lonergan's convictions with regard to culture may be one of the pillars on which his own thought stands. Thus, Lonergan's thought collapses if his position on culture is inadequate.

For Lonergan, there is another possibility and it is fostered by the mentality he calls "cosmopolis." Cosmopolis fosters autonomous cultural values, meanings by which people live because they are worthwhile. Cosmopolis is a critique of the meanings which people do live by, and an evocation of constitutive meaning and culture that is worthwhile. In general, Marxists would hold such a pursuit to be ideology that necessarily entails relinquishing concern for the justice of the social order; they would hold that a concern for culture is an escape from problems of social justice. It would be seen as entailing ideology, not meeting the questions and the problems of the disadvantaged, the poor, and the oppressed. Doran clearly holds that there is a way of contesting this Marxist claim; he insists that there can be a concern for culture in terms of the scale of values that does not mean relinquishing a concern for social justice in any way.

This much must be granted the Marxist position: frequently culture is what Marx says that it is, an ideological superstructure. Further, as Lonergan grants, the view of culture fostered by cosmopolis "is not easy" (*I*, p. 241); in fact, this is "the chief characteristic" of cosmopolis. This kind of pursuit demands a great deal of sacrifice; it is not going to sell books and it is not going to propel people into the limelight. The sacrifice involved is that of authenticity, at the cultural level. But to say that it is 'not easy' and to say that it is 'impossible' are two very different things. What is needed for it is first religious value – God's grace – offering a faith that this vision of culture is possible.

> One dimension of the Marxist critique of culture envisions culture as the pursuit of the leisured class; but this presupposes a classicist notion of culture. In fact, there is no single normative notion of culture; rather, culture is the set of meanings and values by which people live. That in itself addresses the Marxist critique. Culture is not simply the pursuit of the leisured class. Rather, anyone is free to question the meanings and values by which people live on the basis of some standard which a person posits as 'better' than the one prevalent in society, and to call the culture to those meanings and values which in fact are proportionate to the underlying social problems.
>
> This is the heart of Doran's argument: the proportions that culture must meet in order to be authentic are set by the underlying social dialectic. If it does not meet those, it is ideological. But

> there can be the pursuit of meanings and values that are proportionate to the contours of te underlying social dialectic. This is one of the reasons that culture can change; *contra* classicism, culture is not fixed for all time. It changes to meet the demands of the underlying social dialectic.

Proximately, theology evokes the church as catalytic agent of a transformed world; it calls the church first to a self-understanding, but also to a praxis that evokes the wider community beyond the confines of the church. Doran calls that wider community a "world-cultural humanity," a phrase he takes from Lewis Mumford, *The Transformations of Man* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1956). Mumford traces developments in human history into our era, and poses the question, 'where do we go from here?' he then proposes two possibilities: post-historic and world-cultural humanity.

Doran's argument is that precisely because of the catalytic function of the church, theology also has to help the church understand and affirm what is **distinctive** about its contributions to the wider community. It cannot catalyze if it does not know what it has to offer. What is distinctive about what the church has to offer is a **soteriological** differentiation of consciousness, Soteriological constitutive meaning. Doran 'wagers' that the Soteriological differentiation is perhaps more clearly and sharply realized in authentic Christianity than it is in any other religious tradition; it most assuredly is pronounced in Christianity.

> Soteriological constitutive meaning is sharply presented in the incarnate symbol of the crucified and risen Lord. This meaning becomes 'full' when preached in the outer word.
>
> Soteriological meaning is also present in Judaism in the symbol of the suffering servant.

The soteriological differentiation is more than the transcendent differentiation of consciousness. [Lonergan does not explicitly mention a 'soteriological' differentiation; it is clearly present in his thought, but it is not explicitly mentioned as is the transcendent differentiation.] The transcendent differentiation is what gives rise, e.g., to natural theology, authentic philosophy as the pursuit of wisdom because of a love of a world-transcendent measure (cf. Voegelin on Plato and Aristotle).

> In the soteriological, the world-transcendent measure is also in love with humanity, and that is not found in the philosophical tradition. The world-transcendent measure has emptied itself out for the sake of humanity, and has come to share in human suffering. That is, as Paul found, a scandal to the philosophical mentality.
>
> That is the distinct contribution which Christianity has to offer. It if does not offer that, it is 'sounding brass and tinkling cymbal.' There are other people who are far better prepared to make other contributions; this is the one that we should be prepared to make.

The Soteriological differentiation is not mediated through other differentiations; this is a key insistence, e.g., of Barth and von Balthasar, and it must be granted to them. The Soteriological is not mediated through natural theology; the Hebrews and the early Christian community had no natural theology, and no natural theology was needed before they could hear the word of salvation.

Nor is there any movement required beyond the cosmological mentality before the Soteriological can be appropriated; it is not required to move out of the cosmological and into the anthropological before the Soteriological can be made one's own. The revelation to the Hebrews was a revelation to a cosmological mentality, and they did not have to pass through philosophy and individuation before they could hear the word of God and the word of salvation. The same thing is true of aboriginal cosmological cultures today; they do not have to pass through the Western transcendent differentiation before hearing the word of God. This mediation of the Soteriological with culture does not demand any other differentiation before it can be heard; it can be mediated to the common sense of the most cosmological culture. It will change that common sense, but it does not demand that that culture first of all be individuated and philosophical.

> We have to grant this fully to Barth and von Balthasar. Though Doran strenuously opposes von Balthasar's rejection of transcendental philosophy/theology. But this is to be granted: God does not depend on any human achievement before God's word can be spoken and heard.
>
> In preaching to a cosmological mentality today, we do not have to educate them to Western culture; you preach the gospel to people as they are.

Nevertheless, the Soteriological must be mediated **with** (not through) other sets of constitutive meaning. It does not demand that one be already at a certain level of development, but the church must mediate this differentiation with people as they are, right now.

If it is correct that the basic forms of cultural meaning are cosmological and anthropological (and support for this position can be found in Eliade and Voegelin), then when the Soteriological is appropriately mediated with one or other of these mentalities, then it will lead that mentality into some kind of alignment with its dialectical pole.



When the gospel is preached to a cosmological culture, it does in fact lead eventually to a sense of individuation in that culture, and to a lessening of the culture's 'fatalism;' there is a truth in the sense of ties to the rhythms and processes of nature, but this can become fatalistic. When the gospel is preached to that kind of culture, it liberates the culture from that kind of fatalism into a sense of responsibility for its own future. When the gospel is preached to an anthropological mentality that has lost its sense of partnership with nature, it calls the culture to a kind of humility that brings it back to its ground in nature ("humus," earth).

As culture itself was the higher synthesis of Intersubjectivity and practicality, so the Soteriological will be the higher synthesis of the cosmological and the anthropological. It will be the condition of the possibility of an authentic dialectic of culture.

Some of the central concerns of the **theology of liberation** do enter into and are addressed by the theology whose categories Doran is proposing in *AD*. This is true because the scale of values provides a **transcendental grounding** for two of the central insights of liberation theologians: (1) the hermeneutically privileged position of the oppressed in the understanding of human reality; and (2) the preferential option for the poor in ecclesial ministry.

To provide this transcendental grounding would be valuable for two reasons:

1. It would show the social significance of a transcendental approach. Liberation/political theologians have criticized, e.g., Rahner (and Lonergan to the much lesser extent that they know Lonergan) for not being able to ground these options. Doran argues that Lonergan's thinking can be 'pushed' to do precisely that.

2. Liberation theology needs this kind of grounding; if its insights are valuable and should remain for all future theology, then the more strongly they can be grounded the better. The better argument you can give for them, the more likely it will be that they cannot be gone back on as theology proceeds. Doran wants to ground the insights of liberation theology not just in a prayerful appropriation of the Scriptures and of the situation, but also in a thoroughgoing methodical theology that establishes foundations and derives its positions from these foundations.

The argument is that the **relations from below** in the scale of values are such that, not only do the lower and more basic levels set problems that can be met only by changes at the higher levels, but that the **proportions** that must be achieved by the changes at the higher levels are set by the problems at the more basic levels. That is the basic argument. The proportions of what is genuinely social good are set by the problems at the level of the distribution of vital values; any social order that does not meet these problems is open to criticism and revision, and it remains open to criticism and revision until it meets the proportions that are set by the underlying problems. The same is true of culture; if it cannot foster a social order that will meet these underlying problems, it is subject to criticism and revision. The same is true with persons and their pursuit of authenticity. And the same is true with religious values themselves; if religious values are not in fact freeing persons for culture, freeing culture for a social order, and freeing a social order for the distribution of vital goods, then those religious values can be criticized as ideological and alienating.



> From that, it is easy to see the hermeneutically privileged position of the oppressed, of those who are not in fact on the receiving end of an equitable distribution of vital goods, for an understanding of the *humanum*, of the human situation. There follows the preferential option for the poor in the ministry of the church. Thus, even when the ministry of the church is working at the cultural level, e.g., it is doing so for the sake of meeting the underlying problems. Accordingly, it should be noted that the 'preferential option for the poor' does not mean that all ecclesial ministry is at the social level. Rather, it means that all ecclesial ministry – at all levels – is in light of the scale of values in which problems are set by the lower levels, by the 'underside of history.'

Doran notes the following points of agreement between his own position and the position espoused by Juan Luis Segundo in The Liberation of Theology (Maryknoll NY: Orbis Books, 1976). [The reason for using this particular book of Segundo's for comparison is the fact that it is explicitly methodological.]

1. 'Tradition' and 'situation' are both theological **sources**.

2. Both tradition and situation are transformed as theology does its work, attempting to understand and address both and integrate them with one another. Both are transformed; that is Segundo's hermeneutic circle which he presents in his first chapter. Not only does theology change the situation; it also changes the interpretation of the tradition.

3. Doran agrees that liberation theology specifies quite accurately one principal feature of the situation, *viz*., the oppression caused by injustice at the social order – the injustice caused by economic imperialism particularly, backed by military forces. This is a feature that liberation theology specifies very dramatically and very accurately.

4. Theology can and must exhibit a partiality for the oppressed. Doran grounds that in the scale of values, and insists that theology can exhibit that partiality without sacrificing universality. It is precisely by addressing that authentically that the universal *humanum* is brought into line with the scale of values.

5. Theological foundations themselves must provide a heuristic structure for social analysis of situations. With this insistence, liberation theology has made a permanent contribution (in Doran's judgment) to fundamental/foundational theology. Now that this has been achieved, it should never be lost in the future development of theology. Social analysis must enter theology from the foundations. This is a further extension (as was psychic conversion) of Lonergan's foundations.

6. Neither mainline North American sociology nor Marxist sociology is adequate for such a heuristic structure.

The one central point of criticism that Doran would make of Segundo is Doran's insistence that the radical solution must include the development of a **superstructural alternative** to theoretical mistakes. Where Segundo's argument falters, in Doran's view, is that after accurately pinpointing the inadequacies

of North American sociology and Marxist sociology for social analysis, Segundo then abandons theory and says that problems are to be worked out piecemeal by piecemeal political decision-making. In his situation, that may be understandable; they may not have the time and leisure to do the necessary theoretical work. But to abandon it without qualification is dangerous, and may involve falling into the trap that is being criticized. The major problem with mainline North American sociology is that it is instrumental and does not have any way of determining what appropriate human ends are. But to abandon theory for the sake simply of practice is to leave oneself open to the danger of falling into instrumentalism: how do you determine what are worthy human ends?

Gustavo Gutierrez has made the point (e.g., at the 1977 colloquium at the University of Notre Dame, "Toward Vatican III: The Work That Needs to Be Done") that Latin American theologians do not have the time in their situation because their situation is too desperate; if the church is going to be church in Latin America, they cannot withdraw to theory. He indicated that this was the responsibility of North Americans who do have the time and possibility for theoretical work. Specifically, he was talking about economic theory. He acknowledged that liberation theologians do not have an economic theory to ground what they are talking about; they simply do not have the time, energy, and freedom to develop such a theory. He pleaded with North Americans to take advantage of the opportunities they have to do this kind of work.

The real inadequacy of the sociologies which Segundo criticizes is a theoretical inadequacy. And as his hermeneutical circle insists, problems must be met at their roots. Doran thus argues that if the inadequacy of tools for social analysis is theoretical, then it must be met at that level by somebody – not necessarily by Segundo. In general, the movement for theology has to be, not just from inadequate theory to piecemeal decision-making, but from inadequate to adequate theory as well. This involves Doran's conviction that the superstructural level of culture is terribly significant for the infrastructure.

"One of the most practical things in the world is a good theory."

Further, it should be noted that in much of his work Segundo is a quite theoretical thinker. Thus, perhaps his practice belies what he has to say methodologically.

As a secondary criticism, Doran also judges Segundo to be too denigrating in his evaluation of cosmological cultures, which he calls "indigenous cultures." He finds them to be almost exclusively superstitious. Doran finds a profound truth in the cosmological mentality, the truth that we are regaining through ecological consciousness, *viz*., that we are part of the rhythms and processes of the natural universe whose flexibility is not unlimited. We are not free to exercise unlimited domination over nature; that is a value which cosmological cultures still have to offer to us.

Chapter nine of *AD* addresses this question: 'In what sense is theology itself praxis?'

In getting at that, Doran first notes the following dimensions that have been so far 'added to' Lonergan, in fidelity to his thought but 'pushing' it:

- Psychic conversion;
- The situation as source for theology;
- A further nuanced position on dialectic;
- The reciprocal relations among the scale of values; and
- The position on praxis.

In "Theology and Praxis" (*A Third Collection*, p. 184), Lonergan distinguishes sharply two meanings of praxis. (1) Praxis as practicality, where theology would be instrumental in the service of praiseworthy ends ('liberation'). In no way is Lonergan trying to denigrate those ends. But he does distinguish another form of praxis. (2) Praxis as "doing," praxis as a doing from freely-chosen ends. This is a doing as the overflow from an authentic choice of ends; this is a doing that is not instrumental for ends, but which results from freely-chosen ends. It is in this second sense that Lonergan wants to address theology as praxis.

Doran, however, wants to raise the question as to whether praxis in this second sense might not also be contributory to the ends of praxis in the first sense. Authentic doing, in fact, will promote liberation. He wants to take the notion of praxis as authentic doing (beyond instrumentalism), but also to argue that praxis in general and theology-as-praxis, if authentic, will in fact be contributory to the ends that the liberation theologians themselves are attempting to meet.

The notion of praxis as beyond instrumentalism is very important. A strictly instrumental notion of theology is temporally, spatially and culturally bounded in a way that Doran thinks we need to transcend; we need to think of theology as a function of the universal church. Theologians want to make permanent contributions to the theological tradition. And if your theology is simply meant to meet an end that is determined by a specific socio-cultural situation, its horizon is perhaps not broad enough. Thus, Doran clearly wants to conceive of praxis in the second sense, but argues that as such it will contribute to praxis in the first sense.

Lonergan's concern is not wanting theology to be just instrumental; at the same time, Doran argues that a theology which results from conversion will be concerned with specific social questions and will make its contribution to meeting them. In other words, praxis in the second sense has a transformative power with respect to the problems of praxis in the first sense. In fact, it has more transformative power precisely because it is not instrumental; it is concerned with 'the good' and 'the truth.' And to the extent that it is concerned with 'the good,' it is not in danger of being derailed by problems of power and ideology – which are the problems that you always have when you are instrumentalizing things too much.

Theology can be praxis in the non-instrumental sense and yet make a contribution to meeting specific social ends if the ends themselves of theology are integrity and authenticity. If what theology is all about is the promotion of integrity and authenticity – personal, cultural, and social – then such a theology will have a transformative effect.

In a sense this is a matter of attitude. It relates to the way John Dunne (in *The Way of All the Earth* [University of Notre Dame Press, 1978], pp. 76-84) summarizes the *Bhagavad Gita*: Act, but

relinquish the fruits of your action; act with integrity and the fruits will follow. Leave the fruits of one's action, in the final analysis, to God; nonetheless, the fruits will follow from integral, authentic performance.

A theology which bases itself on authenticity will evoke integral dialectics of the subject, of culture, and of society; it does that precisely by enlightening and illuminating. In a sense, enlightenment is transformation in this kind of theology; it is not just disclosure. David Tracy, among others, makes a distinction between disclosure and transformation models of theology. But a theology that would disclose the subject and the question of authenticity cannot remain purely disclosive; it has an intrinsic transformative movement to it. It is calling for a real assent, and not just a notional assent; and a real assent means a change. So, this kind of theology would be a catalyst of emancipation from distortion.

> *AD*, p. 223: "It provides the constitutive meaning of doing, of conduct, of praxis, in history, and so it is an element in that praxis itself."

The whole notion of **cognitive praxis** needs a great deal of development. Cognitive praxis provides higher integrations in the universe of being, i.e., in the being of meaning. Meaning 'is,' and the cognitive praxis is concerned with the being of meaning; it provides higher syntheses in the being of meaning, and so in the universe of being.

This whole 'ontology of meaning' is open territory that needs considerable development.

The primary **transformative** role of this kind of theology is with regard to **meaning**; it transforms meaning. It transforms meaning at the superstructural level, where it enters into collaboration with other disciplines and at times has to engage them dialectically and reorient them. Theology has a transformative role based on conversion as foundation, with respect to those other dimensions of understanding. In the prior chapters of *AD*, Doran has attempted to show how theology can be transformative of social science. In other works and in later chapters of *AD*, his concern is with the transformation of depth psychology. This is a transformation of the reality/being of meaning, which is itself constitutive of societies; thus, it is also a transformation of society itself. It is cognitive, but is a reorientation of meaning. And if Doran's position on culture is correct, a reorientation of meaning is a reorientation of the social infrastructure as well, and so of the channels of distributive justice – because meaning is constitutive of those structures. Thus, theology is **transformative of situations** by being **transformative of the meaning which constitutes situations**. Most directly that will be at the superstructural level; but that will be effective in reorienting the infrastructure.

So, theology at the superstructural level works to reorient human science toward the ideal goal of an interpretive and evaluative hermeneutic of culture. But through that it will influence the infrastructure: social institutions, Intersubjective groups, and distributive justice.

In the church, we need to gain a sense of academic work as ministry. Meaning is praxis; meaning is **act**. The primary sense of meaning is not content, but action: "I mean. . ." Theology's praxis is meaning, in

that active/effective sense. And that active meaning constitutes a community. Theology contributes first to the constitutive meaning of the Christian community, but beyond that of the human community.

> Theology in the sense of praxis-as-doing has the effect of social transformation in and through the **mediation of soteriological meaning with other meanings**. That is the main thrust of chapter nine of *AD*.

Theology's responsibility for **continuity** emerges in the position on theological method: the theologian's own position on doctrines (given in the sixth functional specialty) are the theologian's own responsibility, but are based on the tradition that has been mediated into the present through research/ interpretation/history/dialectic and based primarily on the options which the theologian takes at the level of foundations. The functional specialty Doctrines will be in continuity with all that is authentic in that tradition if, in fact, the theologian is basing his/her doctrines on the foundations and selecting out of the tradition what is in keeping with the foundations and rejecting what is not in keeping with the foundations. Doctrinal continuity, accordingly, is not a mere 'parroting' of the past, but at the same time it is not a contradiction of what is authentic in the past, if it has proceeded on the basis of this kind of method.



But, besides the tradition, there is another source of theology: the **situation**. This is the ultimate reason for **innovation** in theology; situations change. It is in its reflection on the situation as source that theology will mediate innovation in the church, as well as continuity. The first obvious innovation is in language; unless they are fundamentalist, theologians speak the **language of their own time** – not that of first century Jerusalem or fifth century Alexandria or sixteenth century Europe. But linguistic innovation can be a coverup for lack of real creativity in thought. "Linguistic innovation can occur in rigid minds as well as original minds." Creativity in theology is not just a matter of facility with language; it is more than that.

Because the situation is a source, theology **creates** what – for a later generation – will be part of the tradition, but which is not part of the tradition for us today. Because we are reflecting on our situation, we will create what will be part of the tradition for a later generation. Perhaps the clearest contemporary example is liberation theology. Reflecting on its situation is the primary inspiration of liberation theology; this is creating what later generations will take to be part of the tradition, *viz*., social analysis, the hermeneutically privileged position of the oppressed, the preferential option for the poor. That will become part of the authentic theological tradition; it is a theology creating what has not been a recognized part of the tradition, but will be part of the tradition for later generations. It is becoming part

of the theological tradition, and not just a linguistic tradition. Liberation theologians are not just playing with words; they are developing meanings which their words express.

> So, the articulations of the realities of God and grace in relation to the dialectics and the scale of values are intended by Doran as something new – not just in language but in meaning. It is innovation in meaning; it is part of his theological doctrines. This articulation is an example of theological innovation.
>
> It is a further question whether any of this enters into church doctrine. It has been convincingly argue (e.g., by Gregory Baum) that some of the thrusts of liberation theology have already entered into church doctrine, in the church's social teaching.

The contemporary situation, set by global proportions from below, demands of theology a contribution to the development of new meanings which can be affirmed across cultures at the level of culture itself. New cultural values are demanded, not simply new religious values or theological meanings; new cultural meanings are demanded. As theology attempts to address the contemporary situation, it will actually be catalyzing the development of new cross-cultural meanings that could sustain and promote a global dialectic of community. These will be cross-culturally accepted meanings and values at the level of culture; these are required if the situation that theology is addressing today is to be addressed adequately in such a way that it can be changed to a more adequate human situation.

Today, theology will mediate faith and culture by evoking a new culture, by evoking new meanings and values at the level of culture; this may be something new. This is a form of innovation that may be peculiar to our time. Karl Rahner, e.g., has spoken of the 'third age of the church,' ("Towards a Fundamental Theological Interpretation of Vatican II," *Theological Studies* 40/4 [December, 1979], pp. 716-727) in which Catholicism has become a 'world church' only within the last twenty-five years. It is not just a matter of developing new meanings within a particular state of meaning; rather, at that point, you are changing 'the whole ballgame.' In Rahner's analysis, the only analogous situation was the first-century move from Jerusalem into Greek culture; that was an example of the actual creation of the culture itself of new meanings through the mediation of the gospel. Perhaps this is the one analogue that we have for what the situation is today. At any rate, given our situation, the only way that theology can mediate faith and culture is by catalyzing the development of new meanings at the level of culture. It is not simply a matter of the development of religious meanings, but of cultural meanings. The ground of that will be the fact that there is a **universal *humanum*** at the level of personal value; there is something that human beings – across cultures – share in common. That 'something' is at least the structure of human consciousness as disengaged by Lonergan; wherever human beings have existed they have experienced, tried to understand their experience, tried to understand it accurately, and have tried to make decisions on the basis of their understanding of experience. That is universally human. In Doran's judgment, Jung has also made us aware that there are symbols which speak to persons across cultures.

> This positing of a 'universal *humanum*' is not a classicist position; what is posited as universal is not specific to any one culture but is found in any and all cultures. It may well have been worked out in one culture, but it means all cultures.

The emergence of **historical consciousness** raises the question of the possibility of **norms in historicity**; this is the question of the **post-modern option**. Is there possible a disclosure of reality that is universal, normative, cross-cultural, but that still will respect cultural particularity and the "poly-centrism" (Geertz) of cultural community? Is there a universal *humanum* that is not a leveling out of cultural particularity and specificity?



The **nihilist** position rejects the possibility of universality and Normativity; the **classicist** position rejects historical consciousness and thus cultural particularity. Doran's question concerns the possibility of getting the two poles into some kind of synthesis with one another.

> For the Straussian classicist, the only alternative to the relativism which is seen as inevitably resulting from historical consciousness, is a return to the classical culture; it is in classical culture that the universal/normative will be found, and is has to be brought to other cultures. Other cultures have to be made 'classical.' That is the only way that we will achieve some kind of universal realization of the *humanum*.
>
> For the contemporary relativist, and the contemporary nihilist in deconstructionism (e.g., Jacques Derrida), there can be no talk of anything universal/normative/cross-cultural; once you accept historical consciousness, there are no norms for knowing or for existential praxis. As Kojève argued, the upshot of this is the universal and homogeneous state; that is the only way that 'everything goes' is not going to result simply in terrorism. The homogeneous state will determined norms, which will be arbitrary. This is what is meant by the 'post-modern' option.

The incompleteness of the turn to the subject prior to the twentieth century has led to idealism in the turn to the subject, and to relativism in historical consciousness. Now the question is whether it is possible to take the turn to the subject and the turn to historical consciousness, and still have any universal and cross-cultural norms. The option is 'post-modern' in the sense that it builds on the incompleteness of the modern turns to the subject and to historical consciousness.

> The option is basically one between (a) **nihilism**, and (b) **interiority** as the source of universality, normativity, and cross-cultural validity in the midst of cultural particularity and specificity. This is the basic option, though it is compounded by the fact that the classicists are proposing their own position as an alternative; it is Doran's judgment, however, that the classicists are simply not going to be heard very persuasively any longer in history. The basic protagonists are (a) those who propose a new stage of meaning (interiority) beyond the second stage of meaning, grounded in the self-appropriation of human consciousness as providing a universally valid discovery of what the

human is, and (b) the nihilism that is the ultimate upshot of the incompleteness of the turns to the subject and to historical consciousness.

Doran, with Lonergan, argues that we must 'go with' the turns to the subject and to historical consciousness, but we must bring them to completion. Instead of noting the incompleteness of the turns and allowing this to result in nihilism and eventually a homogeneous state to control things, push the turns to their completion.

The imperialisms are heading toward a homogeneous, universal state. The option built on interiority will be heading toward a communitarian alternative.

The deconstructionism of Derrida, *et al*., is very influential in the academy today, especially in literary criticism. It involves a derisory, cynical attitude, which despairs of the possibility of meaning; nothing means anything. This is one basic option; the other is interiority.

This option is fundamentally cognitive; but it is also existential and political in the sense that the nihilist option will lead (as Kojève argued) to the universal and homogeneous state as the only control over catastrophe. If nothing means anything, if people cannot find any meaning, something to organize human communities in a humane way, then you have to give that power over to the hands of the state. Thus, there is a political and existential meaning to this as well as cognitive meaning.

Concerning his positing the possibilities for this notion of cross-cultural universality and Normativity, Doran notes the contextual significance of living in Toronto where the possibility of multiculturalism is 'part of the air that you breathe.'

5 March 1987

In chapters ten and eleven of *AD*, Doran is attempting to exercise theology as praxis, in the sense of mediating a transformation at the level of culture – i.e., at the level of constitutive meaning for ways of living. Theology's most radical transformative function is on persons; but its most direct transformative impact on society is on culture, i.e., on the meanings and values which inform the society's way of life. It is through its influence on culture that theology has an impact on social structures and the distribution of vital goods.

Thus, in part three of *AD* the attempt is to move beyond talking about theology-as-praxis, and to begin **exercising** the praxis role of theology in the critique and transformation of constitutive meaning.

Readings for March 5:

- *AD, chapters 10, 11, 12*

In mediating a cultural matrix and religion, a theology will establish and strengthen culture itself. It will contribute to culture as the higher synthesis of the dialectic of community; it will contribute to the formation of a culture that can be a higher synthesis for the dialectic of community. It does this by specifying the responsibilities that culture must meet if it is to satisfy the exigence of the underlying dialectic. And

> culture changes as the underlying social dialectic becomes more complex; this is one of the major historical reasons why a classicist notion of culture is invalid. Culture must change, because that is the only way it can meet the exigencies of the changing underlying social dialectic. Culture is a historical and historically-changing set of meanings and values constituting a way of life.
>
> Theology helps culture fulfill its authentic responsibilities, synthesizing Intersubjectivity and practicality. It allows culture to exercise its praxis in the situation – allowing, freeing, encouraging, and inviting it to do that.

The transcendental ground for talking about culture in this way is the scale of values, which specifies that the higher synthesis – at any level – must meet the exigencies of the underlying dialectic. This means that, at the level of culture, the culture must be such as to allow for a harmonious dialectic at the social level; today, the proportions of the problems at the social level are global, and so in our day culture must somehow be a function of transcultural communication.

What is called for in our time is a cross-cultural communication that will generate an understanding of 'the human' that can be participated in by people of various cultural backgrounds, without sacrificing the richness of their own cultural traditions. This is the social and cultural meaning of what Lonergan calls 'the third stage of meaning.' The historical situation is ripe for the development of meanings and values that can be shared across cultures by a deeper appropriation of the human reality that gives rise to culture in the first place; that sharing will not threaten cultural traditions/heritages, but will enable various cultures to appropriate their own cultures in a deeper way.

Today, we are without such corresponding cultural values, by and large; at best, they are in a state of germination. They are elemental and potential, not yet having become the form of a social way of living. We have a sense that something could happen or must happen, but it has not happened yet.

> Jung, who had this vision of cross-cultural communication, judged that it will take about six centuries before such a culture would become the constitutive meaning of a global community. This is especially interesting in light of Jaspers' interpretation of the previous axial period, which he judged to have spanned six centuries (800-200 B.C.E.) Jaspers saw this developing coming to fulfillment in the West in Greek philosophy; but the root of that, the questions, even the sense of the unknown that gave rise to that began several centuries earlier.

In the first section of chapter ten (*AD*), Doran offers one more argument for the need to posit culture as the focus of attention for transformative praxis. Now, the argument comes from **political philosophy**, especially the questions that are raised by contemporary political philosophy at the Boston College Lonergan Workshops, largely between Fred Lawrence and Matthew Lamb. At Boston College, there is a great deal of discussion of political philosophy, largely because of the presence of the Straussians there.

Modern (post-Machiavellian) political philosophies tend to be either "**liberal democratic**" or "**Marxist**." For all their differences – differences which could blow the world apart – they share a common neglect of the three higher levels of value: religious, personal, and cultural. They tend to collapse the scale of values into social and vital values. This is a matter of neglect in liberalism, and outright ideological

rejection in Marxism; Marxists reject even the possibility of there being an authentic realization of culture, person and religion. In one way or another, both liberalism and Marxism call for social transformation; thus, they hold a social transformation notion of praxis. This is stronger and more radical in the Marxist position, but the liberal democratic position is also oriented toward the transformation of social structures for the distribution of vital values.

Classically inspired political philosophies (especially Strauss, but also Voegelin) tend not to be sufficiently sensitive to the problem of social justice, which is precisely the problem which is focused on in different ways by Marxism and democratic liberalist. The question of the distribution of vital goods – food, clothing, housing – tends to be not central to the concerns of classical political philosophers.

Strauss, in particular, adopts a quite straightforward aristocratic notion of culture; he is convinced that the retrieval of classical political philosophy is the only solution to 'the mess that we are in' at the present time. Voegelin tends to be more nuanced, but social issues are also far from the center of his concern.

Classical political philosophers will focus on cultural, personal, and religious values; modern political philosophers will focus on social and vital values.

Doran insists that the **link** in the scale of values is at the level of culture. Both classical and modern political philosophy tends to overlook **culture-as-link**. The classical philosophers certainly focus on culture, but do not recognize it as a link to the infrastructure; they do not recognize culture as being authentic only when it has the dimensions or proportions that can meet the underlying social problems. They do not hold that the criterion of cultural authenticity is its being able to address the underlying social dialectic. The classical people are also insufficiently concerned with the everyday level of culture. On the other hand, the Marxists are suspicious of the superstructure; the link between the superstructural and infrastructural levels of culture is overlooked.

> The cultural link between religious/personal and social/vital levels of value is overlooked: from the top by the classical philosophers, from the bottom by liberals and Marxists.
>
> The reestablishment of culture itself as a link within the entire scale of values, as the key of the integrity of the whole scale, would meet the dialectic of political philosophy in our day. It would be able to advance the positions offered by both modern and classical political philosophy, precisely by recognizing where those positions belong in the context of the heuristic for a whole understanding of human society.
>
> What needs to be highlighted is culture as link between religious and personal authenticity, on the one hand, and vital and social values, on the other.
>
> In Marxists you have a suspicion of culture, and in liberals a neglect of it; in classicists, there is an emphasis on culture but it is an aristocratic culture, not proportioned to meet the problems of the underlying social dialectic.
>
> > For classicists, it is not culture as link, but culture as "ivory tower!" Culture is marginalized.

> The opposition of modern and classical political philosophies is a function of a common neglect of culture-as-link. Doran hopes to be able to recognize the positions that should be kept out of both of these emphases, by restoring culture to its place in the discussion

There are **two different notions of praxis** disclosed in these two opposing philosophies: (a) Modern political philosophers – liberal and Marxist – emphasize a **social transformation** notion of praxis; (b) classical philosophers will speak of a **conversion** notion of praxis. In many discussions these are played off against each other, as if they were contradictory and irreconcilable. Doran asks whether it is not true that genuine social transformation is rooted in conversion, and whether it is not true that 'conversion' is not genuine conversion if it is not concerned with social transformation.

> Doran suggests that culture be seen as a link between conversion and social transformation. Culture is what enables the transformation which takes place in persons to reach to the structures of the institutions of society. It is superficial to see these notions of praxis as contradictory.

> Doran differs from Marx in insisting on the possibility of an authentic culture that can link personal authenticity to society; he joins with Marx in calling for social transformation. He differs from classical philosophers by saying that their notion of culture is not adequate to meet today's problems; he joins with them in the emphasis on religion, the possibility of human authenticity, and the possibility of cultural authenticity.

Conversion is central, not just to Christianity, but to classical political philosophy. The 'myth of the cave' in Plato's *Republic* is a story of intellectual conversion; *periagoge* means a 'turning around.' Thus, Greek philosophers were clearly sensitive to this radical personal transformation. Voegelin interprets this as a function of divine revelation and grace.

Doran uses the term "culture" in a quite neutral, general sense to refer simply to the meanings and values informing a way of life. There remain further questions as to the authenticity of cultures; thus, the present position on the scale of values would involve insisting that there is no authentic culture without religious values and personal authenticity. *Contra* Marx, Doran insists that authentic religion, and authentic persons, and transformation of meanings are the ways to reach the goals of social justice that Marx genuinely wanted.

> In the scale of values, there are relations from-above-downwards and from-below-upwards. The truth of the basic Marxist position is that there is a certain development of the underlying values that is necessary for the development of the higher ones. If people are starving (vital), there is no way that they can contribute to the good of others (social); the distribution of vital values has to reach people before they are able to make a contribution to the social good. There has to be a functioning social order before culture values can be pursued. And so on and so forth. . . . This is the truth of one of the things that Marx recognized. But Doran also insists that at times, we meet problems at underlying levels that cannot be solved except by a transformation at a higher level. Thus, there is also a movement from above. Marx would cut this movement off at the level of social value, granting that a transformation of social order through revolution would affect the equitable distribution of vital goods, but disallowing any movement from above from cultural, personal,

religious values. Doran's insistence is that there is another way of reaching the transformation of the social, namely, through the transformation of culture. This is the way that theology and the Church in its ministry have to promote, rather than promoting revolution. The needed transformation of culture comes from transformed persons, and transformed persons come from the grace of God.



Marxist 'cut-off'

The constitution of authentic values at the religious, personal and cultural levels is a function of the proportion to which they meet problems at the social and vital levels. Thus, any religion which stops short at the personal or cultural levels, and does not go forward to meet problems in the social order, is ideology.

The basic thrust of chapter ten (*AD*) is the transposition and transformation of the anthropological principle, which is the basic insight of classical political philosophy. Voegelin has provided the source for Doran's understanding of classical political philosophy. For Voegelin, Greek philosophy is thoroughgoingly **political**; it arises as a result of **resistance** against a corrupt state of affairs in the *polis* (Athens). Voegelin understands the entire motivation behind Greek philosophy as being an attempt to find the measure of an authentic society. In the Greek thinkers, "political" and "philosophy" are coextensive. Their philosophy is political in orientation, motivation, and causation. For example, Socrates is really resisting an inauthentic derailment from integrity; his whole way of life is praxis in resistance to corruption.

Voegelin understands the basic insight in Greek philosophy to be Plato's **anthropological principle**: the psyche ("soul") is a manifold of social forces; society is a manifold of psychic forces. Up to this point, there is a circle between the individual soul and society:



The individual's own soul is constituted by social forces, and society is constituted by the souls of individuals. But the circle is broken in the recognition that **the soul is the measure of society, and God is the measure of the soul**. (Cf. Plato's *Gorgias* or *The Republic*.) The principle of soul being

the measure of society is spelled out especially in *The Republic*; to find out what would constitute an authentic society, find out what constitutes an authentic person. In other words, an authentic society can be understood by analogy to what constitutes an authentic person. Plato's vocabulary for authenticity is "the **just** society."

Voegelin has retrieved the whole of classical political philosophy on the basis of the statement of this anthropological principle. All of Greek philosophy is political through and through; it is the result of resistance against prevalent personal and social corruption. But it is the result as well of a **breakthrough** to a major differentiation of consciousness; the breakthrough is to **recognition of a world-transcendent reality** (*to theon*, *to agathon*) **as measure of personal integrity**.

According to Jaspers, this occurs elsewhere in the world in different ways during roughly the same time period. Lonergan calls this the **transcendent differentiation of consciousness**; human consciousness moves out of a certain compactness to the recognition that the standard of integrity is beyond the world. That standard is understood in different ways in different cultures; but it is a more or less universal set of events in the world between 800 and 200 B.C.E.

Beyond recognition that there is this world-transcendent 'Good,' Greek philosophy also acknowledges that it **loves the 'Good.'** Philosophy is the love of the measure – etymologically, "love of wisdom." "Wisdom" is the knowledge that enables one to be attuned to the measure. Thus, Plato acknowledges his own love of the world-transcendent 'Good.'

It is as the result of a transcendent differentiation of consciousness that Greek philosophy is able to move to this understanding, and to move to **individuation**, in which the authentic individual is posited as the measure of society. Voegelin goes so far as to speak of this as the **revelation** of the divine that occurs in "the mystic philosophers of Greece;" it was some kind of revelation of divine being that promoted individuation. In Doran's judgment, Voegelin's interpretation retrieves the genuineness of what was going on in Greek philosophy; it helps to remove much of the rhetoric that has been built up against the Greeks (e.g., by Leslie Dewart, et al.). It allows real appreciation of the magnificent development in human consciousness that was occurring at this point.

This raises an interesting theological question. We speak of the offer of grace as being universal; would we then not also speak of revelation outside the Christian tradition. Voegelin posits real **mystical experience** in the pre-Socratic philosophers and in Plato. Voegelin is insistent on the centrality of experience; he may be more anti-conceptualist than Lonergan. He insists that we cannot understand symbols and symbolization if we cannot get at the experience underlying them.

> Voegelin refers to Greek culture as *praeparatio evangelica*. The reason that the Gospel was able to move with such facility out of Palestine and into Greece is that the questions had already been raised by the experiences of the mystic philosophers. The opening of consciousness to Transcendence had already taken place.
>
> The central difference in Hebrew/Christian meaning from the Greeks, is recognition of a divine response to the human. The Greek recognition of the opening of the human to the divine, and

> the recognition (Plato) that I am in love with God. There is no Greek recognition that God is in love with me. What is specific to Hebrew/Christian meaning is recognition that there is a bending of God toward humanity, as well as a human yearning and reaching for God.

The anthropological principle undergoes a transformation when it is addressed by the Gospel; this can be traced historically, in the texts of our Western tradition. Doran proposes that this transformation, in fact, is a bringing of the anthropological principle into some kind of dialectical relationship with the cosmological.

> This is proposed as a hypothesis to be considered. And in some sense, it is proposed as something to-be-accomplished (programmatic) rather than as reflection on something already-accomplished.

The radical transformation is from *eros* to *agape*. In Christianity, the goal of the philosopher's striving has chosen to be a constitutive element in our fidelity to the demands of authenticity. The divine goal has chosen to share divine life with us as we strive for that goal in authentic living. Thus, grace is human participation in the very life of God as a constituent element of human striving. Insofar as the offer of grace is universal (cf. Rahner's "supernatural existential"), this grace was present in the Greek philosophers but was not differentiated, recognized, or acknowledged by them.

Voegelin, The New Science of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 77-78: "The impossibility of *philia* between God and man may be considered typical for the whole range of anthropological truth. The experiences that were explicated into a theory of man by the mystic philosophers had in common the accent on the human side of the orientation of the soul toward divinity. The would orients itself toward a God who rests in his immovable transcendence; it reaches out toward divine reality, but it does not meet an answering movement from beyond. The Christian bending of God in grace toward the soul does not come within the range of these experiences – though, to be sure, in reading Plato one has the feeling of moving continuously on the verge of a breakthrough into this new dimension. The experience of mutuality in the relation with God, of the *amicitia* in the Thomistic sense, of the grace which imposes a supernatural form on the nature of man, is the specific difference of Christian truth. The revelation of this grace in history, through the incarnation of the *Logos* in Christ, intelligibly fulfilled the adventitious movement of the spirit in the mystic philosophers. The critical authority over the older truth of society which the soul had gained through its opening and its orientation toward the unseen measure was now confirmed through the revelation of the measure itself. In this sense, then, it may be said that the fact of revelation is its content."

> The full range of experience is always present, including what Rahner refers to as the "supernatural existential;" thus, the mystic philosophers had the experience of grace. But this experience was not differentiated; it was not recognized or acknowledged. This soteriological 'bending of God toward humanity' is most sharply differentiated in Israel and Christianity.
>
> The soteriological differentiation contains elements that are not acknowledged in the anthropological breakthrough. When those elements are spoken to the Greek mind, they are not always recognized as complementary to the Greek striving. Paul found this, and consequently speaks of the cross as "a stumbling block and scandal to the philosophers."

> In John Dunne's terms (*The Way of All the Earth*), the philosopher goes up the mountain to meet God at the top, but gets to the top of the mountain only to discover that God has bone down into the valley. It is a startling strangeness, an inverse insight to understand that God is to be found in the valley, not at the top of the mountain. God has chosen to be a constitutive part of our life in the valley; that can be shocking and offensive to the mind that has given up everything to climb the mountain to find God at the top. Particularly, the cross of the suffering servant as the form that the measure took in entering into our adventure can be a stumbling block to a mind that reaches beyond the turmoil of this life to find God.
>
> Attunement to the divine measure, which is what the philosopher was all about, is shown in Christian revelation to be attunement to the pattern of the suffering servant under the law of the cross. This differentiation is the *novum*. This is shocking and startling to the well-ordered *eros* attuned to the world-transcendent measure. It takes another step to think of oneself as redeemed by that measure's gracious initiative, that measure's offer to become a constitutive element in our own life by participation in God's life and by the invitation to share in the pattern that the incarnate measure took on in becoming human.
>
> In the soteriological differentiation, God becomes known, not just as the goal of certain inclinations, but also as partner, companion, friend, and as having already established the terms of authentic living. To be attuned to the divine measure is to be attuned to the law of the cross.
>
> This soteriological differentiation does not deny the anthropological breakthrough, but it does transform it by adding something quite new and surprising.

In this, there is a movement from a classicist notion of culture to **history**, and from aristocracy to **universalism**. In "The Transition from a Classicist Worldview to Historical-Mindedness" (*A Second Collection*, pp. 1-9), Lonergan says that the Gospel is not harmonious with a classical mentality; they are in conflict with each other. No order – even an order as noble as the classical – has any license to regard itself as normative; no human culture is normative. Integrity is collaboration with God in grace, and that can happen in any culture. Integrity is a matter of collaborating with God's grace as God redeems us by making the divine life a constitutive element of our lives. The 'law of the cross' that Lonergan is proposing can be realized in any cultural framework. The Gospel opens up a way beyond classicism, and it does so without succumbing to normlessness. A great part of Lonergan's life work was to retrieve the normative from classical philosophy; in this, much of his inspiration comes from the Greek experience of reason. But he wants to show how that normative is found in history. He sought to discover, within the context of historical-mindedness, an invariant basis that is universally human and that can be brought into consistent activity by God's grace and only by God's grace. But it is a *humanum* that is universal, invariant, and the ground of authenticity; it alone is normative. That distinguishes Christianity from classicism which would set its own cultural order as normative.

> In Christianity, the norm lies in grace, which releases us to be authentically attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and loving human beings.

Doran suggests a further development that has to be added to shat Lonergan has done, and which is implicit in his own work. If we are going to move beyond classicism, and if the church is going to move beyond classicism in its mentality – which it is still struggling to do – **being and the good can no longer be identified with each other** in the way that they were in classical, Catholic philosophy. The **transcendentals are united in desire, but not in fact**; we want what-is to be good, and we want the good to exist, but we have to acknowledge that a great deal of what-is is to be disapproved and a great deal of what is good does not-yet-exist. Thus, the integration of the transcendentals is the goal of our desire.

> It is a classicist ploy against social transformation notions of praxis to revert to the Thomistic understanding of the unity of being and the good. In *Science*, *Politics*, *and Gnosticism*, Voegelin engages in this 'ploy;' he appeals to the identification of being and the good as an argument against the transformationist notions of praxis. He calls these notions "Gnostic."
>
> Doran argues that the truth of the Thomist identification of the transcendentals is that as the object of our desire we **want** all being to be good, and we want the good to exist. In fact, in history, there is a great deal that-is that-should-not-be, and there is a great deal that-is-not-yet that-should-be. Thus, the notions of being and of the good have to be distinguished from one another.
>
> In terms of the levels of consciousness, the notion of being is the first three levels of consciousness: experience, understanding, and judgment. It is the notion of being that brings us to the knowing of being in true judgment. The notion of good is distinct, it is the fourth level of consciousness, the notion of value; it moves beyond what-is to what-should –be.
>
> > This takes us beyond the classicist identification of being and the good.
> >
> > Evil remains a *privatio boni*; it is not reality in itself. But it must be said that a great deal of what-is is 'shot through' by the *privatio boni*, and we want what-is to not be shot through by the *privatio boni*.

Another shift that is encouraged by the Gospel when it speaks to the anthropological is the move from aristocracy to **universalism**. For classical political philosophy, in fact, it is the philosopher who is privileged to participate in the human good. There is an aristocratic conception of human worth. It happens to be the case that these philosophers had the leisure to pursue their contemplative way of life, because they were relatively free of worries concerning where their next meal was coming from, etc. **Plato had his slaves**.

Historical-mindedness promotes a **universal participation in the human good**, and not just the participation of those who happen to be socially privileged enough to be able to engage in this kind of life. Christianity will not be satisfied until all participate fully in the scale of values. That full participation is an eschatological reality, but that is where we are headed. This acknowledgement of the eschatological nature of this participation is no excuse for not promoting it here and now.

> If the invariant structure of what constitutes human integrity is common to all human beings and is their natural right, it is a natural right for all to participate fully in the scale of values.

> These are the kind of transformations that Christianity works on the classical and on the anthropological, without at all denying the truth of the anthropological.

The point of chapter eleven (*AD*) is that as the soteriological works such transformation it is in fact establishing some kind of dialectic of the anthropological with the cosmological. It is bringing the anthropological down from the mountain back down to the valley of the earth. Part of that involves retrieval of the truth of the cosmological vision.

> This transformation does not negate the truth of the anthropological breakthrough, wherever it occurred. The truth of it is the transcendent differentiation establishing the integrity of the individual as the measure of the individual's integrity. The transposition of this is in terms of the full scale of values. The scale of values can be regarded as a contemporary statement of a transformed anthropological viewpoint. In its transposition, it brings into account the more basic levels of value.

There are transcendental notions associated with each of the levels of consciousness:

Decision	:	Good
Judgment	:	True
Understanding	:	Intelligible
Experience	:	Beauty

> The beautiful is the **sensitive splendour** of the intelligible, the true, and the good. Thomas: *splendor veritatis*.
>
> The present assertion has been that the notion of the intelligible is distinct from the notion of the true; the true includes the intelligible, but it introduces a further differentiation. That further differentiation is a function of the question, "Is it true?" The question is necessary because, as Lonergan frequently remarked, "Insights are a dime a dozen!" In other words, many things that are intelligible are not true. The notion of the good is a further qualification of transcendental intending beyond the notion of the true (.e., of being).
>
> > We make judgments of fact and judgments of value. Sometimes what we judge to 'be' in a judgment of fact, we also judge to 'be good' in a judgment of value; but other times, there is a discrepancy.

Chapter eleven (*AD*) argues that the implicit effect of the theological transformation of Greek philosophy, i.e., of the anthropological principle, has been to bring the anthropological into creative dialectical tension with the truth of the cosmological. But further, there is an explicit need today for this dialectic to become the constitutive meaning by which people live. Doran's hypothesis is that the truth of these two horizons can be integrated with one another; not only is this a possibility, it is quite desirable in our time. It would in fact enable the kind of global cross-cultural community that we need, because the peoples of the earth come out of one or other of those backgrounds – cosmological or anthropological. To establish a creative unity between them would 'bring everybody in.'

Theology, accordingly, has to catalyze the emergence of an explicit dialectic of culture, to inform the underlying social dialectic. Today, for systematics to mediate Christian faith with a cultural matrix is for systematics to participate in the emergence of a new cultural matrix.

The meanings and values that could inform the way of life of a global, communitarian alternative to imperialism are not going to be created *ab ovo*; rather, they are going to be **creative transformations** of the heritages/traditions that belong to the various cultures of humanity at this time. The various cultural traditions have to be **retrieved**, **communicated** across cultures, what the reference of their meanings is has to be **specified** by quite serious intellectual work, and **integrated** in a cultural synthesis that is beyond anything presently operative.

The sets of meanings and values by which people have lived in the course of human history can be genuinely referred to as cosmological, anthropological, and soteriological. These terms are taken from Voegelin (volume one of *Order and History*), but what is being posited in the terms is supported by Eliade. Thus, people who have done extensive hermeneutics of culture do tend to place these structures – cosmological, anthropological, soteriological – on cultures. These distinctions are supported by extensive cultural research.

The thesis of chapter eleven (*AD*) is stated in three points (pp. 299-289):

1. Cosmological and anthropological constitutive meanings will constitute an integral dialectic of culture for world-cultural humanity;
2. Soteriological differentiation will be the condition of the possibility of the integrity of the dialectic; and
3. By mediating the soteriological differentiation with cosmological and anthropological insight and truth, theology will be assuming responsibility for the integrity of the dialectic of culture.

The dialectic of culture is in addition to what Lonergan has said, but it does not contradict anything he has said. In fact, it is an attempt to push forward the meaning of his own thought insofar as this dialectic is **structured** in a way that is **analogous** to the dialectic of the subject and the dialectic of community. There is the same kind of creative tension between principles of limitation and transcendence. Now it is a matter of limitation and transcendence in the realm of meaning itself.

> The same bases for the principles exist. The basis for the principle of limitation is the psyche, which is the source of cosmological constitutive meaning. The basis for the principle of transcendence is the spirit of human intentionality, which is what gets disengaged in anthropological constitutive meaning. Thus, it is the same creative tension of intentionality and the sensitive psyche that gives rise to the three dialectics.

Human experience, when it is in the dramatic pattern, is a **search for direction in the movement of life**. And the dramatic pattern is the basic pattern; we enter into all other patterns out of the dramatic. Choosing to be a scientist is a dramatic choice to make the intellectual pattern central to one's life; the choice is made in the dramatic pattern as the person decides who s/he is. Human experience – as a search for direction in the movement of life – is always present in the fullness of its dimensions in human

consciousness, but it varies from compactness to differentiation. It is elemental, primordial, and universal. **Direction is found through meanings and values**. The experience of searching for direction is at the base of every culture; culture is a function of the search for direction in the movement of life, and it is a function of the discoveries that people have arrived at as they have pursued that search. Doran understands culture and its ordering symbols as a function of this experience of consciousness in the dramatic pattern. Culture arises out of people's search for direction in the movement of life, and out of the discoveries that people have made along the way. The ordering symbols of culture are a function of the achieved discoveries.

The most **compact** ordering of that experience occurs in cosmological culture, where – as both Eliade and Voegelin have argued – the measure of integrity is provided by the **rhythms of the cosmos**. Human integrity affects first of all the society. Especially through its rituals and also its customs, the society keeps itself in harmony with or brings itself back to harmony with cosmic rhythms. Eliade has argued this over and over and over again. The rituals of a cosmological society are reenactments of the founding events in the cosmos, reestablishing the society in harmony with those founding cosmic events. It is the society, then, that provides the measure of the individual's rectitude; the individual is basically a function of the society's order.

> At the root of this, the **sensitive psyche** is the determining conscious factor in the establishment of cosmological constitutive meaning. Our sensitivity is part of the rhythm of the cosmos; it participates in cosmic rhythms. Even today, when we have moved so far away from this, our sensitivity continues to participate in the rhythms of the cosmos; this is evidenced, e.g., when a change in mood accompanies a sharp change in weather. The psyche is the predominant conscious factor in the establishment of cosmological constitutive meaning. Thus, the **self-appropriation of the psyche** at the level of personal value will be the source of the retrieval of the truth of cosmological constitutive meaning. This is the genuine value of someone like Jung who has gone into the psyche at an archetypal kind of depth, and finds in the symbols of the psyche this cosmic kind of meaning.

With the **axial** period in the different cultures, what happens at the level of personal value is that the **spirit** becomes **differentiated** from the psyche; insight/understanding becomes a specialized pursuit, and is disengaged from the sensitive flow. It is so disengaged from the sensitive flow that, for Plato, there are two separate worlds: the world of ideas and the world of sensitive appearance. This disengagement of understanding was so strong that he projected it to another real world; in fact, this world of ideas was posited as being more real. Aristotle brought the two back together, by saying that intelligibility was in this material world, not in some other world.

> This disengagement of spirit established another direction of integrity, in which God establishes the integrity of the person and the authentic person is the measure of the society. Thus, the axial break is a break from the cosmological.
>
> With the axial period, there is a differentiation of spirit from the psyche; human desires are sorted out, differentiated. Plato speaks of the **golden cord** by which God draws us to the divinity. This is

> distinct from all the other pulls and counter-pulls; the key is to find the golden cord and to follow it. There is a **differentiation of desire** that takes place in the anthropological breakthrough.

The same experience, however, of search for direction in the meaning of life that was at the root of cosmological meaning is at the root of the anthropological breakthrough. Culture is a product of that search. The axial disengagement results from that search, results from human beings searching for direction in the movement of life.

The movement forward to a dialectic of culture cannot simply be a reversal back to the cosmological. L It has to be **forward** towards **self-appropriation**, which will appropriate the roots of both cosmological and anthropological meanings. It will appropriate both spirit and psyche as roots for these sets of meanings and values. We will understand what it is in human consciousness itself that has given free rise to the cultures that inform different peoples' ways of life.

> Interiorly differentiated consciousness will find the roots of the cosmological in the psyche, and the roots of the anthropological in the spirit. It will then constitute a differentiated unity by establishing the creative tension of the spirit and the psyche.
>
> It is not simply a matter of saying 'the anthropological has come to a dead end' and we have to revert to the cosmological. L Rather, it is a matter of discovering that it is dimensions of human consciousness that have given rise to these horizons, and through appropriating the roots (in consciousness) of these horizons appropriating the horizons themselves sin such a way that they can be integrated.

Soteriologically differentiated consciousness will also point out the need for a **religious** differentiation. Interiorly differentiated consciousness reaches (at the end of chapter eighteen of *I*) the awareness – through interiority – of human **moral impotence** and the need for grace. The soteriological will be retrieved – in the kind of culture Doran is proposing – by a religiously differentiated consciousness that knows its way around the experience of the grace in which God offers to be become a constitutive element in our own adventure by sharing the divine life with us. All of this cultural integration that Doran is proposing as possible and desirable is the fruit of self-appropriation. The groundwork of self-appropriation, which has been laid for the first time in the twentieth century, is what will propel us forward.

In working out the difference between the cosmological and the anthropological, it is important to recognize their **different experiences of time**. Eliade characterizes the cosmological experience as 'cyclic,' and the anthropological experience as 'linear.' Doran proposes a qualification of these terms for the sake of precision. Strictly speaking, there are no 'cycles' and there is not 'straight line;' rather, there are **schemes of recurrence**. The cosmological is more locked into a set of patterns of schemes of recurrence, precisely because of its harmony with cosmic rhythms, which tend to be extraordinarily stable. For example, the objects of the astronomer's knowledge are systems that just keep working in the same way; such systems have an extremely high probability of survival, and the emergence of departures from these systems have an extremely low probability of emergence. The anthropological is not straight-linear. Rather, the schemes of recurrence are more flexible, because there is a recognition

that the spirit (insight and decision) can introduce the 'new' into history, and that we are not totally determined by the patterns of the cosmos that our psyches are in harmony with. The human spirit – through its capacity to understand, to judge, and to decide – can introduce the new. Accordingly, the schemes of recurrence will change more once there has been a breakthrough to history, through the anthropological and soteriological differentiations.

> What Eliade terms 'cyclic' is actually a matter of more-or-less **fixed** schemes of recurrence; what he terms 'linear' is a matter of more-or-less **flexible** schemes of recurrence.
>
> The important thing here is **meaning**. It is under the influence of certain sets of constitutive meaning that we experience time as either determined and fatalistically fixed, or as flexibly open to the introduction of the new.

12 March 1987

The distinction proposed between source and foundation in theology was this: a **source** provides data; the **foundation** is the subject (in her/his authenticity) that works on the data.

> But there is also a sense in which the subject also provides data, insofar as the objectifications of conversion are data for theology. The subject provides 'foundational data,' which enables the theologian to 'work on' the tradition and situation.
>
> Further, in the sense that it is work in the first phase of theology that moves the theologian to foundations, that first phase can also be considered in some sense as foundational. Thus, whereas the subject is the 'primary foundation' of theology, both tradition and situation can be spoken of as secondary foundations.

As the church preaches the gospel today to the "world" – understood as a global community torn between escalating imperialisms, but yearning for a communitarian alternative - it should be consciously evoking a dialectical form of constitutive meaning in culture, the form that could constitute a world-cultural community.

> Thus, the church is to catalyze the emergence of a new cultural matrix. Insofar as theology participates in the ministry of the church, theology is not simply mediating faith with a stable cultural matrix. The fact is that today cultural matrices are not stable. The mediating task of theology involves participation in the evocation and establishment of a new culture.

These affirmations have been made:

Readings for March 12:

- *AD, chapters 13 and 14*
- *"Psychology and the Foundations of Interdisciplinary Collaboration," chapter 3 of Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundations, pp. 89-131.*
- *"Aesthetics and the Opposites," Thought 52 (1977), pp. 117-133.*
- *"Aesthetic Subjectivity and Generalized Empirical Method," The Thomist 43 (1979), pp. 257-278.*

1. Consciousness in the dramatic pattern of experience is an experience of life as a movement with a direction to be found or missed (Voegelin). This movement is the base experience out of which cultures arise; culture is a function of the search for direction in the movement. Culture consists in the questions which constitute that search, and the incremental answers which have been found in the historical engagement in that search.

2. Cosmological ordering (as an 'ideal type' – Max Weber) is more 'compact' than anthropological ordering; it is not as differentiated. It is dictated more by psyche than by human spirit; because psyche is closely tied to body, it participates in cosmic rhythms and processes.

    The psyche can be called the "***sensorium*** of wonder." 'Wonder is universally human, but the psyche is where that wonder is 'felt.'

    In cosmological constitutive meaning, the cosmos is the measure of integrity/authenticity; the society has to stay in harmony with the cosmos, and the individual has to stay in harmony with the society.

        Thus, there is very little room for individuation in cosmological societies.

3. The axial developments – in Israel, India, and China, as well as in Greece – in effect differentiated spirit from psyche. That language was not explicitly used, though very similar expressions can be found in Confucius.

4. Today, there is required a new dialectical integration of those two forms; there is a truth in each of them that cannot be lost, except at great peril to humanity.

    The truth of cosmological meaning can be expressed as 'ecological consciousness:' the awareness that there are limits to interference with nature, and that if those limits are transgressed (*hybris*) a chain of distortions will result.

    Doran narrates the story of an Indian tribe who lived along a settlement of whites. After the homes of the white community had been destroyed in a tornado, the Indians commented: "We told them that **place** wasn't safe, but they wouldn't listen." There is a remarkable attunement with 'place' that characterizes cosmological cultures.

5. Religious differentiated consciousness will appropriate the soteriological differentiation which will help establish the creative tension between cosmological and anthropological meanings. Doran says this on the basis of what has *de facto* happened when the gospel has been preached.

    When the gospel is preached to cosmological cultures, they are freed from their fatalism; when preached to anthropological cultures, they are called to humility, they are called 'back to earth.'

Paul, preaching to the philosophers, called them to return to earth, without repudiating their ascent of the mountain.

It must be emphasized that the roots of grace's capacity to integrate cosmological and anthropological culture lie in the fact that grace is what integrates psyche and spirit in the human person.

Paul Ricoeur (*Fallible Man*) speaks of a **disproportion** in human being which is the condition of the possibility of sin. This is parallel to what Doran means by psyche and spirit.

Grace is the 'inner word' which addresses interiority, enabling the creative tension of psyche and spirit; the gospel (soteriological meaning) is the 'outer word' which addresses public meaning, enabling the creative tension of cosmological and anthropological meanings.

Doran proposes this as a hypothesis which needs to be tested.

The movement of life is experienced in the psyche; it is a 'sensitive' movement. The search for direction in that movement, however, takes place in the human spirit – in questions, insights, judgments, etc. As the search takes place, the movement itself changes.

General features of the **search for direction**:

In speaking of "primal **anxiety**," Doran is attempting to understand the kind of experience that Heidegger considers in *Being and Time*: it is what Kierkegaard calls "dread" or "anxiety."

Heidegger insists that there is a primal anxiety endemic in the human situation: it must be confronted.

Human consciousness is a pure question that can be satisfied or frustrated, but it will not go away. In the dramatic pattern of experience, it is a search for direction in the movement of life, permeated with an awareness that the search is precarious. I.e., there is awareness that the direction can be missed, and that even it if is found it can be lost.

The precariousness of the search is expressed in Jesus' insistence that sometimes what appears to be life can really be death, and that what appears to be death can really be life.

The deepest desire of the human person is to succeed in that search for direction in the movement of life.

Each of us has a unique vocation in the universe; it is our deepest desire to find it. And this is a developing thing; it is never found once and for all.

The situation today is a culturally pervasive failure to find direction in the movement of life. There is a massive loss of the discoveries that have been made by the cosmological and anthropological cultures. There is a massive forgetfulness of the gospel and its message.

There is even a repression of the question in our time. And people who raise the question are considered to be dangerous people.

> Repression of the question today means the loss of all three sets of major cultural forms: cosmological, anthropological, and soteriological.

> But the anxiety can only be repressed into the unconsciousness; it cannot be evacuated. But if it is suppressed long and hard enough, we no longer know the source of the anxiety, and we no longer know the hope which comes from knowing the source and from knowing that the direction can be found.

The three sets of cultural meanings all involve a recognition that "we are not alone;" there is a sense of a **partner** in the search for direction in the movement of life. In cosmological meaning, the partner is the universe in which we are intimately involved. In anthropological meaning, it is the transcendent divine measure. In soteriological meaning, it is the divine measure incarnate.

> The partner measures the search; thus, losing the partner is in a sense losing the search.
>
> This is what gives such horrifying meaning to Nietzsche's declaration that "God is dead!" It is an assertion that there is no partner, there is no search, humanity is on its own and can do whatever it will.
>
> Finding the partner and following the partner is the key to the search. An important part of soteriological meaning is that the incarnate Logos let us know that the neighbor is also our partner in the search.

In *The Denial of Death*, Ernest Becker identifies "primal anxiety" with the rear of death; Doran has great respect for Becker, but judges him to be wrong in this identification. In his position, the fear of death is a function of the search for direction.

> It seems to be a fact that people who are confident of having found direction in the movement of life no longer fear death (at least not in the same way).
>
> The danger of Becker's position is that totalitarians (cf. the reference to Hobbes in *AD*, p. 306) want to awaken the fear of death; if we are afraid of death, we will not ask the questions which constitute the search for direction.
>
> The radical anxiety is "the profounder horror of losing, with the passi9ng of existence, the slender foothold in the partnership of being" that we can find by attunement but also lose by default. (*AD*, p. 307, quoting Voegelin, *Order and History* I, pp. 4-5.)

<u>Sin and Grace</u>:

Social sin is an important category in theology today. Doran is convinced that it can be understood in terms of distortions in the dialectic of community, and the resultant maldistribution of goods. The proximate source of this distortion is the distortion of the dialectic of culture; thus, it is in terms of meanings and values. The radical source of social distortion is the breakdown in the integrity of persons, which is sin in the proper sense.

Distortions of the dialectics of community and culture make personal Inauthenticity more and more probable.

Long before the category of social sin had emerged, Lonergan anticipated its importance (cf. *I*, p. 218). Distorted social structures have a certain dominance over the development of individuals, and make it more difficult for a person to develop authentically.

A theology of social sin can be developed from these categories.

But sin in its most proper sense is **personal refusal** to seek and find direction in the movement of life; it is a breakdown of personal value. It affects a distortion in the person, and through that personal distortion there arises a distortion of the dialectics of culture and community.

Grace is mediated through the personal resolve of subjects, which is itself made possibly by grace; grace makes personal integrity possible. It enables the creative tension between psyche and spirit which is essential for authentic human development.

Only a community of (graced) creative individuals can break down the vicious circle of moral impotence.

The situation has a profound impact, insofar as the social surd gives rise to higher and higher probabilities of persons being distorted. As the social situation continues to deteriorate (which is the meaning of the longer cycle of decline), the statistical probability of personal breakdown increases.

A theology that would awaken personal integrity must be constantly on guard that it is itself in attunement; the theologian must be concerned with her/his own authenticity, which is ever precarious. The theologian must constantly beg God's grace.

The intellectual apostolate of the church (of which theology is part) can be in collaboration with the grace of God; today, this is true especially as the grace of God is awakening the kind of consciousness (*viz*., awareness of interiority) that can reverse decline.

Authentic theology is a function of a prophetic charism; it is a matter of enunciating the constitutive meaning that God would introduce into human affairs.

Chapter twelve (*AD*) tries to bring together what would be the culture of the creative minority that could assume responsibility for reversing the longer cycle of decline.

In assuming this responsibility, you have to turn to other differentiations of consciousness. Interiorly differentiated consciousness remains the foundation, but interiority will use the other differentiations.

The guiding question is this: What is the requisite structure of consciousness for exercising contemporary theological responsibility.

The levels of consciousness (experience, understanding, judgment, decision, love) function in many different patterns. Those patterns can become specialized differentiations of consciousness. Doran has been able to locate at least nine differentiations that have *de facto* appeared historically. Anyone addressing a world situation will have to have some awareness of these differentiations.

- **Prehistoric** consciousness (following Erich Neumann, in *The Origins and History of Consciousness*). Prior to the emergence of the ego, consciousness is at one with nature.

  This is an ideal construct, a limit concept against which the remaining differentiations can be understood.

  An "undifferentiated 'mandala'."

- The emergence of ego into **realistic common sense**. It is important to speak of differentiations within common sense (which Lonergan tends not to do).

  Common sense can be more or less realistic/objective. Thus, ancient high civilizations developed great practical skills (such as building the pyramids); yet this was frequently combined with superstitious myth and magic. In this sense, there can be a conflict between realism and superstition within common sense.

  In chapter three of MT, Lonergan distinguishes various functions of meaning:

  - Cognitive
  - Effective
  - Constitutive

  - Communicative

  Prehistoric consciousness does not distinguish between these functions. When cognitive and constitutive meanings become confused, e.g., there results a projection of myths of cosmic origins onto the world. Similarly, a blending of effective and communicative meaning can give rise to magic.

  With the differentiation of ego, there is some responsibility and authority for existence taken; it is a matter of freeing oneself from captivating myths (in the pejorative sense of 'myth').

- **Artistic** differentiation: Lonergan treats of art in chapter six of *I*, chapter three of *MT*, and chapter nine of the philosophy of education lectures.

  Art differs from common sense in that it is **not instrumental**; artistic experience evokes patterns for their own sake – a flow of experience that appreciates sensible form for its own sake.

  Art is a matter of creativity in the realm of sensible form.

The artist conspires with the unconscious, operates in creative equilibrium with unconscious. In his *Anatomy of Criticism*, Northrop Frye speaks of the poet's consciousness as being cooperative with her/his unconscious.

In artistic experience, consciousness directs; it is not simply a letting-go to the unconscious. But there is a delicate balance maintained.

- **Ecological** differentiation.

  Doran sees the need for a contemporary ecological differentiation which is not just a return to the cosmological, but is a function of insight into something that cosmological cultures understood.

  It will involve recovery of the psychic sensitivity of cosmological cultures.

- **Transcendent** differentiation: This is what occurs in the axial breakthroughs, in which the measure of integrity is distinguished from anything intra-cosmic; the measure is ultimately beyond the cosmos.

  The integrity of human inclinations is measured by their attunement with this transcendent measure.

  As this differentiation occurred in the West (i.e., Greece) it is primarily a noetic differentiation; it is a cognitive opening to transcendence. Thus, Plato's world of forms/ideas.

- **Theoretic** differentiation: At least in Greece, it is the transcendent differentiation that leads to the theoretic (in Doran's judgment). It is the opening upon world-transcendent reality that is also the beginning of theory, which distinguishes from purely descriptive knowing.

  The question that asks about ultimate reality gives rise to the question which asks about the **forms** of things. Thus, Socrates becomes interested in "the nature of" things. The common sense mentality knows how to use, e.g., the word "courage" (descriptively), but it could not give a definition (explanatory) that applied *omni et soli*. This theoretic mentality is opened by the transcendent differentiation.

  In our personal lives, in many cases, the first theoretical question one asks may well have to do with transcendence. There is something in transcendence that encourages the emergence of theory.

- The **modern scientific** differentiation is a further differentiation of theory; it is a development of theoretic consciousness.

  Over and over again in *A Second Collection*, Lonergan highlights the **shift** from the Aristotelian to the modern notion of science.

Aristotle: true and certain knowledge of causal necessity.

Modern: hypothetical approximation to de facto terms and relations.

Also, with quantum physics there has emerged the recognition of the inevitable statistical component in scientific knowledge. Statistics brings contingency under theory, and for Aristotle that could not be done. This enters into our understanding of the universe itself. The universe is not causal necessity; the occurrences in the universe are statistically probably occurrences.

This is a major transposition of theory which has occurred within the last couple of centuries. Newton was still working out of an Aristotelian notion of science.

- A s**cholarly** differentiation was consolidated in the nineteenth century development of critical historical methods. Lonergan treats this in chapters eight and nine of *MT*; those chapters present his understanding of the scholarly differentiation.

- The soteriological differentiation of consciousness reaches maximum clarity in Christian revelation. It disengages the grace that is a supernatural existential, always-already offered to human existence I the search for direction in the movement of life; that grace is always offered, but it becomes differentiated through God's freely given revelation. It takes revelation to differentiate grace as a component in the search.

- **Interiorly** differentiated consciousness has emerged in the twentieth century; it was prepared by the turn to the subject in Descartes, Kant, the depth psychologists, *et al*. It applies the capacities of scientific consciousness to the data of interiority.

All these differentiations have to come together in the consciousness that Doran is calling 'world-cultural' consciousness.

All these differentiations result from the search for direction; they are a function of that search. They all change as that search goes forward.

Fully differentiated consciousness on the level of its own time is very rare; this would be a consciousness which is 'at home' in all the differentiations which have been historically opened up, able to move in those different worlds. Leonardo da Vinci is an example of a consciousness which was differentiated quite fully on the level of his time. He could move with facility from the scientific to the artistic differentiation.

But however rare, full differentiation remains a goal. It is the kind of consciousness that a theologian has to seek: to be as fully differentiated as s/he can be on the level of her/his time.

Some of these differentiations seem to be requisite for the development of others. Quite obviously, some theoretic capacity is a prerequisite for a modern scientific differentiation; the theoretic

differentiation is probably also a prerequisite for the scholarly differentiation, in the sense that it opens up consciousness to a detachment that is necessary in scholarship. The theoretic differentiation is also a prerequisite for interiorly differentiated consciousness. Theory, however, may very well depend on transcendence.

These relationships of dependence are proposed as hypotheses.

Relationship between the **differentiations** and **culture**:

As a general notion, culture is the set of meanings and values informing a given way of life. This notion can be 'filled out' and enriched through consideration of the differentiations of consciousness.

A given culture is, in part, a function of the prevalent structure of differentiations operative in that community. It is a function of interaction, collaboration, and conflict among persons of variously differentiated consciousness.

This is a first approximation of an approach to culture from the standpoint of interiorly differentiated consciousness.

The relations of interaction, collaboration, and conflict establish and modify cultural meanings and values.

Furthermore, all of these differentiations will have to enter into the constitution of a world-cultural consciousness.

Differentiations help us especially to understand **conflict** within cultures, and conflict between cultures. By helping us to understand such conflicts, this notion might help these conflicts to seem less hopeless to us.

Many conflicts occur at the common sense level; even then, they can be a function of the other differentiations because of the fact that the 'more sophisticated' differentiations affect common sense, by 'osmosis' as it were.

A lot of conflicts are between persons of variously differentiated consciousness. Lonergan speaks (in *MT*) of the way in which a person of less differentiated consciousness will regard with resentment a more differentiated consciousness, and will meet such a person with incomprehension. And on the other hand, the person who is more differentiated will be exasperated by a person of lesser differentiation.

This issue can become even more complex in that a whole culture can come to regard its differentiations as superior to those of other cultures. Particularly in our time, the Western cultures that have the technical know-how that results in and from the scientific differentiation think that this gives them a cultural superiority over other cultures, which may not have the scientific/technological differentiation,

but which may have artistic, ecological, transcendent, soteriological differentiations which *de facto* give them a cultural richness absent from contemporary Western culture.

> This is not to say that we should not go forward with scientific and technological advance; rather, it is a matter of **mutual enrichment**. Our culture needs to recognize what it can learn from other cultures.

To cosmological, anthropological, and soteriological forms of constitutive meaning, Doran (following Matthew Lamb) adds mechanomorphic constitutive meaning. Mechanomorphic society is a function of purely instrumentalized relations to nature, other persons, other groups, under the dominance of a will to power. The machine becomes the 'form' of society. The source of order in a mechanomorphic society becomes the human will to domination; the directing force is the human will for power, rather than participation in the order of the universe of collaboration with a trans-human partner.

Every culture has its own brand of common sense; artistic and ecological differentiations will emerge at the cosmological level; the transcendent differentiation emerges in the anthropological, and grounds the leap from cosmological to anthropological; the theoretic, the scientific, and interior differentiations are dependent on the transcendent; the soteriological can happen (in one form or another) to either cosmological or anthropological.

> Many of these differentiations are taken directly from Lonergan; Doran has added the ecological and soteriological.

The ecological differentiations is not just learning from the aboriginal peoples about their harmony with the rhythms of the cosmos. Rather, it involves a **critical retrieval** of the truth of the cosmological mentality; this would be a critical retrieval through our own scientific and theoretic developments, and would be mediated first of tall through our appropriation of the psyche which is the source of our participation in the rhythms and processes of the cosmos.

Doran wants to clearly distinguish the soteriological differentiation from the transcendent. The soteriological can have a dialectical relationship with the transcendent if, in fact, the transcendent is closed to the word of salvation – and it can be, as Paul found in Athens.

> Theology will make its contribution to an alternative way of living by mediating the soteriological with all of the other differentiations, and by mediating those differentiations with one another. If a theologian is interiorly differentiated, s/he will be able to move in the various differentiations, and will thus be able to mediate them with the soteriological.

A culture is also a function of **conversion** on all its levels, or its lack; accordingly, differentiation is not enough to understand culture. An adequate theory of culture has to include an account of conversion. A cultural matrix is a function, not only of variously differentiated subjectivities, but also of the conflicts between inclinations to conversion and counterpulls to unconverted living. There is a drama of conversion in the very constitution of a culture.

Doran posits at least five dimensions of conversion (corresponding to the five levels of consciousness):

→ Religious conversion affects the fifth level of consciousness; it is an about-face that acknowledges the world-transcendent reality as measure of integrity. In the soteriological form, it is the acceptance of the offer of grace; it is that movement in love which stands at the base of everything else.

→ **Moral** conversion is rooted in the fourth level of consciousness; it is the shift in criterion of one's decision from satisfaction to value. This is a matter of development; we are always developing as moral beings. In Walter Conn's terms, moral conversion remains always more challenge than achievement.

→ **Intellectual** conversion is primarily a shift at the third level of consciousness, i.e., in one's criterion of 'the real.' Is the real already-out-there-now to be known by 'taking a good look,' or is it that which is known in reasonable judgment following upon intelligent grasp.

In two unfinished papers in the archives of the Lonergan Research Institute, Lonergan speaks of two forms of intellectual conversion: spontaneous and retrieved.

- **Spontaneous** intellectual conversion is just giving free rein to questioning.
- **Retrieved** intellectual conversion is a philosophic appropriation of the process of questioning; it is a matter of reflectively making one's own the process that spontaneously goes on in the spontaneous intellectual conversion.

→ Philip McShane speaks of a **theoretic** conversion at the second level of consciousness; this is an orientation to explanation. It is a matter of wanting to know the immanent intelligibility of things.

→ **Psychic** conversion concerns the first level; it is a matter of letting consciousness be open to the data that will emerge from neural processes (images, affects, dreams), recognizing this to be important data for the search for direction in the movement of life.

Spontaneous psychic conversion is the genuineness of the person who has not been spoiled by the corruption and cynicism of a decadent and declining society.

Retrieved psychic conversion is the self-appropriation of the psyche, perhaps by one who knows that s/he has not escaped from the affects of life in a declining society. Psychic self-appropriation gives rise to a narrative about oneself that is simultaneously dramatic and explanatory. It is explanatory in that it is able to relate to one another such things as images and dreams.

A good example of such an explanatory narrative is Gerhard Adler's *The Living Symbol*. This is the narrative of one year of a woman's dreams, spontaneous fantasies, drawings, etc.; it is all narrative, but Adler points out how images relate to each other and how they are transformed. It is explanatory in that it catches the relations that obtain among the images themselves.

The theologian must strive for religiously, soteriologically, morally, intellectually, theoretically, and psychically converted consciousness that is differentiated in the realms of practical common sense, theory, modern science, scholarship, art, interiority, transcendence, and ecological participation in nature.

That is an ideal! It is the kind of development that is required if we are going to have the kind of creative minority that will be able to catalyze the cultural alternative that is needed today.

This is what cosmopolis would be today. It would be a mentality that strives for this kind of converted differentiation.

This is a hope, an ideal, a challenge.

Note that Lonergan never uses the expression "experience of God." For him, the presence of God is always mediated; thus, he speaks of a mediated immediacy.

In Grace and Freedom he speaks of "universal instrumentality." Grace can be mediated to us through anything in the universe.

19 March 1987

In reading part four (*AD*) it is essential not to lose sight of the centrality of the act of insight in Lonergan's laying of foundations.

It is possible to lose this, and turn to the levels of consciousness (experience/understanding/judgment/decision) either as descriptive (which makes them then as valid as any other description of human experience) or they can be used conceptualistically. To use them in conceptualist fashion indicates that one has not actually gone through the self-appropriation that grounds interiorly differentiated consciousness.

The key to move beyond description and to avoid conceptualism is to grasp that it is insight – the act of understanding – that enables the whole structure of consciousness to tumble together. In both his early and later work, Lonergan is calling us to the act of understanding which enables the whole structure to fall into place.

I, p. ix: "Its [the act of understanding] function in cognitional activity is so central that to grasp it is its conditions, its working, and its results, is to confer a basic yet startling unity on the whole field of human inquiry and human opinion."

In theological education, e.g., a process of ministerial reflection is too often spoken of in this way:

Experience ⟶ reflection ⟶ conceptualization action

Readings for March 19:

- *AD, chapters 15 and 16*

In such a model, the act of understanding is missed. To jump from experience to conceptualization is abstraction; it is not dealing with situations, it is not dealing with persons.

Human beings understand! Their understanding may be imperfect, sometimes it is erroneous, but it is central. And no matter what 'type' of person one is (e.g., in Jung's typology or in Sufi typology), one still understands. Those typologies are helpful in understanding human differences, different approaches, the different kinds of data which different persons process most easily. Nevertheless, persons of all types understand.

It is not just the 'thinking' type of person who understands. Upon entering a room, e.g., an 'intuitive' person will size up the mood of the room; s/he is processing an intangible kind of data, and is understanding it. A 'sensate' person will notice, e.g., the shape of the furniture! S/he is processing sense data and is understanding it. In all types, understanding occurs.

What is important is the **unity** that the act of understanding gives to the whole structure.

In part four (*AD*) Doran is speaking particularly of the foundations of contemporary theological responsibility in direct discourse, a responsibility to implement the higher viewpoint of cosmopolis – as this has been understood, imperfectly and in an inviting sort of way – earlier in the book. He is trying to get systematic theology started according to the method that Lonergan proposes. Others will come along and do it better, but the present effort is to get it off the ground.

The **foundations** for implementing this cosmopolitan responsibility – the higher viewpoint of a world-cultural mentality – are proximately at the level of personal value.

On personal value, cf. *MT*, p. 32: "Personal value is the person in his self-transcendence, as loving and being loved, as originator of values in himself and in his milieu, as an inspiration and invitation to others to do likewise."

Doran wants to extend this to note that the character of personal value that can ground the mediation of religion and culture in our time will involve the step to the type of self-transcendence that is also self-appropriation.

But this cannot be the radical foundation. If it is, the whole project is doomed because personal value as it develops from-below-upwards is not adequate to meet the underlying problems which it must meet in the movement from-above-downwards.

There is a conditioning set of relations from-above-downwards:



> Personal integrity is required to promote authentic cultural values, and that authentic promotion of values that is culture is required for a just social order, and that is required for the equitable distribution of vital goods.

But if, at the foundational level of personal value, there is only the movement of development that we all go through from-below-upwards, that movement from-below-upwards in human consciousness is affected by bias and the incompleteness of intellectual, volitional, and affective development. Thus, unless there is also a movement from-above in human consciousness itself at the level of personal value, that bias and incompleteness can never be overcome. There is need for a development from-above that meets one at the level where one feels, and in one's feelings apprehends the possibility of real value, and allows oneself to be changed by that apprehension. Unless there is that kind of development which from the apprehension of value in feelings moves downwards in consciousness and changes one's knowing and judgments, one's way of approaching understanding, and changes one's spontaneous psychic sensitivity, the whole project from above among the scale of values is doomed from the outset.

In other words, this is an argument for the need of grace. It is another argument for our impotence for sustained development on the basis of our own resources.

Lonergan argues to our need for the gift of grace operating from above in consciousness (mediated through the support and love of community) largely from the incompleteness of our intellectual (knowing) and volitional (willing) development. This is the argument proposed in chapter eighteen of *I*. Doran wants to extend this to include an argument from the incompleteness of human psychic development. Our moral impotence, i.e., our incapacity for sustained development on the basis of our own resources, is also a psychic matter; there can be a psychic source of an inability to grow, unless there is some gift that will release that ability. What is needed is a gift, something that one cannot achieve on one's own resources.

Thus, Doran's focus in addressing foundations and personal values is on psychic sources of possible bias and psychic sources of incomplete development. This is why it must be emphasized that the centrality of the act of insight must be maintained. He is moving away from explicit focus on insight by moving into the realm of psyche, but his own expression of this psychic emphasis could only be articulated through foundations grounded in the act of insight. Thus, Doran's psychic analysis is rooted in intentionality analysis that takes the act of understanding centrally.

Recall Lonergan's complaint that over 700 years, only seven commentators on Aquinas noted the centrality of the act of understanding (*intelligere*) in Aquinas' own work. It would be sadly ironic if students of Lonergan lost sight of the centrality of insight in his work!

Chapter six of *I* establishes that the human subject is a **dialectical** process – a creative tension of limitation and transcendence. The poles of that dialectic are spoken of as (a) neural demands and (b) the orientation of the dramatic pattern of experience. It is the dramatic pattern in which we live our lives and out of which we move into other (e.g., intellectual) patterns.

In “Dramatic Artistry and the Third Stage of Meaning” (*Lonergan Workshop* 2) Doran argues that what *I* calls the dramatic pattern is what Lonergan’s later work disengages as a fourth level of (‘existential’) consciousness; in oral comments made at Boston College, Lonergan indicated his agreement with the argument of that paper.

Neural demands: At the level of our neural physiology, there are processes over and above purely neural functioning – processes that reach a unity at a higher level, i.e., at the level of sensitive consciousness.

Recall from *I* Lonergan’s understanding of world process; there are different levels of activity, with ‘acts’ at a lower level becoming potency for an immediately higher level.



There are subatomic events which are purely coincidental (i.e., non-systematic) at the level of purely physical laws, but which are regular and their ‘regularity’ can be explained only by chemistry. At the level of chemistry there are coincidental events which can be explained only by the science of biology; they are ‘chemical’ events but chemistry cannot explain them simply at that level. A higher viewpoint is needed which takes living organisms as its central category, and in terms of that these events can be understood. At the level of some living organisms there are certain (conscious) events that are not explained by biology but which are systematized by psychology, which is the science that understands psychic events. (Recall McShane’s remark that they gave Konrad Lorenz a Nobel Prize for discovering that zoology is about animals!) Psychic events are the neural events that neurology (which is a biological science) cannot account for; it can account for the strictly neural element in such events but not for the consciousness. Psychology understands the consciousness. Finally, at the level of consciousness itself there are acts (insight, judgment, decision) that are not accounted for by a sensitive psychology – but only by a psychology that achieves a higher viewpoint which takes understanding, judgment, and decision as the focus of its interest.

Events that are purely coincidental on one level, become systematic at a higher level.

Neural events are events at the biological level that cannot be explained by biology; i.e., there are some neural events which can only be understood by recognizing that those neural events give rise to consciousness: **neural demands for conscious integration and psychic representation**.

This is one pole of the dialectic of the subject.

The other pole is the **orientation of the dramatic pattern**. These two poles are opposites in the sense of contraries. They can tend to be in conflict with one another, and they can split apart from one another. It is also possible, however, for an integration to be achieved.

In a 'splitting apart' of these two poles, the orientation of the dramatic pattern goes off in a direction that violates neural demands.

Neural demands place **limits on the flexibility** of the underlying material that we have to work with as we construct and create our own lives; we do not have unlimited possibilities. The person for whom, in Kierkegaard's term, there is "too much possibility" is a person who is violating those limits – i.e., the limits of the flexibility of the underlying, bodily reality that we have to work with as we shape the work of art that we are able to make out of our own lives. There is also the possibility of imbalance in the direction simply of the neural demands; some types of depressive personalities are often in that direction.

> In the integrated person they are brought to function together, in harmony with each other.
>
> Jung speaks of dreams as being either compensatory or complementary to the attitude of waking consciousness. Dreams come from neural demands, they are expressions of neural demands entering into consciousness at the primal, symbolic level. They are **compensatory** to the attitude of waking consciousness when caking consciousness is off-balance in the direction of 'ambition' that is violating the limits to the flexibility of the underlying materials; the underlying materials in dreams will compensate. E.g., one of June's patients was an aging mountain climber, who had the recurring dream that the next time he went mountain climbing he wasn't going to make it. Jung said 'If I were you, I'd stop; you're too old for this.' The man didn't stop and he died in a climbing accident. There is something about the neural demands that is compensating and trying to establish a balance. The dream can also be **complementary** when the balance is already functioning; then the dream is simply reflecting the creative tension that is already operative.
>
> In Jung's significant theoretical paper, "On the Nature of the Psyche" [1946, *CW*8], he speaks of the tension between instinct/matter and spirit and makes it basic tension in the human person in terms of which most other tensions can be understood.
>
> > At this point in his writings, he does not regard this as analogous to a tension of evil and good; he does seem to fall into this in later works (e.g., "Answer to Job.")
> >
> > Doran insists on this. Evil is not to be placed on one side of other of the dialectic, not is good. What is good is the integration, and what is evil is the split.

Ontologically, there are different **schemes of recurrence** in the body and the spirit. The human organism, out of which the neural demands arise, is a matter of more fixed, less flexible schemes of recurrence than is true of the spirit which is capable of 'flying off' in all sorts of directions and has a freedom of imagination, insight, project, and constructing possibilities for itself. In Aquinas' terms, the

spirit is *potens omni fieri*, it is capable – in intention – of becoming everything; it is an 'unrestricted' desire to know; its home is the whole universe.

> The problem is the tension of those schemes of recurrence, and getting them to cooperate in a creative tension – not interfering with or violating each other. In Paul Ricoeur's understanding (*Fallible Man*), the possibility of sin is the disproportion between these tow. Concupiscence is the tendency to split apart, in one direction or the other. The state of "integrity" (in the myth of paradise) would be an habitual abiding in the creative tension of the opposites. Habitual grace is the condition of the possibility of abiding in that integral tension.

Negatively, the source of the splitting is the various kinds of bias: general, group, individual and dramatic. In Doran's understanding, **dramatic** bias is the bias of the 'victimized psyche;' it is a bias for which the psyche is not responsible. It is the overwhelming affect that simply captures the capacity of orientation, no matter what one wants in one's will. The first key to a possible healing is precisely to recognize it as a victimization, that it is not responsible for itself; in theological terms, it is the effect of the 'sin of the world.' Dramatic bias includes narcissism, which seems to be more and more common in our culture. Treating narcissism is very difficult, because it is not simply a matter of changing what a person wants, but what a person is capable of wanting. Some (e.g., Nathan Schwartz-Salant, in *Narcissism and Character Disorders*) theorizes that male narcissism is rooted in the loss of the anima at a very early age. Doran tells of one patient who is brought back to a scene on a beach, during the fourth year of his life; in this scene, his sister has been murdered by a group of very sinister men who are hiding in the bushes. This is the destruction of the anima at a n early age. In other words, narcissism is a matter of dramatic bias – and is thus distinct from individual bias. **Group** bias includes the kinds of things that are responsible for 'class warfare;' Lonergan brings it in largely to establish dialogue with Marx, acknowledging divisions in society that result from group selfishness. Doran wants to establish a psychic root for this, as well as the 'spiritual' root which Lonergan establishes. Freud ("Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego") shows that we have a tendency toward group bias in our psyches; Becker shows that it is very hard to break away from the pressures of the group. We have a need to identify with the group. What Lonergan is speaking of when he speaks of group bias is when that becomes inauthentic – In other words, when it is pitted against the common good. The psychic root of this is our spontaneous intersubjectivity, which in itself is a very good thing, but which can become inauthentic. **Individual** bias is a choice of one's own advantage; distinct from narcissism, it is a quite conscious choice for which one is responsible. **General** bias is a bias of the human spirit against the further questions which pertain to the long-range point of view and ultimate issues.

As you move down-wards, the **psychic** component is be-coming stronger.	▲ General Individual Group Dramatic ▼	As you move up-wards, **spirit** plays a considerably greater role.

> As the psychic component grows, there is greater victimization involved; accordingly, considerably more help is needed in overcoming the bias.

Doran's concern is with psychic self-appropriation, a conversion of the psyche to a state in which it can participate fully in the human adventure. He is speaking of **aesthetic liberation**. There is no attempt here to give full foundations, or a full notion of personal value. He is trying to emphasize one dimension, *viz*., the psychic.

> In dramatic bias, the needed liberation is from too restricting a neural manifold. Aesthetic liberation would be a matter of allowing experience to occur for its own sake, allowing feelings to emerge.
>
> In individual bias, experience is instrumentalized to our own advantage. In general bias, experience isn't free enough to enable us to raise long-range questions, and questions about ultimate issues. In fact, you can set up entire curricula that are based on general bias.

What Doran speaks of generally has to do with dramatic bias as a source of our inability to sustain development on the basis of our own resources. Aesthetic liberation is a certain releasement – what Heidegger terms *Gelassenheit*: let what is going to come into consciousness come in.

> Allowing experience for its own sake is clearly not a matter of merely distracting entertainment. Rather, it is a matter of letting experience emerge as non-instrumentally as possible precisely so that it can be sublated by the summons of the question. Thinking begins with this releasement that lets phenomena appear, and does not screen them out for instrumental purposes. When it is free, experience is open to insight and judgment.
>
> Thus, Kierkegaard's use of the term "aesthetic" is quite different from Doran's. For Kierkegaard, the "aesthete" is a Don Juan who pursues trivial pleasures. For Doran, the "aesthetic" refers to the task of making a work of art out of our lives.

Bias is an impairment of the subject, and is thus located at the level of personal value. The question is to what extent is it an effect of pneumopathology (impairment of spirit) or psychopathology (impairment of sensitive psyche). These terms are Voegelin's. "Pneumopathology" characterizes the human person who can, but will not, raise questions.

The higher synthesis of the dialectic of the subject – i.e., what enables integration of neural demands and the orientation of the dramatic pattern – is an "**antecedent willingness**;" this is Lonergan's term in *I* prior to the introduction of theological considerations (chapter eighteen). This refers to a willingness that is not a product of one's own immanent development, but that in a certain sense precedes that development and enables it to proceed in a healthy way. It is not something achieved on the basis of one's own resources. Some kind of antecedent willingness is required to keep the person open to the development that can go forward if the two poles of the dialectic of the subject are operating in creative tension with each other; it is a lack of that willingness that is the cause of the breakdown.

> Reference is to a willingness that is above both neural demands and the dramatic pattern, and that is open to further development wherever it may originate – whether in spirit or psyche, or in the

society that addresses spirit and psyche. It is willing to take the plunges that are necessary for further development.



After theological considerations have been introduced, Lonergan speaks of this (chapter twenty) as **charity**, as gift/grace. For him, charity is the most radical of the theological virtues; out of it there develops a hope as the yearning for love of what cannot be seen, and a faith as the eye of love.

Thus, antecedent willingness is the general category through which Lonergan understands what theological language calls charity. Charity is the higher synthesis of the dialectic of the subject; it is the condition of the possibility of the maintenance of creative tension in that dialectic. It gives freedom.

Chapters fifteen and sixteen of *AD* study some psychic dynamics setting up the need for this kind of gift and what happens when the gift is given. But it must be remembered that this is a consideration only of psychic effects; it does not attempt a comprehensive position. The gift of grace involves many other things besides *gratia sanans*; but healing of the psyche is part of what is entailed in the gift of God's love.

In three different sections of *I*, Lonergan is inching toward the argument that comes out into the open by the end of chapter eighteen: we need a higher synthesis in the form of gift, if we are going to grow and if there is going to be any solution to the problem of evil.

Chapter 15: discussion of genuineness
Chapter 15: discussion of the unity of the person

Chapter 17: discussion of the appropriation of truth

In every instance, Lonergan argues in terms of a vicious circle; on the basis of our own resources we get caught in a vicious circle. 'How is one to be persuaded to be open when is not yet open to persuasion?' (chapter 18). This is the experience that only the occurrence of something rather dramatic can open me to begin to listen to something that I need to hear.

Doran's attempt is to understand the psyche's role in that vicious circle: how it contributes to it, and how a release of psychic energy helps one get beyond it.

There is need for this willingness to penetrate to the psyche. Because we are constituted the way we are – as incarnate spirits – the gift of universal willingness (charity) in its perfection is open to whatever is necessary; it is open to living in accord with the order of the universe, open to living in accord with an order that God understands. Karl Rahner characterizes it in this way: "… let ourselves fall into the incomprehensibility of God as into our true fulfillment and happiness."

["Thomas Aquinas on the Incomprehensibility of God," Journal of Religion 58 (Supplement, 1978), p. S123].

It is very important this willingness touch not only the spirit, but that it also reach to the psyche. Otherwise, it will not be universal; it will be always in conflict.

I, p. 723: [The penetration of w2illingness is manifest in] "images so charged with affects that they succeed both in guiding and propelling action."

That is the kind of psychic effect that Doran wants to try to understand. These are symbols that he calls **anagogic**. Symbols that open one to the mystery of God and the mystery of the universal order.

I, p. 723: "Man's sensitivity needs symbols that unlock its transforming dynamism and bring it into harmony with the vast but impalpable pressures of the pure desire, of hope, and of self-sacrificing charity."

This can happen in dreams, in which a dream symbol not only symbolizes but is the unlocking of that dynamism. A dream symbol can be 'sacramental,' giving what it symbolizes. A dream about healing not only symbolizes healing, it can effect it.

Doran tells the story of a friend whose very difficult early background – schizophrenic mother, etc. – had resulted in very deep hurts; he was unable to work his way beyond these hurts and was generally even unable to talk about it. But at one point there was a movement in his life, and everyone could see that something very good was going on; it was evident that some kind of release and freedom was happening. This movement culminated in a dream that was very simple but which had a very deep affective element. He is standing in front of a mirror and shaving over a scar; in the dream it is clear that it is the first time he has been able to shave over the scar without opening it. The scar has 68 stitches; it obviously stems from a very serious wound. And in the dram, the scar remains; but it is not reopened. There is, in other words, a deep would in the 'persona,' the face that one sets to the outside world in one's social contacts; that wound is healed. The scar will remain, but it will not open any longer.

That dream did not just symbolize, but in a sense gave the healing. And he knew it. Subsequent to the dram, his psychic energy was noticeably rechanneled. He obviously still had to pick up on this and integrate the psychic energy into his life; but the energy was not available to him in a way that it previously had not been.

I, pp. 723-724: [The divinely originated solution to our problem of evil is, in part,] "a mystery that is at once symbol of the uncomprehended and sign of what is grasped and psychic force that sweeps living human bodies, linked in charity, to the joyful, courageous, whole-hearted, yet intelligently controlled performance of the tasks set by a world order in which the problem of evil is not suppressed but transcended."

> This refers to psychic participation in the gift of grace. There are even physiological effects of grace, which in their intensity are manifest in the mystics, but which at less intense levels are manifest in all graced persons.

In Lonergan's later works, all of this is moved into a context that is better able to sustain it. The emergence of the fourth, 'existential' level of consciousness sustains this dramatic material much better.

Chapter fourteen (*AD*) raises the problem of psychic self-appropriation precisely **as a problem**. What is its relevance to what we have been talking about up to this point in the book? What is its relevance, especially its social-cultural relevance?

> He attempts to meet the objection that is occasionally raised that psychology is simply an escape from social problems.
>
> Doran argues that is psychic conversion brings one to an appropriation of feelings through symbols, and if feelings are the part of one's being which one apprehends values, then psychic conversion helps one know oneself as a moral being, and therefore as a being responsible for society and culture and other people. The attempt is to give a **self-transcendent** thrust to psychology.
>
> If psychology is just in the interest of self-fulfillment, then much of the critique of it is accurate. There are some who argue that psychology is either a matter of self-fulfillment or of self-destruction! Doran recalls Irenaeus' dictum that 'the self fully alive is the glory of God,' posits the possibility of psychology promoting authentic self-transcendence.
>
> This involves psychology aiding one to know oneself as a moral being, a religious being, and a social being. The moral dimension regards feelings as response to value. The religious dimension regards anagogic symbols which orient one to mystery. The social dimension lies in the fact that it can help one understand and criticize one's situation, and to work for the transformation of that situation. Insofar as one is a foundational subject, the better integrated and more authentic a person is, the more accurate that person's understanding of the situation will be and the more long-lasting will be the contributions that the person can make toward transforming the situation.
>
> Accordingly, to talk about conversion is not socially irrelevant. **Conversion is a progressive and cumulative process of integrating the dialectic of the subject**. If this whole model of concupiscence, sin, and grace is accurate, then the process of conversion is a progressive and cumulative process of integrating the dialectic of the subject. If that is the case, then there has to be a psychic dimension to it; thus, we should turn to the people who have studied that psychic dimension (viz., psychologists) to learn from them and, where necessary, reintroduce our qualifications and reorientations.

Theology that is grounded in conversion finds considerable resistance in the present situation of the academy! The secular academy is not ready for this kind of enterprise; further, many theological schools simply will not let you 'talk this way.'

> In *The Lonergan Enterprise*, Fred Crowe notes that theology as Lonergan envisages it is a collaborative enterprise that should be done wherever it can be done. If it cannot be done in the academy, it should be done in retreat houses or wherever. Much of this simply cannot yet be done in the mainstream of the academy.
>
> The first stage of the Enlightenment was cognitive; the academy is rooted in this. The second stage is existential, and the academy is generally not ready for this.
>
> In terms of Lonergan's stages of meaning, the contemporary academy is a second stage institution – i.e., focused in the stage of theory in which conceptualization is prized, refined, etc. The third stage of meaning takes its ground in interiority; the academy basically is not there yet.

Stephen Toulmin raises the question about what will give a discipline control, so that its efforts are not 'going all over the place.' Doran's point is that for theology, it is conversion and self-appropriation that give the kind of control that Toulmin is speaking of. Yet the academy will not allow those foundations, and will not allow talk about those foundations.

> Perhaps something analogous to the medieval promotion of genuine culture in a monastic setting is needed. Part of the problem in our situation is that the institutions which are supposed to be promoting culture are cutting out the very foundations of authentic culture. That is part of our situation; it is part of what we are dealing with when we encounter people from other sciences.

That part of our academic situation is very much in line with the situation that Lonergan was struggling with in his own work. But there are certain things about our current academic situation that have changed. For thirty years, the major issue facing Lonergan was getting beyond neo-Thomist, which he recognized as obviously out of touch with modernity: modern science, scholarship, and philosophy. Yet the church kept saying that this had to be the philosophy and theology taught in seminaries and other schools; as people obeyed that they just made the church more and more out of touch with modernity. Lonergan struggled with the whole problem of continuity with Aquinas that was able to understand, appreciate, and learn from modern science, scholarship, and philosophy.

Neo-Thomism is not our problem. Nor is our problem accepting the turn to the subject and historical consciousness into theology – which are other things that Lonergan wrestled with. Those are not our problems; unless the [unnamed!] rigid conservatives win out, those battles have been won. Our task is neither to reorient Thomism nor to meet the modern differentiation, but to address a context that is not modern, but post-modern and that calls itself 'post-modern.' New in the contemporary context is the resurgent influence of nihilists, such as the deconstructionists with their new interpretation of Nietzsche. Part of the task of addressing this post-modern context will be on the basis of presenting an image, a psychic reality, a sensible form of human dignity; part of what is needed is the ability to do that through appropriation of the psyche. We need to present a sensible form of human dignity in an age in which human dignity is denied, spurned, rejected – an age in which, as Hannah Arendt put it, "nothing means anything at all, and anything can mean anything."

Doran concludes chapter fourteen (*AD*) with a consideration of how this 'ties in' with the transcendental analysis of Lonergan; it ties in precisely as a **transcendental intending of the beautiful**. Psychic self-appropriation, as transcendental, is the appropriation of our intention of beauty. The psyche intends the beauty that is the splendor of truth and goodness. Thus, at this point we are moving into another dimension of transcendental foundations.

> Lonergan has spoken of the transcendental intention of the intelligible, the true, and the good. Doran understands psychic participation in that in terms of intending the beautiful as the sensitive splendor of the true and the good.

David Tracy [*The Analogical Imagination* (New York: Seabury, 1981)] speaks of theologians who emphasize **manifestation** (pp. 376-386) and theologians who emphasize **proclamation** (pp. 386-389). This is one way in which he will talk about contemporary pluralism in theology.

> Doran is trying to argue that while it may be the word proclaimed that is the root of intellectual conversion, insofar as the word addresses the whole human being with a message that can be appropriated, understood, affirmed and valued, there is nevertheless a kind of prior claim that comes through manifestation of a vision of reality that is communicated affectively. Such a vision can be communicated before any proclamation can be heard; for example, it can be communicated to the affectivity of an infant. It is a matter of a goodness, a beauty, a sense of the trustworthiness of existence. That kind of manifestation makes it possible to hear a proclamation; without manifestation of some kind proclamation cannot be heard, cannot be appropriated. The question is this: to what extent does the word of a loving God depend upon a manifestation through vision of the good of that God as *diffusivum sui* in the beauty of love and the beauty of human goodness. Perhaps epiphany/manifestation establishes the context of proclamation.
>
> > It is true that there are theologians who emphasize manifestation and theologians who emphasize proclamation, but perhaps some unity is achieved by positing the priority of manifestation. Might it be the case that there is a manifestation which renders proclamation hearable?
>
> The value of the work of Hans Urs von Balthasar is his emphasis on beauty; the aesthetic component of foundations is the value of what he is saying. He insists that any theology which departs from consideration of beauty is missing at its core something that is integral to the communication of Christian faith. Doran judges him to be accurate in this insistence, but also judges that he needs a transcendental grounding. He is afraid, however, of the turn to the subject, and his fear leaves him open to arbitrariness – which makes it possible for his work to be taken over by ideology. Ideologically consumed people in the church are making him their hero, and somehow he is letting that happen.
>
> > The image-as-image cannot become the criterion of truth; the image is the splendor of truth, not the criterion of truth. This might be where the difficulty lies, if not in von Balthasar at least in the people who make use of him. During his Toronto visit, e.g., Cardinal Ratzinger was challenged on some of the policies being employed at the present time; he kept coming back

to the image of the unity of the church in his response. The problem is that is just an image, it is not a criterion of judgment. If you do not have a transcendental analysis, you get this out of focus.

Aside from Hans Küng, the people that Rome has been giving difficulty to are Thomists. And Thomists are people who emphasize understanding. There is a campaign against that at the present time. [On Ratzinger's opposition to Thomism, e.g., cf. Joseph Komonchak, "Issues Behind the Curran Case," *Commonweal* (30 January 1987), pp. 43-47.]

Ratzinger's appeal is to the image, and that is an illegitimate appeal. Doran acknowledges that the image is central, but image as the splendor of understanding and truth and goodness. The criterion of truth does not exist in the power of an image; it exists in evidence for judgment.

<u>26 March 1987</u>

Present concern is with the **place of the psyche in the dialectic of the subject**. Thus, chapters fifteen and sixteen (*AD*) fill out material based on the basic terms and relations presented in chapters one and two. The underlying question is this: 'What is the place of the sensitive psyche in the constitution of the human subject?' Accordingly, concern is with sensitive psyche as support-for and condition-of authentic operation as human subject; the wounded psyche, then, is an additional source of human impotence with respect to authenticity. Such a wounded psyche can become a support for authenticity only if a certain healing occurs.



<u>Readings for March 26</u>:

- *AD, chapter 17*

The present discussion will consider some elements in a heuristic structure of such psychic healing. One of the advantages of this approach is the fact that I can understand what it is to be psychologically well by using the categories derived from Lonergan's intentionality analysis: our spontaneous desire for the adventure of self-constitution through understanding, judgment, authentic decision-making and love. This forms Doran's grid for understanding a good deal of what it means to be well at the level of the sensitive psyche.

In order for the human being spontaneously to exercise responsible world- and self-constitution through the operations of insight, and judgment and decision, and the operations of a person-in-love, there is a

certain **abiding at the level of the presence of the subject to her-/himself** that is required. There is needed an **ability** to abide at the level of one's presence to oneself; that ability is **psychic**. It is an ability to **receive**, and in order for the operations to proceed spontaneously there is a certain receiving that is necessary. That ability to abide and receive is an ability of the healthy psyche. There is a receptive element involved in all intentional operations; it is a mistake to conceive them as simply active.

> Thomas Aquinas understood this receptive dimension. Thus, he spoke of the possible as well as the agent intellect. The possible intellect receives the species of the object. It is the agent intellect that is in act, but the species of the object understood is received in the possible intellect. There is a moment of receptivity in the operations of sensation; thus, the object seen or heart is the efficient cause of sensation, and my sense capacity receives. In understanding there is a receptivity involved. In judgment there is an ability to wait and let the evidence be marshalled; it is not an inactive waiting. It is under the guidance of the *intellectus agens*, but it is not dominated by it. It is not just active; there is a **dialectic of receptivity and action**. And the psychic dimension has a great deal to do with whether one is able or not to perform those operations with a certain kind of ease and spontaneity. Can one abide at the level of the subject's presence to her-/himself?

Doran understands narcissism in terms of the depth of the wound to the psyche that has occurred, usually quite early in life. Precisely what that personality cannot do is abide at the level of self-presence. The narcissistic personality cannot abide at the level of the presence of her-/himself to her-/himself. There is a chronic restlessness, and projection, and biological extroversion in the narcissistic personality – the inability to stay with oneself.

> The ability to abide in self-presence is necessary for commitment. The narcissistic personality is scared-to-death-of and incapable-of commitment. S/He cannot per her-/himself on the line. This is not an unwillingness; it is an inability.
>
> A tremendous amount of compassion is needed in dealing with the narcissist precisely because of the depth of the woundedness. Needed is the compassionate understanding that they cannot do it; they cannot stand themselves, they cannot abide with themselves. There are not present to themselves sufficiently to be able to exercise self-transcendent operations in a consistent fashion. They can do so occasionally, but such occasions are coincidental; there are occasions of kindness, etc., but they are coincidental. They are not habitual; they do not come from a habit. And the habit is not there because the psyche is deeply, deeply wounded.
>
> Schwartz-Salant says that negotiating the narcissistic personality is the most difficult thing that he has had to do as a psychiatrist. If you are not very careful, they will 'suck you in' to a counter-transference; then you are 'caught' in their own drama. This happens if you do not maintain the objectivity and distance that is needed; and if you get 'caught,' it's over and you can't do anything for them at all. Thus, you have to show compassion without becoming a function of their own psyches. That is what narcissism entails: they make everything a function of their own psyches. There is a fine line between the narcissistic personality and the sociopath; they can slip over very easily into sociopathological and psychopathological destructive behavior – precisely because

> everything is a function of their really deep needs. Because those needs have not been met, they make it impossible for the subject to abide at the level of presence to self that is necessary for the exercise of self-transcendent operations.

These, then, are the concerns: (a) the role of the psyche as a sustaining force for human authenticity; (b) the role of the psyche in human moral impotence, affecting our inability to be authentic; and (c) the need for a healing that is not only a healing of spirit (of which Lonergan speaks in terms of intellectual and volitional development), but that also touches and reaches all the way to the sensitive psyche.

There are two considerations which govern these suggestions:

1. **Psychology does need an explicit set of foundations**; Doran is not attempting to offer the total set, but simply to offer some suggestions as to what he thinks belongs in that set of foundations. That explicit set of foundations must recognize that the unity of the human person is radically a function of her/his capacities to understand, judge, decide, and love; those are the capacities that constitute the **psychological unity** of the human person. Those kinds of activities – especially those of authentic decision and loving commitment – effect and catalyze the unity of the human person. Commitment establishes a unity in oneself when I have made a difficult but authentic decision there is a new unity of my-self.

2. Psychology needs to extend its horizons beyond a purely therapeutic context. There is something that even the relatively healthy person who doesn't need psychotherapy can profit from in psychology. It has something to offer particularly to what Doran terms the world-cultural community. **The finality of psychology** is not simply therapeutic; its finality **extends to the development of the healthy person**.

Concerning psychology's possible contribution toward a world-cultural humanity, Doran refers to a footnote in his article, "Aesthetics and the Opposites" [*Thought* 52 (1977), p. 125]: "See Max Zeller, 'The Task of the Analyst,' *Psychological Perspectives* (Vol. 6, No. 1, spring, 1975), esp. p. 75, where Zeller relates a dream that was visited upon him at the very end of a three-month period in Zurich during which he was seeking to answer the question of how he was to understand what he was doing as an analyst. The dream is a s follows: 'A temple of vast dimensions was in the process of being built. As far as I could see – ahead, behind, right and left – there were incredible numbers of people building on gigantic pillars. I, too, was building on a pillar. The whole building process was in its very beginnings, but the foundation was already there, the rest of the building was starting to go up, and I and many others were working on it.' Jung called the temple the new religion, said it was being built by people from all over the world, and indicated that dreams of his own and others indicated that it would take 600 years until it is built. I owe to a student of mine, Bozidar Molitor, the precious insight that the dream, so interpreted, reverses the myth of the Tower of Babel."

> Zeller's dream was an answer to the question as to the purpose of his being a psychotherapist. He was to make a contribution to the building of a cross-cultural humanity. He was able to go home with a new meaning to what he was doing; beyond therapy, he could understand himself as discovering and catalyzing in others dimensions of themselves which enable them to form

community with people of different cultures. Psychology has something to offer to the new world-cultural humanity that is emerging.

We can speak of ourselves as being at the beginning of an 'axial' period, I which the control of meaning is shifting. He identified the period from 800-200 B.C.E. as comprising an axial shift from myth to realism and capacities of spirit – in different ways in different cultures. Lonergan argues that the shift to interiority and turn to the subject is a new control of meaning; in that sense, we are at the beginning of an axial period. What is emerging in our time is a new control of meaning; beyond theory – not short of it – there is a shift to interiority.

The two vectors of consciousness form a significant element in the heuristic structure Doran is attempting to assemble. The major source in Lonergan's *ouvre* for speaking of this is "Healing and Creating in History," *A Third Collection* (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), pp. 100-109. This is his fullest post-*MT* exploration of the vector from-above-downwards in consciousness.

The **creative** vector in consciousness ('creating' in history') is the experience of human consciousness moving from the data of sense and of consciousness to understanding, from understanding to further questions leading to critical understanding (judgment), a movement through further questions to decision and then the capacity for the human being to fall in love and to act in love.



At each level of this creative vector there is a greater involvement of the subject. You are more 'on the line' in making a judgment that you are simply in understanding; understanding is of the possible, of what might be, but sometimes you have to make an affirmation of what is. An even greater degree of responsibility is involved in decision, where you are putting – one only your cognitive self – but your entire being on the live. You are called to a greater degree of self-transcendence with each of these levels of consciousness.

The psyche – sensitive self-presence – changes with the operations at each of these levels. There is a **sensed clarity** that emerges with understanding, a **sensed assurance** that comes with the grasp that the evidence is sufficient for a certain judgment; there is a **sensed peace** of a good conscience, and a **sensed joy** that accompanies being-in-love.

This vector is called "creative" because, to the extent that the person is spontaneously and easily operating this way, that person is, in fact, effecting a continuous series of changes in self and in world. Such changes are 'positive' changes if, in fact, they are proceeding from the authentic

operation at these levels. Thus, a first indication of what makes human beings well is this ability to function in a consistent fashion with the creative vector of consciousness; such a 'well' person is not constantly torn by inner conflicts that prevent her/him from performing authentically.

There is an **affective** kind of **freedom** necessary, a capacity to abide at the level of the presence of the subject to self, for the integral functioning of these creative operations. The narcissistic personality, e.g., cannot – in a consistent way – operate in this fashion; there are affective wounds that prevent the kind of abiding that is necessary for such authentic functioning.

All of us have some such blockages in the psyche. Phillip Rieff once said to Ernest Becker: "Would you please introduce me to a 'whole person'." None of us are completely free of affective hang-ups and blockages – to a greater or lesser extent. Thus, there is another source of obstruction for sustained development – besides the ones that Lonergan emphasizes in chapter eighteen of *I*, *viz*., the intellectual and volitional.

The appropriation of these (creative) operations would be a first step in moving toward a new foundation for culture.

A necessary second step is psychic self-appropriation. We need to understand what 'makes us tick' psychologically; this, in itself, is not narcissistic.

In his day, St. Augustine was able to say, "Thank God we're not responsible for our dreams" – which makes you wonder what kind of dreams he had! But might it be the case that, in some sense, now that we know a bit more about that dimension of ourselves that we could become responsible for our drams and what they reveal, and act on that kind of self-knowledge.

Jung's notion of **complexes** is helpful in understanding the obstructions to this kind of spontaneous operation. In his word-association tests – very early in his psychiatric career – Jung arrived at the hypo9thesis that psychic sensitive consciousness is distributed into various units of psychic energy, each with a central nucleus around which are constellated a number of associated factors. And these will be different in different people. In the word-association tests, he found that certain words will constellate a complex; one can work from the difficulties that people have in associating with certain words to what the nucleus of that difficulty is, and the to what the unit of the various contributing factors around that nucleus might be. Eventually he discovered that dreams are far better indications than word-associations of what the nucleus is and what the complex involves.

This emerged from Jung's dissatisfaction with the various forms of psychotherapy that he discovered when he began his career. He tried to find something that would get at a sympathetic understanding, rather than simply arriving at a diagnosis and then shunting people off to this-or-that part of the hospital depending on how they were classified. He sought a sympathetic understanding of what was keeping people from performing responsibly. What is blocking that? What are people's inflexibilities, compulsions, anxieties, resistances, etc?

At first, the notion of complexes was purely negative for Jung. But he eventually came to postulate that the entire psyche is distributed into these units – and some of them are extremely positive. There can be a nucleus of certain energies/images/sensations/memories/feelings that supports and sustains an exhilarating and continually growing and developing human life. Thus, there are positive as well as merely negative complexes. Cf. especially "A Review of the Complex Theory" (1928), *CW* 8, where he argues that the entire psyche is constituted this way and that some of these complexes are extremely positive; he also argues that many of the positive complexes are the result of the transformation of the energies involved in the negative complexes. In that transformation, energy is released and becomes – no longer an obstruction – but a sustaining factor in one's life. If handled well, it is possible that the energies bound up in obstructing complexes can be slowly dissolved and freed to enter into new constellations in a person's life.

> There is a great deal of hope, a great deal of respect for the human being, and an attempt to move away from determinism in Jung.

To the extent that one's psyche is composed of units that are positive and sustaining of one's life and authentic operating, one has **affective freedom**. Affective freedom **is** that psychic sustainment of authentic operation.

This can be related to the whole discussion of discernment in spirituality. Affective freedom is either the goal or condition of discernment, depending on a person's concrete situation.

> In some instances – when we are torn by different, conflicting forces – the choice is to be for what will bring one to that felt unity of person; in that sense, affective freedom is the goal or objective of the discernment. Choose that which, in fact, brings you to this state of creative tension.
>
> If you are in that state, then affective freedom is the condition of discernment; it makes it possible for you to weigh the pros and cons of the various alternatives.

Psychology and spirituality need to be integrated; they are not two separate worlds.

A psyche that is in the process of becoming healed is a psyche that is more capable of spontaneity in the performance of authentic human operation; that is what Doran takes as a criterion of psychic healing.

David Tracy speaks of three alternatives in speaking of authenticity:

- Self-fulfillment;
- Self-abnegation;
- Self-transcendence.

> Cf. "The Catholic Model of *Caritas*: Self-transcendence and Transformation," in Andrew Greeley (ed.), The Family in Crisis or Transition [*Concilium* (1980)], pp. 100-110.
>
> What Doran proposes for psychology is neither a self-fulfillment nor a self-abnegation model, but a self-transcendence model. These are not operations in which one is wrapped up in oneself, but

they are also not operations in which one is destroying oneself. There are operations through which one moves beyond oneself in the constitution of the world of human relationships as works of art.

Differentiating the **sources of psychic disturbance** is extremely complex; Doran is simply attempting to give some dimensions of a heuristic framework for understanding these sources. The specific sources will vary from one person to another. The attempt here is to understand some kind of heuristic grid, which is constituted by the dialectics of subject, culture and community.

Directly, psychic disturbance affects the dialectic of the subject; and insofar as it is psychic 'disturbance' it affects this dialectic in a negative way.

But it is also related to the other dialectics:

1. To a greater or lesser extent, it can be **grounded-in** distortion in the dialectics of community and culture.

2. It can be **contributory-to** further distortion in those dialectics.

In any event, whatever the source is of psychic disturbance in any given case, whether I myself am responsible or a distorted community (e.g., family) or distorted culture – or, as is usually the case, a combination of these – **the psyche itself is a victim**; the psyche is not responsible for its own disorder under any circumstance. I may be responsible, but not insofar as I am psyche. Insofar as I am free, I may be responsible for victimizing my own psyche; but, *qua* psyche, I am not responsible.

By "psyche" is meant such things as my sensitive stream of sensations, memories, images, emotions, conations, associations, bodily movements, and spontaneous intersubjective responses. That dimension of myself is not responsible for its own wounded ness, for disorder. Psychic wounds are victimizations of the distorted dialectics that con constitute a distorted history. Such wounds are formed as the result of my inevitable participation in the dialectics constitutive of history. I am born into those dialectics, at a certain time and place, and I have no choice over that; the wounds that may be inflicted on the human psyche are the result of one's own thrownness into a situation with respect to which one had no choice.

> Whatever the dominant source of the violence is – and it could be myself-*qua*-spirit, or a function of community or culture – psychic spontaneity is not morally responsible for its own disorder.
>
> This needs to be taken into account in the tone adopted by moral teaching in the Catholic church at the present time; that teaching evidences a lack of compassion for people's conditions – disordered or not. A judgmental, condemnatory attitude toward the psyche is off base.
>
> > The subject-qua-spirit may be responsible; but, as Karl Rahner has said as clearly as anyone, let's leave that judgment to God. It is difficult enough to judge such responsibility with regard to oneself, let alone to make that judgment with regard to other persons.
>
> The psyche – the complex – is the victim; it is not responsible. The various compositions and distributions of our sensitive consciousness begin to be set for us without our personal choice –

from the womb. The dialectics of community and culture can have a very dominant influence, even a relative dominance, over the development of the subject.

I, p. 218: "The dialectic of community holds the dominant position, fir it gives rise to the situations that stimulate neural demands and it moulds the orientation of intelligence that preconsciously exercises the censorship."

It is the dialectic of community, i.e., that provides the stimuli for images and the questions for inquiry and the data that might be used to reach understanding; in that sense there is a certain dominance of the community over the development of the subject.

Thus, you can speak of a "generational bondage," similar psychic patterns running in a given family from one generation to another until there is a release and a healing that can end it. Until such time, there are set complexes passed from one generation to the next.

There are multiple dialectics in the subject. The radical dialectic is unpacked in chapter six of I. But there is also a tension within consciousness between (b1) psyche and (b2) spirit. Further, there is a dialectic within psyche between (b1i) a regressive tendency ever-backwards away from consciousness, and (b1ii) a progressive tendency toward cooperation with spirit.



Freud remarked that there is residual narcissism in everyone; this is the resistance to participation in the operations of spirit. The primary focus of Doran's present work is with the conflicts that arise at this point, within the psyche; conflict between obstructing the sublation of psyche into the authentic performance of consciousness, on the one hand, and cooperation with that sublation, on the other.

Recall that Doran has posited a progressive psychic dominance in the biases that Lonergan speaks of:



There is an increasing psychic element as you move from general to individual to group to dramatic bias; the predominance becomes more and more psychic in the constitution of the bias against self-transcendent behaviour. He also hypothesizes that, to the extent that the bias is psychic in its roots and constitution, the source of the bias is what Doran terms "**other**-causation." Dramatic bias, e.g., is largely a bias **in the psyche**; it is here that we are talking about 'autonomous complexes' that function outside the realm of one's freedom. In dramatic bias, the dimension of other-causation is great; i.e., causation from significant others in one's life and from distortions in one's community and culture is greater the more that the psychic component is at the heart of bias.

It is extremely important to get as clear as you possibly can an understanding of where this is coming from. What is its source? It will be treated differently in different cases. If it is predominantly psychic in its constitution, then it has to be treated as victim; and that is essential to any kind of healing. If the self (*qua* spirit) is responsible and is still capable of doing something about it, that opens up a different avenue of approach. Thus, one's approach has to be different depending on the responsibility and capability of the self.

> Doran recalls a psychiatrist who, when he has judged that a client is capable of responsible behaviour, gets such a client engaged in some kind of responsible and productive work as a condition for any further therapy; get them occupied in something be3yond themselves, with a sense of responsibility for something. This would be a start for getting them out of the twists and turns that they are caught in. But this is based on the judgment that he was dealing with responsible people capable of taking responsibility.

To bring this into a theological/religious context, Doran notes two common ways in which people usually treat their own psychic disturbances:

1. Further **repression** of the difficulties; try to repress energies that one does not want. You are dialing here largely with what Jung called "the shadow."

2. Acting out, giving up, moral renunciation of responsibility.

These seem to be the two most common ways, and both of them are further victimizations of the psyche. Repression is just pushing the thing further into the ground, pushing the darkness further into the darkness. And acting out is frequently based on the illusion that one can achieve an integration 'beyond good and evil.' But such acting out just further increases habits that are already there – habits that are destructive and self-destructive. There is no condition beyond good an evil in which darkness in this sense can be integrated.

A third possible way of negotiation begins with recognition of the victimization, recognition that what you are dealing with (in self or others) is participation in the compassion of redemptive love:

1. Recognize the **complex as victim**; recognize, i.e., that there is something here that has not formed of its own will.

2. Adopt, therefore, an attitude of **compassionate negotiation** – listening to it, negotiating it in the same way that you would treat a person you knew to be a victim of injustice.

3. And let there emerge from that compassion a **willingness to do what is necessary to cooperate with the various healing forces**.

But this (1-3) is precisely what you cannot do if your affectivity is such that it is incapable of these kinds of intelligent and reasonable and responsible operations. This is what is meant by discussing **psychic dimensions of moral impotence**. The power of the complex first of all prevents one from even recognizing it as a complex, i.e., as not the whole of one's self. When it is operating, its power is so overwhelming that you cannot disengage it as just a dimension of your 'self;' you cannot attain any objectivity in its regard. It is totally dominant over your consciousness. It is impossible, because of the power of the complex, to gain the kind of perspective on it that would recognize it as one dimension and not the whole, and as a wounded dimension toward which a certain attitude has to be taken.

> The solution is clear but one cannot avail oneself of it, because one has to have a certain affective freedom to be able to operate intelligently, reasonably, responsibly, and lovingly – and that is precisely what one does not have. You can't pull yourself up by your own affective bootstraps. We are unable in our personal constitution – unless the freedom is given to us – to move beyond it.
>
> There is need for some kind of agency that meets us from beyond the creative vector of our own consciousness, because it is that creative vector that is crippled by the power of the negative affective complexes. L We can't be compassionate in a responsible way if, in fact, the affective freedom to enter into that kind of treatment of ourselves is not ours. Without some kind of agency that meets us from beyond the creative vector, we are doomed to adopt a destructive attitude. Unless this freedom is given to us from the depths of being, we are caught – in the same way that Lonergan speaks of our being caught in the incompleteness of our own intellectual and volitional development (chapter eighteen of *I*).
>
> > We cannot emerge from a vicious circle of disordered affective development unless there is some agency that meets us. The freedom to deal with our own darkness in a responsible and compassionate manner has to be given to us; it is because that freedom is necessary for intelligent, reasonable and responsible behaviour and because we don't have the freedom that it has to be given to us from outside, by an agency that is independent of this immanent source of our own development. Ne need a healing that originates beyond the distortions of the dialectical processes of history – no matter how that healing is mediated to us, it itself must come to us from a power that is beyond the destructive forces of the dialectical processes of history.
>
> Since no one escapes such victimization and disorder, each of us needs the agency of some power that will meet us as we are and that is capable of mediating to us the ability to abide with ourselves as we are, and to free us into a posture of cooperation with the forces of growth and development.

The needed agency is **unconditional love**, in the atmosphere of which one can abide with oneself in a way that frees one to begin to take responsibility for what one cannot do if one is relying only on one's resources; it is being loved and accepted as one is that enables this.

> The ability to take compassion on one's own darkness has to be given by a power that enables one to be with oneself in her/his darkness. This is what is being spoken of here: being given the ability to take compassion on the dark, distorted, and twisted elements of myself.
>
> Perhaps most commonly this given ability is mediated to us in relationship to other persons; accordingly, what we do to contribute to the constitution of others is extremely important. In a relationship of acceptance, we give another permission – perhaps for the first time – to abide with her-himself.

This unconditionally loving acceptance can affect not only our effective, but even our essential freedom (cf. *I*, pp. 619-622); it can stimulate the very desire to be free. There are people so wounded that they have lost this desire.

Where this agency meets one is at the level of consciousness where one apprehends possible values; what this love does is to open up the possibility of apprehension of the value of self, of self-compassion, and of self-development, and even of the desire to be free. It meets one at the level of intentional feelings apprehending potential values. The love gives one the ability to feel in such a way that one can apprehend my self, self-compassion, self-development, and effective freedom as a personal value.

> It is a love that meets us at a fourth, existential level of consciousness and frees us for the deliberation and decision that follow on the apprehension of value. This is a very slow and gradual process; it is not a 'one shot affair' by any means. The movie *David and Lisa* is a good story of love touching a wounded person and effecting healing, which takes place step by step.
>
> This allows us to abide in being loved, and from that operations that previously were not possible can proceed. It is progressive, precarious, and gradual.

It is obviously a love that is **mediated through human beings**, but it is not initiated by other human beings alone. It is human love that is cooperating-with and participating-in the love of God. No human being, on her/his own resources, can be the source of another person's redemption; it one tries to fulfill that kind of role one is becoming another source of victimization. Or if one expects another person to be the source of one's redemption, s/he is expecting and asking too much, because each one of us is also affected by the win of the world. It is only to the extent that a human being has been freed to participate in a love that is cosmic in its orientation, to participate ultimately in cosmic order, in the universal instrumentality through which God achieves Her/His purposes in the world, that love will be a mediation of healing to another person. It has to be the kind of live that is willing and able to receive the disappointments and the hurts that will come when you are dealing with darkness; it has to be the love of a person that is her-/himself also on the road towards ever greater healing, and the love of a person who is sufficiently healed that s/he can submit to being hurt by the darkness of another – without fear that s/he is going to lose her-/himself in the process. That kind of live is capable of mediating healing in

the human community. And this is a matter of cooperating with divine grace, which is what enables a person to be a healing factor in community.

The depths of potential distortion in the subject, community, and culture are very profound; there is a great truth that we Catholics have to learn from the Protestant emphasis on the force of what sin has done in the world, and what it continues to do. Perhaps ultimately Catholic and Protestant differences over this are largely linguistic.

Scripture is quite clear with respect to the power of the force of sin in the world. In scholastic language, this was called *peccatum originale originate* – originated original sin, the sin of the world.

To the extent that what needs to be touched, needs to be affected in this psychic rigidity beyond one's control, the dynamics of healing and conversion proceed generally along the lines that have been suggested here. But there are different dynamics to the extent that a person is already free and capable of taking some responsibility for her-/himself. That is still relational and in the context of community. But to the extent that we are free we may be met in a somewhat different way – brought up short by the workings of grace through universal instrumentality, rather than touched simply by the dimension of compassionate love.

The first rule of discernment in the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius of Loyola is that it depends on me how God deals with me; it depends on what condition I am in. To the extent that I am free and moving in a derailed fashion, I may be dealt with rather harshly – and that might be the initiation of the conversion. But a harsh treatment will not be the initiation of development to the extent that what is already at the source of the difficulty is something that has been victimized by history.

> So, the heuristic is one that has to be worked out for different orientations, depending on what kind of process is being dealt with and what the needs are.
>
> Thus, there is such a thing as 'holy fear.' People who say that God never works in a way that causes fear are speaking nonsense! It depends on the person, and what is needed. A 'holy fear' can lead one to recognize how dependent s/he is on God, because s/he can't do it her-himself. This can be a tremendous grace.

These healing dynamics operate in consciousness from-above-downwards. Love meets me at the level where I am capable of apprehending a new value; it is at the level where my consciousness is a notion of value, an anticipation of value. Then the slow transformation of the subject is the transformation of the spontaneous scale of one's values. But the value in particular that is touched is **oneself as personal value** – that is what you apprehend and begin to respond to in a new way.

But there is an affective freedom that is necessary for intellectual integrity (third and second levels); that abiding-capacity is very important for insights to occur and for judgments to proceed. Insights occur and judgments proceed in a subject who is capable of abiding at the level of presence to self.

Finally, there is a dissolving that works down and progressively dissolves the sensitive psychic obstructions (first level). But it begins by affecting the psyche as the psyche is sublated into the notion of value; it does not begin as pure sense experience.

> Doran recalls his dream that occurred when he was first trying to work out his basic position on the relationship between depth psychology and Lonergan's intentionality analysis. In the dream he was walking downstairs into the basement, i.e., entering the depths of the psyche to explore images there. He meets Lonergan on the stairwell, who says, 'If you really want to see some images, come with me.' He leads Doran to the topmost floor where they watch a movie together.
>
> The existential level is the important level of consciousness for understanding the psyche – the psyche sublated into a capacity to apprehend values. It isn't down in the basement where your just 'trundle around in the darkness' or 'tiptoe through the archetypes'!

The two vectors are **complementary**. The one from below needs the one from above if it is to operate; the one from above needs the one from below if it is to have any effect in the world. The complementarity is what is meant by **integral interiority**.

<u>2 April 1987</u>

The foundational intent of what Doran writes in chapter sixteen (AD) is this: to extend the process of self-appropriation to the level of sensitive/empirical consciousness, as that level of consciousness permeates, is sublated by, and is affected/changed by the levels of inquiry through which the human spirit moves to understanding, judgment, and decision.



> The intent as foundational is to extend the process of self-appropriation in the sense which Lonergan means is – *viz*., to appropriate oneself in the structure of one's operations and states as a subject – to extent that process beyond what Lonergan has explicitly covered, to sensitive/empirical consciousness as that consciousness, permeates, is sublated by, and is changed by the operations of understanding, judgment and decision.
>
> Lonergan has subjected the operations of understanding, judgment, and decision – and all that is involved in them – to self-appropriation: the inquiry that leads to understanding, the further inquiry that leads to judgment, and the further inquiry that leads to decision. Doran wants to submit to that process of self-appropriation the level of experience (empirical consciousness), as that level permeates the other levels, is sublated by them, and is changed by them.

The primary element in self-appropriation as Lonergan means it is the 'recovery of spirit,' not in the mode of theory, but of interiority. Plato and Aristotle preeminently (in Western civilization) disengaged spirit from psyche, from sensitive consciousness; this is the primary differentiation of consciousness that

took place in what Jaspers refers to as the 'axial period.' They 'discovered' the human spirit. Plato's discovery was so dramatic that (at least for a time) he placed the objects of the human spirit in another world. Aristotle corrected that and insisted that the objects of the human spirit are in this world; intelligibility and goodness are in material things of this world, but it is the human spirit that recognizes that intelligibility and that goodness. It is a function of the spirit to be able to have insight into the intelligibility and the goodness of this world. That is what Lonergan is all about: recovering that spirit in the mode of interiority.

> Doran wants to keep that foundation, even for his own work in depth psychology. Chapter sixteen (AD) comes back over and over again to those foundations for what Doran wants to do. He does not want to 'collapse' the human person into a compound of the bodily organism and the sensitive psyche. To do that is to go back more than 2,000 years; it is to revert to a stage of human self-understanding that we have definitively transcended But one of the problems in modern times has been a collapse of the spirit back into just the psyche and the bodily organism. Eric Voegelin (*The New Science of Politics*) refers to this as the modern psychology of "passional motivation," as though the human person were nothing but a stimulus-response machine, with perhaps an organism in-between the stimuli and the response to them. Such 'behaviorism' is a reversion of a major civilizational advance; it is going back on something that is our heritage and that needs to be preserved. We are not just bodily organism and sensitive psyche; a dog is that, and a human being is not a dog.
>
> What differentiates us as human is precisely our ability to understand, to pass judgment reasonably, and to make free decisions. That (self-appropriation of spirit) has to be the foundation for recovering the psyche.

In *The Denial of Death*, Ernest Becker has a chapter (Five) on Kierkegaard. And while he makes good use of Kierkegaard in order to make his own point, he also makes a fundamental misinterpretation of Kierkegaard. Becker interprets Kierkegaard as saying that we are body and consciousness; and for Becker, consciousness is not differentiated into sensitive and the other levels. But precisely what Kierkegaard does **not** say is that we are just that. Rather, even in *The Concept of Dread*, which is the book on which Becker relies, what Kierkegaard says is that the relationship of the psychic to the bodily in the human being is not automatic, as it is in other animals. It is the function of the **spirit** to determine what the relationship of the psychic to the bodily will be in the human being; this is precisely the 'dread' that Kierkegaard is talking about. L Each human being has the responsibility to determine for her-/himself whether one will allow one's psyche to be just a bodily consciousness, or whether one will allow one's psyche to share as well in the dimensions and the drama of the human spirit. In *The Concept of Dread*, this is precisely the meaning of **human freedom**; it is up to us to determine what we will do.

> For Kierkegaard, there are three dimensions to the human person:



It is the function of the spirit in freedom to determine what the relationship of the psychic to the bodily is going to be. For Kierkegaard himself, that was the major existential problem of his life. He tended toward "aesthetic subjectivity," in the sense in which he speaks of that in *Either/Or*; that was his constant temptation and he was trying to be more than just the aesthetic. He obviously succeeded in that, but it was a fight for him.

> By "aesthetic," Kierkegaard means the Don Juan, one who simply 'drifts' with the movements of the psyche.

In speaking of spirit, Kierkegaard emphasizes freedom; Doran, following Lonergan, wants to emphasize understanding and judgment as well as freedom. It seems clear that Kierkegaard would not deny the inclusion of understanding and judgment in spirit; rather, it is just that his focus was clearly on freedom (decision).

In Crowe's interpretation, the differentiation of the fourth level of consciousness in the course of history occurred in Kierkegaard. The differentiation of the second level (understanding) occurred in Plato, and of the third (judgment) in Aquinas.

Doran's position is that psychology is the first of the sciences to be engaged on the basis of the type of foundations that Lonergan has provided. In chapter fourteen of *I*, Lonergan speaks of the **reorientation** where necessary and the **integration** of the various sciences; he sees his own position as providing some help toward integrating the various sciences. The first science to be addressed and engaged is psychology, because it treats the same **interiority** that Lonergan has treated, but another dimension of it – not the intelligent, reasonable, and responsible dimensions of interiority, but the psychic states of the human subject: sensing, feeling, emoting, imagining, remembering, and dreaming. Those are the states studied by a genuinely humanistic psychology, one that does not collapse the human person to the level of an animal or a robot.

> This engagement itself enters-into and contributes-to **foundations**, precisely because you are talking about interiority and that is where you find your foundations – in the self-appropriation of interiority. Thus, any work that is done with psychology would be foundational work, because it is a further clearing, a further objectification of that dimension of reality that is human interiority.

What Doran has attempted to do from the beginning of his work (1975, dissertation) is to add a strictly **psychological dimension to foundations** as Lonergan understands foundations. As a theologian, he is primarily interested in the foundations of theology, and especially of direct discourse in theology: where does the theologian go to find her/his foundations? Lonergan has pointed out that you cannot go to theory, because theory is the act of a subject, most theories are just hypothetical, and theories as theories conflict with one another. You cannot go to authority, because you either give or withhold assent to authority; it is precisely the foundation of giving assent that he is trying to get to. Further, authorities are just as much subject to exegesis as are historical texts; we submit the documents of contemporary authorities to exegesis, wanting to find out the conditions of their emergence and the

influences behind them. Such influences affect the kind of assent that we give to them. There is a foundation to our assent. You may assent to authority – and Lonergan himself clearly did, and speaks of what genuine authority is in "Dialectic of Authority" (*A Third Collection* [New York: Paulist Press, 1985], pp. 5-12) in attempting to preserve the category of authority – but this is not a foundation. The foundation of it is **in the subject** who assents; that is what he is trying to get at.

> Thus, Doran is interested in this primarily as it affects theology. But those same foundations will affect other human sciences: philosophy, psychology, the social sciences, hermeneutics, and so on. It is clear in *AD* that these foundations have had considerable influence on Doran's thinking about various human sciences (social, cultural, political, psychological).

To do human science **in the concrete** will necessarily involve a theological component; this is, of course, a controversial claim. But if human science is done without a theological component it is being done in the abstract. This is because human beings – as they concretely are – are human beings in a world that is affected by sin, human beings that are offered divine grace, human beings that accept or refuse that offer, human beings that are called to live a life of charity in community with one another – and that is the **concrete** human situation, and that is theological. To study human being in abstraction from that might make a contribution, but it remains an abstract study until it is integrated with the theological dimension.

> There are a lot of human scientists who would not want to admit that! There are, however, others who would go at least a certain way in assenting to it. Jung would be one of them; he had a tremendous respect for the religious dimension of human existence, and found that a number of the problems of his own patients were religious, who, if they could find satisfactory religious orientation, were healed. Becker, in *The Denial of Death*, is talking about the reorientation of psychology and would go along with this; he ends basically by saying that you have got to put this whole thing in the context of the relationship of the human being to God or else it does not make sense.
>
> So, it's not unheard of to make these kinds of statements, though it's also not exactly mainstream in these fields today either!
>
> But other essential dimensions of the human being are also neglected in a lot of these fields. There are psychologists who proceed as though human beings never had acts of understanding, and acts of judgment, and made decisions – even as if they never had consciousness. B.F. Skinner (at least in his early work) is a clear example of that. It makes no difference to a behaviourist scientific understanding of the human that the human being is conscious; it's like studying a robot or a machine.

The following five steps have occurred in this kind of foundational movement in theology:

1. The **self-affirmation of the knower** (chapters eleven, twelve, and thirteen of *I* – especially twelve). I am asked to affirm that I am a conscious unity/identity/whole capable of asking questions and answering them; these questions are differentiated into questions for insight and

questions for judgment. Start with the affirmation that I am a conscious unity who does raise questions for insight and questions for judgment, and sometimes I reach answers to those questions.

2. Subsequent to writing *I*, Lonergan disengaged a fourth, **existential** level of consciousness (decision), as quite distinct from the levels of understanding and judgment. This is really the ground even for one's performance at the first three levels. 'Will I be an authentic questioner or not?' is a matter of free decision. So the ground for how I perform in the other operations is in the fourth level. This is also the goal of those other operations; though knowledge is pursued in a disinterested fashion, it is for the sake of world- and self-constitution.

3. In sporadic references in later works, Lonergan speaks of a possible fifth level. These references are not in published papers, but in response to questions. See, e.g., Philosophy of God, and Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973) p. 38: "You can say it's on the fifth level. It's self-transcendence reaching its summit and that summit can be developed and enriched, and so on. But of itself it is permanent." This is reference to our experience of the **mystery of grace**; there are some indications that Lonergan was beginning to speak of this as a distinct level of consciousness. In *MT* this was clearly placed at the fourth level; but in some subsequent references, there is at least advertence to a possible, distinct, fifth level.

4. Then there are the two vectors in consciousness: (a) from-below-upwards, and (b) from-above-downwards.

5. Beyond these four foundational steps found in Lonergan's own work, Doran suggests adding psychic conversion, i.e., attention to the psyche, as a fifth dimension of the foundations. And, as is clear throughout *AD*, the notion of dialectic and the scale of values builds on psychic conversion; those are foundational categories. This depends on the first four steps, but it is foundational.

To say 'this is my position' on some theological issue is a theological doctrine; one can be confronted with the question, 'why?' That 'why?' is the **foundational question**, and it regards the basis for the position I have affirmed. Lonergan insists that the basis for saying what I way is who I am – and what has constituted me as **who I am** is what has happened to me religiously, what my fundamental moral option is, my own intellectual development and perhaps conversion, and, Doran adds, what has happened to me psychologically.



Doctrine…… My personal affirmation of 'x'.

> This is what Doran means by asserting that the psychic dimension is foundational. The positions that I take on an issue are rooted in my psychic constitution, as well as the religious, moral, and intellectual dimensions of who I am. What has happened to me psychologically, all that has entered into my affective development, etc., have an awful lot to do with what I am willing to put myself on the line for – and that is what doctrines are all about. 'My doctrines' are what I say is true, and that is rooted in who I am.

The intellectual dimension of foundations is clear. If, e.g., you compare Karl Barth and a Thomist on analogy, it becomes evident that basic intellectual options ground the positions that are taken on this specific question. Their positions on analogy are grounded in their different convictions as to what is possible for human knowing.

> The moral and religious dimensions are evident. Lonergan has emphasized the intellectual dimension, insisting that foundational intellectual options are just as important for positions in systematics as religion and morality are. Doran wants to say an analogous thing about what has happened in a person's own psychological development. A way has to be found to engage the psychological with precision, exactitude, care and concern; it is necessary to take the same kind of care that Lonergan took with the intellectual and rational and deliberative dimensions of consciousness. We can have the same kind of precise understanding of ourselves in the psychic dimension as Lonergan offers in the dimensions that he has studied.

The fundamental 'place' for understanding the psyche within this kind of context is to understand its relationship to the fourth, **existential** level of consciousness. This is where we can grasp what is distinctively human about the human psyche, because at that level there is the psyche functioning in the apprehension of possible value; possible values are apprehended by feelings. And that is the sensitive psyche. It is the sensitive psyche of an intelligent person, and there is insight involved; but the predominant function for the apprehension of value is **feeling**. This is in harmony with Jung who understood the feeling-function to be a value-function; feeling is a rational function. Feeling is a matter of an intelligent and rational person apprehending value. Thus, the psyche functions in existential consciousness in a value. Thus, the psyche functions in existential consciousness in a very important sense. That is the reason for beginning the discussion by considering the relationship of the psyche to the fourth level.

Further, if we say that (a) feelings apprehend values, and (b) feelings have a reciprocal relationship with symbols – so that a symbol is an image of an object (real or imaginary) that awakens a feeling, and so that feeling express-themselves-in and evoke symbols – then 'feelings' can be grasped as a common term that enables us to relate symbols and values.



Lonergan does not explicitly draw this connection, but the two basic relationships – (1) feeling/value, and (feeling/symbol – are present in his work. The subsequent relation between symbol and value, mediated through feeling, is implicit in this.

Thus, there is some relationship between symbol and value; or, if less moralistic language is preferred, there is a relationship between symbol and one's orientation in life. Given this, it may very well be that a lot of our dreams (especially 'dreams of the morning' that anticipate our waking lives – Binswanger) have something to say about our existential orientation and possibilities as dramatic subjects in the world. This is the position that the existential psychiatrists have followed: the dream is not the twilight of life, but its dawn. It is a vital anticipation of the subject's engagement in her/his world. That is the approach to take in the interpretation of many of our spontaneous symbols. Dreams are a 'place' where our symbols are released in a spontaneous fashion, not under the control of the conscious, waking ego 'keeping the lid on,' or contriving the symbols. Rather, they are released fry the psyche in a spontaneous kind of way.

Further, dreams would not be the only manifestation of this. Ira **Progoff,** e.g., has done a lot of work helping people get ahold of this dimension, especially people who do not easily get ahold of their dreams. He engages people in other kinds of activities that he calls "twilight imaging" (see The Symbolic and the Real). In a sense, this is a 'waking dream.' But you've got to let you conscious control be no stronger that it would be if you were asleep, and this is hard to do. Progoff also has ways of dialoguing with your body, with your job, etc.

Jung has his "active imagination," which he frequently used to follow up on a dream. Start a dialogue with a figure from a dream, but let it proceed without your controlling where it goes – the same way that would be the case if you were dreaming it. Wee what this figure has to say; hear it out.

It is basically a matter of releasing that repressive censorship over what could enter into sensitive consciousness if we would let it in.

This is not, or course, done with the narcissism that you can get into with all this stuff – like people saying 'I'm going to go take a nap so I can have another dream!' Rather, because the whole thrust of it is existential orientation to self-transcendence, that changes the whole picture; you are trying to understand these things in the context of becoming a more authentic person.

This is what stimulated the original connection in Doran's understanding. Freudian and Jungian psychology had intense interest in dreams, and thus were dealing with symbols. And those symbols are obviously fraught with feeling; they are affect laden images. But feelings are also our locus of apprehension of values and orientation. This raises the question as to the possible existential meaning of a lot of the symbols. This was the key to the whole possible connection between depth psychology and Lonergan's intentionality analysis.

If this is the case, then psychological self-analysis and self-appropriation would have something to do with the appropriation of one's moral being, at least one's spontaneous scale of values. If you are able to appropriate yourself in the affective dimension, you can attain insight into your existential orientation, and it is through symbols that many people find help in this.

> John Dunne says that feelings are hard to know, but if you can attach an image to a feeling then you can begin to understand that feeling.

It is through images and symbols that we can begin to make an appropriation of our feelings. And if our feelings are value functions, then moral self-appropriation is helped by this whole process. To put depth psychology into that kind of context removes the criticism that is leveled against much depth psychology today, *viz*., that it is narcissistic self-fulfillment and is politically irresponsible. If, in fact, all these dimensions of the subject are matters of authenticity in one's self- and world-constitution, then that kind of criticism is not true of all de3pth psychology. There is at least the possibility that this whole process can be oriented in a very different direction from the self-fulfillment model, narcissistic model, or even a 'wholeness' model. 'Wholeness' is always temporary; there are temporary integrations. But then new challenges arise and there is a new organization of the personality that has to take place as you face new challenges. Thus, a Christian believes that complete wholeness will take place in the eschatological kingdom where God for whom we are made will be available to us as that God is in Her/His own self. That will be the fulfillment, but until that point our hearts and minds will be restless. Each level of integration will be broken down for a further level of integration as we meet new challenges.

Paul Ricoeur (*Freud and Philosophy* [Yale University Press, 1970]) speaks of a **second naiveté**; he asks 'where is all this critical examination of the subject headed?' What is the finality of the turn to the subject that has run through Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Freud, *et al*.? His answer is that it is heading toward a second naiveté, a **post-critical self-possession** where once again we can let down all demands and listen and speak as simple human beings – but not with the first immediacy of the pre-critical mind; for many twentieth-century people that simply will not do. We have to go through the critical turn; our mind's won't let us stay short of it. We have to raise these questions with all the risks that they entail. But he postulates that the finality of it all could very well be this second, post-critical naiveté, where we can once again – and here he is talking as a Christian, and even as a Barthian – hear the word and believe it and assent to it. L But it is difficult, if not impossible, for many modern people to do that because they have to go through the critical turn which is part of the development of human consciousness that we are engaged in in our time.

> In some ways this corresponds to James Fowler's stages of faith development; see, e.g., *Stages of Faith: The Psychology of Human Development and the Quest for Meaning* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981).

Ricoeur indicates that a lot of his work is oriented toward working through the critical questions in order to get to a second naiveté. He pulls his whole understanding of what Freud was all about into the pursuit of the second naiveté and the second immediacy. It's part of that criticism of consciousness and of the naive subject that we have to go through. The second naiveté will be very different from the first;

it is chastened, purified of many illusions. But perhaps once again at the end of it we will be able to hear the word and respond and believe as simple believers – simple but informed.

In Lonergan's terms, we can speak of this second naiveté as a **mediated return to immediacy**; this is what Doran means by a **second immediacy**. Thus, there is the immediacy of the infant whose whole world is just immediate – before one has learned to speak. Then there is the whole world mediated by meaning that one enters into with language; Helen Keller is the most dramatic example of this with the whole new world that opened up for her when she realized that these taps on her finger had meaning. In that world mediated by meaning there is still an immediacy: the subject is immediate to her-/himself, and immediate to the images/concepts/words that mediate the world. Thus, concepts mediate the world to me, but I am immediate to those concepts; there is an immediacy of myself to these meaningful media. To appropriate that immediacy that continues in adult life is to mediate immediacy in self-appropriation. That is what self-appropriation does; it mediates immediacy by meaning. There is a mediated return to immediacy.

> Thus, Doran speaks of a second immediacy in the same sense that Ricoeur speaks of a second naiveté. There is a critically recovered immediacy that remains an always asymptotic goal of the process of self-appropriation.
>
> This is different from Hegel, who envisioned a mediation of totality. Lonergan speaks, not of a mediation of totality, but of a mediation of the self; but the self is to be mediated as totally as possible.
>
> The mediation of the totality of meaning will be given only in the vision of God; thus, there is no Hegelian ambition in Lonergan. But I can push toward an ever more total mediation of my self.

Thus, Eliot: We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.

"Little Gidding," lines 239-242

A second immediacy is never complete, and will never be complete short of when we know even as we are known in the vision of God. L But an analogy would be the music critic, who, precisely because of the knowledge that s/he has of music, hears the symphony anew every time. Or the literary critic who reads Shakespeare, and it is a new experience each time; it is precisely because of the knowledge that s/he brings to that.

> Satori (in Zen) would be a similar experience, though not mediated through criticism.

This is a mediated immediacy. The same thing can be true – analogously and up to a certain point – in our development simply as human subjects engaging in the world; and also a subjects hearing the word of God. For many modern people, and certainly for anyone who has had a certain amount of education,

there is that critical journey that has to be gone through. This is a function of living in a post-Enlightenment world, where you take seriously the challenges of that world and don't go back on it.

> It is a matter of being educated to the level of one's time. Being educated to the level of one's time does not mean that you have to be in a mess! But it does mean that you have to go through the mess, rather than walling yourself off against it.

One can also speak of this in Freud's language, yet this does a certain violence to Freud's language. He distinguished between primary and secondary process. But Freud leaves too much out of primary process, which is for him the pulsing flow of life. In the pulsing flow of life people occasionally get insights, and that was not accounted for in Freud's primary process. So Doran wants to put more into primary process, including all the acts of the human subject. And then talk of a secondary process as being an objectification of the structure o the primary process. But it should be clearly recognized that this is to use the terms very differently than Freud did.

> Cf. "Primary Process and the Spiritual Unconscious," *Lonergan Workshop* 5, pp. 23-47.

To grasp the manner in which foundational religious experience occurs in empirical consciousness sublated at another level, see "Religious Experience, *A Third Collection* (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), pp. 115-128. In this paper, Lonergan makes differentiations on the word "experience;" it is not just pure and simple empirical experience, but experience as it has been sublated at the higher levels. Thus, it is the experience of one in love, and that is at least fourth level type of experience.

> Almost all of our experience is sublated, i.e., patterned. Raw experience – such as expecting one more step that isn't there at the bottom of a flight of stairs – is quite rare. Most of the experience is organized by other levels of consciousness.

Dreams are the area that has been most important for Doran in moving toward the notion of psychic conversion. This is not to say that dreams are the only road to transformation of the censorship from the repressive to the constructive mode; there are many other ways to this transformation.

But what happens in the dream is that there are items, elements, figures – i.e., elemental meanings – released into consciousness precisely because the censorship is at least relatively relaxed. So the dram can at times be a very helpful avenue to self-interpretation, self-knowledge, and self-constitution, as it is sublated through the levels of consciousness. It comes into the empirical level of consciousness by being remembered, into understanding through interpretation, into judgment through critical interpretation, and into decision as one acts on knowledge that one gains from the interpretation of the dream.



Many dreams are **symbolic**, precisely in terms of the way we have spoken of symbol as related to value/orientation through feeling. Jung is extremely helpful on this whole notion of the symbolic

character of the dream. Jung distinguishes (a) **personal** dream symbols from the 'personal' unconscious, and (b) **archetypal** dream symbols that come from the 'collective unconscious' (i.e., that dimension of the psyche that is universally human and that expresses itself in symbols that are reflective of the drama of life that we all have to go through). Archetypal symbols emerge very frequently in the moments of 'passage' in human life. The dreams of children tend to be archetypal. The passage into and through puberty is an archetypal period. So too is mid-life, the movement from 'the first half of life to the second,' and the approach to death. In such moments of passage, people's dreams will tend to take on an archetypal significance because these are moments that are kind of ground themes in human existence and in the human adventure.

Doran (following Frye's *Anatomy of Criticism*, and Joseph Flanagan) adds **anagogic** symbols. This yields a three-fold distinction:

- Personal symbols
- Transpersonal symbols
    - Archetypal
    - Anagogic

A **personal** symbol in a dream is taken from my own life, and refers to highly individual circumstances in my life that are not the circumstances of another person's life. Doran recalls studying philosophy at St. Louis University form a Professor Collins, who was a notoriously difficult grader; in this particular course, you needed to get at least a 'B' in order to continue in the graduate program. One student had a recurrent nightmare of Collins chasing him all over the place. Collins was wheel-chair bound, and so in one dream the student ran down stairs to the basement to escape; when he got to the basement, Collins was already there and kept chasing him. This reflected his personal anxiety as to whether he was going to make it through the semester; 'this guy is after me.' That is a personal dream symbol. It is taken from his own life, and has no archetypal significance. It is dramatic, but is not reflective of a universal mythic theme – in the sense that symbols such as parents, child, wise old man/woman, water, trees, life-giving river, etc. Those have universal mythic meaning to them.

The **archetypal** symbol is often, but not necessarily, derived from personal experience. Jung writes many examples of people who have had archetypal dreams where the figures do not come out of anything in their past experience at all. Archetypal dreams are constellations of psychic energy that reflect the person's participation in the basic ground theme of humanity: what it is to be a human being. They are cross-culturally intelligible; they give you a sense that you are participating in an adventure that is not just your own, but everyone's. Characteristic of archetypal as opposed to anagogic symbols is that they are taken from nature and they imitate nature in their symbolic meaning. When a maternal symbol, e.g., is not just personal but archetypal, it does not mean my mother or my mother-complex. Rather, it has a much broader meaning than that; it has something to do with nature, perhaps with the feminine dimension of my psyche in its nourishing or destructive character. What my relationship with my mother was very well might influence the form that this symbol takes, but it doesn't mean 'mother' in the physical sense, when it is

archetypal. It rather means something to do with a maternal quality in nature or a maternal aspect of the psyche itself. It is taken from nature and imitates nature. It imitates a mother, but it doesn't mean mother and it is not a mother-complex. The archetypal symbol is transpersonal; it's not just me and my history, but is a universal theme.

The **anagogic** symbol is taken from nature or history, but it points to the dimension that we could call supernatural or eschatological: the total transformation of everything under the mystery of grace in overcoming sin, i.e., the redemptive quality of the religious dimension of human existence. So there is a quality that permeates the anagogic symbol that puts you in relationship, not to nature, but to what is beyond the cosmos, to the transcendent God, and to the mystery of grace in human existence.

> Such symbols may well be taken from nature or history, but it has a meaning that is not nature and is not an imitation of nature, but points to the total transformation of nature and history – and the involvement of nature and history in the mysterium *iniquitatis et gratiae*.
>
> For example, note the Isaian vision (11.6-9) of the lion lying down with the lamb. This is taken from nature, but rather than imitating nature it transforms it. The point of it is that 'there will be no hurt on my holy mountain;' this is what he is leading up to. This is what will happen with the full realization of the Kingdom. It has that kind of significance.
>
> Doran understands most Scriptural symbols as being anagogic – eschatological promises.
>
> Frequently, anagogic symbols will be transformations of the archetypal or the cosmological. At the very end, e.g., of the book of Revelation, you have a soteriological/anagogic transformation of the cosmological symbol of the river with trees, etc.; this not belongs to the heavenly Jerusalem, it is the new kingdom in which there are no tears. The image is taken from nature, but there is a total transformation; it points to a 'place' where there is no death.

The symbol is pre-linguistic in origin; the images expressed in a text emerge from psychic elemental meaning.

The ground hermeneutic is the hermeneutic of the self. In dependently of an interpreter, the only thing that is in a text is black marks on white paper; independently of the mind of the interpreter, the text is nothing. The radical source of the interpretation is the one doing the interpretation; the quality of one's interpretation is a function of the quality of the self-knowledge of the interpreter.

> It is not true that the passage through the text is the long way, and the passage through the self is the shortcut; the passage through the self is not a shortcut at all! It is a very long and arduous journey.
>
> In this, Doran differs explicitly from Paul Ricoeur (cf. chapter three of *SP*). The symbol is a pre-linguistic reality in its elemental function; once it has appeared in a text, it is linguistic. But that arises from the subject. Isaiah gets the image from the level of elemental meaning.

The great Greek tragedies can be interpreted as reflecting precisely what was going forward in consciousness at that time. Consciousness was undergoing a major, epochal differentiation; this is reflected in the Oedipal and Orestes stories. You can do a full-scale interpretation of these stories as reflecting the consciousness of the people at that time, coming to expression in and through the self-possession of Sophocles and Aeschylus.

It is possible that a lot of the Scriptural images emerge from experiences that would be analogous to dreams: anagogic visions. That is clear in the book of Ezekiel, where the images are functions of visionary experiences. And Ezekiel is one of the primary instances of the transformation of cosmological symbolization under the soteriological.

Cf. Ezekiel 47.1-12, where the river coming out from the temple on all four sides, which is a mandala, a nature symbol, is transformed to mean the city under God ('the temple in the middle'); Ezekiel takes the mandala and transforms it to mean the restored Kingdom with God at the center.

> This is what Israel regularly did: took the Canaanite cosmological symbols and transformed them under the power of its religious experience.
>
> That is also what Jesus did in the parables: taking the symbols of the people and transforming them under the force of the message that he wanted to convey.

8 April 1987

In the previous lecture, we were talking about the **complementarity** between intentionality analysis and psychic analysis – especially between Lonergan's intentionality analysis and the psychology of Jung. Both are **analyses of interiority**.

A way of dealing with this that can lead into a discussion on hermeneutics is to call to mind Paul Ricoeur's statement (*Freud and Philosophy*) that what he wants to work out is a "**semantics of human desire**" – a comprehensive articulation of the structure and the process of human desire. Doran's insistence is that in such a 'semantics of human desire' the structure of intentionality has to figure; there has to be a clear articulation of intentionality, and it has to be distinct from the articulation of the psyche.

> To this point, depth psychology – with rare exceptions – has not been based on this; it has not been informed by a working out of the structure, process, and objectives of human intentionality.
>
> Human desire is **polymorphous** – as Freud himself insisted. One line within that polymorphous human desire is the line that is manifested in our questioning: our desire to understand, our desire to understand truly which occurs in judgment, and our desire to the good which is reached in decision. There are questions for understanding, judgment, and decision, and those questions are manifestations of one dimension of this polymorphous, many-faceted, many-formed reality of human desire. What Lonergan has to offer to such a "semantics of human desire" is the clear articulation of this process of human questioning; he has articulated the pure question of human consciousness for intelligibility, the truth, and the good.

> Doran tries to place the analysis of the psyche within the framework that is established by this order of questions, and to say that one can develop a depth psychology on the foundations of the articulation/clarification/differentiation of the pure question that consciousness is. There is an (almost metaphysical) option involved in this: that the meaning of the human person is most clearly disengaged if in fact one disengages our desire to the intelligible, the true, and the good. We will not cease questioning until that desire is satisfied in a way that demands no further questioning. From a theological point of view, there is a natural desire for the vision of God; that is determinative of this human desire that someone like Paul Ricoeur wants to understand.

This is important for addressing contemporary depth psychology. Carl Jung admitted the existence of the human spirit, and admitted that it is distinct from the psyche. He posited the human person as a triple compound of spirit, psyche, and organism (see "On the Nature of the Psyche," *CW* 8). But in that same paper, he also says that the human spirit is an "unknowable" Kantian noumenon (*ding an sich*); it cannot be known, but must be postulated as some kind of ideal or limit-concept that alone renders intelligible some of the things that can be known, namely, the phenomena that appear in the events of the human psyche. These phenomena that occur in the events/occurrences of the human psyche are what can be known (dreams, symbols, feelings, responses).

There is obviously a clear difference between Jung and Lonergan on this particular point. They both admit the existence of human spirit that is a quest for what goes beyond everything in this world. But Lonergan maintains that this can be **known**. It is not an unknowable *ding an sich* lying behind the phenomena; it can be understood truly. Its intelligible terms and relations can be worked out. The human spirit is known In the self-affirmation in which I maintain that I am a conscious unity/identity/whole that unfolds on the levels of experience, understanding, judgment, and decision. This self-affirmation is a knowing of the human spirit; it is not a 'postulating' of an unknowable *ding an sich* that lies behind the psychic phenomena of dreams, symbols, images, feelings, etc. Rather, there is a **judgment** that is made in which the human spirit is affirmed – and affirmation is knowing. The structure of human spirit is affirmed as having been grasped in a way that cannot be denied; it can be gone beyond and filled out, but it cannot be gone back on. That structure is human consciousness proceeding from experience through understanding, through judgment, to decision by the force of the desire that is the human question.

> There is great Complementarity between Jung's "On the Nature of the Human Psyche" and the fifteenth chapter of I; they both admit the existence of spirit in the constitution of the human person. The fundamental difference is that for Jung the spirit has to be postulated as the only condition for the possibility of the phenomena that happen in the psyche, whereas for Lonergan spirit can be known in the correct judgment of self-affirmation.
>
> Doran argues that from the correct judgment of the structure of human spirit, we can enter into a dialogue with depth psychology, and, where necessary, raise questions that can be faced if you know what this dimension of human desire is. There are questions about psychology that can be faced from the articulation of the self-transcendence of the human spirit.

This notion of the desires of the human spirit is quite significant for – and even determinative or – the meaning of the human person.

For Jung, the central archetypal symbol is the **mandala**: the perfectly found, quadripartite, perfectly integrated figure. It is a symbol of the self and a symbol of integration.



Doran argues that the mandala has to be relativized in Jungian thought. It is relativized if you say that it is a symbol of integration, and when the mandala symbol appears (e.g., in a person's dreams) it means integration and even gives integration, but insist that in addition to integration there is the operation that moves people beyond where they are at any given point in their integration. And the main operator in human development is the question. We do not stop at any plateau of integration – whether it be a plateau of sensitive integration, of full integration o the person (psyche and spirit). We d not stop there; there are the force of circumstance and new questions that arise to move us beyond any level of integration that we achieve. This will be true until 'we know as we are known.'

> In Doran's judgment, Jung over-absolutizes the significance of the mandala. This is obvious in a very late dream in Jung's own life where he really will not submit to the invitation to go beyond the mandala to the transcendent-beyond. In his autobiography, he relates this dream where he is called and invited to bow down in adoration of the highest presence that is through a doorway beyond this perfectly hermetically sealed mandala that he is in; that presence calls him to submit, and he will not do it. That indicates an absolutization of the integration as contrasted with the operation that moves us beyond.

Hermeneutics:

> From the outset, Doran has wanted to suggest certain categories that would enable some kind of dialogue with, at times reorientation of, and then incorporation of various human sciences into a systematic theology that would be a theology of history. Thus, he has addressed the various foundational questions in certain human sciences to see whether or not some categories can be derived from dialogue with those sciences, and at times from reorientation of those sciences, for a systematics that would be through-and-through a theology of history – so that all Christian doctrines would be interpreted in categories of history. Our attempt this semester has been to derive the general categories for a theory of history; those categories are the three dialectics (subject, culture, and community) and the scale of values, which determines how those dialectics are related to one another. We have talked about the sciences of society in the section of *AD* on social values and the dialectic of community; we have talked about sciences of culture in the section on cultural values and the dialectic of culture; and we have talked about sciences of the subject in the whole section on the psyche.
>
> These final considerations will deal with what the approach that is taken in *AD* would have to say about the science of hermeneutics.

Doran would begin a discussion of hermeneutics by appealing to Northrop Frye's insistence (*Anatomy of Criticism* [Princeton University Press, 1957], p. 118) that there is a **center to the order of words** and that center is **human desire**. In Doran' interpretation, this is a major point for Frye; he judges it to be the center of the *Anatomy of Criticism*. Frye, however, is a very subtle author, and he does not 'trumpet' this (any more than he 'trumpets' anything else!). Doran's judgment is that Frye's book cannot be understood without this conviction being understood as the central thesis. Doran agrees that the center of the order of words is human desire. This, of course, departs quite radically from the deconstructionist position.

If that is the case, then **the foundations of hermeneutics and of literary criticism will lie in the interpreter's differentiation of desire and in her/his cognitional, existential, and sensitive appropriation, of that differentiation**. Just as in theology the foundations lie in the self-appropriation of the theologian as a human subject, so too in interpretation the foundations of understanding what other people have said and done is the differentiation and appropriation of human desire. It is a matter of the differentiation and cognitional/existential/sensitive appropriation of one's differentiation of desire.

> The **cognitive** differentiation of human desire is the clarification of the structure of human desire. You can clarify the structure of human desire, e.g., by speaking of various 'levels,' by differentiating spirit and psyche, and so on; these would be instances of a cognitive appropriation – a clarification in clear and precise terms of what you think is the structure of human desire.
>
> > Thus, the way you will understand what someone else has written or said will depend in part on how you articulate, how you understand and judge the structure of human desire.
>
> But our appropriation of that human desire has to be more than cognitive; it has to be **existential**, as well. In Newman's terms, it has to be a real, and not just notional, apprehension and assent. And a 'real assent' means that you give yourself to the pursuit of the authentic structure of human desire, that you commit yourself to that. And part of the reason that this has to figure in the foundations of interpretation is that, in interpretation, you do not only want to understand, but eventually you also (in dialectic) want to evaluate what others have said/written/done. And the grounds for any evaluation will be your existential commitment to what you hold to be the structure of human desire.
>
> Thirdly, there is a **sensitive** appropriation, and this can be talked about in terms of what has been said in the last several lectures about the psyche; there is a sensitive appropriation of the differentiations of desire. Any new, particularly major differentiation of consciousness is a breakthrough on the part of the human subject to a new understanding of reality, of the world, or her-/himself, of whatever that differentiation might be. The breakthrough will always be a movement beyond the previous integrations which the person had achieved, and it takes time to move to a new integration. Differentiations of consciousness can be a highly upsetting affair, because you have been firmly fixed at a previous level of your integration; something new has happened, and you break beyond that firmly fixed integration. It takes time to move toward a new integration, because your sensitive habits have to catch up with the new breakthrough. Thus, the

sensitive appropriation is the development of new spontaneities to conform to the new differentiation of consciousness that one has undergone.

Thus: if it is true that the center of the order of words is human desire, then the foundations of that will lie in one's differentiation of human desire and one's cognitive, existential, and sensitive appropriation of that differentiation. That is, in fact, the foundation of any interpreter's performance in hermeneutics or literary criticism. If you read a work in literary criticism or interpretation, you will eventually get back to the questions of what you think the human person is – the human person whose desire is coming to expression in the text being interpreted. The questioning then will center on foundations, and the questioning will center on one's own differentiation of human desire and one's appropriation of that differentiation.

Essential contributions to a correct differentiation of desire – not the only contributions by any means, but still essential contributions – are offered by **Lonergan** in *I* and *MT*. These contributions lie precisely in the delineation he has offered of the desire to know and the desire for the good. These are essential contributions to a correct unpacking or differentiation of human desire.

The **desire to know** is a **notion of being**. Notice that the notion of being is central in chapter seventeen of I on hermeneutics. Remember that by 'notion' Lonergan does not mean concept or idea; he means a **vital, intelligent, rational anticipation**. When you raise questions you do so because you want to know what-is, and that wanting to know what-is is a vital, intelligent, rational anticipation of being. That, in fact, is why we raise questions – because we are a notion of being; we want to know what-is and we will not stop asking questions about any given issue until we reach a point at which the grasp of evidence is sufficient in a given case for passing judgment. Until we reach that point we continue to raise questions. So, we are a notion of being.

This is Lonergan's appropriation of Aquinas: the desire to know as the natural desire for the vision of God.

We are also a **notion of the good**, a notion of value. We continue to raise questions for deliberation, and we continue to criticize every instance of the good in this world, because we are a notion for unqualified good. We will not be satisfied until we have reached unqualified good.

This is Lonergan's appropriation of Augustine: the heart is restless until it rests in God.

We are this vital, intelligent, rational, responsible, existential anticipation of being, of the good, and finally of Transcendent Mystery. We are a vital, intelligent, reasonable, existential, and potentially loving anticipation of the Transcendent Absolute Mystery that is God.

Doran proposes (with Lonergan in chapter seventeen of *I*) that the results of methodical interpretation of any text will express the material interpreted as a particular differentiation of the notion of being, or of value, or of Transcendent Mystery. The material being interpreted will be understood by attributing to the one who wrote the material a particular differentiation of the notion of being, the notion of value, of the notion of Transcendent Mystery, or some combination of those three. This is the major statement

that Lonergan is making in chapter seventeen of *I*. He is making it there with regard to the notion of being; at the time of writing *I*, Lonergan did not have a differentiated notion of value. The major statement he is making in that chapter is that the result of a methodical interpretation of a text will be to attribute to the one expressing her-/himself in that text a particular differentiation of the desire for being that is the notion of being, i.e., the vital anticipation of being. Doran would add to that, in light of Lonergan's own later development, the notion of value and the notion of Transcendent Mystery.

You could go further and say this: the results of methodical interpretation will express an understanding of the text as indicating a particular cognitive, existential, or sensitive appropriation of these differentiations of the notions of being, of value, of God. In other words, in every text, there is an **intentionality** that is expressing itself. L And that intentionality is the center of the order of words in the text. So that if one, as an interpreter, has a differentiated understanding of what human intentionality is, then what you will be doing as you interpret the text is that you will be understanding the text as expressing some particular differentiation of human intentionality that has come to expression in the text.

> This is not a matter of getting at what the author 'intended' in the narrow sense of that term, i.e., as a conscious and deliberate intention. The interpreter is not getting at the author sitting down and saying 'this is what I mean' of 'this is what I want to say.' It is not the 'intentionalist fallacy.' You cannot reconstruct the author's process, by which s/he comes 9through decision, etc.) to say whatever s/he says.
>
> Rather, the sense of intentionality as subject meaning object. What you can 'get at' is a subject-object complex: intentionality meaning 'this.' That can be derived from an understanding of the text, if one has a worked-out notion of intentionality.

When Lonergan is offering this position in chapter seventeen of *I*, he is offering it as the basis for interpreting philosophical texts. The central question of that chapter is: 'How am I to understand the plurality, diversity, and at times contrariety/conflict of philosophers?' his whole point is that the entire history of philosophy, interpreted in a fair way, can be a series of contributions to a single but complex goal, *viz*., our understanding of the polymorphism of human consciousness. You can interpret the entire set of texts in the philosophical tradition as contributions to the single goal of our understanding of human consciousness as polymorphous desire. But the basis for being able to do this is having worked out for oneself a differentiated structure of what that desire is. L If you have that worked out, you will be able to understand the philosophical text as a subject-object complex, as intentionality meaning certain objects.

"Meaning" – The words in the text are 'outer words:' words that are written or spoken. The outer word **means** the inner word of the subject; it means what one has understood or affirmed. There is an inner word expressing conceptualization of what one has understood, and an inner word of judgment expressing one's affirmation. The inner word **means** the object understood and affirmed. (Cf. *Verbum*). These are basic foundations for what Lonergan said and for what Doran is saying. If you do not accept that we can talk about an inner word, then you cannot agree with Doran's position, which insists that an

outer (spoken or written) word means what one has understood or affirmed (inner word); the inner word means the object understood or affirmed.

> The outer word **intends** the inner word, and the inner word **intends** the object.

The question emerges as to whether this position is suitable for interpreting other kinds of texts beyond philosophical texts, which is what Lonergan is talking about in chapter seventeen of *I*. Is it suitable, e.g., for reading Scripture, literature, drama, poetry?

Doran suggests that what has been said about **psychic conversion** helps to apply this hermeneutic theory to literary and Imaginal discourse.

> Cf. Doran, "Self-Knowledge and the Interpretation of Imaginal Expression." *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 4 (1986), pp. 55-84.

Philosophical discourse explicitly aims at going beyond the Imaginal; Plato, e.g., has his myths, but his myths are to express something other than what is related in the myth. The myth of the cave is meant in philosophy, the images are used to get beyond the imagination. But that is not the case in literature in general, and it is certainly not the case in our Scriptures.

But if Doran's position on psychic conversion has any validity, perhaps it will help us to take a theory of interpretation such as Lonergan's and use it for the interpretation of Imaginal texts: discourse in the area of symbols and images.

> If the symbol is understood in relationship to the unfolding of human consciousness as question intending the intelligible, the true, the good, and Transcendent Mystery, then symbol will express some sensitive/psychic differentiation of the pure question.
>
> The symbol in literature (and thus in Scripture) will express some sensitive appropriation on the part of the one whose intentionality is expressing itself of a differentiation of anticipation of being, the good, and/or God.
>
> The Scriptural images, e.g., at the end of the book of Revelation (see Doran's paper from the Concordia hermeneutics Conference) are transposed cosmological symbols (e.g., the city – the heavenly Jerusalem coming down from God in the form of a mandala; the river of life that gives life to every creature in the city; the trees), and transposed symbols of history (e.g., there will be no more weeping or mourning, and the former things have passed away). Those symbols are an expression of a sensitive appropriation of a differentiation of the desire for God, as that desire for God has been met and realized in the revelation of God in Jesus Christ.

The various methods of criticism (form, redaction, historical, literary, structural, etc.) can be placed in this framework, in terms of Ricoeur's triad of understanding ⟶ explanation ⟶ understanding.

> The initial understanding is a hypothetical grasp of intentionality meaning object expressed in a text. Then one moves to a test of the hypothesis: how in the light of what we know about the

circumstances under which a text was produced would that kind of expression of human desire be expressed? This is the moment of explanation.

But then what you have set out to understand is intentionality meaning something and expressing that meaning in the outer word that is the text; that is the objective. So, one moves through the various forms of criticism with the objective of arriving at an understanding of the intentionality expressed in the text.

You begin with a hypothesis of what the desire/intentionality is and what that intentionality means in this particular text. You move through the various techniques of exegesis to test the hypothesis: how would that kind of differentiation and appropriation be expressed in the circumstances in which the text was produced? You move through those techniques to an understanding of intentionality expressing itself as meaning objects of 'this' kind in 'this' text.

All of this depends on the position of Lonergan in *Verbum* that the outer word does mean the inner word, and the inner word is at least twofold (and in his later work threefold): the inner word of understanding, the inner word of judgment of fact, and the inner word of judgment of value. Those inner words intend an object.

In understanding, the inner word intends an object that may or may not be distinct from the intentionality of the subject. In judgment, it intends an object that is affirmed to be independent of the subject.

If you do not accept this relationship of outer word to inner word, and of inner word to object, then this whole position will not be acceptable.

There is the possibility of one's results in interpretation being **explanatory**. This possibility is achieved if, in fact, you can relate what you have interpreted to be the subject-object complex in one expression to the subject-object complexes in other expressions. Explanatory understanding is always in terms of relating things of relating things to one another. You can understand the intentionality-meaning-world in one text and relate that to intentionality-meaning-world in others. If you are able to set up that kind of understanding of genetically and dialectically related expressions, then you can arrive at an explanatory understanding of the texts that you are studying.

This is similar to what has been said earlier about a subject being able to understand one dream in relation to others. If you have that kind of understanding of the history of your own dreaming (and the transformations of the symbols that have occurred) you have an explanatory understanding.

There is a basic example of this in the differentiation that occurs in Plato and Aristotle of a second level from a first level of consciousness; in Aquinas, of a third level from second and first levels; and in Kierkegaard, of a fourth level from third and second and first levels. That would be an example of relating things to one another that would give you an explanatory understanding.

Doran's fundamental interest concerning hermeneutics is a statement of the **objective** of interpretation, and the foundations of moving toward that objective. The total objective would be a grasp of the

polymorphism of human desire in the world; you are moving toward that through an interpretation of the expressions that have been made in the course of human history. The single but complex goal of interpretation – whether it be philosophical or literary or religious texts – will be the understanding of the intentionality of human desire.

In terms of contemporary discussions of the 'world behind the text' and the 'world in-front-of the text,' Doran grants that the 'world in-front-of the text' is the most important thing; he does not, however, understand this to be a function of interpretation as he is speaking of it. This comes from his understanding of the functional specialties; he does not, in other words, want to collapse everything into interpretation.



> Interpretation as a functional specialty is understood in a very narrow sense; it is simply understanding the intentionality that is expressing itself in this particular body of expressions. You move toward "application" (Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 274-305) of that through the other functional specialties. Doran does not in any way deny the importance of application; but greater clarity into the 'how' of application seems to be gained by differentiating the various functional specialties. He puts application in the process that moves through evaluation in dialectic, into the decisions as to what you are going to accept out of that evaluation and how you are going to apply it; those are second phase steps, where you affirm, understand, and apply your own positions to a given set of present historical circumstances.
>
> All the moments that Gadamer mentions in terms of application fit in here, but they are not all put in interpretation.

Correct interpretations are incremental advances in understanding polymorphic human desire as that desire means and constructs the world.

> This notion of 'incremental advance' places Lonergan in distinction from any Hegelian notion of the mediation of totality. Doran argues that chapter seventeen of *I* should be interpreted against the background of Hegel (who is mentioned in the first and last sentences of that chapter).
>
> What Lonergan means by "universal viewpoint" is never more than a **potential** totality of genetically and dialectically related viewpoints. It will never be more than that for us under the circumstances of the finitude of our knowledge of everything. What renders it 'universal' is the fact that there is a structure of human consciousness that is found everywhere; wherever there are human beings they experience, understand, judge, and decide, and they do it either authentically or inauthentically, and they either do it in this particular order or they violate that order.

Symbols (e.g., dreams) are to be interpreted in this way – as well as texts. Symbols are expressions of desire, or intentionality-meaning-world.